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Abstract
This is an intellectual biography of Hans Morgenthau. Morgenthau was a 
German Jew who, in fleeing Nazi Germany, emigrated to the United States in 
the mid-1930s. He subsequently came to have an important impact upon the 
nascent discipline of International Relations in the United States in the 
immediate post-war period. His book Politics Among Nations was the first 
major textbook to be used in International Relations w ithin American 
universities and through a number of editions it came to sell something like 
half a million copies. Morgenthau was also active as a public commentator on 
international politics and, in particular, American foreign policy and he 
became a prominent opponent of the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early 
1970s. The central claim of this thesis is that M orgenthau's intellectual 
contributions and political activities can only be properly understood when 
set in the broader intellectual and political contexts both of Germany where 
he was educated and the United States where he spent the second half of his 
life.
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Introduction
’T he trouble with Morgenthau”, says one capital critic, ”is that he is so 
totally predictable. He is a doctrinaire liberal w ith a rather hard-nose 
attitude which doesn’t fool anybody. He is a surface cynic, [sic] nine times 
out of ten you’ll find a frustrated idealist. That’s Hans Morgenthau, a 
frustrated idealist who was shocked by a glim pse of the real world.” 
(Newsweek Report, January 14,1963)
”Do I contradict myself? Very w ell, I contradict myself. I am rich. I contain 
multitudes.” (Walt Whitman)
The past fifty years has witnessed a massive global expansion of higher 
education that, in addition to the traditional areas of enquiry in the 
humanities and social sciences, has brought new subjects to the fore. One of 
the most prom inent of relatively recent entrants has been the discipline of 
International Relations.^ The first chair was established at the University of 
Aberystwyth in 1919 but it was not until the end of the Second World War 
that International Relations began to expand dramatically as a subject 
formally separate from politics, history and law. It is now a ubiquitous feature 
of the intellectual profiles of universities throughout the anglophone world 
and, increasingly, around the globe.
Initially, of course, those coimected with the new subject were mostly 
interested in pursuing the immediate problems of international politics and 
asking whether theoretical and philosophical perspectives could be brought 
to the problems of war and peace. Was humanity weighted with the burden 
of an anthropological disposition towards violence? Was war, instead, the
 ^ W hen capitalised 'International Relations' or 'International Politics' refers to the discipline  
itself rather than the object of enquiry.
inevitable by-product of an 'anarchical' system of states with 'no common 
power' to establish and enforce a rule of law? Could different institutional 
arrangements, in the form of the United Nations or otherwise, mitigate the 
seemingly ubiquitous manifestation of war? W ould sociological changes 
brought about by the global spread of capitalism and free markets make a 
difference?
It has only been in comparatively recent times that thought has turned 
to the history of this young subject itself, and of its earliest representatives in 
the form of men like EH Carr and Hans M orgenthau. One response to 
International Relations had been to emphasise that, while the discipline may 
be relatively young in an institutional sense, there is nothing new at all about 
its subject matter. The problems of war and peace, of political violence, of 
political economy, are age-old and perennial. There is, correspondingly, an 
immense literature stretching back thousands of years which grapples with 
essentially the same dilemmas - from Thucydides and Augustine through 
Hobbes and Machiavelli to the twentieth century. As Robert Gilpin once put 
it, "everything - well, almost everything - that the new realists find intriguing 
in the interaction of international economics and politics can be found in the 
History of the Peloponnesian War."^
This sort of position can also be found more broadly in political 
science and intellectual history. In his History of Political Science from Plato to 
the Present, Robert Murray asserted that there was not "a single controversy of 
our day w ithout a pedigree stretching into the distant ages."^ It followed, 
then, that the ideas of the great political thinkers had a topicality and a 
resonance which was universal. If Robert Jervis had thought that he was first 
to address the problem of the 'security dilemma', or had Hans Morgenthau
2 Robert Gilpin, 'The richness of the tradition of political realism'. International Organisation, 
Vol.38, No.2, Spring 1984, p.293.
 ^ Murray quoted in James Farr, 'The History of Political Science', American Journal of Political 
Science, Vol.32, No.4, Novem ber 1988, p .175.
imagined that there was something novel in his explorations of the balance- 
of-power, they would both have been mistaken: Thucydides had witnessed 
both phenomena and reported so in his History of the Peloponnesian Wars. 
Students of politics and history could, therefore, prosper from the study of the 
’canon’ of great texts from 'Plato to Nato', whether or not they were familiar 
with the contexts these great works were drawn from. One need not know 
anything of the rivalry between Sparta and Athens in order to grasp that 
Thucydides was reporting upon universal dilemmas. A knowledge of the 
history of the Italian city-states and of the rhetoric of renaissance humanism 
was not required in order to be able to appreciate Machiavelli's The Prince. 
Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan was, manifestly, concerned with the age-old 
problem of political order: one needed to know little of the English Civil War, 
or of the linguistic and religious conventions of Hobbes' time in order to be 
able to understand it.
D uring the 1970s, however, this universalist m ethodology was 
challenged by what has been called "a neo-contextualist and neo-historicist 
approach" to the history of ideas, which was employed by historians like JGA 
Pocock and Quentin S k i n n e r . 4 Their main point was that the text was never a 
self-sufficient resource. In order to be able to reach a proper understanding of 
a text two things were required, firstly a general investigation of the 
prevailing social, economic, and political conditions and, secondly, an 
awareness of the specific linguistic context in which a book was being 
written.^
Skinner has pointed to some of the problems inherent in an approach 
to the history of ideas based on the autonomy of the text. One danger is that 
on the basis of tenuous or even chance similarities authors are linked to a
 ^John G. Gunnell, 'The Historiography of American Political Science', in David Easton, Jolin 
Gunnell and Luigi Graziono (eds.). The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey 
(Routledge, London, 1991).
 ^ John Patrick D iggin s, T h e Oyster and the Pearl': The Problem  of C ontextualism  in 
Intellectual H istory’, History and Theory, Vol. XXIII, 1984, pp. 151-154.
subject in an absurdly anachronistic fashion.^ Examples of historical 
malapropisms are legion. Adam Smith, with invisible hand intact but theory 
of moral sentim ents detached, becomes a card-carrying Thatcherite.^ 
M ontesquieu is lauded for allegedly "anticipating the ideas of full 
employment and the Welfare State." At the hands of Karl Popper, Plato's 
views in The Republic are equated w ith those of "a totalitarian party  
politician."^ From here it is but a short step to the apportionment of 'blame': 
Nietzche (or Wagner) for Flitler; Marx for Stalin or even, less dramatically, 
Machiavelli for Morgenthau.
A study unattuned to context may also miss im portant linguistic 
subtleties. Just to take one example - Benjamin Franklin's use of the word 
'empire' in the late 18th century at a time when it referred to little more than a 
given area of land; it was not until the late nineteenth century that it came to 
acquire its contemporary meaning. Reading the nineteenth century meaning 
back to Franklin's time has been a source of historical misunderstanding. We 
may also tend to underestimate how different an idea can appear when 
placed in its original historical setting. Charles Taylor provides an amusing 
example of this:
"One has an ironic sense of how things have changed, when one reads 
Descartes advising his readers to ponder the meditations seriously, and even 
to spend a month thinking about the first one, so difficult did it seem to him 
to break the previous m ind-set and grasp the dualist truth. Today, 
philosophers of my persuasion spend years trying to get students (and 
decades trying to get colleagues) to see that there is an alternative. Cartesian 
dualism is immediately understandable to undergraduates on day one."^
^Quentin Skinner, 'M eaning and Understanding in the H istory of Ideas', in J. T ally  (ed.). 
Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his critics (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988) p.32.
 ^Paul Ormerod, The Death of Economics (Faber and Faber, London, 1994) p .l2 .
 ^Popper quoted in Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding', p.44.
 ^ Charles Taylor, 'Philosophy and its History', in Richard Rorty, JB Schneewind and Quentin  
Skinner (eds). Philosophy in History (Cambridge University Press, 1984) p.21.
A third problem identified by Skinner is what he refers to as 'the 
mythology of c o h e re n c e 'W h e re  interpreters give themselves the task of 
situating a particular author within a 'canon' of literature there is a strong 
built-in temptation to side-step important contradictions and inconsistencies 
which would otherwise make the subject's taxonomy more problematic. A 
substantial portion of an author's work may simply be set aside as 
'unreflective' or 'polemical'. At worst a thinker may become so thoroughly de- 
contextualised as to become little more than "ventriloquist's dummies" at the 
hands of their controllers.^^ The 'myth of coherence' will also tend to obscure, 
in a deeply counter-intuitive way, the simple fact that thinkers will probably 
change their positions over time. We need only think of our own lives and 
how our ideas have changed in order to appreciate that this must often be so 
with those we study. Why should it be the case that only the greatest thinkers 
were also monomaniacs?
This neo-historicism is not, of course, without problems itself. The 
most obvious of these is that it may lead us to a deep scepticism about the 
possibility of any kind of historical enquiry concerned with recapturing the 
'real' essence of a thinker or period. Following Collingwood and Gadamer all 
historical explication is necessarily refracted through minds which cannot be 
freed from contemporary influences and patterns of thought. "True historical 
thinking", according to G adam er, "m ust take account of its own 
h i s t o r i c a l i t y . " i 2  T J i j g  is, undoubtedly, a serious epistemological question 
which could be given a thesis length treatment on its own. In effect, though, 
Skinner and Gadamer are agreed in so far as they are aware that there is.
Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding’, p.38.
This phrase com es from M ichael Donelan quoted in Ken Booth, 'Dare not to Know: IR 
Theory Vs the Future', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.). International Relations Theory 
Today (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995) p.333.
Gadamer quoted in John G. Gunnell, Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (Winthrop 
Publishers, Cambridge, Mass, 1979) p .112.
indeed, a problem to be reckoned with: an awareness that has been sadly 
absent until comparatively recent times in International Relations.
In Skimierian terms a lack of contextual sensitivity has been an all too 
familiar feature of the literature of International Relations. A 'canon' of 
political realism will be constructed by, say, linking Thucydides (two pages of 
The Peloponnesian Wars); Machiavelli (the notorious sections from The Prince); 
Hobbes (a chapter from Leviathan); and so on to EH Carr and Morgenthau, 
with perhaps a sprinkling of Augustine and Weber's definition of the state for 
more sophisticated types. I should stress that I do not wish to suggest that, for 
example, a Renaissance humanist like Machiavelli cannot 'speak' to a political 
realist of the nuclear age. I accept the possibility of creating what Richard 
Rorty referred to as "rational bridgeheads" which permit "conversation" 
across "ch a sm s" .N o r am I necessarily rejecting the existence of perennial 
'questions' even if the 'answers' to such questions are attempted in radically 
different contexts. However, it does seem to me that to construct a realist 
'canon' which stretches across vast spatio-temporal distance must at least raise 
important intellectual problems which are often not even considered let alone 
engaged with. 14
This lack of contextual sensitivity has hindered our efforts to reach a 
proper understanding of many of the discipline's most important thinkers. 
The desire to situate a writer within a broader 'canon', and more specifically 
within a contemporary 'school' of thought, so that he or she can be paired off 
against the representatives of other 'schools' (paradigms') has often led to 
writers being reduced to mere caricatures, the flimsiest of straw-men, and 
Hans Morgenthau has been as badly treated as anyone in this respect.
1  ^Richard Rorty, 'Introduction', Philosophy in History, p.5.
14 For an exploration of the problem s raised by the discipline's historical treatm ent of 
Thucidydes see James Der Derian, 'A Reinterpretation of Realism: G enealogy, Sem iology, 
Drom ology', in Frances A. Beer and Robert Hariman (eds), Post-Realism: the rhetorical turn in 
international relations (Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 1996). For an alternative 
reading of M achiavelli see Rob Walker, Inside/Outside: international relations as political theory 
(Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp.34-49.
7Morgenthau will, of course, be familiar to almost anyone with even a 
passing acquaintance with the history of International Relations since World 
War Two. An emigre Jew who came to the United States in the late 1930s, 
Morgenthau went on to lecture in international politics at the University of 
Chicago. His Politics Among Nations was one of the subject's first textbooks 
and it went on to sell something like half a million copies through its various 
editions. Few reading lists in International Relations courses in the 
anglophone world, at least until, say, the mid-1970s would have failed to 
mention Politics Among Nations. In recent decades, however, his reputation 
has been much diminished, particularly in certain fashionable circles where 
he has come to be a treated as little more than a figure to be mocked. He is 
often used as a straw-man to be swept aside by those w ith their own, 
sometimes eccentric, agendas.^5
This development has, I think, been grossly short-sighted. For one 
thing, and this is not w idely appreciated in International Relations, 
Morgenthau's was a life of extraordinary richness. As a young Jew in pre and 
post World War One Germany he felt the impact of anti-Semitism first hand 
and observed, w ith dismay. H itler's rise to power. Intellectually, he 
participated in the pre-World War Two discussion surrounding the efficacy 
of international law and the League of Nations in addition to absorbing the 
works of writers of great importance in the twentieth century. He fled 
Germany in the early 1930s for Switzerland and then Spain only to find 
himself in the middle of the Spanish Civil War. He arrived in America at 
precisely the moment in which it had risen to the status of the pre-eminent 
global power and this enabled him to take part in the debates as to what the
For especially crude caricatures see Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society (Verso, 
London, 1994) p.lO; 'What's the Matter w ith  realism?', Revieiv of International Studies, Vol.16, 
1990, p p .285-303; M artin Grilliths,Realism , Idealism and International Po/zh'cs(Routledge, 
London, 1992); Hans-Karl Fichier, 'The godfathers of 'truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in 
M orgenthau’s theory of pow er politics', Revieiv of International Studies, Vol.24, 1998, p p .185- 
200.
appropriate course for American foreign policy should be. Following Max 
Weber, he also brought with him to America the belief that it was the duty of 
the intellectual to participate in the political sphere, to speak 'truth to power'. 
In this capacity he was heavily involved in one of the gravest crises to affect 
the United States in the post-World War Two period, namely the calamitous 
intervention in Vietnam which he had opposed from the beginning. In short, 
he was connected in some way with many of the momentous events and the 
crises of his troubled century. We are in need of a full-length biographical 
treatment of this extraordinary life, but I hope for the moment that this what 
is, in effect, intellectual biography will at least provide some insights into a 
fascinating life.
There were, undeniably, deep-rooted intellectual problems which his 
many critics have been only too eager to draw our attention to. As we shall 
see, his many publications were riven with antinomies, intellectual cross­
currents, and dialectics which failed to find their synthesis. In this, too, he was 
very much a man of his time - inspired by the works and imbued with the 
values of Immanuel Kant and of nineteenth century German idealism but 
forced to try and reconcile them with the harsh realities of the political life of 
the twentieth century. Far from being the crude advocate of power politics 
that many of his caricaturists would have us recognise, he was a man of deep 
ethical instincts and it was precisely his desire to illuminate a moral path for 
hum anity - under the shadow of the Holocaust and the development of 
weapons with the capacity to extinguish life altogether - that gave rise to the 
pathos and the tensions and contradictions in his work.
My hope here is that a properly contextual study will at least enable 
us to reach a better understanding of Morgenthau. I should stress that my aim 
is not to explain away inconsistencies or to bury contradictions. 6^ Studies
A s Charles Taylor has put it: "A satisfactory explanation m ust also make sense of the 
agents. This is not to say, of course, that it m ust show  their action as making sense. For it very 
often does not. Frequently they are confused, malinform ed, contradictory in their goals and
which bend an author to fit a particular thesis or to squeeze him or her into a 
suitably identified pigeon-hole are undoubtedly easier to write but they often 
leave us with mere shadows of their subjects, desiccated husks drained of 
their humanity. I can only hope that I have been able to capture at least an 
essence of the complexity of Morgenthau and of the richness of his life. I don't 
w ish to imply, however, that nothing worthwhile has been w ritten on 
M orgenthau to date. I should like to forego, if I may, the PhD candidates 
customarily defensive vilification of the existing works in his or her area of 
interest. Much of the secondary literature pertaining to Morgenthau is given a 
close scrutiny in the chapters proper and I don't intend to repeat the analysis 
here, but I would like, in passing, to draw the reader's attention to the best of 
what is currently available.
An essential starting point for anyone with an interest in Morgenthau 
is the collection of essays written to mark his death. Many of the contributors 
were drawn from the closest of Morgenthau's colleagues and former students 
and most of the problems that I explore in detail in this dissertation are noted 
there, however briefly.^^Stanley Hoffmann, too, understands the fundamental 
problems concerning Morgenthau though he's never written more than a few 
pages on the subject in any given context.^s Niels Am strup's article on 
Morgenthau's early intellectual development was written as long as twenty 
years ago and nothing written subsequently has improved upon it.49 Jaap 
Nobel has written a good article which attempts to trace the twists and turns 
of Morgenthau's analysis of American foreign policy over the course of the
actions. But in identifying the contradictions, confusions etc zve make sense of what they did. 
And that m eans that w e come to see how  as agents ie beings w ho act, have purposes, desires - 
they com e to do what they did, and to bring about w hat beiell."Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp .116-117.
47 Robert M yers and Kenneth Thom pson (eds), Ti'uth and Tragedy (Transaction Books, N ew  
York, 1984).
4^  The bibliographical details of Hoffman's works can be found later inthe dissertation.
49 N ie ls  A m strup, 'The 'Early Morgenthau': A  C om m ent on the Intellectual O rigins of 
Realism', Cooperation and Conflict, V o l.l3 ,1978, pp.163-175.
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Cold W a r . 2 0  In terms of the general context, intellectual and otherwise, 
Michael Joseph Smith's Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (mercifully not 
Thucidydes to Kissinger), and Joel Rosenthal's Righteous Realists: political 
realism, responsible power, and American culture in the nuclear age are both 
excellent.24 The concerns of Rosenthal, in particular, parallel many of those I 
explore here. Despite, or perhaps because, of not being addressed specifically 
to a treatment of political realism in International Relations, Rob Walker's 
contextually alive sections on the subject in his Inside/Outside: international 
relations as political theory, are the most illuminating to be found a n y w h e r e . 2 2
There is no shortage of general works dealing with political realism 
and international relations theory with insights to offer about Morgenthau, 
but there is a dearth of full-length works devoted to him specifically. Aside 
from the collection of essays mentioned earlier, the only English language 
book given over to Morgenthau entirely is Greg Russell's Hans J. Morgenthau 
and the Ethics of Statecraft which is too deeply flawed in conception to be 
generally r e c o m m e n d a b l e . 2 3  In his in troduction  Russell refers to 
M orgenthau's "theory and philosophy of American r e a l i s m . " 2 4  He later 
suggests that the 'six principles of political realism' outlined in Morgenthau's 
Politics Among Nations specify the "content and boundaries of an American 
philosophy of power p o l i t i c s . " 2 5  The second chapter is given the title 'Roots of 
an American thinker' (emphases added). This is absurdly parochial. For one 
thing if there is an authentically American brand of realism it is, surely, the 
neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz and his followers rather than Morgenthau's
20 Jaap N obel, 'Morgenthau's Struggle w ith Power: the theory of power politics and the Cold 
War', Review of International Studies, V o l.21 ,1995, pp.61-85.
24 M ichael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Louisana State University  
Press, Baton Rouge, 1986); Joel Rosenthal, Righteous Realists: political realism, responsible pow er , 
a7td American culture in the nuclear age (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1991).
22 Rob Walker, Inside/Outside: international relations as political theory (Cambridge University  
Press, 1993).
23 Greg Russell, Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft (Louisiana State 
University Press, Baton Rouge, 1990).
24 ibid. p .l.
23 ibid. p.59.
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version. Nor can Morgenthau be claimed for Team America in the way that 
Russell attempts to. He hardly seems to register the fact that Morgenthau was 
thirty-seven years old when he came to the United States, the bearer of a rich 
intellectual heritage and fully developed in his own right. Russell's chapter on 
'The Continental Heritage' begins w ith Thucidydes and works its way 
through the familiar rogues gallery of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Richelieu et al but 
at no point does Russell actually attempt to inform us, specifically, what the 
intellectual links might be with Morgenthau, and he has little to say about 
thinkers who were of direct relevance - Nietzche, Schmitt, Mannheim, 
W e b e r .26 Russell's is precisely the kind of flawed intellectual genealogy that 
neo-contextualists like Skinner have been drawing our attention to. Russell, 
correctly sensing Morgenthau's deep ethical instincts, wishes to separate him 
from what he sees as an amoral continental tradition of raison d'état but he 
wrongly assumes that Morgenthau must have found his ethics in the United 
States. They were, in fact, drawn from the heritage of German idealism and, in 
a somewhat different form, from the theory and practice of Max Weber. 
Russell's failure to appreciate this seriously compromises his study from the 
beginning.
Aside from Russell, an unusual recent take on Morgenthau has been 
provided by A1 M u r r a y .27 Murray, too, wants to link Morgenthau with an 
intellectual 'canon' - but not the usual one of realpoUtik. M urray instead 
suggests that Morgenthau is best viewed as part of a Judeo-Christian moral 
tradition as refracted through St Augustine and his twentieth century 
follower Reinhold Niebuhr. The attraction of Augustine for Morgenthau, 
M urray claims, lies in the formers attempt to reconcile a transcendental 
Christian morality with a 'realistic' acceptance of the conditions of temporal
26 ibid. pp.10-55.
27 A1 Murray, 'The moral politics of Hans J. M orgenthau', Reviezu of Politics, Vol.58, N o .l ,  
Winter 1996,pp.81-108;Recottsfructm^ Realism: A Reinterpretation,Rearticiilatmi, and Réévaluation 
of the Theory of Political Realism (Phd Dissertation, Department of Politics, University of Bristol, 
1996).
12
life; in Augustine's case the collapse of the Roman Empire. Given that Christ's 
second coming may not be imminent, Christians have a duty to engage in 
temporal affairs rather than retreating to a position of stoic withdrawal and 
abandonment of the polis to the reprobate. The political sphere is, of course, 
corrupted by the lust for power, an arena in which fallen man's worst instincts 
are given the freest reign. Hence, morally pure acts are impossible. Christians 
must wrestle with the moral antinomy of The City of Man and The City of 
God "... and hope that their virtue will attain them forgiveness for their
sins."28
M urray points specifically to two features of the Augustinian 
framework common to Morgenthau; firstly a similar conception of the essence 
of hum an nature and, secondly, a similar dialectical understanding of the 
relationship between political necessity and moral transcendence and a 
concomitant commitment to political engagement in spite of the moral 
hazards of so doing.29 This Judeo-Christian framework is then made 
operational through the introduction of Burkean and Weberian elements, in 
particular the consequentialism of Weber's 'Ethics of Responsibility'.30 All of 
this leaves us with "a non-perfectionist Judeo-Christian ethics."34 Suitably re­
equipped with this re-jigged intellectual genealogy we are now able to reach, 
as Murray immodestly puts it, " ... a global understanding of Morgenthau's 
project. Situating him within this Judeo-Christian context offers the final piece 
of the jigsaw which allows us to understand the whole picture."32
In spite of a superficial plausibility the problem, once again, is that the 
author has m isjudged the appropriate context for M orgenthau. In the 
introduction to his dissertation, Murray claims that he draws "heavily upon
28 This is a sum m ary of M urray’s argum ent in 'The Moral Politics of H ans M orgenthau', 
pp.88-89.
^9 ibid. p.88.
30 Murray, Reconstructing Realism, pp .150-160; 'Moral Politics', pp.99-100.
34 Murray, 'Moral Politics’, p. 105.
32 ibid, p .106.
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the contextualist approach developed by Quentin Skinner" but he then goes 
on to do precisely what Skinner says should not be done, that is, to place an 
author in an intellectual 'canon' stretching across vast lengths of time.33 The 
specific problem with situating Morgenthau in this Judeo-Christian context, 
and it does seem extraordinary that this needs to be pointed out, is that 
M orgenthau was not a theist!34The fundam ental anchor, surely, of an 
Augustinian moral framework is a belief in god and the hereafter.35 A god­
less Augustinianism - a City of Man without a City of God - is surely 
something altogether different. If a City of Man is all there is its politics 
assume a gravity which moves them beyond any Judeo-Christian conception. 
And given the dangers posed by the combination of virulent nationalism in 
combination with the availability of weapons of unprecedented destructive 
capacity, the politics of the mid-twentieth century were very grave indeed.
A brief comparison with two authentic Christian realists will help to 
illuminate the point being made here. It has, for example, been said of Herbert 
Butterfield that "there was a sense in which Butterfield’s transcendent 
loyalties made him unable ultimately to take politics too seriously."36 
Reinhold Niebuhr, at the end of a discussion of the threats of 'atomic 
annihilation' or 'universal tyranny' concluded that "if such a day should come 
we will remember than the mystery of God's sovereignty and mercy 
transcends the fate of empires and civilisations."37 No similar passage is to be
33 Murray, 'Reconstructing Realism', p.27.
34 H e also w rote on a num ber of occasions that Christian ethics w ere irreconcilable w ith  
successful political action. See, for example, 'The Dem ands of Prudence', World Viezu, Vol.3, 
N o .6, June 1960, p .6; 'The influence of Reinhold N iebuhr in Am erican Political Life and 
Thought', in  H .Landon (ed.), Remhold Niebuhr: a Prophetic Voice in Our Time (Books for 
Libraries Press, N ew  York, 1962).
33%n truth, Murray is actually aware that the value of a conception of ethics based around 
Judeo-Christian theology m ust be highly questionable in a more secular age. {Reconstructmg 
Realism, p .191.) Later in the dissertation, having painstakingly reconstructed his Augustinian  
fram ework he then backs away from it by inserting a Rortian-style pragm atics - a deeply  
unsatisying sleight of hand.
36 Alberto R. Coll, The Wisdon O f Statecraft (Duke University Press, Durham, 1985,p. 11.
37 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (Faber and Faber, London, 1953) 
pp.112-113.
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found anywhere in Morgenthau's vast opus precisely because, faced with the 
possibility of nuclear annihilation, he cannot turn his face away from the City 
of Man. This is also why politics assumes a genuinely tragic dimension for 
Morgenthau in the way that it does not for Christian thinkers. As Niebuhr has 
put it, "... a purely tragic view of life is not finally viable, it is, at any rate, not 
the Christian view."38That. Christianity is profoundly anti-tragic seems 
obvious enough to a non-believer like George Steiner too.39 Like that of many 
others, Murray's portrait of Morgenthau is too neat and well-rounded, shorn 
of its pathos and modernist angst.
There is, then, a case to be made for a full-length treatm ent of 
Morgentliau which does not seek to evade the problems and contradictions 
that were the product of his rich and divided intellectual heritage and of a life 
spent in the political sphere. The first stage of a remapped intellectual 
genealogy for Morgenthau lies in a thorough exploration of the German 
context, historical and intellectual. The failure of German liberalism and the 
Romantic reaction against the Enlightenment is documented in chapter one. 
As we shall see, the suspicion of political liberalism became a feature of 
German intellectual life, extending to those émigrés who came to the United 
States, Hans Morgenthau among them. M orgenthau had also witnessed 
German intellectuals abasing them selves before the state pow er of 
Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany. He, instead, took with him to the United 
States the belief that the intellectual had an obligation to speak 'truth to 
power' in the political sphere rather than collaborating with it. His inspiration 
had been the example of Max Weber who had refused to pander to the most 
base elements of German nationalism. Weber was one of a number of German 
intellectuals who were of great importance in the shaping of Morgenthau's 
world-view, the others being Karl Mannheim, Friedrich Nietzsche and Carl
38 Reinhold Niebuhr, The lro7iy of American History (Charles Scribner's Sons, N ew  York, 1952) 
pp. 156-157.
39 George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (Faber and Faber, London, 1961) p.331.
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Schmitt. Together, they form a very modern intellectual genealogy which will 
help us to shed a great deal more light upon Morgenthau than the usual 
ahistorical 'canon' of realists.
In chapters two and three we see how the German intellectual ethos 
conveyed by Morgenthau translated in the very different context of the 
United States which was largely free of any sense that politics was a diabolical 
and often tragic undertaking, and where the Enlightenment's doctrine of 
progress had not been subjected to sustained challenge, intellectual or 
otherwise. In chapter two we deconstruct the early books with which 
Morgenthau established his intellectual reputation and see how they appear 
when set against the backdrop of the history of political science in the United 
States.
In chapter three we trace the evolution of Morgenthau's ideas over the 
course of the 1950s to the early 1960s. We also begin to examine Morgenthau's 
life beyond the academy as an 'intellectual in the political sphere' committed 
to taking part in the debates over the course of American foreign policy as the 
Cold War unfolded. We also examine some of the problems - practical and 
ethical - facing the intellectual in political life under the conditions of 
modernity.
Chapter four continues the narrative into the 1960s and focuses in the 
event that, more than any other, came to dominate his life in this decade - the 
Vietnam War. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the last decade of 
Morgenthau's life and how his ideas were influenced by the turbulent politics 
at home and abroad. We will also explore his complicated relationship with 
Henry Kissinger.
Given his importance to the history of International Relations and the 
limitations of some of the existing literature, this study shouldn't require any 
further justification. I hope that one of the strengths of what I am attempting 
here will be that my genuine interest in M orgenthau and his historical
16
contribution will help to illuminate him better than would be the case if I 
were merely using him in order to participate in one of the discipline's 
interminable 'debates’ between 'schools’. Too many studies in intellectual 
history are compromised by manifestly half-hearted attempts to demonstrate 
a topical, instrumental usefulness for the work concerned. W hatever there 
may or may not be in Hans M orgenthau's work to help illum inate 
contemporary problems in world politics is a question for another occasion.
17
Chapter One: The Failure of German Liberalism  and the Crisis of 
Modernity
”I never believed in liberalism” (Hannah Arendt).
"Everything Rom antic stands in the service of other unrom antic 
energies”(Carl Schmitt).
On the 17th of November 1918 an opening ceremony was held in 
Munich for the short-lived Bavarian Republic which emerged from the chaos 
following the disintegration of the Wilhelmine order. Bruno Walter, Mahler's 
protégé who was later to become part of the émigré community in the United 
States, conducted Beethoven's Leonore Overture No.3 and Kurt Eisner, 
intellectual and author and now both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of 
the newly established government, made a speech linking the recent political 
developments with Beethoven's music:
"The World seems shattered, lost in the abyss. Suddenly in the m idst of 
darkness and despair the sounds of trumpets ring out, proclaiming a new 
word, a new mankind, a new freedom. Thus did Beethoven see the destiny 
of the World ... the work of art we have just heard describes with prophetic 
foresight the reality we have just experienced."^
Given this taste for romantic metaphysics it was, perhaps, predictable that 
Eisner and his fellow intellectuals who governed the Raterepublik saw no need 
to develop rhetorical strategies for the speeches and pamphlets they made for 
public consumption.Their language has been described elsewhere as "abstract, 
mystical moralising."^ Such men had little w ith which to oppose the
^Eisner in Stephen Lamb, ’Intellectuals and the Challenge of Power', in The W eimar 
Dilemma:Intellectuals in the Weimar Republic, A.Phelan (ed.), (Manchester University Press, 1985) 
p. 140.
^Lamb, 'Intellectuals', p. 158.
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pragm atic bru tality  of right-w ing violence which was dedicated to 
establishing a grip upon power rather than prom oting 'G e is t' and 
'Gemeinschaft' amongst the masses. Less than a hundred days after his 
accession to power Eisner was m urdered by a Bavarian noblem an. 
Astonishingly, at Eisner's funeral Heinrich Mann felt that he could provide 
consolation w ith the suggestion that "the hundred  days of Eisner's 
government have provided more pleasurable exercises of Man's rational 
faculties, more rejuvenation of the spirit than the previous fifty years." (^!!)
The assassination of Eisner unleashed a further wave of anarchy in 
Munich and, in the political vacuum that followed a short-lived attempt to 
form a government under the majority socialist Johannes Hoffman, an even 
unlikelier group of intellectuals claimed authority. This motley crew included 
the anarchist philosopher Gustav Landauer; Ernst Toller, one of Germany's 
leading exponents of Expressionist drama; the poet Erich Miihsam who 
immediately offered up some verse entitled 'Der Lampenhutzer' in mockery of 
left-wing rivals; and one Dr Franz Lipp who has attained a measure of 
political immortality by virtue of his first act as Foreign Minister, namely the 
sending of a telegram to 'Comrade Pope, Peter's Cathedral, Rome’, in which 
former Prime Minister Hoffman was accused of having stolen the key to 
Lipp's toilet. Lipp was also kind enough to provide his Holiness with some 
quotations from Kant's Perpetual Peace.^ This is, surely, much closer to the 
revolutionary praxis of Marx, Groucho than Marx, Karl. This exquisite 
theatre would be all the more enjoyable if one were not aware of the 
consequences for German democracy. The inability of German intellectuals to 
provide any sort of worthwhile leadership for the German left and centre was
^Mann in ibid. p. 139.
''^Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.410-411. See also Walter 
Laqueur, Weimar: A Cultural Histoiy 1918-1933 (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1978) pp.41- 
78.
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yet another factor working to underm ine the Weimar Republic.^ These 
interventions in political life, however ineffectual, were themselves rare on 
the part of German intellectuals for whom  a complete disdain for the 
perceived vulgarities of politics was the more usual position.
No-one better illustrates this stance than Thomas Mann in his famous 
clash with his brother Heinrich during the First World War. Heinrich Mann 
had responded to a couple of chauvinistic essays written by his brother with 
an essay of his own on Emile Zola and the Dreyfus Affair. For Heinrich, Zola 
was a 'democratic leader' and the model of an activist" intellectual for whom 
literature and politics were indivisible.*^ Heinrich saw himself as the German 
equivalent of Zola in challenging the Wilhelmine regime just as Zola had led 
the attack against the French establishment over Dreyfus.^ Heinrich had, for 
some time, been critical of the passivity of German intellectuals whom he felt 
to have acquiesced in the rule of "God's grace and the fist."^ Thomas correctly 
recognised that Heinrich had included him as a member of those "false 
intellectuals", the "entertaining parasites" who stood "in elegant array against 
truth and justice."9Thomas Mann's reply was contained in his Reflections of a 
Nonpolitical Man. This is, in part, a piece of the crudest invective and the most 
transparently chauvinistic propaganda but at another level it does capture 
very well the Zeitgeist of the intellectual in Germany.
Mann claimed that the war represented a German defence of its 
national culture against the th reatening  m aterialist values of the 
Enlightenment.^^ As in his earlier essays Mama juxtaposed the 'culture' Kultur) 
of Germany - musical, metaphysical, pedagogical and subjective - against the
 ^ I don't wish to overstate the importance of this point. As Laquer has pointed out, there was also a 
much broader failing on the part of the centre left to match the dynamism of the Nazis.
 ^ See Donald Prater, Thomas Mann: A Life (Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 102.
 ^ Walter D. Morris (trans.), 'Introduction', to Thomas Mann, Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man 
(Frederick Ungar Publishing, New York, 1986) p.VIII.
 ^Ronald Hayman, Thomas Mann, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 1996) pp.287-288.
 ^ Morris, 'Introduction', p.VIII 
Mann, Reflections, p.82.
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mere 'civilisation' of the West - analytical, sceptical, and deeply politicald^ 
Politics, for Mann, was synonymous with the grubby wheeling and dealing of 
democracy of which he wants no part for a Germany whose inhabitants "will 
never be able to love political democracy because they cannot love politics 
itself... ." The authoritarian state, Mann suggests, "...remains the one that is 
proper and becoming to the German people, and the one they basically 
want."^^ Heinrich's advocacy of political engagement for the intellectual was 
anathema to Thomas for whom politics and intellect were fundamentally 
antithetical.i3Heinrich,"civilisation's literary man" in Thomas's condescending 
description, looked to politics because he has never been able to enjoy "the 
high ecstasy of German metaphysics.''^^ The state was also considered to be an 
important component of this German metaphysics and hence not part of the 
political sphere. This deeply conservative, quietistic view of political life had 
important consequences for German political life as I've already suggested. As 
we shall see later, in reacting against this historical tragedy Hans Morgenthau 
took with him to the United States the very different perspective that the 
intellectual had a duty to engage with the political sphere.
Thomas Mann himself came eventually to distrust 'the high ecstasy 
of German metaphysics’ and in 1930, shortly after Hitler's first important 
electoral breakthrough, his essay Appeal to Reason warned against "the ideas 
of a romanticising philosophy." National Socialism, with the support of "the 
academic professional class" was haranguing Germans "... in an idiom of 
mystical philistinism ... which give the movement an ingredient of cultured 
barbarism more dangerous and more remote from reality ... than the ... 
political romanticism that led us into the war."^^ This belated conversion to 
reason was, in many ways, too little and too late. Most German intellectuals
Moms, ’Introduction’, p.VII; Mann, Reflections p. 17.
Mann, Reflections, pp. 16-17.
3^ See ibid. ppl7, 152, 234-235.
14 Ibid. p.408.
13 Mann in Gordon A. Craig, The Germans (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1982) p.209.
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were by this time entirely antipathetic to the democratic politics of Weimar 
and were instead devoted to the worship of the state which was seen to exist 
metaphysically above the sordid realities of democracy.
The Failure of German Liberalism
The story of how such a state of affairs came to pass is inevitably 
bound up with the broader questions of German political evolution, in 
particular the failure of the 'Enlightenment Project' in Germany and of 
German liberalism. Historical sociologists like Barrington Moore and 
Alexander Gerschenkron have pointed to the fact that 'late' industrialisation 
has tended to be associated with more corporate forms of socio-economic 
organisation and more authoritarian forms of government.^^And where the 
bourgeoisie failed to make a thoroughgoing breakthrough the continuing 
authority of the landed classes, in Germany the notoriously reactionary 
Prussian Junkers, served to frustrate democratic development and stymie the 
growth and activity of the intelligentsia.
Turning from political sociology to a more straight forward geo­
political perspective leads to similar observations. In the often brutal 
maelstrom of Central Europe states were forced to swim or sink. Some states, 
like Prussia, were able to successfully re-organise to respond to the imperative 
of survival. Others, like Poland, were not and suffered the tragic 
consequences of which we are only too aware. We need not agree with 
Francis Fukuyama (and Hegel) that the Prussian defeat by the French at the 
battle of Jena in 1806 marked the 'End of History' in order to be able to 
recognise the stimulus it gave to the reorganisation and further expansion of 
the Prussian S t a t e . I n  most parts of Central Europe m ilitarisation
See Bamngton Moore Jnr, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy (Allen Lane,1967) & 
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness in historical perspective (Praeger, New York, 1962).
Francis Fukuyama, 'The end of history'?". The National Interest, Vol. 18, 1989, pp.3-18.
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encouraged stronger and more centralised state structures at the expense of 
the growth of a liberal civil society.
Even so, it is true that we can find resistance to the 'Enlightenment' in 
Germany which predates the great political and socio-economic upheavals of 
the nineteenth century. The pre-eminent intellectual figure of this opposition 
was undoubtedly Johann Gottfried Herder. Herder was born on the 25th of 
A ugust 1744 in the East Prussian tow n of M ohrungen, the son of a 
cantor/schoolm aster. Both birthplace and familial background mitigated 
against his intellectual development but good fortune led him to university 
where he studied under a young instructor by the name of Immanuel Kant 
who went on to become the most famous of the German Aiifklarer. His most 
implacable opponent, openly so from 1785 on, was his former student Johann 
Herder.
When one reads Herder it becomes clear why he had such a profound 
impact upon subsequent generations of German intellectuals. His wide- 
ranging explorations across theology, philosophy, aesthetics and the natural 
sciences teem with the vitality of a scholar who was unusually alive to a 
universe of different colours and shades, to the sheer diversity of hum an 
experience.^^ If we understand historicism to represent the assertion of the 
particular and the contingent against the universal and the teleological 
Herder was the first and, arguably, the greatest of the German historicists.i^ 
His defence of the communal against the cosmopolitan became a permanent 
feature of the intellectual landscape of Germany, including a large part of the 
group of German émigrés who came to the United States in the 1930s and
Herder's complete works run to some thirty three volumes but a good selection is provided by P.M. 
Barnard, J.G.Herder on Social and Political Culture (Cambridge University Press, 1969).
^^There is, of course, any number of different understandings of the term 'historicism'. Karl Popper, for 
example, links historicism with Marx, Hegel and historical telos. See his The Poverty of Historicism 
(Routlege and Kegan Paul, London, 1945).
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1940s. He was, as Isaiah Berlin has pointed out, "the profoundest critic of the 
Enlightenment.
For Herder, as for Aristotle and many others, "man is by nature a
gregarious creature, born to live in society..." indeed, "the hum an race has
never been without government; it is as natural to it as its origin and as the
grouping together of its members w ithin f a m i l i e s . T h e  basis for this
collective political identity is not the acceptance of a common sovereign
power, nor is it defined by bloodlines or other genetic indicators but is rather
established through a shared culture which called is marked predominantly
by the use of a common language. For Herder, as for George Steiner, the
collapse of the Tower of Babel has been a source of great richness rather than 
22a curse.
It should already be apparent that Herder's Weltanschauung placed 
him at odds with many of his predecessors and contemporaries. Any sort of 
pre-social 'state of nature ' or contractarian understanding  of social 
relationships can be rejected out of hand:
"Man is not a Hobbesian Wolf, nor a lone creature of the forest, as Rousseau 
would have it, for he has a communal language in which to communicate."^^ 
Nor was Herder's outlook based upon a slavish devotion to the state.^^ He 
m aintained a consistent opposition towards any kind of adm inistrative 
centralisation and rejected any suggestion that the worth of nations could be 
linked to territorial aggrandisement. Barnard has accurately described the 
nature of Herder's political communities as anarcho-pluralistic rather than 
nationalistic.^
Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder:Two Studies in the Histoiy of Ideas (The Hogarth Press, 1976) p. 165. 
LHerder, 'The Origin of Language', p. 161; 'Dissertation on the Reciprocal Influence of Government 
and the Sciences', p.229 in Barnard, J.G.Herder. See also pp. 163,317-8,324.
See George Steiner, Errata: An Examined Life (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1997) p. 102. 
Barnard, J.G Herder, p. 167.
On his rejection of the centralised, bureaucratic apparatus of the state see his 'Ideas for a Philosophy 
of History', in ibid. p.310.
Barnard, Herder, p.7.
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One of the most striking elements of Herder's treatm ent of these 
language-based communities is his resistance to a normative ranking of them. 
In his ironically titled Yet Another Philosophy of History (1774) he condemns the 
"arbitrary verdicts of praise and blame" which are attached to communities 
past and present. How, Herder asks, can we judge other nations and ages by 
our own understandings of virtue and happiness? Is "good not dispersed over 
the earth?" Has it not "...been distributed in a thousand forms, changing shape 
like an eternal Proteus throughout continents and centuries?"^*^ Hence 
H erder's exasperation w ith the custom ary idolatry extended to the 
civilisations of Ancient Greece and Rome. Not only does this serve to cast a 
shadow over other worthy groups it is, in any case, an undertaking which is 
essentially pointless on anything other than strictly antiquarian grounds. We 
cannot capture the virtues of these past communities and somehow transfuse 
them into our own. Herder similarly questions the claims made by many of 
his colleagues. He rejects the simple bifurcation of the gothic darkness of the 
Middle Ages with the enlightened eighteenth century.^^And he is highly 
attuned to the hypocrisies of the age: slavery may have been abolished in 
Europe but non-Christian and non-European peoples are 'devastated' and 
'debauched' across three co n tin en tsE u ro p ean s do not possess a monopoly 
of virtue. In short it was this thoroughgoing pluralism, this rejection of the 
h istorical telos and other sim plistic universalism s of his Atifldcirer 
contemporaries that set Herder apart from them.
It should be clear by now that there was little rational basis for Nazi 
efforts to transmogrify Herder into some sort of proto-fascist. His opposition
J.Herder, 'Yet Another Philosophy of History', in ibid. p. 187
ibid. pp. 192-194. "...in some respects we would willingly take their disorder and unpolished 
manners, in exchange for our light, and our unbelief, our enervated coldness and refinement, our 
philosophical exhaustion and human misery."
ibid. p.219. In this respect at least Herder's rejection of any hierarchical racial division and simplistic 
dualisms like 'enlightened' and 'unenlightened' and 'cultured' and 'uncultured' made him rather more 
progressive than the allegedly cosmopolitan Kant, a disagreement that Herder would point to with great 
pleasure. See Robert T. Clark Jnr, Herder: His Life and Thought (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1955). pp.322-325.
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to racism is clear and there is also some evidence to suggest that Herder 
admired the Jews for their ability to retain a sense of communal identity in 
spite of their scattered condition. Moreover, he saw 'the Jewish Problem' in 
political rather than religious or racial terms, amenable to what later came to 
be called 'the Zionist Solution'.^^Nor is there any hint of anthropomorphism 
in Herder's notion of a 'volk' which remains a collectivity of individuals, not 
the organic, biological entity it became in the hands of others.^^ Add to this his 
rejection of the centralised state and his distaste for war and the parallels 
become even more distant.
And yet one can see why the Nazis and the romantic nationalists of 
the nineteenth century would want to try to lay claim to Herder as part of 
their intellectual heritage. Herder’s understanding of volk could easily be 
supplemented with racial, biological, and hyper-nationalist attributes. His 
fear of hum an alienation at the hands of a mechanising modernity anticipated 
one of the fundamental concerns of almost all the German intellectuals who 
followed him. Moreover, his generally discriminating and mostly pertinent 
critique of what came to be seen as the Anglo-French Enlightenment provided 
a foundation for the increasingly irrational opposition of the next century and 
a half. Herder, of course, bears no responsibility for the subsequent 
perversion of his work. His vision of decentralised, self-contained, 
linguistically-based communities may strike the contemporary observer as 
hopelessly naive but it did make at least some sense within the context of the 
fragmented and largely agrarian Germany of the late eighteenth century. It 
became progressively less plausible and increasingly dangerous when 
combined with the dramatic geo-political and socio-economic transformations 
of the nineteenth century.
29 Berlin, Vico and Herder, pp. 159-60. Nazi propagandists admitted that Herder was "handicapped"'by 
a "lack of race consciousness," See Clark, Herder, pp.336-337.
3 0 Barnard, Herder, pp.53-4; Berlin, Vico and Herder, p. 198.
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Herder did not live to see the victory of the rampaging levee en masse 
over the Prussians and the subsequent further strengthening and 
centralisation of the Prussian state. Other intellectuals were, however, quick 
to respond to the changed circumstances. In shedding Herder's opposition to 
the centralised state individuals like Adam Müller, Fichte, and Hegel instead 
raised it to the pinnacle of the German nation.^! Müller suggested that the 
state was "the interest of all interests, the supreme end, the totality of all 
human a f f a i r s . T h i s  remark is aimed squarely at Anglo-French empirical 
and utilitarian interpretations of the nature and role of the state. No longer 
merely a means towards greater ends, the state becomes an end in itself. 
Given this new mystique as the very embodiment of the German nation, state 
worship became an integral part of the German landscape to the later 
advantage of both the reactionary Wilhelmine regime and Nazism.
The period from 1848 to the late 1870s stands out as a pivotal one for 
German liberalism and for the role of the intellectual in public life. The failed 
1848 Revolution marked a pre-Weimar high water mark for both political 
liberalism in Germany and the political participation of intellectuals. 
Subsequently, the liberal parliamentary grouping continued to offer some 
resistance to Prussian autocracy but Bismarck's twin triumphs - the defeat of 
Austria and the subsequent victory over France - provided him with an 
irresistible momentum. And just as political liberalism was tottering, its 
economic coun terpart was being d iscredited . Germ any's relative 
'backwardness' always suggested that the reception of free trade doctrines 
would be problematic and, indeed, German intellectuals were among the first 
to question Manchester School liberalism. As was the case with Herder's 
challenge to the political creed of the Enlightenment, German political
31 Morgenthau later referred to the 'bad metaphysics' of the Hegelian tradition which endowed;
"...a metaphor, such as Power or Leviathan or Minotaur, or a legal abstraction, such as the government 
or the state, with certain qualities which are meaningful only when they are attributed to real persons." 
See 'The Evil of Power', The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.III,No.4,June 1950, p.515.
Barnard, Herder, pp.54-5. See also Craig, The Germans, p.32; Chris Brown, International Relations 
Theory: New Normative Approaches (Columbia University Press, 1992) pp.60-75.
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economists asserted historicism - contextuality and particularity - against 
ahistorical deductive generalisations. In normative terms, communal values 
were re-asserted against the perceived selfish individualism of the liberal 
creed. And, in an accusation that would subsequently become a part of the 
intellectual arm oury of Hans M orgenthau, Friederich List charged that 
beneath the veneer of enlightened economics lay what would later be called 
the 'imperialism  of free trade'. The maintenance of Britain's industrial 
'comparative advantage' w ould serve to bolster its national power and 
condemn Germans to the status of 'hewers of wood and drawers of water.' 
German industry would need to be protected by the state if it were to 
challenge British supremacy.
List's lead was followed by subsequent generations of German 
political economists. In 1872 the Verein filr  Sozialpolitik (Social Policy 
Association) was established under the leadership of Gustav Schmoller, 
Adolph Wagner, and Lujo Brentano with the aim of influencing public policy 
as well as providing a forum for the pursuit of intellectual problems. In 
addition to echoing List's by now familiar critique of Manchester Liberalism 
they advocated a whole range of policies which came to be, for the most part, 
a widely accepted part of twentieth century socio-economic organisation 
elsewhere: social insurance schemes, the nationalisation of certain industries, 
health and safety regulations, public works programmes and so on.^^ Though 
we can now agree that most of these elements represented a progressive 
amelioration of laissez-faire capitalism, in the context of Germany in the 
1870's they had the unfortunate political consequence of further enhancing 
state power at the expense of an already weak civil society.
This formidable challenge to liberal political economy was further 
compounded by the economic turmoil of the 1870s, in particular the disaster 
of the so-called 'Gnindeszeit' - the speculative boom and bust of the early
Ringer, Decline, pp. 147-148.
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1870s. Recriminations were swift to follow and two groups in particular were 
singled out for blame: the liberals and those familiar scapegoats of the 
European past, the Jews. The consequence was a revival of anti-Semitism 
which had, of course, long been woven into the tapestry of European history 
and politics. It would be absurd to draw a straight line here from stock 
exchange to concentration camp but it is also true that from the 1870s anti- 
Semitism was rarely absent from the mainstream of German life, never 
fading into the background as it had done periodically in the past. And, as we 
shall see, the general climate of anti-Semitism had a profound impact upon 
the young Jewish-German Hans Morgenthau.
We can say with some confidence that liberal attempts to transform 
the German polity had been stopped dead by 1880. The result was what has 
been aptly described as the 'feudalisation' of the bourgeois classes. Deferring 
to the m artial values that were increasingly im portant in this strutting 
German Empire, the upper middle classes sought social cachet through the 
marriage of their offspring to the sons and daughters of the nobility, the civil 
service, and the Junker class iir general. Military practices came increasingly 
to be mimicked in other walks or German life. In commerce the owners of the 
great conglomerates "ran their enterprises as if they were fortress 
commanders", much like those 'Captains of Industry' referred to by Carlyle in 
his wonderfully sardonic summary.34 in the universities, student corporations 
were modelling their organisations along military lines and many of their 
teachers were fervent nationalists.
For much of that disillusioned section of the middle classes and 
intelligentsia not co-opted, the 'escape' from politics and the political sphere 
proved an alternative. For many this amounted to little more than the quiet 
accumulation of property in a manner which is utterly routine in our own 
societies at the end of the twentieth century. Others, however, pursued more
34 Craig, The Germans, p.239.
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imaginative forms of escape, some of them leading to quite dangerous forms 
of irrationalism.
'Escape' had always been a component of German romanticism and 
hence a familiar theme in Germany since at least the 1770s. Resolutely anti­
modern, romanticism defined itself against industrialisation and urbanisation, 
against the scientific demystification and subjugation of nature which served 
to denaturalise man himself, and against the Cartesian duality of m ind and 
body. It amounted, in sum, to a reassertion of man's warm irrational whole in 
opposition to cold, alienating reason. No German captured the spirit of 
Romanticism better than Richard Wagner. A participant in the failed Dresden 
uprising of 1848, Wagner withdrew into the fantastic universe of his operas; a 
world in which gods rubbed shoulders with men, a realm where chivalric 
values reigned supreme in a Germany of forests and mountains where, very 
often, no trace of urban conglomeration was to be found anywhere. Other 
more sober thinkers were also influenced by romanticism. Even Goethe, so 
often a defender of the classical against the romantic, wrote a novel in which a 
young man leaves a bourgeois life behind in order to embark upon a romantic 
journey of self-discovery.^^
Though Gordon Craig is right to suggest that most romantics were 
essentially unpolitical, it is easy to see how romanticism could come to have 
profound political implications, particularly when combined with the ever 
more assertive nationalism of the late nineteenth c e n t u r y H e r d e r ' s ,  in at 
least some senses, relatively cosmopolitan notion of a.Vdlk was transmogrified 
into an ugly, explicitly racist claim to German ethnic and national supremacy, 
based upon the most romantic and unhistorical foundations imaginable and 
buttressed by the 'scientific' support of the legions of charlatans plying their 
trade in anthropology, philology, and phrenology. And while the activities of
Craig, The Germans, p. 192. 
ibid.
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the romantically-inspired youth movements that became so popular may 
have been harmless enough in isolation, the heady brew of German 
nationalism and vdlkisch mysticism its members were exposed to made them 
easy fodder for Hitler?^
The Crisis of Modernity
None of this actually served to prevent profound economic change. In 
the four and a half decades from 1870 to 1914 "Germany was transformed 
from a relatively backward and predominantly agricultural nation into one of 
the greatest industrial powers in the wo r l d .U rb a n i s a t i o n  went ahead at a 
rapid rate and the population increased by some sixty percent in a period of 
forty y e a r s . A n d  though Junkerdom clung to its political prerogatives, 
industrialisation continued to underm ine its agricultural base in spite of 
protectionism. Add to this the escape from politics described above, a nascent 
industrial proletariat, and an increasingly bellicose German Government 
headed by an erratic, over ambitious, young monarch and it is not surprising 
that so many came to feel a pervasive sense of unease and even threat, such as 
to cunount to what I will call the 'Crisis of Modernity'. There were, however, 
as we shall see, individuals, modernists, who chose neither escape into a 
world of romantic and volkisch fantasy nor the submission to Prussian 
autocracy.
There is no single understanding of w hat 'modernity' is or who 
'modernists' are, no straightforward and uncontested definition of the kind 
beloved of textbook authors and their student readers. For Nicholas Rengger, 
as for many others, modernists or moderns are those involved with the
For a good discussion of these themes see George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: 
Intellectual Origins of The Third Reich (Grosset and Dunlop, New York, 1964).
Ringer, Decline, p.42. 
ibid.
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promotion and defense of the 'Project of Enlightenment', however this may 
be defined and understood.^^ For Peter Gay modernists could be both exultant 
destroyers of the old and haters of the new, artists who could simultaneously 
usher in the modern whilst turning their backs upon it.^  ^ I have no desire to 
contest the validity of either usage but I do want to make clear that the 
conception I adopt here is somewhat different. Much of this should have been 
implicit from the discussion thus far but, to re-iterate, I understand modernity 
to constitute that process of m aterial /  technological and cultural change 
initiated by the rise of capitalism and industrialisation and necessitating an 
ever m ore specialised division of labour, increasing urbanisation, 
secularisation, and the growing impact of tire masses upon political and social 
structures. To be a modernist, I would suggest, is first and foremost to 
recognise the impact of these changes and, secondly, to accept its 
inexorability in broad terms. Men as subjects may be able to shape and mould 
this modernity but they cannot, Canute-like, turn it aside nor can they wish it 
away. Modernists need not have a normative commitment to modernity, but 
they must at least offer it a resigned acceptance.
In the German context then we can see why certain of the groups 
discussed thus far were not comprised of modernists: romantics and 
'escapists', volkisch mystics barkening after the rejuvenation of hyper-idealised 
communities which have probably never existed, the most reactionary of 
conservatives etc.^^ In the political, and especially the intellectual circles of 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany there were relatively 
few modernists. Of those who were the most important grouping, for our 
purposes, was centred on the new discipline of sociology.
Nicholas Rengger, Political Theory, Modernity and Postmodernity: Beyond Enlightenment and 
Critique (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995) p.94.
See Peter Gay, Freud, Jews, and other Germans (Oxford University Press, 1978) pp,21-28.
The above understanding of modernity is, I would suggest, compatible with a more enlightened and 
measured kind of conservatism. Conservatives are, of course, the creation of moderniry but they are 
not necessarily modernLrj.
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Sociology was a quintessentially modern subject: a natural outgrowth 
of the empirical, historicist, concerns of German political economy. The man 
most reflective of this new discipline was Ferdinand Tonnies whose 1887 
work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society) was of 
fundamental importance in shaping the subject. For Tonnies, as for virtually 
all of his colleagues, modernity was transforming the landscape of Germany 
through the replacement of the organic, personal, links of Gemeinschaft with 
the more mechanistic, informal, instrum entally rational operations of 
Gesellschaft. There is no doubt that setting up this antithesis carried with it the 
danger of reaction and romance, of the nostalgia for idealised other-worldly 
'communites'.Tonnies himself regarded the replacement of Gemeinschaft with 
Gesellschaft as a great tragedy but the sociologists distinguished themselves 
from their romantic contemporaries by their forthright acceptance of the 
imperative to square up to the realities of modernity, forgoing the luxury of 
'escape'.^^ Indeed in Max Weber's case resolve may even, in one reading at 
least, merge into a grim fatalism, an 'iron cage' of modernity in which man as 
subject disappears beneath a suffocating blanket of specialisation and 
bureaucratisation. Karl Mannheim, alternatively, may have been naively 
optimistic in his hopes for an intelligentsia able to break free of the 'iron cage' 
and help in shaping the course of modernity.
To link Hans Morgenthau with these modernists may seem somewhat 
perverse given the common association of Morgenthau with a reactionary, 
even nostalgic, political 'realism' based upon allegedly age-old forms of 
political behaviour. This is undoubtedly a controversial suggestion which 
will require further explanation.44 For the moment, though, we need to 
introduce Morgenthau to the narrative.
My discussion of Tonnies is based upon Fritz Ringer's excellent summary. See Ringer, Decline, 
pp. 162-175.
44 I don't wish to claim that Morgenthau was a thoroughgoing modernist in the manner of Weber who, 
for example, thought that the study of history had a purely antiquarian value, unlike Morgenthau. I do 
want to stress that the modernist elements in Morgenthau have been neglected in other accounts as has 
the intellectual influence of modernists like Nietzsche, Weber, and Mannheim.
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Morgenthau and the ' T e wish Problem*
To be a German Jew or more precisely a Jewish-German was awkward 
enough; to later add the status of intellectual amounted to a combination as 
problematic as one could imagine anywhere in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Hans Joachim Morgenthau was born in 1904 in the town of Coburg, 
at that time the capital of the independent Duchy of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, later 
to be absorbed by Bavaria. Coburg had been a • relatively im portant 
commercial centre since at least the Middle Ages as a stop along the trade 
routes running from Augsberg and Nürnberg to Northern Germany. Coburg 
(population 24,000) now served as the market town for the surrounding 
agricultural areas in addition to having various forms of light industry, the 
bureaucracy of the Duchy, and a small artistic community centred on the 
theatre.^^M orgenthau was the only son of a doctor: an authoritarian 
paterfamilias according to Morgenthau's account. It has frequently been noted 
that children without siblings are natural candidates for the introspective 'life 
of the mind' and this, in combination with his father's iron hand made, in 
M orgenthau's self-description, for a rather shy, w ithdrawn and unhappy 
child of artistic bent. His father looms as a massive presence extending even 
into M orgenthau's early adulthood in rejecting his son's choices of both 
university and subject and exhorting him to join a duelling f r a t e r n i t y A  
second and clearly more pernicious influence was the prevailing atmosphere 
of anti-Semitism.
I have already noted that the financial crisis of the 1870s served to 
stimulate anti-Semitism. Many German 'intellectuals' played their part in this
N.F.Hayward and D.S. M oms, The First Nazi Town, (Gower Publishing, 1988) p.2; Bernard 
Johnson 'Interview with Hans Morgenthau', in Truth and Tragedy , eds. Kenneth Thompson and Robert 
Myers, (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1984) pp.331,334.
Johnson, 'Interview', pp.338,342; Hans Morgenthau, 'Fragment of an Intellectual Biography’ in 
Thompson/Myers(eds.), Truth and Tragedy, p.4.
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revival. A crudely irrational Social Darwinism combined with the 'science' of 
phrenology to be used as racial weapons against the Jews. Eugen Dühring's 
The Jewish Question (1880) suggested that Jewish 'depravity' in every sphere 
could be linked with specifically racial characteristics.^^ The notorious, 
transplanted Englishman Houston Stewart Chamberlain, in addition to the by 
now familiar racism, established to his evident satisfaction that Jesus Christ 
himself was not a Jew, thus paving the way for a properly Aryan Christ. The 
German race, he suggested, was engaged in nothing less than a 'mortal 
struggle' against Judaism.^^
There is some debate here as to what we are to make of these 
developments. For Gordon Craig the picture is one of a constant downward 
spiral in Jewish fortunes beginning in the 1870's:
"Every argument that National Socialist orators used against the Jews had 
been made before 1914; the only difference was that the Nazis had the 
strength of their convictions and turned these arguments into a program of 
action... All that was needed was Adolf Hitler's demonic will to transform it 
into reality."^^
This may be rather too deterministic, even unhistorical. Peter Gay provides a 
more nuanced reading. The anti-Semitism of the nineteenth century, he 
suggests, was different in kind from that of the twentieth.^° Indeed, Gay feels 
that at the turn of the century Jews could fairly claim to look back upon 'a 
century of emancipation.'^^ While restrictions remained in certain areas, the 
'liberal' professions had opened up and Jews were, in general, much more 
diversified in their social and professional status.^^ Jews had come to adopt 
German as their first language over the course of the nineteenth century and
Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology , p.94. 
ibid. pp.95-96.
Craig, The Germans, p. 140.
Gay, Freud, Jews and Other Germans, p. 15.
ibid.p.95.
ibid.pp.95-96.
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had made strenuous efforts to make themselves indistinguishable from their 
fellow Germans. Popular anti-Semitism, Gay suggests, was less active in the 
1890s than in the preceding two decades and 'racialists' had been discredited 
in many circles.^^ The Dreyfus Affair in France and pogroms in Eastern 
Europe presented more cause for concern than anything at home.^^In short, 
"Germany's Jews had therefore good reason to feel themselves, or to aspire to 
feel themselves to be Jewish Germans."^^For Gay it was the poisonous legacy 
of the First World War that transformed the situation. Both accept, however, 
that in the end the strenuous efforts of Germany's Jews to assimilate had 
amounted to naught.^^
Morgenthau has pointed out that his father, too, was driven by "this 
senseless assimilationism among many German Jews."^^ And, whatever the 
status of Gay's general claims it is clear that the town of Coburg was rife with 
anti-Semitism during the early part of the twentieth century. Coburg has in 
fact attained a permanent notoriety by virtue of its status as 'The First Nazi 
Town' where Hitler had been active as early as 1922. In 1924 an alliance of 
various right-wing parties won a majority in the Landtag elections with an 
explicitly anti-Semitic campaign which called for "the removal of all civil 
rights from Jews". This 'first' was added to in 1929 when Coburg became the 
first town in Germany to elect a majority National Socialist town council.^^ It 
appears that Duke Carl Eduard, who had been forced to abdicate after the 
First World War, remained an influential patron and active supporter of the 
Nazis in the region. This same Carl Eduard presided over an event that 
Morgenthau described as the most traumatic experience of his life.
ibid. pp.94, 109. 
ibid. p. 166. 
ibid.pT9.
See Craig, The Germans, p. 141 and Gay, Freud, pp.3-28, 93-168. 
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There was, it seems, an annual ceremony in honour of the Duke at 
which the most academically successful pupil from the local Gymnasium was 
given the responsibility of crowning a statue of the Duke and making a 
speech. This dubious pleasure fell to M orgenthau one year and his own 
account is worth recalling at some length:
"I was the first in my class so I was the one to do this. Of course there was an 
enormous commotion: "Should we let that Jew make the speech and crown 
our Duke?" But there was no way of getting around it. I was the best student 
in the school so I was decided upon. On the morning of the celebration anti- 
Semitic leaflets were distributed which contained mean and disparaging 
remarks about me... They called for demonstrations and so, of course, I was 
pretty much frightened. But I went up there, anyway, and made my speech. 
Afterward we marched to a meadow just outside the town for more 
celebrations. This was the worst day of my life because nobody would speak 
to me on that march. Nobody would walk beside me. People shouted at me 
and spit at me. (NP) It was a kind of, as they say in German, "spiessruden 
laufen"- "running the gauntlet". People shook their fists at me and shouted 
anti-Semitic insults. It was terrible. Absolutely terrible ... Photos were taken at 
this ceremony and I still have one today. You can see the Duke sitting at the 
window in that photo, together with Count Westorp ... They are holding their 
noses while I am standing there giving my speech. There was a folklore in 
Germany that Jews smelled, just as racists in [the United States] believe that 
Negroes have a particular odor. Yes, that was probably the worst day of my 
life I would guess.
A school essay written at approximately the same time expressed the 
frustration no doubt felt by thousands of other Jewish Germans:
"My relationship to the social environment is determined by three facts: I am a 
German, I am a Jew, and I have matured in the period following the war.
Johnson, 'Interview', pp.340-341.
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Certain groups w ithin our society and, more particularly, the socially 
dom inant ones, are inclined to hold responsible for all changes and 
deficiencies of our period of history that segment of our society to which I 
belong. Regardless of the merits of these accusations, one thing is certain: I am 
innocent of what the Jews are reproached with. The accusations that are 
directed against me as a Jew are totally unjustified.
Both of these extracts make for poignant reading. The latter shows an 
exasperation that his Jewishness, a mere accident of birthright, appears 
inescapable: I am innocent of what the Jews are reproached with.
Some years later his attempt to gain a professorship at the University 
of Frankfurt was rejected on the basis that the university already retained too 
many Jewish instructors.^^ He also claims that a strong anti-Je wish prejudice 
was present in American universities in the period before and immediately 
after the Second World War.^^
In his biography of Henry Kissinger Walter Isaacson notes that his 
subject was exposed to a similar array of anti-Semitic experiences. The legacy, 
he suggests, was a 'philosophical pessimism'. Going further still he claims that 
"the Nazi experience could have instilled in Kissinger either of two 
approaches to foreign policy: an idealistic, moralistic approach dedicated to 
protecting hum an rights; or a realist, realpoUtik approach which sought to 
preserve order through balances of power and a willingness to use force as a 
tool of diplomacy."^^ It would seem to me that there is a great deal wrong 
with the second of these claims at least. Setting aside the possibility that 
Kissinger could have gone on to become a suburban accountant who never 
gave another thought to foreign affairs, it can hardly be very helpful to
Morgenthau, 'Fragment' p.2.
Johnson, 'Interview' p.352. See also his letter to Professor Niels Amstrup of November 29, 1978 
(Hans J,Morgenthau Papers, Box 5, Adams Library,Library of Congress, Washington DC) where he 
adds that another reason for his moving to Geneva was the "intolerable increase in anti-semitism."
idid.p.365
Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (Faber and Faber, London, 1992) p.31.
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suggest that a single set of childhood experiences could be responsible for 
instilling a realistic or an idealistic approach to international po l i t i c s . I n  the 
tracing of intellectual biographies it is rarely convincing to make connections 
like this in such a direct manner.
However, I would like to venture a couple of tentative suggestions 
concerning the impact of anti-Semitism upon Morgenthau. The first is simply 
to state that Morgenthau's childhood experiences gave him an early exposure 
to social conflict. The second is the probability that this powerful conflict of 
identities helped to sharpen his critical faculties and encourage the 
'independence of judgement' which Freud found so often to be a part of the 
make-up of Jewish intellectuals.^^ It may also have served to stimulate the 
existential angst, the air of pathos, that M orgenthau's works contain in 
contrast with those of many of his colleagues in post-war American political 
science. It is, of course, a truism that most of us are subject to competing 
claims of identity and that there is nothing unique about Jewishness in this 
respect. Few of these clashes have been as acute, as 'the Jewish problem' in 
Europe however, and fewer still have had such tragic consequences.
Despite this traumatic childhood Morgenthau qualified for university 
admission and he entered the University of Frankfurt, one of the newly 
established German universities, in 1923 and stayed for a semester before 
switching to Munich to study law.^^ Student life for Morgenthau included 
experiencing the dubious pleasures of the M ensiir  as a mem ber of a 
(presumably Jewish) duelling f r a t e r n i t y His participation in this 'aping of 
aristocratic customs' as he described it, was at the behest of his father who
Isaacson's biography suggests that Kissinger was indeed studying to become an accountant until a 
chance encounter with one Fritz Kraemer shifted him towards an interest in international politics. The 
point, I think, should be that the political turmoil of Central Europe stimulated political and 
philosophical thought of a wide variety of shades.
Freud in Ringer, Decline, p.239. Morgenthau suggested in the school essay quoted earlier that his 
critical attitude towards the 'socially dominant group' had been sharpened. See Morgenthau, 'Fragment'
p.2.
His father would not permit his preferred choice of literature.
Marx and Weber also participated in the Mensur.
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considered that it would mark the culmination of his son's assimilation into 
German society.^s
Intellectually he, naturally enough, found most of his law lectures 
uninspiring and he spent as much time as was permitted in taking courses 
outside the field. During his first stay in Munich he appears to have been 
exposed to RealpoUtik in the lectures of the historian Herman Oncken who 
specialised in German history of the nineteenth century and, in particular, the 
foreign policy of the Bismarckian period. Oncken, his pupil later suggested, 
"...entered into an historic period or personality, and reconstructed it, laying 
bare the hidden connections of motivations, actions, and consequences." 
M orgenthau felt reassured to discover that his hitherto "isolated and 
impressionistic" thoughts on foreign policy were "in the Bismarckian 
t r a d i t io n ." 6 9  reading Oncken one becomes even more aware of the strength 
of the connection. Many of the elements of Morgenthau's version of realism 
were present in Oncken: a strong emphasis upon the importance of the 
balance of power, the "immutable component of the national will to power" 
and so on.^^ There is too, as we will see in Morgenthau's work, an overlay of 
idealism upon this RealpoUtik evidenced when Oncken refers to "...the 
unwritten law of morality which guides the life of nations and sets bounds to 
the egoism of national interests."^!
33 He carried the physical scars for the rest of the life. See Johnson, 'Interview', pp.342-343. 
Morgenthau's father was right to imply that participation in the Mensur represented one of the most 
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After a year in Berlin deepening his legal studies Morgenthau returned 
to Munich for the first of his examinations and the position as a law clerk that 
folio wed.72Whilst working he continued to take classes and two were of 
particular importance: Karl Neumeyer's seminar on international law and, 
above all, Karl Rothenbücher's seminar on the political and social philosophy 
of Max Weber.73
Back in Frankfurt once more Morgenthau worked as an assistant to a 
lawyer whilst reading for a doctorate in the area of international law with the 
title Die Internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen ihre Grenzen (The International 
Judicial Function: its Nature and its Limits). M orgenthau claims that the 
original title of the thesis, rejected by his supervisor, was The International 
Judicial Function: its Nature and the Goncept of Politics :
"Having learned already that international law is a particularly weak kind of 
law, I now discovered that the main source of its weakness stems from the 
intrusion of international politics. From that discovery there was but one 
step to the conclusion that what really mattered in relations among nations 
was not international law but international p o l i t i c s . "74
M orgenthau's claim that, in effect, he had established his realist 
credentials by the late 1920s has been the subject of some dispute. Christoph 
Frei and Niels Amstrup accept that there is a fundamental continuity in all of 
Morgenthau's w r i t i n g s . 7 3  Alfons Sollner and Jan Willem Honig give a very 
different account of Morgenthau's ideas changing dramatically between 1929
72 por an amusing account of his experiences with the local peasantry in the Bavarian village he was 
assigned to see Johnson, 'Interview', pp.345-348.
73 Morgenthau, 'Fragment', pp.7-8; Johnson, 'Interview', pp.347-348. A fellow Jew, Neumeyer 
committed suicide with his wife when threatened with arrest by the Nazis. Morgenthau wrote his 
obituary for the October 1941 issue of The American Journal of International Law. Morgenthau, 
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Amstrup, 'The 'Early' Morgenthau: A Comment on the Intellectual Origins of Realism,' Cooperation 
and Conflict, V ol.l3, 1978, pp.163-175.
41
and 1948 (or even 1 9 5 4 ) 7 6  Sollner describes "the traumatic transformation of 
a Weimar liberal into an American conservative" as reflected by the second 
edition of Politics Among Nations (1954)77 The difficulty with this account is 
that it simply isn't clear how the label of 'conservative' can make any sense 
for Morgenthau in the American context. European conservatism is, I would 
suggest, so different from its American (and, increasingly, English) namesake 
that linking the two is deeply problematic.78 Honig's account of change is 
more straightforward: idealist to realist. Honig claims that it was the Second 
World War which 'radicalised' Morgenthau.79 Up until that point "...he still 
had not entirely shed his earlier optimism and idealism... It was only in his 
194.6Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics that the "realist" Morgenthau emerged,"30 
As has already been suggested, we should be wary of accounts which seek to 
crystallise Morgenthau so directly. Had Honig read on beyond Scientific Man 
Vs. Power Politics and Politics Among Nations to The Purpose of American Politics 
he would no doubt have had to account for the re-emergence of the 'idealist' 
Morgenthau. It would be plausible to argue that Morgenthau's appreciation of 
'the political' was becoming sharper over the course of the late 1920s and 
1930s and that the Second World War and the American nuclear attack upon 
Japan further strengthened it but a straightforward narrative of an idealist 
evolving into a realist is deeply unconvincing.
Honig is right to point out that most accounts of the evolution of 
realism and of Morgenthau's intellectual genealogy have ignored the impact 
of particular twentieth century developments, but his alternative association
73 Alfons Sollner, 'German Conservatism in America: Morgenthau's Political Realism’, Telos, Vol.72, 
Summer 1987, pp. 161-172; Jan Willem Honig, 'Totalitarianism and Realism: Hans Morgenthau's 
German Years', in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) Roots of Realism (Frank Cass, London, 1996) pp.283-313.
77 Sollner, 'German Conservatism', pp. 163-175.
73 The claim that "...American conservatism is more optimistic, materialistic, and individualistic than 
the conservative tradition" should in fact, be to accept that it is not usefully described as conservatism 
at all. See Kenneth Thompson, Political Realism and the Crisis o f World Politics (Princeton University 
Press, 1960) pp.79-80. Morgenthau himself accepted that conservatism "...has no place in the 
American tradition of politics." See 'The Decline of American Government', New Republic, December 
16 1957, pp.9-10.
79 Honig, 'Totalitarianism and Realism', p.284.
30 ibid. p.304.
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of totalitarianism with realism is crudely sensational.®i With the possible 
exception of Carl Schmitt who, in any case, was more self-promoting 
opportunist than authentic totalitarian ideologue, none of the figures 
associated most closely with Morgenthau's intellectual development can 
reasonably be associated with Nazism. As an alternative genealogy there are, 
I think, four individuals we need to examine in terms of their influence upon 
Morgenthau: Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Mannheim, Max Weber, and Carl 
Schmitt.
A M odern Genealogy
An exploration of the links between Morgenthau and Friedrich 
Nietzsche needs to be pursued with caution. It would, after all, be possible to 
construct a virtually endless list of seemingly disparate individuals and socio­
political groups, all of them claiming Nietzsche as an important influence. It 
may well be that there is something in Nietzsche for almost everyone. Even 
so, and with this caveat firmly in mind, I do think that there are intellectual 
connections worth bringing to light. Morgenthau has himself emphasised the 
importance of Nietzsche. He urged his regular correspondent Louis Halle to 
read Nietzsche and he also sought to impress upon his students that they 
should not make the usual association of Nietzsche with Nazism .®^ In a letter 
written in support for the funding of a prospective book on Nietzsche, he 
stressed that there was a "serious need" for a reappraisal because "both the 
German nationalists and Nazis and their Anglo-Saxon opponents have made 
a caricature of Nietzsche's political philosophy. Yet Nietzsche has probably 
been the most influential single philosophic influence, together with Marx
ibid.p.283.
37 See Louis J.Halle, 'General Education and the Understanding of Politics: The Case of Hans J. 
Morgenthau', in Thompson/Myers (eds.) Truth and Tragedy, p.65. For the remarks to his students see 
his lecture notes of May 1, 1962 in the Morgenthau Papers, Box 19. All the lecture notes in the 
Morgenthau Papers appear to have been prepared by his students but as he retained them we can only 
assume that he was reasonably satisfied with their summaries.
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and Freud, in the European continent during the last half century/'^^jn a letter 
detailing those individuals of most significance in shaping him intellectually 
he described Nietzsche as "a m ost pow erful and probably decisive
influence..."84
We can certainly trace the way in which M orgenthau adopted 
Nietzsche's notion of a 'Will to Power'. Morgenthau first referred to it in his La 
notion du "Politique" and it appears again as an important component of his 
first American book Scientific Man Vs Power Politics.^^ For both, this 
ubiquitous power drive had organic origins. "Where I found a living creature, 
there I found the will to power; and even in the will of the servant I found the 
will to be master" asserted Nietzsche in the guise of his prophet Z a r a t h u s t r a . 8 6  
Morgenthau referred to the animus dominandi, the lust for power. For both this 
elemental instinct extended well beyond the mere imperative of survival. 
Nietzsche: "A living thing desires above all to vent its strength- life as such is 
the will to power-: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most 
frequent consequences of it..."87 M orgenthau distinguished a mere basic 
selfishness, "food, shelter, security, and the means by which they are 
obtained" from "the desire for power which concerns itself not w ith the 
individual's survival but with his position among his fellows once his survival 
has been secured. Consequently, the selfishness of man has limits; his will to 
power has none."88
88 Letter to Kenneth Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation, Dec.23, 1959, Morgenthau Papers, Box 49. 
84 Letter to Samuel Magill, January 5 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 39.
88 Morgenthau, La Notion du "Politique" pp.42-43, cited in Honig, 'Totalitarianism and Realism', 
p.287. Scientific Man Vs Power Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1974 (1946)) pp. 192-193
86 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R.J Hollingdale, (Penguin Classics, 1961) 
p. 137. "Exploitation...pertains to the essence of the living thing as a fundamental organic function, it is 
a consequence of the intrinsic will to power which is precisely the will of life." Beyond Good and 
Evil, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Penguin Classics 1973, revised edition 1990) p.259.
87 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and E v il, p.l3.
88 Morgenthau, Scientific Man , p. 193. Reinhold Niebuhr made the similar claim that "every group, as 
every individual, has expansive desires which are rooted in the instinct of survival and soon extend 
beyond it. The will-to-live becomes the will-to-power." See his Moral Man and Immoral Society 
(Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1960 [1932] ) p. 18,
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There are, manifestly, any number of problems involved in assuming 
this sort of universal lust for power, including the obviously questionable 
animomorphism. Morgenthau's difficulties with the assumption of power 
maximisation will be explored in detail in the next chapter. For the moment it 
is enough to note that it gave rise to similar tensions and inconsistencies in 
the works of both men. As Janko Lavrin has pointed out "...Nietzsche does 
not make it clear whether such 'will to power' operates as an independent 
agent, or as a predetermined tool of 'necessity', or else as a kind of Bergsonian 
élan vital." 89 in Morgenthau too, as we shall see, there is a persistent tension 
between the notion of power maximisation as some sort of mechanistic 
natural phenomenon or the product of deliberate choices on the part of 
statesmen.
It is, I hope, not an overextension to make the claim that links can be 
drawn between Nietzsche's prophecy of the rise of the Übermensch, Weber's 
hopes for the emergence of 'charismatic leadership', and Morgenthau's call for 
the revivification of the skills of the d ip lo m a t .^ ^  A H  three were compelled to 
place their faith in man in a godless universe; in Zarathustra's words : "All 
gods are dead: now we want the Superman to live...".^^ All three hoped that 
exceptional men could help to break the 'iron cage' of a suffocating modernity, 
again, to quote Zarathustra: "Overcome, you Higher Men, the petty virtues, 
the petty prudences, the sand-grain discretion, the ant-swarm inanity, 
miserable ease, the happiness of the greatest n u m b e r ! " ^ ^  i^  ^the market place, 
as Zarathustra observes, "...no-one believes in Higher Men."^8 M orgenthau 
would not have subscribed to the extreme illiberalism of Nietzsche's 
sum m ary bu t there is a comparable sense in which he hopes for the 
emergence of an exceptional elite of diplomats able to transcend the noise of
89 Janko Lavrin, Nietzsche (Studio Vista, London, 1971) p.85.
90 'Higher Man' may be a better translation than the usual 'Superman', particularly given the latter's 
unavoidable association in English-speaking countries with the Man of Steel 1
91 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra , p. 102
92 ibid. p.298.
93 ibid. p.297.
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the market and the hatreds of mass-based international politics. A similar 
genealogy can be outlined from Nietzsche through Weber to Morgenthau in 
terms of their subscription to a consequentialist ethics, an 'ethics of 
responsibility' which is juxtaposed against Kant's categorical imperative, an 
'ethics of absolute c o n v i c t i o n ' . ^ 4  problems this presented for both Weber
and Morgenthau will be explored later in the chapter.
Finally, we can see quite clearly that M orgenthau and Nietzsche 
shared a similar sense of modernistic angst, of a common quest for moral and 
existential meaning. The dilemma was the same: in a godless universe with 
man as merely another form of animal where could moral foundations be 
found? Neither, I would suggest, was ever able to provide a satisfactory 
answer. Marshall Berman, in his well known book on the phenomenon of 
m odernity, asserts that "Nietzsche's own stance towards the perils of 
modernity is to embrace them all with joy... As ardently as Marx, he asserts 
his faith in a new kind of man..."95 This strikes me as a grossly one-sided 
reading. To be sure, Nietzsche does his best to convince himself that this is, 
indeed, the case. In his 1882 resolution for the New Year he writes that "...I 
want to be at all times hereafter only an affirmer."96 Even so it is a strange 
kind of affirmer, and an even stranger kind of prophet, who seems to recoil 
from virtually everything he encounters in the world. Nietzsche, in his thinly 
disguised alter-ego of Zarathustra, seems dismayed by all that he encounters 
on his travels, continually returning to the refuge of his mountain lair.97 A 
more balanced reading of Nietzsche is that of an individual torn between the 
engagement with and the flight from m odernity.98 Nothing illustrates this 
antinomy better than his convoluted relationship with Richard Wagner:
94 See for example Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pp.44-46.
98 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air (Verso, London, 1983) p.23.
96 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (Random House, 1974) p.276.
97 Nietzsche/Zarathustra's alienation seems clear enough: "When I went to men for the first time, I 
committed the folly of hermits, the great folly: I set myself in the market-place. And when I spoke to 
everyone, I spoke to no one." Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra , p.296.
98 The story of Nietzsche's own life is, of course, that he led an increasingly hermit-like asocial 
existence until his final mental breakdown.
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simultaneously seduced and revolted by Wagner's music and the romantic 
escape that it proffered from the problems of modernity. Hans Morgenthau, 
too, shared this ambivalence as I will show in chapter three.
The ambivalence of engagement was also reflected in Morgenthau's 
response to the work of Karl Mannheim. Mannheim is best known for his 
contribution to what has come to be called 'the sociology of knowledge'. In 
Mannheim's case, as Raymond Aron has pointed out, this amounted to a 
rather odd amalgam of Marxism and historicism.99 Mannheim was part of a 
group of left-wing writers in pre-World War One Budapest who subscribed 
to Georg Lukacs’s belief that intellectuals ought to be at the vanguard of 
progressive social c h a n g e . in the context of Weimar Germany Mannheim 
suggested that the intelligentsia could provide at least a partial solution to one 
of the central problems of modernity: Weber's 'iron cage' of bureaucratisation, 
specialisation, and instrumental rationality. In his influential work Ideology 
and Utopia, first published in 1929, Mannheim accepted the essentially 
m arxist/m aterialist proposition that ideas were a function of a class or 
groups social position.^o^ Unlike Marx, however, Mannheim did not believe 
that a particular class or group (i.e. the proletariat) was the bearer of a 
universal truth and the others of a false c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ^^ 2 instead we have a 
relativistic, historicist image of classes and other social groups unable to see 
beyond the limitation of their own socially determ ined perspectives. 
Mannheim claimed that the only "...unanchored, relatively (Mannheim's
99 Raymond Aron, German Sociology, trans. Mary and Thomas Bottomore, (William Heinemann, 
London, 1957) pp. 55-56.
On Mannheim's Hungarian experiences see H.Stuart Hughes, The Sea Change: The Migration of 
Social Thought 1930-1965 (Harper and Row, London, 1975) p.76; Edward Sagarin and Robert J. Kelly, 
'Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge', in The Legacy o f the German Refugee Intellectuals, 
ed. Robert Boyer, (Schollen Books, New York, 1972) p.273.
Karl Mannheim, Idelogy and Utopia, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, (Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner and Co. Ltd, London, 1936). EH Carr was another to be heavily influenced by Mannheim. See 
Charles Jones, 'Carr: Ambivalent Realist', in Post-Realism: the rhetorical turn in international 
relations, eds. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, (Michigan State University Press, 1996) pp. 101- 
102.
102 Mannheim, Idelogy and Utopia, p. 137. in addition to Marx, Mannheim suggested that Nietzche 
was "the other source of the modern theory of ideology and of the sociology of knowledge."
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emphasis) classless stratum  is, to use Alfred Weber's terminology, the 
"socially unattached intelligentsia"4^3 These 'free floating’ intellectuals could, 
Mannheim suggested, seek refuge in romantic and religious transcendence or 
in the conscious renunciation of a "direct participation in the historical 
process" but his hope was that the intelligentsia would assume a vital 
political function: the "special task" of providing "an interpretation of the 
world for [each] society."404
Hans Morgenthau's reaction to all of this was an ambiguous one. In 
his Fragment of an Intellectual Biography he discusses his exposure to Marxism 
and 'modern sociology' through meeting scholars and attending lectures held 
under the auspices of the Institut filr Sozialforschung at the University of 
Frankfurt:
"I was particularly struck and repelled by the contrast between the real 
political situation in Germany and the futile hair-splitting in which the 
ordinary members of the Institut engaged. The Nazi enemy was standing at 
the gate, aided and abetted from within, and these intelligent and learned 
people, the natural enemies and designated victims of Nazism, found nothing 
better to do than search for the true meaning of one statement by Marx as 
over against another. On the evening before I left Germany I attended a 
lecture at the Institut - if memory serves, the speaker was Karl Mannheim - 
that was dedicated to the proposition of the decisive role "free-floating 
intelligence" had to play in the struggle against Nazism. More and more I 
came to appreciate Marx's statement to his son-in-law: "Moi, }e ne suis pas 
Marxiste"
This public expression of exasperation at Mannheim's naivete is 
balanced by much more favourable private r e m a r k s . 4 0 6  And it is possible.
(03 ibid. p. 137.
(04 ibid. pp. 9,233.
105 Morganthau 'Fragment', p. 14.
(06 See, for example, the letter to Thomas Robinson in which he confirms that Mannheim was an 
important influence. Letter to Thomas W. Robinson, 3 November 1969, Morgenthau Papers, Box 49.
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once again, to point to direct intellectual links. Morgenthau's treatm ent of 
ideology as a disguise (often unconscious) for the pursuit of interest appears 
to be draw n almost directly from Mannheim. In a letter to Edward Shils 
M orgenthau claimed that "...I find after re-reading Mannheim that the 
meaning in which I use the term corresponds exactly to his concept of 
"particular ideology" to which the idea of disguise is essential."407 Mamaheim, 
in common with so many other German intellectuals, accepted that liberalism 
served to mask the real essence of politics:
"The rise of the bourgeoisie was attended by an extreme intellectualism. 
Intellectualism, as it was used in this connection, refers to a mode of thought 
which either does not see the elements in life and in thought which are based 
on will, interest, emotion, and Weltanschauung - or, if it does recognise their 
existence, treats them as though they were equivalent to the intellect and 
believes that they may be mastered by and subordinated to reason. This 
bourgeois intellectualism expressly demanded such a scientific politics, and 
actually proceeded to found such a d i s c i p l i n e ."408
This neatly encapsulates the main theme of Morgenthau's first book Scientific 
Man Vs. Power Politics. Morgenthau's apparent scepticism towards the idea of 
'free floating intelligence' is a reflection of a deeply rooted ambivalence rather 
than a firmly held rejection of the idea. Indeed, as we shall see in chapter 
three, Morgenthau came to accept that the intellectual had both the capacity 
and the duty to engage with the political sphere, to speak 'truth to power'.
In this he was following the example of Max Weber who was by some 
distance his most important intellectual influence. This should come as little 
surprise given Max Weber's status as one of the most important intellectuals 
of the last hundred years. He is one of the few authors of his period who is 
able to 'speak' so directly to an audience of our time. One only has to look
((4?Letter to Edward Shils, December 31 1947, Morgenthau Papers, Box 174. He makes a public 
acknowledgement of this intellectual debt in his Politics Among Nations (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 
1948) p.68.
108 Mannheim, Ideology , p. 108.
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around to see a swarm of bureaucrats, in their contemporary guise of 
'managers', invading every sphere of hum an endeavour much as Weber had 
anticipated. Morgenthau considered his exposure to Weber to have been one 
of the most important experiences of his life409
"Weber's political thought possessed all the intellectual and moral qualities I 
had looked for in vain in the contemporary literature inside and outside the 
universities. For one who has not lived through this period of German 
history, it is impossible to visualise the ignorance, confusion, meanness, and 
general moral and intellectual degradation that dominated German public life 
and upon which the authority of great scholars bestowed a semblance of 
moral and intellectual legitimacy. Weber was everything m ost of his 
colleagues pretended to be but were not. While as a citizen he was a 
passionate observer of tire political scene and a frustrated participant in it, as a 
scholar he looked at politics w ithout passion and pursued no political 
purpose beyond the intellectual one of understanding."440
Though sometimes omitted from the ahistorical pantheon of 'realist' 
thinkers he is actually a far more important figure than the 'usual suspects' 
rounded up: Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes et al.^n Given his importance 
to Morgenthau and to realism in general we need to examine Weber at some
length. 412
Max Weber
Weber has been a figure of some controversy for much of the 
twentieth century and the subject of dramatically disparate a s s e s s m e n t s . 4 4 3
(((9 See the transcript of the 'Values in Contemporary Society' Rockefeller Foundation Conference of 
July 13, 1972, p.37, Morgenthau Papers, Box 174.
( ((( Morgenthau, 'Fragment' p.7.
( ( ( Smith's Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger is an exception.
((2 Arnold Wolfers was one of the few contemporaries of Morgenthau to be aware that he was 
following in Weber's footsteps. See his 'Statesmanship and Moral Choice', World Politics, Vol. 1, 1948,
p. 180.
((3 Lawrence Scaff lists the following 'well-worn categories': 'Weber as "founder" of sociology 
(Parsons, Bendix), leader of the "revolt against positivism" (Hughes), theoretician of Machtpolitik  
(Mommsen, Aron), defender of "bourgeois reason" (Marcuse, Lukacs), or proponent of "decisionism" 
and "value nihilism" (Habermas, Strauss). See Lawrence Scaff, Fleeing the Iron Cage:Culture, 
Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber (University of California Press, 1989) p.3.
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For some he is the standard-bearer for a positivist, value-free social enquiry; 
for others, including Leo Strauss and Alasdair Macintyre, Weber is "the most 
important contemporary representative of the position they oppose" that is, 
'individualism', 'historicism', 'machiavellianism', 'nietzcheanism' and so on.444 
Similarly, very different readings can be made of W eber’s approach to 
politics. One could see him as contextually liberal in his commitment to 
parliam entary democracy, his challenge to the habitual worship of the 
German state and in his public opposition to extreme German ambitions 
during W orld War One. Students and colleagues of Weber did much to 
promote this sort of i m a g e . 4 4 5  jt is also possible to indict Weber as a red- 
blooded Machtpolitiker who accepted that international politics was an arena 
for perpetual struggle. Wolfgang Mommsen made this claim in his 1959 work 
Max Weber and die Deutsche Politik where he asserted that the 'national power 
state' was Weber's ultimate political ideal.446 Many of these debates erupted 
during the German Sociological Congress held in Heidelberg in 1964 to mark 
the centenary of Weber's b i r t h . 4 i 7  Jürgen Habermas, the heir to a somewhat 
different tradition of German thought, challenged both Talcott Parsons' 
understanding of Weber as a positivist and the 'liberal' interpretation of 
Weber's international politics. Indeed, for Habermas Carl Schmitt was 
Weber's 'natural son'.448
As is the case with most thinkers of any importance, a num ber of 
plausible readings are possible and I lay no claim to being able to provide the 
definitive one here. Even so it does seem that the first of these disputes, that of 
Weber as 'positivist' is perhaps the easier of the two to resolve. For the more 
one learns of Weber, in contextual terms, the more deeply implausible the
((4 Charles Turner, Modernity and Politics in the Work o f Max Weber (London, Routledge, 1992) 
p.24.
( (8 Smith, Realist Thought, pp.27-28.
((6 ibid. p.28.
((7 The conference papers and discussion are reproduced in Otto Stammer (ed.). Max Weber and 
Sociology Today (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971).
((8 ibid. pp.61-65.
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'charge' (as it usually is) of 'positivism' becomes. To begin with, Weber 
entirely accepted Wilhelm Dilthey's division of Naturwissenschaft, the natural 
sciences, from Geisteswissenschaft, the humanities (for w ant of a precise 
translation). It seemed obvious to Dilthey that the sorts of universal 
generalisations and hypotheses which were possible in the natural sciences 
were impossible for human beings, self-reflective and infinite of variety. This 
fundamental epistemological distinction challenged positivist claims about 
the unity of method. Nature, Dilthey suggested, could be studied via causal 
explanation {Erklaren), and the mental life characteristic of the humanities via 
understanding (Verstehen)}'^'^ Hum an beings as subjects simply cannot be 
'known' in the same way that an object like a tree can be. Hence the meaning 
of social actions can only be gleaned on the basis of an em pathetic 
reconstruction from 'the inside looking out' as it were rather than 'explained' 
from the 'outside looking in'.420
This does not mean, for Weber drawing upon Dilthey and Rickert in 
opposition to W indelband, that particularity and contingency deny the 
possibility of any form of general claims about hum an actions and their 
meaning.42iWeber draws upon two mediating tools here. The first is that 
general concepts - social science categories - can be used to illuminate the 
behaviour of individuals. These 'ideal types' as Weber referred to them are 
fictitious constructs.422 There is no 'correspondence theory of truth' here, no
((9 See Wilhelm Dilthey 'The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Studies' (excerpts) in 
H.P. Rickman (ed, trans.), W.Dilthey Selected Writings (Cambridge University Press, 1976) pp. 170- 
245.
120 por a much fuller treatment of these issues and their relevance for contemporary accounts of 
international politics see Matin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990).
(21 For a detailed description of this intellectual lineage see John Patrick Diggins, Max Weber: 
Politics and the Spirit of Tragedy (Basic Books, New York, 1996) pp. 113-125.
(22 it is convenient for the sociologist from time to time to employ average types of an empirical 
statistical character, concepts which do not require methodological discussion. But when reference is 
made to "typical" cases the term should always be understood, unless otherwise stated, as meaning 
ideal types, which may in turn be rational or irrational..." Max Weber, Economy and Society (3 
volumes), Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich trans., (Bedminster Press, New York, 1968) V ol.l p.22.
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direct relationship between knowledge and its object. Weber is explicit on this 
point:
"In no case does [the theoretically conceived ideal type of subjective meaning] 
refer to an objectively "correct" meaning or one which is "true" in some 
metaphysical sense."423
Secondly, the possibilities for moving beyond particularity  are 
heightened by ascribing to hum an actions a sense of rationality, of 
purposiveness. Weber drew up a typology of 'social action' based around a 
four-fold distinction between behaviour which is:
"1) instrumentally rational (Zweckrational ), that is, determined by expectations 
as to the behaviour of objects in the environment and of otlier hum an beings; 
these expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for the attainment of 
the actor's own rationally purposed and calculated ends;
2) value rational {Wertrational ), that is, determined by a conscious belief in 
the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of 
behaviour independently of its prospects of success;
3) affectual (especially emotional), that is, determined by the actor's specific 
affects and feeling states;
4) traditional, that is, determined by ingrained habituation."424
The most important categories for Weber are those of value and 
instrumental rationality. Weber describes a pure value rational orientation as: 
"...the actions of persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act 
to put into practice their convictions of what seems to them to be required by 
duty, honour, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the 
importance of some "cause" no matter in what it consists."425 
Action can only be considered instrumentally rational:
(23 ibid. p.4. 
(24 idid. p.24. 
(28 ibid. p.25.
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"...when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally 
taken into account and weighed. This involves rational consideration of 
alternative means to the end, of the relations of the end to the secondary 
consequences, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends. 
Determination of action either in affectual or in traditional terms is thus 
incompatible with this type. "426 (emphasis added)
This is important because Weber accepted that instrumental rationality 
was coming to define the predominant form of social action. Weber accepted 
Tonnies' distinction between communal {vergemeinschaftung) and associative 
(vergellschaftung) forms of social relationship, between Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft, though he saw these as continuous rather than dichotomous 
social forms.427pven so it is clear that for Weber, as for Tonnies, Gesellschaft is 
increasingly coming to replace Gemeinschaft. In this, as in so many other 
respects, Weber was a quintessential modernist.
Irreligious from the age of fifteen, Weber, like Nietzsche, explored the 
problem of establishing meaningful foundations for human existence in a 
godless u n i v e r s e . 4 2 8  'Meaning' was becoming increasingly problematic in a 
world dominated by the rise of capitalism and its highly specialised division 
of labour and attendant bureaucracy. Capitalism, originally part of a 
protestant ascetic which had as its end the service of God, had become 
secularised and the acquisition of wealth an end in itself rather than a means 
to a greater end. Capitalism had once been a light cloak which the 'saint' could 
set aside "... but fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron c a g e . " 4 2 9  
This 'iron cage' is reinforced by the ubiquity of bureaucracy:
(26 ibid. p.26.
(27 ibid. pp.40-46.
(28 On Weber's atheism see Marianne Weber, Max Weber: A Biography trans. H.Zehn, (Wiley, New 
York, 1975) p.57.
(29 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons, (Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1930). Charles Turner suggests that Weber may have drawn this metaphor from his 
reading of Nietzsche. Turner, Modernity and Politics in the Work of Max Weber, p. 142
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"The development of modern forms of organisation in all fields is nothing less 
than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic 
administration. This is true of church and state, of armies, political parties, 
economic enterprises, interest groups, endow m ents, clubs, and many
others."430
Bureaucracy is not, of course, an invention of modernity "[b]ut no country 
and no age has ever experienced, in the same sense as the modern Occident, 
the absolute and complete dependence of its whole existence, of the political, 
technical, and economic conditions of its life, on a specially trained 
organisation of officials."43i Bureaucracy is far more persistent and 'escape- 
p roof it its connection with rational specialisation than "other historical 
agencies of the modern rational order of life."432
This form of modern organisation tends to produce social action 
based upon the exercise of instrumental rationality. In one sense this is a 
welcome development for Weber because he is sympathetic towards forms of 
ethical practice which concern themselves with means-ends balancing and the 
assessment of consequences. As we shall see later, Weber wishes to juxtapose 
a consequentialist 'ethic of responsibility' against an 'ethic of conviction'. The 
difficulty is that the last element in Weber's description of instrumental 
rationality, the weighing up of 'the relative importance of different possible 
ends', has become deeply problematic for hum an beings as mere cogs in a 
highly specialised division of labour. This is modernity's paradoxical twist: 
the advance of rational forms of social organisation problematises the rational 
contemplation of substantive values. As I have already suggested in at least 
one reading this is where Weber's vision ends with humanity locked into an
130 Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1 p.223.
131 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 16.
132 Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 3 p. 1401.
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'iron cage' of marxian alienation and a kind of grim fatalism. Did Weber offer 
us any alternatives to the 'disenchantment of the world' ?433
In this conflict of the "requirement of meaningfulness" with "the 
empirical realities of the world" there was always the possibility of the 
'escape' from modernity through the rejection of politics and the political 
sphere.434 'Escape', Weber suggested, could manifest itself in a number of 
different forms: mysticism, an ethic of "absolute goodness", the "irrationalities 
of non-religious emotionalism, above all eroticism’, or in "a world-fleeing 
romanticism" like "the flight to the people" (e.g. socialism and Tolstoy's 
worship of the peasantry) or Rousseau's retreat to a mythical nature 
uncorrupted by society.435 The intellectual was confronted with this dilemma 
in a particularly acute form for two reasons, the first due to a natural 
tendency to "conceive of the world as a problem of meaning" and the second 
because of the intellectual's position of relative detachment from the 'iron 
cage' of the modern division of labour. 436 the Germany of Weber's time the 
escape of the intellectual was increasingly taking the form of the bellicose 
hypernationalism  discussed earlier. The chief culprit from W eber's 
perspective was Heinrich von Treitschke w hom  he condem ned for 
"...politiciz[ing] his students, fill[ing] them with enthusiasm for Bismarck and 
the Hohenzollern dynasty, and stirr[ing] up anti-Semitism among them."437
This brings us back to the original point about the charge of 
'positivism' because it enables us to grasp Weber's repeated calls for 'value- 
neutrality' and 'objectivity' in the intellectual sphere. Instead of seeing this as 
some sort of universal methodological precept it may make better sense for us
133 Weber, 'Science as a Vocation', in From Max Weber, H.H Gerth, C.Wright Mills (ed,trans.), 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1948) p. 155.
134 Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 2 p.506.
(35 ibid. pp.506, 601.
136 Weber would not, however, have accepted the stronger Mannheimian treatment of intellectuals as 
'free-floating' agents.
(37 Marianne Weber, Max Weber, p. 119. Similarly, though Weber was impressed with the sheer 
artistry of Stefan George's poetry he was deeply critical of George's mystical aesthetic. See p.457.
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to see it as a kind of rigorous ascetic, an ethical code of conduct for 
intellectuals.
Weber's call for value neutrality in the classroom did not extend to an 
intellectual's activities outside it and any discussion of Weber's own system of 
values leads us inevitably to 'the political' and international politics. However 
unpalatable it may be for some of his many admirers, there is no denying that 
Weber was a German nationalist who fully supported Germany's claims to 
dominance in Central Europe and a broader imperial role. This position was 
in many respects a natural extension of his understanding of the nature of 
political life. "All politics", Weber asserted, "is oriented to raison d'etat and to 
the autonomous end of maintaining the external and internal distribution of 
p o w e r . " 4 3 8  Furthermore "the prestige of power means in practice the glory of 
power over other communities; it means the expansion of power..."439More 
broadly, "violent social action is obviously something absolutely primordial. 
Every group, from the household to the political party, has always resorted to 
physical violence when it had to protect the interests of its members and was 
capable of doing s o . " 4 4 0
It is also true that there are moments in Weber when 'the political' 
goes beyond an ontological reality and assumes an almost existential 
importance. Hence the fact that "the individual is expected ultimately to face 
death in the group interest ... gives to the political community its particular 
pathos and raises its enduring emotional f o u n d a t i o n s . "441 The clearest 
evidence of this element is to be found in his famous essay Science as a 
Vocation in which he wonders whether death has become meaningless for 
"the civilised m a n . " 4 4 2  Similarly, Marianne Weber reports a wartime outburst 
(admittedly made in 1914 rather than 1918!) in which Weber claimed that
138 Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 2, pp.600-601 
(39 ibid. p.910.
(40 ibid. pp.904-905. There is no suggestion of a Schmittian ethical dualism in Weber. He sees 
elements of struggle within even the most intimate of human relationships. See page 636.
(41 ibid. p.903
(42 'Science as a Vocation', p. 140.
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"despite its hideousness this war is great and wonderful and worth
experiencing. "443
An alternative portrait would distance Weber from both Schmitt and 
the extreme wing of German nationalism. When set contextually Weber's 
nationalism appears quite moderate. He sought - in vain - to moderate the 
fantastically ambitious annexationist plans that were being widely touted 
during the First World War. He pointed to the potential dangers posed by the 
mere "power politician" the "parvenu-like braggart with power."444 Nor was 
Weber an uncritical worshipper of the Maachstaat. He warned against reified, 
organic understandings of the state.445 Nothing better reflects Weber's ability 
to observe a critical detachment from German power politics than his 
condemnation of the 'unrestrained adulation' of Bismarck. Bismarck’s 
domination of German politics, Weber suggested, robbed Germany of its 
ability to exercise political judgement, leaving "a nation accustomed to 
fatalistic sufferance of all decisions made in the name of monarchic
government."446
As Walker has pointed out, Weber's (and later Hans Morgenthau's) 
unease with a pure power politics led Weber to juxtapose a so-called 'ethics of 
responsibility' against both an ethics of absolute conviction and the 
instrumental calculation of means to fixed e n d s . 4 4 7  in this Weber was not only 
concerned w ith the extreme nationalism of the right but also w ith the 
politically irresponsible actions of the left. Bolsheviks and Spartacists, Weber 
suggested, exercise violence under the conviction that, as their ends were just, 
they were free to use any means at their d i s p o s a l . 4 4 8  Such individuals were 
acting under the delusion that they could free themselves from the inherent
(43 Marianne Weber, Max Weber, p.522.
(44 Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in From Max Weber, p. 116.
(45 Weber, Economy and Society, Vol.l p. 14.
(46 See Weber, Economy and Society’, Vol.3, pp. 1385-1392.
(47 R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: international relations as political theory (Cambridge University 
Press, 1993) p.32.
(48 Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', pp.l 19.
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ethical ambiguity of political action, the tragedy that political life often 
amounted to a choice amongst relative evils:
"No ethics in the world can dodge the fact that in numerous instances the 
attainment of 'good' ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay 
the price of using morally dubious means or at least dangerous ones - and 
facing the possibility or even the probability of evil ramifications. From no 
ethics in the world can it be concluded when and to what extent the ethically 
good purpose 'justifies' the ethically dangerous means and ramifications."449 
"Diabolical forces", he warns us, are "lurking in all violence."450
Though he initially establishes an ethic of absolute ends and an ethic 
of responsibility as irreconcilable opposites, by the end of the essay his 
position has become more ambiguous. It is, Weber suggests;
"immensely moving when a mature man ... acts by following an ethic of 
responsibility and somewhere reaches the point where he says: 'here I stand; I 
can do no other.' ...And every one of us who is not spiritually dead must 
realise the possibility of finding himself at some time in that position. In so far 
as this is true, an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility are not 
absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a 
genuine man - a man who can have the 'calling for politics'.
In this potential meeting of instrumental and value rationality Weber 
at least tempers the grim fatalism of his reading of modernity but the space 
opened up for ethical conduct is both circumscribed and fraught with 
difficulties. Just as there is no rational way to determine what constitutes a 
responsible choice of ends there is, equally, no rational way to decide upon 
what constitutes a responsible choice of means. This relativism, this lack of 
solid foundations, presented a problem which has, as Walker has also pointed 
out, bedevilled much of the realist analysis of international politics, in its
149 ibid. p. 121.
150 ibid. p.125-126.
151 ibid. p. 127
59
'classical' vein at least.432 And certainly, his choice of end - the strengthening 
of the German nation state and its rightful place in world politics - in 
combination with his view of political life as 'tragic', offered little prospect for 
the amelioration of international conflict. Even setting aside, for the moment, 
the question of how to identify an ethics of responsibility, Weber was faced 
with the further task of specifying the sort of 'genuine man' suitable for 
politics and imbued w ith the appropriate combination of 'passion and 
perspective.'453 The problem was that the m odern division of labour had 
produced a type of bureaucratic man who lived from  politics rather than for 
i t  154 Politics as a vocation had been replaced by politics as a profession.
Weber's antidote to bureaucracy was the irrationalism of ' c h a r i s m a ' 4 5 5  
"There is the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace 
(charisma), the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in 
revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership. This is 
'charismatic' domination, as exercised by the prophet or - in the field of 
politics - by the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the great 
demagogue, or the political party l e a d e r . " 4 5 6
Charismatic leaders have "emerged in all places and in all historical epochs" 
but modern bureaucracy was serving to stifle them.457 Weber hoped that a 
fundamental reorganisation of German political institutions would help to 
counteract modern developments. In particular, he looked to a strong 
Reichstag and Prussian House of Representatives which would act as a 
counterweight to bureaucracy by encouraging, through competition for office.
152 Walker, Inside/Outside, p.58.
153 Weber, 'Science as a Vocation', p. 128. See also 'Politics as a Vocation’, p. 115.
154 Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. Ill p.1427. See also 'Politics as a Vocation', p.l 15.
155 "The term "charisma" will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of 
which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least 
specifically exceptional powers or qualities." Weber, Economy and Society, Vol.l, p.244.
156 'Politics as a Vocation' p.79.
(57 ibid. p.80.
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the emergence of charismatic leaders who would control the masses in a 
'plebiscitarian democracy' through the use of 'responsible d e m a g o g u e r y ' 4 5 8
The most immediate problem with this approach is obvious to anyone 
with an awareness of the subsequent course of German history for a 
'charismatic demagogue' did indeed appear in the form of one Adolf Hitler 
who would, no doubt, have horrified Weber in every respect. And once again 
we have no formal criteria with which to assess what a 'responsible leader' 
should look like. Weber's own judgements offer little for us to develop upon. 
As Michael Joseph Smith has pointed out, Bismarck clearly possessed both 
charisma and a clear commitment to an ethics of responsibility but he was 
also found wanting by W e b e r . 4 5 9
Weber's wrestling with the antinomies, the perils, of m odernity is 
important because so many intellectuals in International Relations were faced 
with the same dilemma: EH Carr, Raymond Aron and many others, above all, 
Hans M orgenthau. M orgenthau's attem pt to come to terms w ith the 
Nietzchean/W eberian legacy will be examined in greater detail in the next 
chapter but I do, for the moment, wish to sketch an outline.
In considering Weber's broader contribution to realism Michael Joseph 
Smith points to five pertinent themes: 1) his definitions of the state and 
politics; 2) his conflictual understanding of the nature of international politics; 
3) his nationalism; 4) his emphasis upon the cultivation of leadership; 5) his 
belief that statecraft needed to be informed by an ethics of responsibility.460 
The first of these is clear enough. In so far as realists have given much 
thought to the 'black box' of the state at all it is to Weber's definition of the 
state they have turned.4 Similarly, Weber's understanding of the nature of
(58 ibid. p. 103.
(59 Smith, Realist Thought, pp.51-52.
(60 ibid. p. 15.
(6( "A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a "state" insofar as 
its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force in the enforcement of its order." Weber, Economy and Society, Vol.l, p.54.
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pow er has been w idely accepted462 phat in ternational politics is 
fundamentally conflictual is the sin qua non of realism.
Weber does, however, at least try to qualify any suggestion of a 
deterministic bias in his assessment of international politics. While "the 
prestige of power means in practice the glory of pow er over other 
communities..." and great powers are often expansive, they "...are not 
necessarily and not always oriented towards expansion."463 Whether political 
structures will seek to project their power also incorporates, Weber suggests, 
"a specific internal dynamic".464 This points towards â fundamental point of 
tension in Morgenthau’s work, namely his apparent readiness to claim that 
power maximisation was a ubiquitous, natural phenomenon while at the 
same time attem pting to reject more explicitly scientistic treatments of 
international politics based on precisely this claim. In his treatm ent of 
statecraft he was, again, torn between free will and determinism, as we shall 
see in chapter two.465
Turning to Weber's nationalism provides us with the clearest point of 
difference with Morgenthau. Morgenthau was, of course, aware that he was 
living through a period of world history in which the most virulent kind of 
nationalism was dominating the conduct of interstate politics. Under such 
circumstances the best that he felt possible for hum anity was for the 
respective national interests to be pursued in a prudential way. He was 
nonetheless, and this is one of the least well appreciated aspects of 
M orgenthau, deeply cosmopolitan in his personal sympathies: hardly 
surprising in an émigré Jew excluded from the membership of his own nation. 
This profound paradox, this vast gap as Morgenthau saw it between is and
162 general, we understand by 'power' the chance of a man or men to realize their own will in a 
social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action." ibid. Vol.II, 
p.926.
(63 ibid. pp.911-912.
(64 ibid. p.910.
(65 This is hardly a dilemma unique to Morgenthau but his handling of it is, I will suggest in chapter 
two, deeply unconvincing.
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ought, gave much of his work a pathos which, if anything, was even more 
pronounced than in Weber.
In terms of the fifth general point identified by Smith, Weber's ethics 
of responsibility was also an essential component of Morgenthau's outlook 
and his treatment of it will be explored in chapter two. Leadership and the 
rejuvenation of statecraft were of deep importance to Morgenthau and the 
problems he faced in articulating this vision within the context of modernity 
will also be considered in the next chapter.
Above all, Morgenthau accepted Weber's belief that the intellectual 
had a duty to engage in the public sphere and Weber’s own example was a 
source of much inspiration. Though accepting the fundamental principle, both 
men struggled throughout their lives to determine precisely what form their 
involvement should take. Weber often toyed with the idea of a political career 
though he never actually served in any form of elected public office despite 
the fact that many of those in his closest circles, including his wife, did so and 
his involvement with professional organisations was always uncomfortable 
and mostly b r i e f .4 6 6  Morgenthau, too, flirted w ith the idea w ithout ever 
bringing himself to pursue public office, elected or appointed, in the 
aggressive and self-promoting manner so often essential. Morgenthau, like 
Weber, was never entirely at ease in the spotlight of public and professional 
life.
A further parallel lies in the irony that while both men are known for 
their acceptance of power politics they also acted as powerful critics of their 
country's respective military adventures. Weber tried, in vain, to moderate 
German ambitions during World War One and he did not permit the death of 
his own brother in the fighting to cloud this judgement. Morgenthau became 
one of the leaders of the anti-Vietnam War movement at some personal cost: 
his conscripted son Matthew was victimised because of his father's activities
(66 Lawrence A. Scaff, Fleeing the Iron Cage, pp. 1-2.
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and official forms of harassment included annual Internal Revenue audits of 
his taxation claims. Both men, as moderates, were m isunderstood and 
m istrusted in their increasingly polarised societies. For volkisch, hyper­
nationalist right-wingers Weber was an irrelevant 'nineteenth century m a n . '467 
For the left he was merely another reactionary. Similarly, Morgenthau's 
nuanced opposition based on an ethics of responsibility and a careful 
consideration of the national interest was largely unintelligible both to cold 
warriors and their radical left opponents. Above all, Morgenthau's Weberian 
emphasis on political life as the realm of tragedy proved, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, untranslatable in the very different environment of the 
United States.
Carl Schmitt: the Primacy of the Political
Carl Schmitt, like Weber, had a powerful influence upon Morgenthau 
who has suggested that his own doctoral dissertation was, in part, conceived 
as a reply to Schmitt's The Concept of the Political}^^Sch.mitt owes his status as 
one of the twentieth century's most infamous political thinkers to two factors, 
the foremost being the services he rendered to Nazism in the 1930s, most 
notably in the legal opinion he wrote in justification of Hitler's 'Blood Purge' 
of 1934. Schmitt's second claim to notoriety derives from his position as one 
of this century's most relentlessly ascerbic critics of both liberalism and 
political pluralism. I will return to both of these points.
In terms of Schmitt's general background there are, I would suggest, 
some similarities with Morgenthau. Schmitt, born in 1888, grew up as part of 
the Catholic minority of the Rhineland, which had been incorporated into 
Protestant Prussia in 1815. The tensions which arose as a part of this
(67 Klemperer, Germany's New Conservatism (Princeton University Press, 1957) p. 115.
Morgenthau, ‘Fragment’ p. 15. Morgenthau’s contention that this influence was both ‘negative and 
temporary’ may serve to understate the importance of the connection.
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minority's resistance to Prussian assimilation are, if not of quite the same 
m agnitude, at least similar to those experienced by the young Hans 
Morgenthau as a member of the Jewish minority. In both cases there was an 
exposure to social conflict during their formative years. Schmitt too clashed 
with his father over his educational path. The bourgeois expectations of 
Schmitt's father would, it appears, have denied him a university education 
altogether in favour of more 'practical tra in in g '.S c h m itt, likewise, came to 
the study of law despite a greater interest in the humanities, though in his 
case it doesn't appear to have been at parental behest. Schmitt also came to 
supplement his legal studies with a political and sociological awareness; 
indeed he participated in what must have been the last of the seminars given 
by Max Weber at Munich before his death.^^°
With respect to specific intellectual content, Schmitt is perhaps best 
known for the stark extremity of his conception that the essence of the truly 
political lies in the antithesis of friend and enemy:
"The Political is the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete 
antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the 
most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping."^^^
The State, in turn, can only be considered sovereign to the extent to which "...it 
is the decisive entity for the friend-or-enemy grouping...[o]therwise the 
political entity is nonexistent. It should be readily apparent that this 
represented a challenge to contemporaneous liberal and pluralist conceptions.
For Schmitt liberalism can only offer the negation of the political, it can 
never on its own produce "a positive theory of state, government, and 
politics...There exists a liberal policy of trade, church, and education, but
Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist fo r the Reich (Princeton University Press, 1983) p.7. 
ibid. p.35.
^^^Carl Schmitt, The Concept o f the Political, G.Schwab trans., (Rutgers University Press, 1976) p.29. 
"...every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a politcal one if it is 
sufficiently strong to group human beings according to friend and enemy...” p.37. 
ibid. p.39.
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absolutely no liberal politics, only a liberal critique of politics,"^^^ He makes 
similar criticisms of Cole and Laski's "so-called theory of Pluralism."^^^ 
Schmitt accepts that individuals may have commitments to a wide variety of 
social entities and institutions. He also concurs with Laski's historical example 
of Bismarck's unsuccessful challenge to the Catholic Church in Germany (the 
so-called 'Kulturkampf) as evidence that the State can be frustrated by a rival 
organisation. This, nevertheless, does not mean that the State is merely one 
kind of organisation in competition with others. Schmitt again reasserts the 
primacy of the political: under no circumstances could the Catholic Church or 
any other organisation have forbidden or prevented the German Reich under 
Bismarck from going to war. Pluralism, like liberalism, has no way to account 
for this quintessentially political feature, nor can it provide an adequate 
theory of the State which is reduced in liberal thought, Schmitt 
contemptuously suggests, to "...a revocable service for individuals and their 
free a s s o c i a t i o n s . T h i s  reiterates a long-standing German objection to 
contractarian understandings of the State.
All these objections would be irrelevant if the political - the antithesis 
of friend and enemy - had ceased to be of importance. Schmitt dismissed this 
possibility out of hand: "...rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations 
continue to group themselves according to the friend and enemy antithesis, 
that the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever present 
possibility for every people existing in the political s p h e r e . A  broader 
anthropological pessimism reinforces this temporal assessment.^^^
Liberal efforts to evade the political are either positively dangerous or 
they, more frequently, lead to the most ridiculous conceits. Hence the
ibid.p.70.
ibid.p.40. George Schwab suggests that Schmitt was the first individual in Germany to draw 
attention to ‘the Anglo-Saxon theory of Pluralism.’
ibid. pp.41-45
op.cit. p.28.
ibid. pp.55-60, 64. See also Bendersky, Carl Schmitt, pp.87-88
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Kellogg-Briand Treaty of 1928, reputedly agreed for the purpose of outlawing 
war, allowed a voluminous list of exceptions to this general commitment/^^ 
Similarly, with clear reference to the First World War, the 'w ar to end all 
wars', Schmitt asserts that "it is manifest fraud to condemn war as homicide, 
and then demand of men that they wage war, kill and be killed, so that there 
will never again be war."^^^ Indeed, Schmitt believes that war simply cannot 
be justified by reference to any ethical or juristic norms:
"War, the readiness of combatants to die, the physical killing of human beings 
who belong to the side of the enemy - all this has ... existential meaning only 
... There exists no rational purpose, no norm no matter how true, no program 
no m atter how exemplary, no social ideal no m atter how beautiful, no 
legitimacy nor legality which could justify men killing each other. If such 
physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential th rea t... 
it cannot be justified.
It follows that any notion of 'Just War' is at best a hollow delusion, at worst a 
cynical form of subterfuge. Moral convictions are of necessity a feature of 
private life outside the amoral sphere of the political.
Assigning Schmitt a political label is problematic. Bendersky's 
suggestion of 'conservative' has a certain plausibility. Schmitt shared the 
familiar German antipathy towards modernisation and was concerned that 
mass democratic forms were breaking down the distinction between state and 
society and leading to the rise of 'total' states.^^^ At the same time Schmitt was 
by no means axiomatically hostile to modern intellectual and cultural trends, 
indeed he took a keen interest in the 'expressionist' movement in art.^^^
"...England’s national honor, self-defense, the League Covenant and Locarno, welfare and 
territorial integrity of territories such as Egypt, Palestine and so forth; for France; self-defense, 
observance of the Kellogg Pact; for Poland; selLdefense, observance of the Kellogg Pact, the League 
Covenant..." Schmitt, ibid. p.50.
ibid. p.48
ibid. pp.48-49.
ibid pp.24,69.
Bendersky, Carl Schmitt, p.58.
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Moreover, most German conservatives who remained uncontaminated by 
volkisch sympathies had no real enthusiasm for Hitler's regime. Relatively 
few of them leapt into Nazi service with the kind of enthusiasm shown by 
Schmitt. It is, nonetheless, difficult to attach volkisch sympathies to Schmitt. 
It may be possible to link Schmitt with that group of Germans who glorified 
war as an end in itself, though both Schmitt himself and other commentators 
have rejected this suggestion.^^^ Leo Strauss, to the contrary, claims to have 
detected an existential commitment to the political, to the friend-enemy 
antithesis:
"...[Schmitt] affirms the political because he realizes that when the political is 
threatened, the seriousness of life is threatened. The affirmation of the 
political is in the last analysis nothing other than the affirmation of the 
moral."^^
If true this would, of course, link Schmitt with a particularly unattractive 
group of thinkers. In the absence of any direct confirmation we will have to 
leave the question open, but the suspicion remains.
The most plausible intellectual link may well be with Thomas Hobbes, 
a connection made by a number of authors and by Schmitt himself who is 
open in his admiration for Hobbes. As Strauss notes, Hobbes's state of war of 
individuals can in certain respects be considered akin to Schmitt's state of war 
of g roups though Schm itt lacked any trace of H obbes' liberal 
sympathies.^^^Schmitt invoked Hobbes directly in confirming that it was also 
his task "...to instill in man once again the mutual relation between Protection 
and Obedience..
This combination of an allegedly Hobbesian world-view and a strict 
ethical dualism precisely represents the position that Morgenthau was often
ibid pp.89-90 and see also Schwab, Tntroduction’ to Schmitt, Concept of the Political, p.7. 
Leo Strauss, ‘Comments on Carl Schmitt’s Der Begriff des Politischen in Schmitt, ibid. p.99 
Strauss, ibid. pp.88-89 
Schmitt, Concept of the Political, p.7.
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accused of subscribing to and spent much of life denying - not always 
successfully. A Times Literary Supplement review of Morgenthau's In Defense 
of the National Interest concluded that his 'doctrine' was "too near to that 
propounded in the 1930s by Carl Schmitt and other Nazi intellectuals..."1^ 7
Morgenthau was exposed to Schmitt in the early 1920s and has 
claimed that his doctoral dissertation was, at least in part, conceived as a reply 
to Schmitt's The Concept of the Political (referred to by Morgenthau as 'The 
Concept of P o l i t i c s ' ) . M o r g e n t h a u  received a letter from Schmitt 
complimenting him on the quality of his research and Morgenthau requested 
a meeting in person. He claims to have left the meeting thinking to himself 
that "now I have met the most evil man alive." This conclusion seems rather 
implausible on the basis of Morgenthau's written account which suggests 
nothing more than that Schmitt was a vain, aloof man lacking in personal 
warmth; hardly unique characteristics in a German intellectual of the period 
and hardly a sufficient basis to sustain the claim that Schmitt was evil 
incarnate.1^9
We should, perhaps, understand this passage as Morgenthau's attempt 
to distance himself from Schmitt in front of a contemporary audience. It 
should not, however, be seen as some sort of cynical rhetorical strategy as one 
critic has imp lied, Morgenthau's desire to distance himself from what
^^ 7 'Diplomacy and the National Interest', Times Literary Supplement, Friday, May 9, 1952, p.310.
188 Morgenthau, 'Fragment', p. 15. Morgenthau claims that Schmitt made adjustments to the second 
edition of The Concept of the Political on the basis of Morgenthau's critique without acknowledging 
so explicitly. Ironically, Morgenthau attacked Schmitt's universal understanding of the political on 
particularist grounds, precisely the same criticism that was to be levelled at Morgenthau and other 
post-war realists, ie "...la doctrine de Schmitt est une metaphysique qui ne fait appel que de très loin a 
la realite historique et psychologique... elle n'est pas donnée une fois pour toutes et n'est pas 
nécessairement attachée, comme telle, a la notion meme de certains objets determines. Elle est au 
contraire relative, comme toute condition est toujours relative au but poursuivi." Morgenthau, La 
notion du "politique" et la théorie des différends internationaux pp.46,49 quoted in Honig, 
'Totalitarianism and Realism' p.301.The translation runs something like the following; "Schmitt's 
doctrine is a metaphysics that resorts to historical and psychological reality only from afar... It is not 
given once and for all, and is not necessarily linked, as such, to the very notion of certain determined 
objects. On the contrary, it is relative, just as any condition is always relative to the pursued goal."
Morgenthau, 'Fragment', pp.15-16.
"...this strongly negative judgement [of Schmitt by Morgenthau} is most certainly conditioned by 
Morgenthau's attempt to distance himself from German acquaintainces that had been involved with the 
Nazi regime." Pichler, 'Godfathers of Truth', p. 192.
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Schmitt came to represent in the post World War Two period was both 
genuine and understandable. Nevertheless one cannot help but wonder 
whether M orgenthau saw in Schmitt a pale reflection of himself, of 
unpleasant realities pertaining to the hum an condition which he wished 
desperately to deny.
There is undeniably a substantial amount of intellectual kinship 
between the two. M orgenthau's critique of liberalism/ idealism will be 
considered in the following chapter. For the moment it suffices to say that 
both pointed out the ways in which liberalism had obscured the centrality of 
power and the political. In this exposure of the conceits and illusions of 
liberalism they joined with much of the German intelligentsia. More broadly, 
they can be linked with that host of unmaskers who challenged bourgeois 
com placency w ith  th rea ten ing  'realities': from Sigm und F reud 's 
psychoanalytic tunnellings beneath the bourgeois facade to Charles Darwin's 
challenge to creationism and Friedrich Nietzsche's announcement of 'the 
Death of God'. Morgenthau, too, shared Schmitt's anthropological pessimism 
as he was to make plain in Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, his first book to be 
published in the United States.
In other respects, however, there were im portant differences. 
Schmitt's amorality was anathem a to M orgenthau who rem ained an 
individual of deep ethical instincts convinced of the urgent need for the 
restoration of at least some minimal normative standards for the conduct of 
international politics. Morgenthau lamented that the shared norms, the 
commitment to certain 'rules of the game' that had informed the classic age of 
nineteenth century diplomacy had given way to the passionate, manichean 
destructiveness of twentieth century international politics. This in itself was 
not unique as it was analogous, Morgenthau suggested, to the hatreds that 
informed the pre-W estphalian religious wars of the seventeenth century. 
There was one im portant difference however: mankind's unprecedented
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technological capacity for destruction. In The Concept of the Political, first 
published in 1932, Schmitt claimed that the fight for existence, the struggle of 
the political, had "primacy over the technical means by which the battle will 
be w a g e d . . . "791 Fifteen years later the splitting of the atom and the 
construction - and use - of nuclear weapons had served to shatter this 
Schmittian axiom. Morgenthau's fears of nuclear cataclysm were central to his 
life and work in the United States. In a letter written near the end of his life he 
re-affirmed that the danger posed by nuclear weaponry represented "the 
overriding ethical issue of our time."i92 We shall see in chapter three how 
Morgenthau attacked the efforts of Herman Kahn and others to re-establish a 
Clausewitzian rationale for the conduct of nuclear war.
It is precisely in his awareness that technological change had 
presented mankind with unique dilemmas that Morgenthau was at his most 
modernistic. Nor could Morgenthau, faced with the prospect of nuclear 
annihilation, fall back upon a religious faith as did so-called 'Christian 
Realists' like Reinhold Niebuhr and Herbert Butterfield. Man, alone in the 
universe, had no refuge from the peril of nuclear cataclysm. It is this threat 
that fed so directly into Morgenthau's sense of pathos and tragedy that was 
largely absent in the environment of his new home, the United States.
It is when we turn to Morgenthau's consistently advocated solution to 
the problems of international politics in the m odern age - the revival of 
diplomacy - that the 'Morgenthau as modernist' thesis is at its weakest. One 
could well make the claim that diplomacy was a form of social dialogue that 
reached its apogee in the nineteenth century and was made redundant by the 
mass-based politics of the twentieth century. If so, calls for its renewal could 
be held to be representative of a hopelessly anachronistic conservatism as, 
indeed, one critic of Morgenthau has suggested.793 The dialectic of diplomacy
9^1 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political , p.46
9^2 Letter to Philip AJohnson, President, Council on Religion and International Affairs, Oct.2 1978, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 13.
9^3 Griffiths, Realism, Idealism and International Politics.
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and modernity in the American context will be pursued at greater length in 
chapter three.
Perhaps the most striking difference between Schmitt and Morgenthau 
lay in their very different approaches to the role of the intellectual in the 
political sphere. While respecting Schmitt's intellectual capacity, Morgenthau 
doubted "...whether any surpassed him in lack of principle and servility to his 
Nazi masters."794As has already been suggested, Schmitt is perhaps best 
known for his collaboration with Nazism in the 1930s. In May 1933, after a 
period of vacillation, Schmitt became a party member and shortly after 
declared the one-party state to be "the state of the twentieth century."795in 
November he was appointed to head the University Teachers' Group of the 
National Socialist League of German Universities.796 in a new 1933 edition of 
The Concept of the Political Schmitt removed references to Karl Marx and 
Georg Lukacs to render the work more acceptable to Nazi tastes. And, for the 
first time, elements of anti-Semitism began to appear in Schmitt's writing.797 
His most notorious intervention came in response to 'the Night of the Long 
Knives'. H itler's 'Blood Purge' of SA ('Brownshirt') leaders and other 
perceived opponents of the regime included Kurt von Schleicher for whom 
Schmitt had earlier acted as an adviser . A few weeks later Schmitt published 
an article entitled 'Der Führer Schutzt das Recht' (The Führer Protects the Law) 
which defended the legality of Hitler's actions.
Even while placing his intellect at the service of the Nazis, Schmitt 
couldn't help but reveal glimpses of political positions previously held but 
now unacceptable to Nazism. For instance, in a 1933 pam phlet Staat, 
Bewegung, Volk (State, M ovement, People) Schmitt had proposed a
9^4 Morgenthau, 'Fragment', p. 15.Though even in his respectfor Schmitt's intellect he was by no 
means an uncritical admirer, in a letter to Hannah Arendt Morgenthau described Schmitt's later work 
Theories des Partisanen as "...interesting but unbelievably shoddy, both in thought and exposition." 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 6.
9^5 Bendersky, Caii Schmittt, pp.204-206.
196 ibid. p.206.
197 ibid. pp.207-208
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constitutional scheme based on the tripartite separation of these elements. 
This reflected an older conservative desire to separate state, party, and society 
which was anathema to Nazi ideologues for whom all of these elements were 
merely subordinate to the great all-embracingyô7/c. A Munich law professor 
charged Schmitt with attempting to mould National Socialism into a 'neo- 
Hegelian' framework with the state at its political apex: a model entirely at 
odds with the holistic National Socialist concept of Volksgemeinschaft (racial
community) .798
This sort of sniping gathered momentum over the next three years in 
spite of Schmitt's support for the Nuremberg Laws and ever more frequent 
and strident outbursts of anti-Semitism. In 1936 Schmitt even felt able to 
accept that, far from being an agent of the state as he had previously held, the 
Führer was indeed "...the highest judge of the nation and the highest 
lawgiver."799 The State was subordinate to both party and race. Most of these 
efforts of abasement were in vain as they only served to further goad 
Schmitt's critics, those 'true believers' in National Socialism who remembered 
Schmitt's earlier political inconsistencies and his role as an adviser to various 
Weimar governments and dismissed him as a mere political mercenary. The 
continuing sympathies of Goring and Hans Frank afforded a degree of 
relative protection but he was, nevertheless, obliged to retreat from public life 
in 1936. As with so many other German intellectuals Schmitt very carefully 
turned to areas of scholarship unlikely to attract any official attention.^oo
The Betrayal of the Intellectuals
Schmitt's case serves in many ways as a parable for the intellectual in 
Germany as a whole. The reader will recall that by the end of the nineteenth
9^8 See the discussion in Bendarsky, Carl Schmitt, pp.210-212; 221-222. 
199 ibid. p.231.
7017 ibid. p.243.
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century an overwhelming majority of German intellectuals were of illiberal 
and antipolitical tendencies. The worship of state power was ubiquitous and 
German intellectuals had been fervent supporters of German territorial 
expansion during World War I. All these elements were brought together in a 
common antipathy for the Weimar Republic. Oswald Spengler/Nietzche’s 
Ape’ in Thomas Mann's m emorably ascerbic description, thought that 
parliamentary government was another symptom of Western decadence and 
in the early 1920s he was actively involved in various rightist plots to 
overthrow democratic government.^ot Edgar Jung plotted the rise of a new 
nobility in defiance of "that political plague of the Western World", the notion 
of hum an equality and its democratic d e r i v a t i v e s . 7 0 2  Many intellectuals 
including the mystical poet Stefan George abandoned the public sphere 
altogether. George's poetry was deliberately constructed in such a way as to 
make it unsuitable for mass appreciation.203 One of the most damning 
criticisms which can be levelled against the Frankfurt School is that the Nazis, 
upon obtaining power, m ade no effort to arrest any of its members 
concluding that the esoteric and often incomprehensible publications of 
Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin et al could be safely i g n o r e d . 2 0 4  Hannah 
Arendt, much to her later regret, was one of those who rejected any 
involvement with the politics of the democratic r e p u b l i c . 2 0 5
At the other extreme the worship of the Machtstaat reached a pinnacle 
in the work of Ernst Jünger. His 1932 hookDer Arbeiter (The Worker) called 
for the emergence of a German society committed to a perm anent 
mobilisation for Total War based around a tripartite social division of 
'warriors', workers, and an authoritarian elite.206jünger, above all, personified
201 A useful summary of Spengler's activities in Weimar Germany can be found in Struve, Elites 
Against Democracy , pp.232-273. See also Alastair Hamilton, The Appeal of Fascism (Anthony Blond 
Ltd. 1971) pp.110-118; Klemens von Klemperer, Germany's New Conseryatism, pp.170-179.
202 Struve, Elites, p.327.
203 ibid. p.45.
204 Laquer, Weimar, pp.63-64.
205 Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (Seeker and Warburg, London, 1969) p.75.
206 Struve, Elites, pp.377-378.
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the rejection of the Enlightenment's faith in reason and the value of education. 
He once complained that universal education was responsible for robbing 
Germany of "a sound reserve of illiterates."202
If only a minority of German intellectuals were direct participants in 
the undermining of Weimar, many of their colleagues urged them on from the 
sidelines and exhorted their students to do likewise. In Hitler and Nazism 
most of them got both rather less - and more - than they had bargained for. A 
grubby, vulgar little Austrian corporal was, after all, hardly in the image of 
the great charismatic leader - theÜbermensçh - they had longed for. The 
second unpleasant surprise was that Hitler, w ith few exceptions, treated 
intellectuals with complete contempt and Nazism had little use for them once 
the initial phase of regime consolidation was completed.208
The fate of the four German intellectuals discussed in this section is 
instructive. Carl Schmitt, as we have seen, was forced into the state of 'inner 
emigration'. Oswald Spengler, too, found that his more orthodox brand of 
German conservatism was offended by the crude excesses of Nazism. His 
form of 'inner migration' involved a retreat to prehistorical studies.709 The in 
many ways rather urbane Ernst Jünger, offended by Hitler's sheer vulgarity, 
published a novel in 1939 which amounted to a thinly veiled condemnation of 
Nazism.210 Hitler, displaying unusual restraint on this occasion, put Jünger 
into a Wehrmacht uniform and sent him to war in France.^n Edgar Jung was 
less fortunate. Jung had, like so m any other German conservatives, an 
instinctive fear of Nazism's cultivation and cooption of the masses and he 
considered Hitler himself to be little more than a crude demagogue. In June 
1934 Jung wrote a speech for his patron, the vice-chancellor Fritz von Pappen,
207 ibid. p.405.
208 The grim fate of the Strasser brothers, who dared to take the 'Socialism' in 'National Socialism' 
seriously, is instructive in this respect.
209 Klemperer, Germany's New Conservatism, pp.206-209.
270 Struve, Elites, pp.412-414.
271 Jünger survived World War Two and lived to the ripe old age of 102 whilst never retracting nor 
apologising for any of his extreme positions.
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which was highly critical of the course of the Nazi Revolution. A few days 
later he paid for his temerity by becoming another of the victims of Hitler's
'Blood P u r g e ' . 2 7 2
Having observed this calamity unfolding in Europe in the late 1930s, 
Morgenthau took with him to the United States a very different perception of 
the role of the intellectual: a Weberian commitment to neither shirk political 
obligations nor to become identified with authority but rather to speak 'truth 
to power'. It comes as no surprise to learn that one of the first articles that 
Morgenthau wrote in the United States was given the title The Escape from  
Power in the Western World in which, like Weber, he challenged his fellow 
men to stare into the abyss without blinking:
"Let us then face bravely the lust for power and power politics in all their 
threatening ugliness as the immutable elements of human life in a political 
s o c i e t y . " 2 7 3
The transmission and reception of this message from Old World to New will 
be the subject of chapters two and three.
212 Struve, Elites, pp.349-352.
213 The Escape from Power', p.9.
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Chapter Two: The American Science of Politics
"Over there the romance of numbers rules the soul, and a strong hope in the 
future lies in every American" (Max Weber).
"When you cannot measure, your knowledge is meagre and unsatisfactory" 
(Motto inscribed on the Social Science Research Building at the University 
of Chicago).
Unlike many other Europeans, Hans Morgenthau's emigration to the 
United States was not the culmination of long-held desires or plans. He had 
initially left Germany in 1933 for a position in the law school at the University 
of Geneva, having already been rejected by the University of Frankfurt on the 
grounds of his Jewishness.7 Here too, he claims to have been badly treated at 
the hands of anti-Semites on the faculty, in addition to having been monitored 
by certain of his own students whom he suspected of reporting to the 
Gestapo. His increasing scepticism toward the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the 
League of Nations was, he suggests, another factor contributing towards his 
unpopularity.2
He left Geneva in 1935 in order to take up a position at the Institute 
for International and Economic Studies in Madrid not long, of course, prior to 
the eruption of the Spanish Civil War. Having lost his home and the rest of his 
property in the fighting and fearing that a Second World War was now 
inevitable, he made the decision to leave Continental Europe altogether. Even 
now, however, the United States was by no means a first choice. Though not 
mentioned in his interview with Bernard Johnson, material in his collection of
7 Johnson, 'Interview', p.352. 
2 ibid. pp.353-355.
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papers suggests that he applied - and was rejected - for admission to England 
through the sponsorship of the Academic Assistance Council. In hindsight 
this was probably fortuitous for Morgenthau. The highly stratified, class- 
ridden England of the late 1930s is unlikely to have afforded him the 
opportunities that he was able to take advantage of in America.
Obtaining a visa for the United States was itself no easy matter given 
that "a number of American consuls were notoriously anti-Semitic and as a 
matter of principle they simply did not give visas to Jews at a l l . . . "3 The 
perm ission to enter the United States was finally secured through a 
sympathetic junior employee of the United States consulate in Geneva who 
encouraged Morgenthau to apply at a time when the more amenable vice- 
consul would be acting for his holidaying superior.
He arrived in the United States with his wife Irma in July 1937 and as 
an intellectual arriving during the Depression with only a smattering of 
English he predictably found the going tough. At an initial interview with an 
employment agency in New York specifically devoted to placing academics, 
Morgenthau was informed that there was a surfeit of individuals with his sort 
of background and that he would be better off taking a job as "an elevator 
b o y " ( ! ) 4  With his wife employed in a department store and the couple living 
in squalid accommodation he eventually found some temporary teaching at 
Brooklyn College.^
Frustrated with their life in New York, Hans was desperate enough to 
accept a position offered through another employm ent agency at the 
seemingly unlikely institution of the University of Kansas City. One can only 
begin to imagine the cultural shock for a cosmopolitan European arriving in
3 ibid. p. 362
'7 L.Fermi, lUiistrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration From Europe 1930-1941 (2nd ed.), 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1971) p.28.
3 With his natural facility for languages, and w ith the encouragem ent and assistance of his 
pupils at Brooklyn, he seem s to have aquired English very rapidly. See ibid. p.29.
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the mid-West in the 1930s. Morgenthau has, indeed, referred to the Kansas of 
the time as "...a kind of overgrown cow town."^
His teaching commitments were heavy and involved "just about 
everything under the sun" including administrative law, constitutional law, 
American government, political theory and comparative government. 
Considering himself to be exploited as little more than a form of cheap labour 
Morgenthau continued to explore other options including qualifying for the 
Missouri Bar. He also applied to, and was rejected by, both the army and the 
navy.2" This unsatisfactory state of affairs was, however, transformed in 1943 
when Morgenthau was appointed to the Political Science Department at the 
University of Chicago as a temporary placement for Quincy Wright who had 
been seconded to Washington.^
That Morgenthau ended up in Chicago is no small irony given that 
Chicago made as large a contribution as any towards making a science of the 
study of politics. It is hardly surprising that Morgenthau clashed both 
intellectually and personally with a number of his colleagues. He arrived to 
find that there was already great friction between the department and the 
university  President Robert H utchins, a neo-Thom ist who shared 
M orgenthau's distaste for the 'science of politics'. Morgenthau claims that 
shortly after arriving he was called into Hutchins' office and informed, in no 
uncertain terms, of Hutchins' contempt for Leonard White and many other 
members of the department.9 White has been described by Morgenthau as the 
'front man' for Charles Merriam who, as we shall see later in the chapter, was 
the driving force behind the Chicago school of politics. Merriam had formally 
retired in 1943 but continued to exert a strong influence indirectly.7 ^
3 Johnson, 'Interview w ith  Hans Morgenthau', p.369.
2 See his letter to Professor C. Jessup, Morgenthau Papers, Box 31.
3 ibid. pp.368-69.
9 Johnson, 'Interview', p.370.
70 In a letter written som e years later, M orgenthau referred to Merriam's 'demoniac lust for 
power'. See his letter to Professor Lindsay Rogers, July 20,1964, Morgenthau Papers, Box 50.
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M orgenthau's scepticism about the potential for science and reason to 
transform politics ran against almost everything Merriam had believed in and 
campaigned for during his life and he was quick to register his displeasure at 
M orgenthau's arrival. As a rem edial m easure he recom m ended that 
M orgenthau teach some courses in administrative law.^i This helped to 
establish a permanent tension between Morgenthau and Merriam's acolytes in 
the department; a line of tension which appears to have become something of 
a schism with the later arrival of Leo Strauss who further marked a division 
between a humanistic wing and a science of politics* group.77 As has been 
remarked elsewhere, it was a great irony that just as the type of political 
science developed in Chicago was becoming dominant nationally, it was 
being challenged in Chicago itself. It has come to be widely thought within 
International Relations that this dispute was to do little more than 
methodology but I will show later in the chapter that it actually had much 
deeper roots and ramifications.
By the early 1950s then, Morgenthau had some sympathetic allies at 
Chicago, but he was very isolated in the mid-1940s and it is hardly surprising 
that his first book. Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, did not fit the prevailing 
intellectual milieu. Most of the book had already been written during his time
77 Kenneth Thom pson, Schools of Thought in International Relations: inteiyreters, issues, and 
morality (Louisiana State University Press, 1996) p .23.
77 H e always remained on good terms w ith Quincy Wright, though. See Kenneth Thom pson, 
'Philosophy and Poltics: The Two Commitments of Hans J. Morgenthau', in Robert M yers and 
Kenneth Thom pson(eds.), Truth and Tragedy (Transaction Books, N ew  York, 1984). A  man he  
didn't enjoy a close relationship w ith w as M orten Kaplan. To w hat extent this w as the 
product of in tellectual or personal d isagreem ents is unclear but it w as probably a 
com bination of the two. M orgenthau once com plained, in a letter written in opposition  to 
Kaplan's prospective tenure at Chicago that "Kaplan w as using the classroom  for personal 
and professional attacks on me" and he added that he couldn't "visualise our sim ultaneous 
membership in the same Department for any length of time." Letter to Professor C. Herman  
Pritchett, N ovem ber 18, 1960, Morgenthau Papers, Box 74. For m ore on the M orgenthau- 
Kaplan dispute see the letter from M orgenthau to D ean Chauncey Harris (w hich opposed  
Kaplan's proposal to re-establish a separate program m e in International Relations) of 
Novermber 12,1958, Morgenthau Papers, Box 74. A lso see the letter to Pritchett of December 2, 
1960, Morgenthau Papers, Box 74. In the end, M orgenthau remained in the department despite 
failing to prevent Kaplan's tenured appointment. See the letter from D. Gale Johnson, Dean, 
D ivision  of Social Sciences, A pril 14, 1961, w hich records his pleasure at M orgenthau's 
decision to remain at Chicago. Morgenthau Papers, Box 84.
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at Kansas and tested in the form of a number of journal articles which 
subsequently formed the core of the work: a pattern that Morgenthau was to 
repeat in every subsequent publication^^
Scientific Man Vs Power Politics
Scientific Man is undoubtedly Morgenthau's most cogent work. It is, 
above all, a polemic against the rational scientific liberalism of the nineteenth 
century that Morgenthau blames for the decay of both political thought and 
action in the West.74 Continuing to place our faith in the powers of reason is 
no longer tenable given the experiences of two World Wars and the rise of 
Nazism. We are deluded if we try to convince ourselves that fascism was "...a 
mere tem porary retrogression into irrationality, an atavistic revival of 
autocratic and barbaric rule. In its mastery of the technological potentialities 
of the age it is truly progressive..." In this respect the propaganda machine of 
Goebbels and the gas chambers of Himmler are "models of technical [or 
instrumental ] rationality."75 They represent the ultimate mockery of the belief 
in science and technological advance. He calls for a re-examination of the 
political problems of the age in light of the "pre-rationalist Western tradition" 
beginning with "the assumption that power politics, rooted in the lust for 
power which is common to all men ... is ... inseparable from social life itself."76 
Though, strictly speaking, there is little in Scientific Man that can be 
ascribed to M orgenthau as an original insight, its importance lies in the 
transmission of the German critique of liberalism to the United States: as such
See for example 'The Limitations of Science and the Problem of Social Planning', Ethics, Vol. 
XIV, N o. 4, (April 1944) pp .174-185; 'The Scientific Solution of Social Conflicts', in L.Bryson, 
L.Finkelstein & R.Maciver (eds.) Approaches to Unity (Conference on Science, Philosophy, and 
R eligion in their relation to the Democratic w ay of life; fifth sym posium . N ew  York, 1945) 
pp.419-443.
74 For another challenge to scientism  see Eric Voegelin, The Nezu Science of Politics (University 
of Chicago Press, 1952).
75 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, p.6.
76 ibid. p.9.
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it amounts to an effective synthesis of the work of Nietzsche, Weber, Schmitt 
and Mannheim et al. Much of this critique of liberalism will be familiar to the 
reader from the discussion in the previous chapter but I think it is worth 
presenting here again at greater length and viewed through M orgenthau’s 
individual filter.
The roots of the liberal "repudiation of politics" are to be located, 
Morgenthau suggests, in the successful struggle of the rising middle classes 
against aristocratic opposition. By falsely conflating "...the general aspiration 
for power over man, which is the essence of politics" with the particular 
historical manifestation of aristocratic domination, liberalism came to identify 
the "opposition to aristocratic politics with hostility against any kind of 
politics..." This delusion was further strengthened by the more subtle means 
by which the victors exercised their own authority through "a system of 
indirect domination which replaced the military method of open violence 
with the invisible chains of economic dependence and which hid the very 
existence of power relations behind a network of seemingly equalitarian legal
r u l e s . " 7 7
Proceeding on the basis of this ideological blindness, liberals sought 
to universalise their domestic experiences by transferring them  to the 
international sphere. Morgenthau suggests that the first manifestation of 
liberalism in international politics can be traced to the eighteenth century but 
"it was not before the end of the Napoleonic Wars that important sectors of 
public opinion demanded the application of liberal principles to international 
affairs [and] it was not before the turn of the [nineteenth] century that the 
Hague Peace Conferences made the first systematic attempt at establishing 
the reign of liberalism in the international field. The appearance of the League
7 7  i b i d .  p .  4 5 .
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of Nations after the first World War signified the triumph of liberalism on the 
international s c e n e . " 7 8
Morgenthau seeks to question what today would be referred to as the 
liberal peace' thesis. The growth of forms of international communication - 
driven by technological innovation - is by no means the unambiguous good 
that nineteenth century liberals took it to be. It has also, for example, 
strengthened the capacity of governments to restrict movement if they choose 
to do so. As Morgenthau points out, effective passport controls are an 
innovation made possible by the introduction of new t e c h n o l o g y . 79
He describes the belief in the pacifying effects of free trade as "the 
shibboleth of liberalism from the physiocrats, through Adam Smith, Cobden, 
and Bright, to Cordell H u l l . " 7 0  Once again an ideological weapon used by the 
middle classes against statist paternalism had come to be universalised; once 
again it served to mask the realities of power politics. Morgenthau draws 
heavily upon the mercantilist arguments of Friedrich List to argue that the 
British Government, having first strengthened domestic manufacturing and 
the position of the British fleet through the protectionism of the Navigation 
Acts, was now free to employ the rhetoric of open commerce as a device to 
preserve Britain's dominant position at the expense of potential r i v a l s .7 7  Even 
if one were to accept that the benefits of free trade would accrue to all "there 
would still be nations that would covet the territory, the colonies, the markets, 
the economic resources of their n e i g h b o u r s . " 7 7
The third element of the liberal triptych is the rule of law and it is here 
- most of all - that the 'domestic analogy’ fails so transparently. The liberal 
conception of the law is based upon "...a threefold misrepresentation of 
reality. It misunderstands the general relationship between law and peace; it
18 M orgenthau, Scientific Man p. 41. 
79 ibid. pp.82, 86-87. 
ibid. 0.8170 p  
77 ibid. pp.84-85 
77 ibid. p.90.
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overlooks the particular conditions which the rule of law encounters in the 
international sphere; and it presumes that all social conflicts, domestic or 
international, can be settled on the basis of established rules of law." The first 
point relates to an inversion of cause and effect. Liberals came to believe that 
"the peace, order, and prosperity of the Victorian age" was the product of the 
successful application of the rule of law when, in fact, it was its precondition. 
In effect, and to oversimplify, the base of material and social relations 
determines the 'superstructure' of the law and not the other way around. As 
such the call "for "order under law" as alternative to the international anarchy 
of our age is reasonable only under the assumption that the international 
sphere already contains the social elements making for order and peace." This 
disregard for the particular has contributed to "the ineffectiveness of the 
international law of the liberal period" and the attempt made with the Briand- 
Kellogg Pact to outlaw war is a "monument to this kind of legalistic 
thinking."73
The third element of Morgenthau's critique alludes to the simple fact 
that, inevitably, there will be times when social conflict - the primacy of the 
political - will prove to be beyond legal restraint. The ultimate - and tragic - 
symbol of liberal naivete is "Chamberlain's waving of a piece of paper with 
Hitler's peace pledge as guaranty of 'peace in our time...'." 74
And where liberal states have resorted to war, the political has again 
been obscured by the liberal tendency to bestow a legitimacy to "wars for 
national unification and wars against despotic aggression" and so using the 
just end to "justify means otherwise c o n d e m n e d . " 7 5  Hence the manifest
73 ibid. pp.116-117.
74 ibid. p .115. Though a brilliant administrator Chamberlain was "...completely lacking in  
that one quality w ithout w hich no statesm an could be successful: political im agination. 
...[H]e w as convinced that all m en w ere bound to think and act like businessm en from  
Birmingham ... In that blind and naive belief that m en like Hitler, M ussolini, and Stalin can 
be dealt w ith  after the fashion in w hich m em bers of the British upper class deal w ith  each  
other lies the ultimate source of his failure." See M orgenthau's review of K.Fely, 'The Life of 
N eville Chamberlain’, Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 23,1947, part 4, p. 4.
75 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, p .151
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absurdity, as pointed out by Carl Schmitt and many other Germans, of 
America entering the European conflict on the basis of it being 'the war to end 
all wars’. Moreover, the objectives of the liberal wars - national unification 
and democratic liberation - "instead of doing away with the only remaining 
causes of war, intensified international antagonisms and made the broad 
masses of the peoples active participants in them... The trium ph of 
nationalism and democracy, brought about by the liberal wars, therefore 
strengthened immensely the sovereignty of the state and with it the anarchical 
tendencies in international society."76 The principle of national self- 
determination became, of course, a powerful ideological weapon of Hitler's 
enabling him to invoke "the professed principle of the Treaty of Versailles", as 
The Times described it in 1938, against its authors.77
The motor of this liberal creed is the faith in science and the power of 
reason to transform the human condition. The age of "the scientific approach 
to international affairs" emerges fully at the end of the First World War and, 
notw ithstanding the experience of a second European conflagration, 
continues to flourish. "Preceded by the Hague Conferences and hundreds of 
private peace congresses, the governments themselves em barked on a 
program of feverish activity, whose extent was unprecedented in all recorded 
history, with the purpose of solving all international problems through 
scientific methods."78
Aside from the neglect of the political there are a num ber of 
ontological and epistem ological problem s w hich render 'scientism ' 
inappropriate as a means to grasping social life.79 His most fundamental point
76 ibid. p .67. It is interesting to note here that M orgenthau anticipates the title of H eadley  
Bull’s now  fam ous work The Anarchical Society.
77 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, p.54.
78 ibid. p.94
79 M orgenthau defines 'scientism' as "...the belief that the problem s of social life are in  
essence similar to the problem s of physical nature, that, in the same w ay in w hich one can 
understand the facts of society  and, through this know ledge, create a gigantic social 
m echanism  w hich is at the com m and of the scientist master." Morgenthau, 'The Escape from  
Power in the Western World', p.3
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is that the continuing efforts of the social sciences to ape their natural 
counterparts are based upon an outdated understanding of the natural 
sciences. The 'rational, calculable' universe of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton 
has been undermined by the scientific developments of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries: what Thomas Kuhn would later come to 
describe, not without controversy, as a 'paradigm shift'.30 Under the impact of 
Einstein, Planck, and the other great innovators in physics "matter has been 
dissolved into electronic atoms; the traditional concepts of time, space, and 
the law of gravitation have succumbed to the theory of relativity; the 
quantum theory has transformed causation into statistical probability and 
replaced determinism by the principle of indeterminacy. W liat... nineteenth- 
century political thought and the social sciences refer to as their object of 
emulation is a ghost from which life has long since departed."3i
Nor have the natural sciences been immune to the problems raised by 
the sociology of knowledge. The "seemingly spontaneous conquest of nature 
by reason" was, in fact, the product of "the emotional upheaval which 
followed upon the collapse of medieaval metaphysics and religion and the 
rise of new economic and social interests". Hence the alleged "triumph of 
"pure" reason over nature" is "but a historical coincidence and not a necessary 
stage in the ever progressing expansion of reason". At other times 'social 
interests' have prevented, for example, the universal recognition of the laws of 
planetary motion and they continue to oppose the acceptance of the law of 
evolution.37 In essence then, Morgenthau rejects the notion that there is a 
natural world which is independent of human cognition and purpose, merely 
awaiting discovery and classification.33
33 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1962).
37 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, pp.131-132.
37 ibid. pp.160-161.
33 This w ou ld  seem  to indicate that M orgenthau subscribes to a form of ph ilosophical 
idealism  but the reader is advised to treat this possibility w ith caution. M any of the sections 
dealing w ith  scientific ep istem ology are very opaque indeed and a dozen readings of the
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Such difficulties are compounded when we turn to the social sphere. 
The social scientist "...stands in the stream of social causation as an acting and 
reacting agent. What he sees and what he does not see are determined by his 
position in these streams; and by revealing what he sees in terms of his 
science he directly intervenes in the social process."34 The social scientist is 
also subject to the limitations of his "membership in religious, political, social, 
and economic groups, which in turn will protect their particular taboos from 
analytical investigation and the concomitant risk of destruction."35 At times 
Morgenthau goes a very long way indeed in his rejection of positivism and 
the claims of the social sciences to universality. The following extraordinary 
passage introduces an almost Gadamerian hermeneutic:
"The presupposition of universality which the social sciences borrow from the 
natural ones, then, not only does not strengthen the scientific character of the 
former but tends to impair it. It does not strengthen it, for the irrational 
determination of the social sciences is incompatible with their universality. 
Their claim to universality, however, is actually detrimental to their scientific 
claim, since it obliterates the social and moral determination by which all 
social science is qualified. It is only through the recognition of this social and 
moral determination that social science is possible at all. A social science 
which refuses to recognize this determination and clings to the illusion of 
universality destroys through this very attribute its only chance for scientific 
achievement. The truth of the social sciences, then, is truth only under the
critical section from pages 140-145 has failed to leave m e entirely clear as to M orgenthau's 
precise m eaning. This philosophical idealism  w ould also seem  to rest uneasily w ith elements 
of determ inism  elsewhere where the ubiquitous lust for pow er in hum an beings is ascribed 
by M orgenthau to biological foundations.
34 M orgenthau, Scientific Man, pp .142-143.
35 ibid. p .l63 . Elsewhere M orgenthau rejected Arnold Toynbee's com parative treatment of 
civilisations because he couldn't see how  emy observer could  "transcend the confines of his 
ow n  civilisation". See 'Toynbee and the Historical Imagination', Encounter, March 1955, pp.2- 
3.
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particular perspective of the observer, yet under this perspective it is truth. 
And this is the only kind of truth to be had in the social sphere." 36
Moving from the epistemological to ontological and methodological 
problems Morgenthau emphasises the sheer complexity of social life. While 
the natural sciences deals with "...isolated causes operating upon motionless 
objects, the social sciences deals with interminable chains of causes and 
effects..." The natural sciences can "fortell with a high degree of certainty that 
upon a certain typical cause a certain typical effect will fo llo w ." 3 7  
To these problems one has to add the contingencies and elements of 
unpredictability that are an inevitable part of social life in addition to those 
'irrational' elements that are also part of hum an nature. How then can we 
pursue any form of meaningful social enquiry given this assault on 
rationalism by "modern epistemology, psychology, and the sociology of 
knowledge?" 38
Morgenthau's solution is to adopt methods similar to those employed 
by Max Weber in order to crystallise elements of rationality. While accepting 
the importance of "the irrational realities of life" Morgenthau nevertheless 
asserts that reason does, on the whole, manage to keep irrational impulses 
within manageable limits through the exercise of a "fourfold harmonizing 
function for human action. It tends towards creating harmony among several 
conflicting , irrational impulses. It brings ends and means into harmony with 
irrational impulses. It establishes harmony among several conflicting ends. It 
brings means into harmony with e n d s . "39 Even so it is important to draw 
attention to the "limitation of rational choice." While reason functions to 
harmonise means and ends the chosen end is often the product of non-
36 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, pp .166-167.
37 ibid. pp.129-131. This does seem  to be a rather oversim plified treatment.
38 ibid. pp.153-154. It goes w ithout saying that Morgenthau w ishes to avoid a fundam entally 
anti-foundationalist conclusion.
39 ibid. pp.157-158.
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rational impulses.40 "There may", Morgenthau cautions, "be objectives and 
techniques much more attractive from the standpoint of reason than those 
actually chosen."4i This amounts, in other words, to Morgenthau invoking 
Weber's notion of instrumental rationality 47
Turning to the question of historical contingency, Morgenthau notes 
that if social life "were completely contingent and irregular only religion and 
philosophy would be able to give meaning and order the historic past" and 
that "whatever meaning and order there is in history is only the reflection of 
the historian's own mind." He qualifies this understanding of contingency 
with the suggestion that "... the contingencies of the present and of the future 
array themselves in a limited number of typical patterns. A historical situation 
always contains only a limited number of potentialities."43 Morgenthau uses 
as an historical illustration the situation in Germany in 1932 which he 
suggests to have contained three "...germinal developments; parliamentary 
democracy, military dictatorship, and nazism." The question of which of 
these three possibilities would ultimately come to pass was contingent and 
unforseeable but, even so, further extrapolation is still possible. Assuming the 
emergence of nazism one could anticipate "conservative militarism, social 
revolution, or totalitarian party dictatorship." Similar possibilities could be 
isolated when looking at the other potential elements of National Socialist 
policy. This same method of analysis "...applies to any other political or social 
problem at any period of history..."44 By way of summary Morgenthau claims 
that:
"Ultimately, the whole future of the social world appears to the analytical 
mind as a highly complicated combination of numerous systems of multiple
43 ibid. p .156.
41 ibid. p .l58 .
47 The problem  of Morgenthau's connection w ith rationality w ill be raised again towards the 
end of the chapter.
43 M orgenthau m ay have drawn this idea from M annheim  w ho m ade a very similar claim. 
See M annheim, Ideology and Utopia pp.114-115.
44 M orgenthau, Scientific Man, pp.149-150.
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choices which in turn  are strictly limited in number. The element of 
irrationality, insecurity, and chance lies in the necessity of choice among 
several possibilities multiplied by the great num ber of systems of multiple 
choice. Viewed with the guidance of a rationalistic, blueprinted map the social 
world is, indeed, a chaos of contingencies. Yet it is not devoid of a measure of 
rationality if approached with the expectations of Macbethian c y n i c i s m . " 4 3  
The question of whether or not this amounts to anything like a convincing 
epistemological position will be considered later . For the moment I wish to 
turn  to Morgenthau's treatm ent of ethics: another of the areas in which 
'Scientific Man' is labouring under fundamental misapprehensions.
"Traditional ethics", according to Morgenthau, is based upon " the 
distinction and strict separation of the ought-to-be and the to-be, the 
normative and the empirical... The ethical command, conceived in terms of 
the divine will or of the reasonable nature of man, transcends the empirical 
sphere and belongs to the world of norms, ends, and values."46 This 
dichotomy came to be abandoned in the nineteenth century under the dual 
impact of Kant's categorical imperative and various forms of utilitarianism.47 
In both cases, Morgenthau asserts, ethics is reduced to an "applied social 
science."48 The quintessential example of the "...belief in the power of a 
perfectionist ethics to transform the actions of man by its rational force alone" 
is provided by Woodrow Wilson.49 Other attempts to overcome "the chasm 
between rationalist ethics and reality" include certain forms of religious 
organisations and "all totalitarian political philosophies from Hobbes and 
Hegel to modern dictatorship.
45 ibid. pp.150-151.
46 ibid. p. 15.
47 ibid. pp. 15-17.
48 ibid. p .l72.
49 ibid. p .173. Elsewhere M orgenthau refers to G ladstone, W ilson, and Briand as "Don 
Quixotes on the political scene." Morgenthau, 'Scientific Solution', in Bryson et. al.. Approaches 
to U n ity , p.431.
33 Morganthau,Sde?thyifc Man, p p .174-175. To list H obbes and H egel as exem plars of 
"totalitarian political philosophies" m ay be som ewhat cavalier.
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In so far as secular Western thought goes beyond perfectionist ethics 
and 'mere utilitarianism ' it makes the further m isunderstanding  of 
subscribing to an ethical dualism based around the separation of the political 
from the private sphere. This misapprehension manifests itself in three ways; 
the first exempts action undertaken within the political sphere from any kind 
of ethical limitation; the second accepts as a given a qualitatively different 
ethic for political action; the third recognises the existence of this qualitative 
distinction but hopes for its transformation into a universal ethical standard 
based upon private ethical standards.31
Morgenthau links the first approach - fairly or not - with Machiavelli 
and Hobbes and their alleged subscription to the 'reason of state'. Where 
statesmen act in their public capacity they are subject to no 'rule of conduct' 
apart from that dictated by self-interest and the exigencies of survival, 
whereas in their private capacity they are free to make moral choices. This 
amounts to an ethical dualism in its starkest form: individual morality is 
juxtaposed with the amorality of the political sphere. The importance of this 
conception, Morgenthau suggests, has been "literary rather than practical" 
because "mankind has at all times refused to forgo ethical evaluation of 
political action." From the time of Ancient Greece political philosophy has 
been based on the assumption that action in the political sphere should 
conform to a standard higher than that of mere success. Even when motivated 
by mere expediency and self-interest actors have felt it necessary to justify 
their actions in ethical terms. This suggests that no acts can actually be 
'beyond good and evil' altogether. "This curious dialectic of ethics and 
politics", as Morgenthau describes it, "which prevents the latter, in spite of 
itself, from escaping the former's judgement and normative direction has its 
roots in the nature of man as both a political and moral animal." 32
31 ibid. pp.175-176.
32 ibid. p p .176-177. E.H. Carr referred to the "curious w ay in w hich pow er and ethics are 
in tertw ined  in all political problems." E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939
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The second misapprehension is based upon the acceptance of a similar 
duality but in this case the political sphere is, in effect, held to be immoral 
rather than amoral. Given that "no Civilization can be satisfied with such a 
dual morality" efforts to bridge the gap often culminate in a Wilsonian-style 
perfectionist ethics.
Perhaps even more dangerous still is the situation where the gap is 
justified in the name of some greater moral principle, that is, where certain 
immoral political actions may be justified in the name of some greater moral 
e n d .33 Here Morgenthau notes Stalin's infamous rationalisation of the deaths 
of millions during the drive for collectivisation on the basis of being "engaged 
in a work which will benefit the whole of humanity." 34
The problem of course, as Weber established, is that there is no 
objective way in which to weigh an immoral means against a moral end. As 
Morgenthau points out "one may argue from the point of view of a particular 
political philosophy, but one cannot prove from the point of universal and 
objective ethical standards that the good of the end ought to prevail over the 
evil of the means; for there is no objective standard by which to compare the 
kinds of happiness or of misery of the happiness of one man with the misery 
of another."33 An ethical standard based around the intent of actions rather 
than their ends is similarly flawed because, a la Weber, "...it violates the ethics 
of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and hence political action 
par excellence, is subject."36
All of these approaches to ethics commit the error of idealising the 
individual sphere and juxtaposing it against the evil of political action. This 
duality is sustained by reified images of collective identities. As Morgenthau
(M acmillan, London, 1969), p .241. G iven this and a num ber of other strikingly similar 
passages it m ay w ell be the case that Carr w as an im portant (and unacknow ledged) 
influence upon M orgenthau w hen he w as writing Scientific Man.
33 ibid. pp.180-182.
34 ibid. p .l82.
33 ibid. p .l83 .
36 ibid. p . l8 6 .
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reminds us "it is always the individual who acts, whether with reference to his 
own ends alone or with reference to the ends of others. The action of society, 
of the nation, or of any other collectivity, political or otherwise, as such has no 
empirical existence at all. What empirically exist are always the actions of 
individuals who perform identical or different actions with reference to a 
comm on end." Given this, the dualities of ind iv idua l/soc ia l and 
private/political can only be relatively rather than absolutely different. As all 
action is potentially immoral the moral hazards of the political sphere may be 
more heightened and more acute but they are not qualitatively different.37 
"The evil that corrupts political action", Morgenthau asserts, "is the same evil 
that corrupts all action..."38 And the roots of this ubiquitous evil lie in the 
animus dominandi, the lust for power.
As has already been suggested Morgenthau's animus dominandi has 
much in common with Nietzsche's 'Will to Power'. In both cases the desire for 
power extends well beyond the limits of mere individual s u r v i v a l . 3 9  This 
element of corruption is a universal feature of human existence but its impact 
"is broadened and its intensity strengthened by the particular conditions 
under which action proceeds in the modern nation state."30 The state has 
become both "the most exalted object of loyalty on the part of the individual" 
and "the most effective organization for the exercise of power over the 
individual." It has acted as a receptacle for the egotism and power impulses 
of individuals: egotism is transformed into nationalism. Suitably buttressed 
"the state's collective desire for power is limited, aside from self-chosen 
limitations, only by the ruins of an old, and the rudiments of a new, 
normative order, both too feeble to offer more than a mere intimation of
37 ibid. ppl87-188. "The very act of acting destroys our moral integrity. W hoever wants to 
retain his moral innocence m ust foresake action altogether and, follow ing Hamlet's advice to 
Ophelia, "go...to a nunnery", p .189.
38 ibid. pp.195.
39 ibid. pp. 192-195.
30 ibid. p.l97.
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actual restraint. Above it, there is no centralized authority beyond the 
mechanics of the balance of power, which could impose actual limits upon the 
collective desire for domination. The state has become indeed a "mortal god" 
and for an age that believes no longer in an immortal God, the state becomes 
the only God there is."^  ^ This passage incorporates much of the German 
intellectual legacy brought by Morgenthau to America in emphasising, as it 
does, the importance of power and the political, the metaphysical crisis 
occasioned by 'the Death of God' and the sheer perils of modernity.
That modern political life is so perilous only serves to re-emphasise the 
facile nature of the schemes of 'Scientific Man' for putting an end to 
international conflict. From the antinomy of "the lust for power as ubiquitous 
empirical fact and its denial as universal ethical norm" comes an awareness of 
the tragic nature of the hum an condition, an awareness apparent in the 
foundations of "the nonutilitarian ethical standards of Western Civilization" 
but oblivious to Scientific Man.^^ And it "is only the awareness of the tragic 
presence of evil in all political action which at least enables man to choose the 
lesser evil and to be as good as he can be in an evil w o r l d . qTiis emphasis 
on the tragedy of the political, so aptly described elsewhere as the 'Realist 
Jeremiad', was the most important component of this message from old world 
to new.^^
What, then, are we to make of Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics more 
than fifty years after its publication? Identifying the intellectual influences 
upon its creation is comparatively easy - Nietzsche, Weber, Mannheim, 
Schmitt and, of contemporaries, E.H. Carr and Reinhold N iebuhr - but 
reaching an overall judgement of the book is more difficult.^^ Our task is
ibid.
62 ibid. pp. 201,209.
63 ibid. pp.202-203.
6“^ Rosenthal, Righteous Realists, pp.32-36.
63 N iebuhr w as one of the few  to receive a form al acknow ledgem ent in the book  itself 
(p.236), though M ogenthau always claim ed to have arrived at his conclusions independently  
of Niebuhr. See his letter to Robert Good, January 11,1954, Morgenthau Papers, Box 23. H e w as
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complicated by the fact that even Henry Kissinger has felt it necessary to 
pronounce that "Wilsonianism has survived while history has bypassed the 
reservations of his contemporaries."66 With the removal of the massive, 
brooding, presence of the Cold War it does seem, at least on the surface, that 
the space for ethical choices has been widened. Given M orgenthau's 
opposition to the particular form of the Nuremberg Trials (an essentially 
political act given a legal mask) one wonders what he would have made of 
the possibility of the establishment of a permanent War Crimes Tribunal. 
From the vantage point of the late twentieth century - the 'End of History' for 
some - it appears that it is the conflict-ridden system of Westphalia that is 
contingent rather than the principles of nineteenth century liberalism.62
It is, indeed, one of the most striking elements of Scientific Man that 
Morgenthau criticises the political philosophy of liberalism for its ahistoricity 
while at the same time feeling confident enough to assert the existence of 
older, eternal v e r i t i e s .6 8  This tension between the universal and the particular 
is, of course, a fundamental problem for almost any form of social enquiry but 
the especially stark nature of the contrast that Morgenthau establishes here 
leaves this reader at least feeling rather uneasy, particularly  given 
M orgenthau's awareness of the problem s posed by the sociology of 
knowledge.
A similar tension pervades M orgenthau's broader philosophical 
disposition. Though his position clearly cannot be one of a pure philosophical 
idealism, for him to claim that we can only know the physical world "...within 
the limits of our cognitive faculties..." or that, "there exists... a correlation
later to suggest that in Am erica N iebuhr w as "responsible for the rediscovery of Political 
Man". M orgenthau, T h e  Influence of Reinhold N iebuhr in Am erican Political Life and 
Thought' in H. Landen (ed.). Reinhold Niebuhr: A Prophetic Voice in Our Time (Books for 
Libraries Press, Plain View, N ew  York, 1962) p.99.
66 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (Simon and Schuster, London, 1994) p.30.
62 In fairness to M orgenthau he w as fully aware of the historically contingent nature of the 
states system. Social conflict is universal but its manifestations are particular.
68 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, pp.4-5.
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between our minds and physical nature as it is reflected in our consciousness" 
is to place a great deal of emphasis upon the importance of cognition.69 At the 
same time - and even as he is lambasting the attempts of social scientists to 
imitate the methods of the natural sciences - he is writing to a zoologist at the 
University of Chicago and asking "...whether the drive for pow er exists 
among non-human animals divorced from any concrete objective such as 
space, food, or mates."20 Again, while this sort of tension may be common 
enough, Morgenthau's handling of it is not very convincing.
In terms of the book’s historical analysis there is m uch that is 
convincing in his treatment of nineteenth century liberalism and its impact 
upon the rise of Scientific Man. There is undoubtedly  som ething 
extraordinary about a Victorian culture professing a commitment to a 'liberal 
peace' which is simultaneously involved in the maintenance and expansion of 
a global empire. This must surely amount, if anything does, to an 'ideology'. 
Morgenthau is also aware of the revolution wrought by Einstein and others in 
science and that many social scientists were continuing to base their methods 
on an outdated understanding of the practices of scientific research. In terms 
of accounting for the rise of Scientific Man, however, as Michael Oakshott has 
pointed out, "...the reader will be disappointed if he looks in his essay for a 
genuinely historical account of the manifestations of the faith: Professor 
Morgenthau is, in fact, no historian. The historical springs of the faith remain
69 ibid. pp.141-142.
20 See the letters from W.C. Allee to H ans M orgenthau of September 28 1944 and N ovem ber  
30 1944, M orgenthau Papers, Box 3. Dr Allee warns that "...it w ould  be as m uch a mistake to 
be anim o-m orphic in our v iew  of m en as to be anthropo-m orphic in our v iew  of other 
animals." In spite of this qualification M orgenthau still felt able to use Dr Allee's publications 
in support of the v iew  he states in Politics Among Nations that "Zoologists have show n that 
the drive to dom inate is to be found even in animals, such as chickens and m onkeys, w ho  
create social hierarchies on the basis of w ill and the ability to dominate." See Politics Among 
N ations (Alfred A.Knopf, N ew  York, 1948) p .l7 . In his review  of Politics Among Natiojis 
Barrington M oore pointed  to the "questionable parallel w ith  animal societies." See The 
American Sociological Review, V ol.l4 , April 1949, p.326. M orgenthau wrote Moore that he w as  
"somewhat am azed at your strictures against the ubiquity of pow er drives." M oore replied  
that he "did not think that all social and historical experience points to anything like a 
universal power drive." See Morgentlrau's letter of M ay 26,1949 emd Moore's reply of M ay 28 
in the Morgenthau Papers, Box 40.
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a mystery, and the circumstances of its appearance and propagation are never 
properly c o n s i d e r e d . O n e  might have replied on Morgenthau's behalf that 
such a thoroughgoing historical treatment was beyond the scope of the 
exercise but Oakshott does draw attention to a problem which is evident 
elsewhere. Morgenthau was as guilty as many of his fellow social scientists of 
treating history as a grab-bag to be raided indiscriminately for empirical 
examples to buttress particular arguments, w ithout devoting sufficient 
thought to the intellectual problems involved in so doing.
Michael Oakshott is a seemingly unlikely reviewer for a book like 
Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics but his is in every respect the most 
illuminating review that I have come across. Though broadly sympathetic to 
Morgenthau's critique Oakshott nevertheless develops a number of criticisms 
that echo across Morgenthau's work. Oakshott suggests that while "there is 
plenty in his book to show that he can recognize [the] differences", he 
nonetheless fails to make clear the distinctions between the pursuit of rational 
enquiry and 'rationalism' and scientific enquiry and ' s c i e n t i s m ' .2 2  In a letter to 
Oakshott Morgenthau claimed that he was fully aware of the importance of 
the distinctions but he also accepted that he had failed to make this clear in 
the b o o k . 2 3  Oakshott's point is, again, well-made but one of the reasons for the 
lack of clarity is the genuine ambivalence in Morgenthau's methodological 
and deeper epistemological positions much like that present in Max Weber's 
attempt to fashion an epistemological 'third way'. As Jaap Nobel is also aware 
there is an inherent tension in M orgenthau's w ork betw een "the
21 Michael Oakshott, 'Scientific Politics', The Cambridge Journal, Vol. I, N 0 .6 , March 1948, p.350.
22 ibid. pp.348-349.
23 Letter to Professor Michael Oakshott, May 22 1948, Box 44, Morgenthau Papers. This is one 
of the very few  exam ples in w hich M orgenthau responds directly to a review  of one of his 
books. H e w as clearly flattered to have reached Oakshott's attention and, as he wrote, "to be 
taken seriously has come to me as a pleasant - and gratifying - surprise."
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hermeneutical approach which seeks to understand in subjective terms, and 
the empirical approach which seeks to explain in objective terms." 24
Perhaps the m ost telling criticism made by Oakshott is that 
Morgenthau says "nothing about the art of statesmanship." Again, one might 
have replied on M orgenthau's behalf that this w asn't necessary for his 
purposes in Scientific Man but when he does actually turn his attention to 
diplomacy and statesmanship in later works, he fails to tackle the central 
problem of how this discourse is to be articulated under the conditions of 
modernity. Nor is the reader ever really made clear as to how the statesman 
can be freed of the dilemma posed by the sociology of knowledge. More 
broadly, there is the problem of how we actually come to judge the worth of 
particular statesmen and this is highlighted most clearly in M orgenthau's 
treatment of Neville Chamberlain.
In Politics Among Nations Morgenthau goes to great lengths to stress 
that the analysis of international politics is no easy matter and that the 
statesman's task in this respect is fraught with difficulties but if this is so it is 
hard to understand how  he can be so scathing in his judgem ent of 
Chamberlain. Given that virtually the entire German elite also mis-read Hitler 
how can one attach serious shortcomings to a British Prime Minister for doing 
likewise? It may be fairer to say of Chamberlain, as Machiavelli may well 
have done, that he lacked Fortiina. And the only useful analogy to be drawn 
from Munich is, surely, the fundamental difficulty that exists in drawing 
appropriate historical analogies.
Morgenthau's position seems all the more surprising when one learns 
that he was aware that E.H. Carr, prior to the collapse of the Munich 
'Settlement', had lauded Chamberlain in the first edition of the Tiuenty Years 
Crisis as, in Morgenthau's summary, "the prototype of a statesman combining
24 Jaap N obel, 'Morgenthau's struggle w ith power: the theory of pow er politics and the Cold 
War', Review of International Studies, V o l.21 ,1995, p.81.
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the elements of realism and utopianism  in his thought and action", a 
judgement which was quietly excised by Carr from the second edition which 
appeared after World War Two73 This should have provided Morgenthau 
with a forceful reminder of how difficult it is to judge in these matters. In an 
article written some years later Morgenthau recalled "the near-unanimity 
with which the Munich Settlement was approved by the theoreticians and 
practitioners of foreign policy and by the man in the street" as an example to 
illu stra te  "the contingencies inheren t in political p red ic tio n ."2 6 
Notwithstanding this emphasis upon contingency Morgenthau still felt able 
to claim that "from that experience we have developed the theoretical 
categories which demonstrate that it was bound to be such a failure." 22 This 
amounts to a gross overstatement of what can actually be accomplished with 
a theoretical framework, realist or otherwise. In truth it is by no means clear 
that M orgenthau is able, any more than Weber on the recognition of 
charismatic leadership, to provide effective criteria for the identification of 
effective statesmen and successful statesmanship.
Perhaps the most interesting point to be raised by Oakshott's review 
was contained in his response to M orgenthau’s suggestion that statesmen 
should be aware of the 'tragic sense of life'. Oakshott, in his typically 
forthright way, rejected the notion entirely:
"Human life is not 'tragic', either in part or in whole; tragedy belongs to art, 
not to life. And further, the situation [M orgenthau] describes - the 
imperfectability of man - is not tragic, nor even a predicament, unless and 
until it is contrasted with a human nature susceptible of a perfection which is 
in fact foreign to its character... To children and to romantic women, but to no
23 M orgenthau, 'The Political Science of EH Carr', World Politics, Vol. I, October 1948, p. 130. 
For the relevant passages in Carr see The Twenty Year's Crisis, pp.278-282.
26 Elsew here he asks "how w as one to know  w ith  any degree of certainty w hat Hitler's 
ultimate objectives were?" Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 47.
22 M orgenthau, "The Purpose of Political Science', in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), A Design for 
Political Science: Scope, Objectives, and Methods (Philadelphia, 1966), p.67.
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one else, it may appear 'tragic' that we cannot enjoy spring without winter,
eternal youth, and passion always at the height of its b e g i n n i n g . " 2 8
This was the only point of Oakshott's critique that M orgenthau rejected
entirely:
"I would not for a moment admit that tragedy is a category of art and not of 
life. How could Hamlet be tragic if he did not represent an element in life 
containing all the elements of tragedy and waiting for the artist to give them 
voice and colour? Man is tragic because he cannot do what he ought to do. 
That contrast between duty and ability is a quality of existence, not a creation 
of art."29
There is no way to reconcile these positions (though Morgenthau's 
point that art could not be perceived to be tragic if it did not have some basis 
in the social world is surely a good one) but one suspects that for most human 
beings with explicit moral sensibilities and a concern for the human condition 
it is Morgenthau's position that can be empathised with most keenly. How 
many of us do not, at least to some degree, feel the weight of a gap between is 
and ought? One could also see these contrasting positions as a reflection of the 
difference between English and Continental intellectual cultures and 
historical experiences.^^ It is much easier for an Englishman, the product of a 
relatively stable political culture protected by the English Channel from the 
worst excesses of continental violence and the necessity for stark political 
choices, to deny that the notion of tragedy pertains at all to the hum an 
condition.
This concern with tragedy highlights Morgenthau's acute ethical 
sensibilities and the intensity of his desire to identify and maintain a space for 
the ethical in political life which, indeed, is obvious throughout Scientific Man. 
One can, therefore, empathise with his frustration that, some fifteen years
28 Oakshott, 'Scientific Politics', p.356.
29 Morgenthau, Letter to Oakshott.
I am, of course, aware that this amounts to an oversimplification.
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later, he was "...still being accused of indifference to the moral problem in 
spite of abundant evidence... to the c o n t r a r y . H e  has consistently rejected 
the notion of an ethical duality of moral man and immoral society by claiming 
instead that the ethical dilemmas posed in the public sphere are only 
relatively not absolutely different from those in other a r e a s . 2^ Even so, in 
Scientific Man and elsewhere, Morgenthau finds it necessary to emphasise the 
starker nature of the ethical choices available in the political sphere generally 
and in the realm of international politics specifically. Though he is able to 
avoid an ethical dualism in theory, in practice one finds that time and again 
he feels unable to avoid the position that the political sphere does indeed pose 
ethical questions of a different o r d e r . 8 3  This political threat to the ethical space 
which Morgenthau wishes to identify is magnified by the specific conditions 
of social life in the mid-twentieth century. The replacement of an aristocratic 
cosmopolitanism with a nationalistic universalism, in combination with an 
unprecedented technological capacity for destructiveness, threatened to crush 
the ethical space that M orgenthau w ould like to protect. Ironically, 
M orgenthau criticised EH Carr for having a "relativistic, instrumentalist 
conception of morality" which lacked a "transcendant standard of ethics" but 
Morgenthau's emphasis upon the perilous position of humanity at the mid­
point of the twentieth century betrayed his own lack of faith in the existence 
of transcendental ethical f o r m s . 3 4  Morgenthau actually conceded the point in 
private correspondence with Carr:
31 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (Alfred A. Knopf, 3rd edition, 1960) preface.
32 See, for example, his letter to William Fox in which he agrees (with Herbert Butterfield) "... 
that a dual morality does not exist. H owever, in the public realm the moral dilem m a is more 
extreme and the ability to satisfy moral com m ands is more limited." Letter to W illiam  T.R. 
Fox, June 2,1956, Morgenthau Papers, Box 22 .
33 It w as, for example, manifest nonsense to maintain, as M orgenthau did, that w hat he called 
the "typical conflict between the mother-in-law and her child's spouse [which] is in essence a 
struggle for power" could som ehow  be qualitatively related to interstate warfare. See Politics 
Among Nations, first edition 1948, p .18.
34 M orgenthau, 'The Political Science of EH Carr', p. 134. For confirmation that Carr "viewed 
morality in an alm ost purely instrumental and epiphenom enal way" see W illiam T. R. Fox, 
'E.H. Carr and political realism: vision and revision’, Revieiu of International Studies, Vol. 11, 
N o .l, 1985, p.9.
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Carr: "What you seem to have proved is not so much the bankruptcy of my 
political thinking - that would not matter - but the bankruptcy of the political 
thinking of the West."
M orgenthau: "... I agree with what I take to be your position that the 
insufficiency of your political philosophy - as of mine - is but a symptom of 
the insufficiency - or if you wish "bankruptcy" - of the political philosophy of 
the West."33
If the tragedy of politics in general and the perilous nature of modern 
political life in particular represented the most important message of Scientific 
Man it is also true that Morgenthau could scarcely have found a less congenial 
political culture than the United States in which to deliver it, as we shall see 
later on in the chapter. For the moment, however, I wish to turn my attention 
to Politics Among Nations which was the second of the three books which 
established Morgenthau's reputation.
Politics Among Nations
Politics Among Nations is undoubtedly Morgenthau's best known work 
having sold something like 500,000 copies in its six editions. Francis 
Fukuyama has described it as "...perhaps the single greatest influence on the 
way Americans thought about foreign policy during the Cold W a r . " 3 6  Some of 
Morgenthau's critique of political liberalism from Scientific Man is reproduced 
here but most of the work is concerned w ith developing M orgenthau's 
alternative schematic based around the notion that "international politics, like 
all politics is a struggle for power" which is "universal in time and s p a c e . " 3 7
83 See Carr's letter to Morgenthau of July 21, 1958 and M orgenthau's reply of July 28 in the 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 9. One reviewer of Scientific Man thought that he detected "implicit in 
his analysis a nihilism  born of despair that is characteristic of all non-christian existential 
thinkers." See John Halliwell's review of Scientific Man Vs Power Politics in the Christian Science 
Monitor, October 6,1947, pp.586-587.
86 Fukuyama, The End of History , p.246.
82 M orgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp.13-14.
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Morgenthau continues to resist notions of ethical dualism by asserting that 
conflict is a ubiquitous feature of social life - "a constitutive element of all 
human associations".38 Morgenthau understands power itself to mean "man's 
control over the minds and actions of other men." Political power is "a 
psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it 
is exercised" and is to be distinguished from military power which reflects the 
actual exercise of physical violence.89 The fact that states are unable to 
calculate their relative positions vis-a-vis other states with any accuracy 
means that they are forced to attempt to maximise their power positions. In 
international politics this gives rise to three fundamental positions based on 
policies aimed at the retention of power, the increase of power, and the 
demonstration of power which Morgenthau labels respectively as policies of 
the status quo, imperialism and prestige.90
He later suggests that a policy of prestige is usually an instrument of 
the other two forms of policy involving ceremonial display or the exhibition 
of military force as in, for example, the invitation by the United States to 
foreign observers to witness atomic tests. Setting this aside, it is the first two 
policies which are of the greatest importcmce. The notion of a policy aimed at 
the maintenance of an existing distribution of power, of the status quo, 
requires little further explanation and Morgenthau provides various historical 
illustrations of the theme, including that of France in the period between the 
two World Wars in its attempts to form alliances to contain the German 
challenge to the status quo. Policies of imperialism involve precisely such an 
attempt to overthrow the status quo and in certain instances have amounted 
to efforts to attain European or global domination. Morgenthau seeks to give 
the term 'imperialism' "an ethically neutral, objective, and definable meaning"
38 ibid. p .18.
39 ibid. pp .14-15.
93 ibid. p.21. This establishes an im m ediate tension betw een power maximisation and a policy  
aimed consciously at the maintenance of a status quo - more on this later.
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which is somewhat at odds with conventional understandings. He rejects 
theories of imperialism which seek to link it as a phenomenon with forms of 
economic organisation - specifically capitalism - or more particularly with the 
alleged interests of big business in the promotion of war. He also suggests 
that imperialism needs to be understood in a dynamic sense and not as a 
static category. Hence British foreign policy in the 1870s, aimed at the 
consolidation of its empire, constituted a policy of the status quo, not of 
imperialism. The fundam ental question arising from this is how  these 
imperial drives, these challenges to the status quo, are contained. Morgenthau 
identifies two factors at this point; the first being the operation of the so-called 
balance-of-power and the quality of its attendant diplomacy and the second 
being the limits which ethics places at any given time upon the pursuit of 
power.
A detailed exploration of the history of the notion of the balance-of- 
power is beyond the scope of this dissertation but we do need to consider 
Morgenthau's understanding of its evolution in both theory and practice.91 
While Morgenthau considers broader notions about the need to balance social 
forces to be "as old as political history itself" he traces systematic reflection on 
the balance-of-power in interstate politics from in its beginnings in the 
thought of Bacon and Guicciardini in the sixteenth century to the heyday of 
the balance-of-power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The irony, 
though Morgenthau doesn't appear to be aware of it as such, is that in many 
ways the notion is clearly infused with ideas drawn from the Enlightenment, 
in particular the physics of Isaac Newton and the political philosophy of 
Montesquieu. As Morgenthau himself pointed out, "the idea of a balance 
among a number of nations for the purposes of preventing any one of them 
from becoming strong enough to threaten the independence of the others is a
91 For a good general overview  see Michael Sheehan,T/îe Balance of Power: History and Theory 
(Routledge, London, 1996)
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metaphor taken from the field of mechanics. It was appropriate to the way of 
thinking of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries which liked to 
picture society and the whole universe as a gigantic mechanism, a machine or 
a clockwork, created and kept in motion by the divine watchm aker."92 
Torbjorn Knutsen sees it as paradoxical that "this age which emphasised so 
insistently the primacy of hum an reason, built its most characteristic social 
vision on an irrational, extra-human principle of self-adjustment."93 Knutsen 
indirectly captures the essence of perhaps the most im portant debate 
surrounding the balance-of-power, namely, is it to be treated as the outcome 
of a mere mechanical process of self-interested, power-maximising actors, or 
can it only be created as the product of specific design on the part of 
sympathetic actors who display at least a degree of empathy for the intent of 
the others and some broader understanding that the 'game' has limits?
Richard Little has rather nicely sum m arised these contrasting 
positions as, respectively, adversarial and associative understandings of the 
b a l a n c e - o f - p o w e r . 9 4  The problem with Morgenthau's treatment is that he 
oscillates between these two positions, at times emphasising that the balance 
of pow er is some sort of self-regulating mechanism, at others that its 
successful operation requires a broader normative framework and he 
sometimes offers a rather uneasy mix of the two. His historical treatment of 
the balance-of-power draws attention to this.
In the broadest terms he traces the rise of the balance-of-power from 
the beginnings of the modern state system - for Morgenthau circa the fifteenth 
century - to the Napoleonic Wars as a period in which the European actors, 
excepting Turkey, were of most importance. The period from 1815 through 
the two World Wars witnessed the global extension of the system. The
92 Morgenthau, Politics Among Natioîts, p .l51.
93 T.Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory (Manchester University press, 1992)
p. 126.
94 Richard Little, 'Deconstucting the balance of power: tw o traditions of thought,' Revieiv of 
International Studies, Vol.15, No.2, April 1989, p .8 8 .
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eighteenth century was "the golden age of the balance of power in theory as 
well as practice. It was during that period that most of the literature of the 
balance of power was published and that the princes of Europe looked to the 
balance of power as the supreme principle to guide their conduct in foreign 
affairs. It is true that they allowed themselves to be guided by it in order to 
further their own interests. But, by doing so, it was inevitable that they 
would change sides, desert old alliances, and form new ones whenever it 
seemed to them that the balance of power had been disturbed and that a 
realignment of forces was needed to re-establish it. In that period, foreign 
policy was indeed a sport of kings, not to be taken more seriously than games 
and gambles, played for strictly limited stakes, and utterly devoid of 
transcendent principles of any kind... [S]uch was the nature of international 
politics... all executed according to the rules of the game which all players 
recognised as binding. The balance of power of that period was amoral rather 
than immoral. The technical rules of the art of politics were its only 
standard."93
This 'golden age' came to an abrupt end with the French Revolution 
and the Napoleonic Wars. The "cleavage between nationalism and legitimacy" 
opened up by the French Revolution was never subsequently closed but the 
Concert of Europe "was most successful in preserving the general peace 
during the ninety years of its existence."96 Its success was facilitated by three 
factors; firstly the fact that 'politically empty spaces' (!) as M orgenthau 
describes them were available for political expansion thus acting as a kind of 
pressure valve coupled w ith the willingness of Britain to undertake 
consciously to maintain the balance-of-power; secondly the fact that the 
"moral consensus lived on as a feeble echo"; thirdly, and most importantly.
93 M orgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p .l39 . For a similar assessm ent see P.A. Reynolds, 
T he Balance of Power: N ew  Wine In An Old Bottle’, Political Studies, Vol.XXIII, 1975, p.231.
96 ibid. p.368. He suggest that the Crimean War was caused by a series of unfortunate 
accidents.
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the Concert of Europe was shaped by "a succession of brilliant diplomats 
and statesmen who knew how to make peace, how to preserve peace, and 
how to keep wars short and limited in scope." 97
All this took place, with the exception of the Wars of Religion in the 
seventeenth century and the Napoleonic Wars, within a context where the 
conduct of war itself was 'limited' in three ways; firstly by the percentage of 
the population emotionally engaged and participating directly in war; 
secondly by the percentage of the population affected by war; and thirdly by 
the objectives of w ar.98 'Limited war' has . turned into 'total' war in the 
twentieth century because of profound changes in military technology and 
the prevailing normative ethos. The mechanisation of war has both increased 
its destructiveness and ensured that whole populations have to be mobilised 
in order to maintain these vast fighting machines.
Alongside these technological developments the normative ethos has 
been gravely weakened by the rise of modern nationalism which, contrary to 
the hopes of its nineteenth century champions, has proved to be 
"particularistic and exclusive" rather than "universalistic and humanitarian."99 
Nationalism has ensured the fragmentation of the "aristocratic international 
society. "130 One of the concrete manifestations of this has been the diminution 
of the norms which had developed around the actual conduct of war, i.e. the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants ; the treatm ent of 
prisoners of war; the prohibition of the use of assassination as a legitimate 
tool of statecraft and so on.i3i Nationalism  has also underm ined the 
effectiveness of the balance-of-power, as Morgenthau explains:
"Of the temperateness and undecisiveness of the political contests, from 1648 
to the Napoleonic Wars and then from 1815 to 1914, the balance-of-power is
97 ibid.
98 ibid. p .l81.
99 ibid. p.l89.
133 ibid. p.l90.
131 ibid. pp.178-185.
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not so much the cause as the metaphorical and symbolic expression or, at 
least, the technique of realisation. Before the balance-of-power could impose 
its restraints upon the power aspirations of nations through the mechanical 
interplay of opposing forces, the competing nations had first to restrain 
themselves by accepting the system of the balance of power as the common
framework of their e n d e a v o u r s " . 1 3 2
The end result at the middle of the twentieth century is a contest between a 
pair of superpowers, armed with weapons of unprecedented destructive 
capacity, in a context of gravely weakened supranational norms where 
diplomacy has lost its vitality.
How convincing, then, is all of this as an historical account? Henry 
Kissinger, for one, entirely rejects the notion that the eighteenth century was 
marked by any sort of associative balance-of-power. The philosophers of the 
Enlightenment, he suggests, "...were confusing the result with the intent. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the princes of Europe fought innumerable 
wars without there being a shred of evidence that their conscious goal was to 
implement any general notion of international order. "133 That "a sort of 
equilibrium gradually emerged out of this seeming anarchy and rapine" is 
entirely due to the simple fact that no state was able to form an empire over 
the opposition of the others. 134 In other words, the balance-of-power was 
adversarial rather than associative. It is indeed rather difficult to reconcile the 
continental ambitions of Louis XIV with the sort of aristocratic game, played 
for small stakes, which Morgenthau describes. That the struggle appears to 
have been restricted may simply be due to the limits imposed by the 
technology of the time and the relatively reduced capacities of the states 
themselves where, for example, the collection of taxation could not be taken 
for granted in the way that is possible for modern states. It is precisely on the
^32 ibid. p .l61.
^33 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p .6 8 .
1 3 4  i b i d .  p p . 6 9 - 7 0 .
108
basis of his treatment of the eighteenth century that critics have accused 
Morgenthau of a misguided nostalgia of the kind that George Kennan has 
confessed to from time to timed^s
M orgenthau may be on stronger ground in his treatm ent of the 
nineteenth century where there was at least some sort of consensual 
arrangement, even if it was based on not much more than a shared fear of the 
ideas unleashed by the French Revolutiond^ôAnd in the form of Otto von 
Bismarck we have at least one example of a statesman who clearly did 
practice diplomacy on the basis of the need for a balance-of-power and who 
did his best to limit the excessive ambitions of some of those around him. A 
problem is raised, however, in Morgenthau's (widely shared) understanding 
that for much of this time Great Britain acted as the 'keeper-of-the-balance' in 
terms of the European balance-of-power. For those who subscribe to an 
adversaria l balance-of-pow er the notion of a 'balancer'is deeply  
i m p l a u s i b l e . 137 Even those who do accept that the suggestion is a plausible 
one find it difficult to point to the phenomenon empirically. In an article on 
the role of the 'balancer' in the history of international politics Michael 
Sheehan is, however, unable to point to a single example of a state acting as a
133On M orgenthau and nostalgia see Griffiths, Realism, Idealism and International Politics, 
p p .72-73; Sollner, 'German C onservatism ', p .172. M ichael O akshott com p lain ed  that 
M orgenthau "writes som etim es as if he knew  of a golden age in the past w hen European 
Society w as strikingly m ore successful in dealing w ith  its political problem s than it now  
appears to be." See 'Scientific Politics', p .347. For Kennan's adm ission  see h is American 
Diplomacy 1900-1950 (University of Chicago Press, 1951) p p .72-73 and Realities of American 
Foreign ÏPolicy (Oxford U niversity Press,1954). In h is m em oirs K ennan recalls "with 
embarassment" a paper he wrote in 1939 w hich called for a return to the particularism of the 
nineteenth century(!) See his Memoirs 1925-1950, p . l l 8 .
136 By the time Kissinger reaches the nineteenth century he too has recognised that "...the 
continental countries were knit together by a sense of shared values. There w as not only a 
physical equilibrium, but a moral one." Kissinger, Diplomacy, p.79. Robert Jervis describes "an 
unusually h igh  and self-conscious level of cooperation among the major European powers." 
'From Balance to Concert: A  Study of International Security Cooperation', World Politics, Vol. 
XXXVIII, October 1985, p.59. A lso see Richard B. Elrod, "Ihe Concert of Europe: A  Fresh Look 
at an International System', World Politics, Vol. XXVllI, No.5, January 1976, pp.159-174.
137see for exam ple K enneth W altz, 'Realpolitik and balance of pow er theory', in  
F.Greenstein and N.Polsby (eds.). International Politics (Harvard University Press, 1959).
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'balancer' apart from Great Britain. 138 it is true that M orgenthau does 
recognise that unusual historical and geographical reasons enable Britain to 
perform this function but even so the whole idea of an associative balance-of- 
power clashes with his fundamental theoretical assumption that states seeks 
to maximise their power.139 This initial assumption only seems plausible 
when the balance-of-power is accepted as an unintended outcome.
There is, too, an extraordinary ambivalence about what he actually 
wants to claim on behalf of the balance-of-power. For more than four 
hundred years, he suggests, the policy (note the emphasis on intent) of the 
balance-of-power thwarted the hegemonic ambitions of individual states. It 
also succeeded in preserving the independence of all the members of the 
system from the Treaty of Westphalia until the partition of Poland in the late 
eighteenth  century. U niversal dom inion has only been prevented, 
Morgenthau claims, at the price of 'virtually continuous' warfare between 
1648 and 1815 plus two World Wars. And the two periods of relative stability 
from 1648 and 1815 were "preceded by the wholesale elimination of small 
states..."113 Given that M orgenthau suggests that the preservation of the 
independence of individual states is one of the most important functions of 
the balance-of-power, this obviously represents a point of considerable 
tension. Beyond this he acknowledges that there is, in fact, no way to judge 
whether the balance-of-power has actually served to minimise the frequency 
and intensity of w arfare.m  Given this scepticism it's difficult to understand 
why M orgenthau places so much store upon the revival of the balance-of- 
power in the twentieth century.
138 M ichael Sheehan, T h e place of the balancer in balance of pow er theory', Revieio of 
International Studies, Vol.15, No.2, April 1989, pp.123-134.
139 Yhe three factors w hich M orgenthau identified as enabling Britain to have acted as the 
balancer are its geographical remoteness, the fact that Britain had no vital interests to defend  
on the Continent, apart from the general one of preventing any pow er from attaining a 
continental hegem ony w hich could threaten it and thirdly that Britain's empire gave it the 
opportunity of 'satisfying aspirations elsewhere,' M orgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p .275. 
113 ibid. p.l50.
I l l  ibid. p .l56.
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A similar ambivalence pervades his treatm ent of the role of 
diplomacy. The reader will recall Michael Oakshott's criticism of the lack of 
attention which M orgenthau actually gave to diplomacy and diplomatic 
practice in Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics. This deficiency is addressed in 
Politics Among Nations but much of the two substantial sections that 
Morgenthau devotes to exploring the role of diplomacy and the proposals for 
its revival is disappointingly banal.n^ His 'four tasks of diplomacy' are 
straightforward enough but he has almost nothing to say about how they can 
be perform ed in an environm ent in the m id-twentieth century where 
"...diplomacy has lost its vitality, and its functions have withered away to 
such an extent as is w ithout precedent in the history of the m odern state
s y s t e m .  " 1 1 3
He offers five factors to account for the decline of diplomacy since the 
First World War.n^ Technological advances in communication have tended to 
turn overseas representatives into mere ciphers and made it easier for non­
diplomats to intrude. This has been combined with a liberal distrust of 
traditional diplomatic negotiations conducted in private which has led to their 
replacement with "parliamentary procedures", as Morgenthau describes them, 
and the "open covenants... openly arrived at" described by Woodrow Wilson.
112 Similarly, a later essay The A rt of Diplomatic Negotiation doesn't actually appear to address 
the subject at all, directly or indirectly. See Morgenthau, 'The Art of Diplomatic Negotiation', 
in Leonard D. W hite (ed.). The State of the Social Sciences (University of Chicago Press, 1956) 
pjp .404-414.
113 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.425. The four tasks of diplomacy are that :
" 1) Diplom acy m ust determine its objectives in the light of the pow er actually and potentially  
available for the pursuit of these objectives. 2) Diplom acy m ust assess the objectives of other 
nations and the pow er actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives. 3) 
D iplom acy m ust determ ine to w hat extent these different objectives are com patible w ith  
each other. 4) D iplom acy m ust em ploy the m eans suited to the pursuit of its objectives." 
ibid. pp .425-430.
11“! The longer standing elem ent which he describes earlier in the book is the replacement of 
diplom ats drawn from an aristocratic background w ith  those thrown up by dem ocratic 
processes. The quality of diplom ats and diplom acy "...is best assured by dependence upon  
tradition and institu tions rather than upon the sporadic appearance of outstand ing  
individuals. It is to tradition tliat Great Britain ow es tlie relative constancy of its pow er from  
Henry VIII to the First W orld War." ibid. p .107. Max Weber took the som ew hat different 
v iew  that the quality of British leadership w as due precisely to its m ore open  and  
com petitive selection w hen compared with that of the German ruling elite.
I l l
The superpowers themselves have either lacked a long-standing diplomatic 
tradition, in the case of the United States, or have consciously destroyed that 
tradition in the case of Russia as a consequence of the Bolshevik Revolution. 
The most important factor in undermining diplomatic discourse is, however, 
"the crusading spirit of the new moral force of nationalistic universalism" 
which manifests itself in a context where wars can become "total" and "two 
gigantic power blocs face each other in inflexible opposition." The 'eight rules 
of diplomacy' which Morgenthau offers as a remedy, again, tell us nothing 
about how a discourse of diplomacy is to be articulated and maintained in the 
intersocietal conditions of the mid-twentieth century as Morgenthau defines 
them.1^3 It is, perhaps, understandable that at least one critic has seen this as 
little more than "a counsel of despair."
We will return to 'Morgenthau and his critics' later in the chapter as 
part of a broader overview of his early books but for the moment I wish to 
turn my attention to the third of these. In Defense of the National Interest, first 
published in 1 9 5 1 .1 1 2  if consider Scientific Man to have been Morgenthau's 
fundamental critique of political liberalism and Politics Among Nations as an
113 The 'eight rules of diplomacy' am ount to:
A) 'Four Fundamental Rules': 1) "Diplomacy m ust be d ivested of the crusading spirit. 2) The 
objectives of foreign policy m ust be defined in terms of the national interest and m ust be 
supported w ith  adequate power. 3) D iplom acy m ust look at the political scene from the 
point of v iew  of other nations. 4) Nations m ust be prepared to compromise on all issues that 
are not vital to them"; and B) 'Four Prerequisites of Compromise' which are: 1) " Give up the 
shadow  of w orthless rights for the substance of real advantage. 2) Never put yourself in a 
position  from w hich you  cannot retreat w ithout losing face and from w hich you  cannot 
advance w ithout grave risks. 3) N ever allow  a w eak ally to make decisions for you. 4) The 
armed forces are the instrument of foreign policy, not its master." Politics Among Nations, 
pp.439-443.
It m ay w ell be that up to this point M orgenthau had sim ply not given very m uch attention  
to the problem s of shaping foreign policy  in a dem ocracy like the United States w ith  the 
added com plication of its peculiar governm ental structure based around a formal separation 
of powers. It is instructive that in the third edition of Politics Among Nations M orgenthau  
added a fifth "prerequisite of compromise" that "The G overnm ent is the leader of public 
opinion, not its slave." Politics Among Nations, (3rd edition 1960), p.567.
^^6 Griffiths, Realism and Idealism, p.72.1 hope that in chapters three and four I w ill show  that 
M orgenthau, through tire w ay that he conducted his life as an intellectual, m anaged to rise 
above this 'counsel of despair'.
^ 2^ For an earlier affirmation of the importance of the national interest see Morgenthau, 'The 
Primacy of the National Interest', American Scholar, Vol.18, No.2, Spring, 1949, pp.207-216.
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attempt, however problematic, to articulate an alternative world-view, in In 
Defense of the National Interest Morgenthau places this vision within the context 
of the diplomatic history and political institutions of the United States. 
Though Politics Among Nations is the book best known to posterity. In Defense 
of the National Interest attracted even more scholarly attention at the time and 
a relatively more hostile reception - hardly surprising given its fundamental 
challenge to the notion of American exceptionalism.
Morgenthau's central theme is the need for American statesmen to 
return to policies based firmly upon the pursuit of the national interest, thus 
enabling them to recapture the essence of American statecraft as it was 
practised at the foundation of the republic. This period am ounted to 
America's own 'golden age' of diplomacy.il® In total Morgenthau identified 
three fundamental patterns in American foreign policy: the realistic - thinking 
and acting in terms of power (Alexander Hamilton); the ideological - 
thinking in terms of moral principles but acting in terms of power (Thomas 
Jefferson and John Quincy Adams); and the moralistic - thinking and acting in 
term s of m oral principles(W oodrow Wilson).H9 There is a rough  
correspondence, M orgenthau suggests, w ith three periods of American 
foreign policy: the first decade of the Republic; the nineteenth century up to 
the Spanish-American War; and the third -and moralistic - period from the 
turn of the century until 1950.
The first, realistic, period is best reflected by Alexander Hamilton, 
writing as 'Pacificus' and 'Americanus', against the 'Helvidius' of James 
Madison on the question of whether the United States should intervene on the
113 "..this generation of Americans m ust shed the illusions of its fathers and grandfathers and 
relearn the great principles of statecraft w hich guided the republic in the first decade and - in 
moralistic disguise - in the first century of its existence." M orgenthau, American Foreign Policy, 
(M ethuen and Co., London, 1952) p.3. In Defense of the National Interest w as published in the 
United Kingdom  under the title of American Foreign Policy and I am drawing upon a copy of 
the latter. It is, in every other respect, identical to the American edition.
119 ibid. p .l3 . He stresses that this typology only refers to 'prevailing tendencies', ideal types 
as it were.
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behalf on Revolutionary France against the coalition ranged against it in 1792. 
In opposition to the arguments of Madison - that the United States should 
fulfil its treaty obligations to a country whose aid had been critical in the War 
of Independence and which now sought to defend similar republican 
institutions - Hamilton "invoked the national interest of the United States." 120 
In weighing up the likely consequences of American intervention both for 
France and for the United States, Hamilton "put the legalistic and moralistic 
arguments of the opposition led by Madison ... into the context of the concrete 
power situation in which the United States found itself on the international 
scene ..." and so helped resist the challenge to Washington's declaration of 
neutrality .121
The second period is marked by a disjuncture between thought and 
action in which American statesmen thought in terms of moral principles but 
behaved rather differently.Though Thomas Jefferson railed periodically 
against the iniquities of the balance-of-power he nonetheless found himself 
withdrawing his pro-French sympathies when Napoleon threatened to attain 
a continental hegemony. And in John Quincy Adams' period of office as 
Secretary of State and President, principles and interests formed "a 
harmonious whole" in terms of his foreign policy initiatives - freedom of the 
seas, the Monroe Doctrine, and Manifest Destiny. The "legal and moral 
principle of the freedom of the seas" became a political weapon to be used 
against British naval domination. The Monroe Doctrine's "moral postulates of 
anti-imperialism and mutual non-intervention" provided space for the United 
States to pursue a continental hegemony. Manifest Destiny provides "moral 
justification as well as moral incentive" for expansion in the W e s t .  122
This rather fortuitous meeting of power and principle ends with the 
Spanish-American War in which McKinley, by annexing the Philippines,
^20 ibid. p.14.
121 ibid. p. 18.
122 ibid. pp.19-23.
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'leads the United States as a great world power beyond the confines of the 
Western Hemisphere, ignorant of the bearing of this step upon the national 
interest, and guided by moral principles completely divorced from the 
national interest." This utopian period is defined most clearly by Woodrow 
Wilson who "not only disregards the national interest, but is explicitly 
opposed to it on moral grounds." 123
Wilson could not however, like Thomas Jefferson before him, 
"discount completely the national interest of the United States." The "objective 
force of the national interest which no rational man could escape" led the 
United States through Wilson into war in 1917 in order to oppose the German 
threat to the balance-of-power in Europe - "the same reasons, only half­
known to himself, for which Jefferson had wished and worked alternatively 
for the victory of England and France."124 Wilson's moralising was, 
nonetheless, not without serious political consequences for, having met both 
his moral objective and the political interests of America with the defeat of 
Germany, Wilson failed to work towards the restoration of the balance-of- 
power, instead taking as his mission the responsibility for putting an end to 
power politics altogether. Faced with the opposition of his allies Wilson was 
forced into a series of 'uneasy compromises' which satisfied no-one and so 
"Wilson returned from Versailles a compromised idealist, an empty-handed 
statesman, a discredited ally. In that triple failure lies the tragedy not only of 
Wilson, a great yet misguided man, but of Wilsonianism as a political
doctrine."i25
The Wilsonian legacy was maintained through Franklin Roosevelt and 
his Secretary of State Cordell Hull who possessed, according to Morgenthau, 
a lawyer's rather than a statesman's mental outlook. 2^6 As with Wilson, "the
123 ibid. p.23.
124 ibid. p.25.
125 ibid. pp.26-27.
126 ibid. pp. 31,106.
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impact of a national emergency upon common sense" m eant that moral 
postulates could co-exist with the American national interest but problems 
arose when American leaders turned to think about the political constellation 
that was to be shaped following the defeat of Japan and Germany. Stalin and 
Churchill had acted with full cognisance of the balance-of-power which 
would be formed upon the conclusion of the war but Roosevelt had not with 
the result that the allies had failed to limit the Soviet sphere of influence in 
Eastern Europe, which would have been possible had it been made an explicit 
object of p o l i c y .  1 2 2  The Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, and the United 
Nations proved to be no substitute for a cogent political strategy. Other more 
prom ising foreign policy initiatives had been comprom ised by their 
presentation in universal moral terms. In this manner, the Truman Doctrine 
"transformed a concrete interest of the United States in a geographically 
defined part of the world into a moral principle of worldwide validity, to be 
applied regardless of the limits of American interest and of American 
p o w e r . " i 2 8  Morgenthau concludes In Defense of the National Interest with an 
extraordinary and, for at least one critic, "painfully embarrassing" coda 
entitled 'Forget and Remember' which is reproduced in full b e l o w . i 2 9
Forget and Remember!
" Forget the illusions of the recent past and remember the great and simple 
truths that the thoughts and actions of the early statesmen of the Republic 
have left you.
Forget the sentimental notion that foreign policy is a struggle between virtue 
and vice, with virtue bound to win.
Forget the utopian notion that a brave new world without power politics will 
follow the unconditional surrender of wicked nations.
122 ibid. pp.32, 95-99.
128 ibid, p .116.
129 See James R. N ew m an's review  of In Defense of the National Interest, 'The Balance of 
Power and the Voice of God', Nezv Republic, A ugust 13,1951, p .19.
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Forget the crusading notion that any nation, however virtuous and powerful, 
can have the mission to make the world over in its own image.
Remember that the golden age of isolated normalcy is gone forever and that 
no effort, however great, and no action, however radical, will bring it back. 
Remember that diplomacy without power is feeble, and power w ithout 
diplomacy is destructive and blind.
Remember that no nation's power is without limits, and hence that its policies 
must respect the power and interests of others.
Remember that the American people have shown throughout history that 
they are able to face the tru th  and act upon it w ith courage and 
resourcefulness in war, with common sense and moral determination in 
peace.
And, above all, remember always that it is not only a political necessity but 
also a moral duty for a nation to follow in its dealings with other nations but 
one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action; The National
Interest. "130
This sermon-like exhortation shows that at times the 'Realist Jeremiad' took an 
almost literal rather than metaphorical form.
Given the centrality of 'the national interest' for foreign policy the 
most surprising thing about the book is that Morgenthau devotes no time at 
all to fleshing out its constituent elements. For that the reader needs to turn to 
an article written at the end of 1952 in which Morgenthau attempts to meet 
this, and other, points of criticism.i3i In response to the charge that the 
national interest was simply too elusive as a concept to enable it to be used as 
a foundation in the way that he does, Morgenthau conceded that "its content 
can run the whole gamut of meanings which are logically compatible with it" 
and "that content is determined by the political traditions and the total
130 M orgenthau, American Foreign Policy , p.242.
^31 M orgenthau, 'Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States', The 
American Political Science Revieio, vol.XLVI, no.6, December 1952, pp.961-988.
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cultural context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy."^ 32 Even 
so the notion of interest is "the essence of politics" and universal and the 
national interest does retain "a residual meaning which is inherent in the 
concept itself." Given a competitive world of sovereign nations "the survival 
of a political unit, such as a nation, it its identity is the irreducible minimum, 
the necessary element of its interests vis-s-vis other units. Taken in isolation, 
the determination of its content in a concrete situation is relatively simple; for 
it encompasses the integrity of the nation's territory, of its political 
institutions, and of its culture." 133
One may well agree w ith M orgenthau that 'national survival' 
provides a minimal content for the notion of the national interest but the 
problem is that in most cases this minimalist position will not provide a very 
useful guide to what states actually must, or should, do. Morgenthau asserts 
that the maintenance of the European balance-of-power has been an axiomatic 
component of the American national interest because only the rise of a 
Continental hegemon could present a threat to American national survival. 
Hence Jefferson, Wilson, and Roosevelt find themselves drawn inexorably, 
against their fundamental instincts, into supporting the balance-of-power in 
Europe. In truth, however, at no time since the middle of the nineteenth 
century at the very latest has the emergence of a threat from Europe to the 
territorial integrity of the United States been even the m ost remote 
p o s s ib i l i t y .  134 ^Jot even in his most extravagant fantasies did Adolf Hitler
132 On other occasions, w hen pushed , M orgenthau w ould  fall back on the notion  of an 
objective national interest. In debate w ith  N oam  C hom sky som e tw enty years later he 
claim ed that "I happen to believe that there is a possibility by rational political analysis to 
arrive at certain objective conclusions w hich define in broad terms what the national interest 
is and particularly to define in negative terms what it is n o t ... I indeed believe that if you did  
not assum e that there exists an objective national interest, you  w ou ld n ’t be capable of 
criticizing or approving of a particular foreign policy, either historical or contemporary... " 
M orgenthau and N oam  Chomsky, 'The National Interest and the Pentagon Papers', Partisan 
Review, Vol.39, N o .3 ,1972, p.362.
133 ibid. p.97.
134 \Yith the possible exception of European pow ers m oving to take advantage of the Civil 
War.
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contemplate the possibility of an invasion of the United States. Morgenthau's 
treatment of this period is deeply ahistorical and serves to obscure the fact 
that the internal debate over American intervention in World War One was a 
very real one, involving entirely legitimate and plausible choices in terms of 
what constituted the national interest of the United States. The same could be 
said of World War Two and, had Hitler not been so foolish as to make a 
declaration of war, it could still have been difficult for Roosevelt to secure an 
American involvement in the European theatre.
The idea of an axiomatic national interest is hot even clear when it 
comes to the United Kingdom and Morgenthau's Chamberlain parable. It is at 
least a possibility that the survival of the United Kingdom as a nation-state 
could have been compatible with German continental h e g e m o n y .^35 As 
Michael Joseph Smith is also aware, Morgenthau was not convincing in his 
efforts to identify 'a rational core' of the national interest to be illuminated 
through objective analysis or, perhaps to be more precise, the core he did 
identify - national survival - could not plausibly serve as a foundation for the 
claims he made about state b e h a v i o u r . 3^6 n  {g hardly surprising then that 
M orgenthau's assertions - whether part of a conscious policy of rhetorical 
overstatement or not - that international politics had 'iron laws' or that for 
statesmen not to believe in the idea of a balance-of-power was akin to "a 
scientist not believing in the law of gravity" merely served as a goad to his 
c r i t ic s . 3^7 Perhaps more importantly it also helped to obscure the fact that 
M orgenthau could indeed make a plausible case for his contem porary 
understanding of what constituted the national interest of the United States, a 
case which was strengthened by the fact that, ironically, for the first time in 
over a hundred years the development of nuclear weapons in combination
135 The suggestion  that a British Empire could also have co-existed w ith  Hitler's grand  
designs is a far more im plausible counterfactual.
t36 See M ichael Joseph Smith, 'Hans M orgenthau and the American National Interest in the 
Early Cold War’, Social Research , Vol.48, No.4, Winter 1981, pp.777, 783-784.
^37 M orgenthau, American Foreign Policy, pp.32,144.
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with long-range bombers and, later, intercontinental ballistic missiles, had 
brought about a situation in which there was a direct threat to the security of 
the United States em anating from Europe. Under such circumstances 
M orgenthau's message of prudence and the avoidance of universal moral 
antagonisms was, indeed ,an important one.
It remains for us to explore how this trilogy of books is situated 
within the broader contexts of American intellectual and political life, but for 
the moment we need to consider the critical reception of the books in their 
entirety and illuminate questions and problems not identified in the 
discussion so far.
Morgenthau's most forthright defender of recent times, A1 Murray, 
has suggested that the extreme statements which Morgenthau has become 
notorious for were more polemical than considered and not a fair reflection of 
his broader opus.^38 M orgenthau intimated as much in the preface to the 
second edition of Politics Among Nations:
"When this book was originally written, that false and pernicious conception 
of foreign policy [liberalism/ idealism] was still in the ascendancy. This book 
was indeed, and could be nothing else but, a frontal attack against that 
conception. It had to be as radical on the side of its philosophy as had been 
the errors on the other side. With that battle largely won, the polemic purpose 
can give way to the consolidation of a position that no longer needs to be 
attained, but only to be defended and adapted to new experiences."
He ends the preface by repeating Montesquieu's plea to his readers that 
"...they will not judge by a few hours reading of the labor of twenty years; that 
they will approve or condemn the book entire, and not a few particular
phrases."139
138 Murray, 'Moral Politics', p.85.
139 Morgenthau, 'Preface to the Second Edition', Politics Among Nations (3rd edition, 1960).
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At times the careless use of language appears to be a source of 
confusion. Morgenthau's most notorious remark, frequently quoted by his 
critics, was that "there is a profound and neglected truth hidden in Hobbes's 
extreme dictum that the state creates morality as well as law and that there is 
neither morality nor law outside the state."i40 in a letter written to the Journal 
of International Affairs in October 1959 Morgenthau stressed that the operative 
w ords were "Hobbes's extreme dictum" rather than "a profound and 
neglected t r u t h . The passage as it originally appeared in a journal article 
published a couple of years before In Defense of the National Interest appears 
to support this:
"However extreme Hobbes's dictum that the state creates morality as well as 
law,and that there is neither morality nor law outside the state,that dictum 
points to an important and neglected truth.
Thirdly, it is also true to say that part of the blame for 
misunderstandings lies with Morgenthau's reluctance to engage openly with 
his critics.143 One can empathise with his frustration, expressed in the preface 
to the third edition of Politics Among Nations and cited earlier, that he 
continued to be accused of "indifference to the moral problem" - a suggestion 
which, as I have already demonstrated, is manifestly untrue. Some critics did, 
however, have legitimate questions which Morgenthau often rather casually 
dismissed out of hand. In a review article examining the first three books 
Robert Tucker points to the uneasy tension betw een free will and 
determinism which sees Morgenthau attempting to use the national interest 
as both an axiomatic guide to the way that states actually behave and a
M orgenthau, American Foreign Policy , p.34.
See Morgentlrau's letter to the editor, April 22,1959, in the Morgenthau Papers, Box 29. 
M orgenthau, "The Primacy of the National Interest', American Scholar, Vol.18, No.2, Spring 
1949, p.210.
^ 3^ H e once suggested  in a letter that "academic controversies are a w aste of time". Letter to 
Mrs Caughey, June 2 1967, Morgenthau Papers, Box 9.
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normative guide to what they should dod^^ Morgenthau refers to this review 
in one of his articles (in a footnote!) and suggests that "it ought not to need 
special emphasis that a principle of social conduct, in contrast to a law of 
nature, allows of, and even presupposes, conduct in violation of the principle. 
Robert W. Tucker ... has missed this and many other points in his zeal to find 
contradictions where there are none."^^^
If this is true then why refer to 'iron laws' at all? How does a 'law' 
pertaining to the social sphere differ from a 'law' of nature? What evidence 
would be required and accepted in order to refute (falsify?) a social law? If it 
is of limited value to account for foreign policy on the basis of the motives of 
statesmen why should we bother, as Morgenthau advocates, to "look over his 
shoulder when he writes hid dispatches" or "listen in on his conversation with 
other statesmen?"^^^ Morgenthau simply ignored these legitimate questions.
That there are deep-rooted m ethodological and epistemological 
problems is undeniable and many of these are a function of his Weberian 
position and are similar to those identified in the earlier discussion of Weber. 
However as Michael Joseph Smith is also aware, M orgenthau is often 
tem pted to push past the limits of what Weber thought possible for social 
science and this weakens the overall plausibility of his claims.
The other factor which runs against the view that Morgenthau's more 
extreme claims were the product of an early form of polemical overstatement 
is that there are many more of them to be found in the later works - In Defense 
of the National Interest and the second edition of Politics Among Nations - 
rather than in Scientific Man Vs Power Politics and the first edition of Politics
Robert Tucker, 'Professor M orgenthau’s Theory of Political "Realism",T/te American 
Political Science R eview , Vol.46, N o .l, 1952, p.216.
M orgenthau, 'Another Great Debate', p .962. In a letter w ritten  a few  years later 
M orgenthau suggested that he made no detailed response to the Tucker article "...because I 
thought it w as so w eek  a criticism as not to deserve a reply. There is no writer, liv ing or 
dead, w ho cannot be exposed to this kind of hair-splitting argument." Letter to John B. Loeb, 
A ugust 9 1956, Morgenthau Papers, Box 34.
M orgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd edition 1960, pp.5-6.
Smith, Realist Thought, p. 144.
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Among Nations. It is not, for example, until the second edition of Politics 
Among Nations that Morgenthau's well-known 'six principles of political 
realism' appear, the first of which announces that "Political Realism believes 
that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have 
their roots in human nature."^^^ a  number of commentators have expressed a 
preference for what Robert Gilpin has described as "the earlier and intuitive 
Morgenthau" of Scientific Man Vs Power Politics rather tlian the Morgenthau of 
Politics Among N a t i o n s , Even Kenneth Thompson, one of Morgenthau's 
closest confidants, felt it necessary to raise the issue with himd^o
If then, these problems cannot be explained away, can they at least be 
better understood? I have already drawn attention to the difficulties inherent 
in a Weberian position. An additional consideration is that many of these 
books were written with the needs of a very wide readership in mind. Is 
Politics Among Nations best seen as a textbook for undergraduates, a manual 
of statecraft or, as M orgenthau himself - perhaps rather ambitiously - 
described it, "a permanent guide for the intelligent observer of international
politics"?^3i
M orgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd edition 1960, p.4. For a critical rejection of the 
six principles see Stanley H offm ann, 'Notes on the Limits of "Realism" ', Social Research , 
XLVII, Winter, 1981, pp.653-659. The m ost pernicious legacy of Morgenthau's introduction of 
the six principles is that it has encouraged students and, m ore seriously, (w ould-be) 
academics - w ho should know  better - that one only needs to read the relevant pages of the 
second edition of Politics Among Nations in order to be able to reach an understanding of 
Morgenthau. See for exam ple Hans-Karl Pichler's wretched article ' The Godfathers of Truth' 
(cited earlier) in w hich he bases his analysis on the six principles w hich he conveniently  
(indolently?) claim s to constitute "a sum m ary of the epistem ological and onto logica l 
assum ptions on which M orgenthau's work is based." (p.187.)
Robert Gilpin, 'The riclmess of the tradition of political realism', p.292. See also Murray, 
'Moral Politics', p .94. and Richard A shley, 'The poverty of neorealism '. International 
O rganization, Vol.38, N o.2, 1984, pp.225-286. One should  keep in m ind, h ow ever, that 
intellectual tensions were present from the beginning.
^30 "... there is this problem: in Scientific Man you question the scientific m ethod, in Politics 
[Am ong Nations] you  com e close to establishing the boundaries of a science of politics -in  
your ow n words... I feel that sooner or later you w ill be obliged to say som ething about this 
important problem." See the letter from Kenneth H iom pson, March 1954, Box 57, Morgenthau 
Pavers.
131 A referee feared its corrupting influence upon the young:
"... it w ill take skillful and constructive teaching to avoid doing a lot of damage to the social 
outlook of unsophisticated youngsters." (!!) See Harold Sprout's letter to Roger Shugg of 
December 24 ,1 9 4 7 , held in the Morgenthau Papers, Box 121.
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There is evidence in the Morgenthau Papers of some tension between 
Morgenthau and Roger Shugg, his editor at the publishers Alfred A. Knopf, 
over the question of who the book was actually being w ritten  for. 
Morgenthau's description of a 'permanent guide' appears in a letter written in 
response to correspondence from Shugg in which the latter suggested the 
employment of a stylist and reminded Morgenthau that "we are trying to 
reach a rather large American undergraduate audience with your book" and 
that "they will complain about any work that is not crystal clear in its 
writing." Morgenthau suspected, probably correctly, that the real target of the 
editor was content rather than style and he complained that it was not 
possible "to translate a theoretical work on international politics into the 
language of a high school text without taking the mind and soul out of it." He 
also took a swipe at one of the other books on the market in warning that "a 
theoretical work cannot have the same instantaneous mass appeal as, let me 
say, Schuman's translation of the content of the New York Times into the 
language of Richard Wagner." (!)tS2
I don’t wish to make too much of this point but it is at least a 
possibility that, for example, the six principles of political realism could be 
better understood as a pedagogical and organisational device rather than as a 
grand ontological statement. It is also understandable that others have seen 
Politics Among Nations as a manual of statecraft, given section headings like 
'How to detect and counter an imperialistic p o l i c y . '^ ^ s
Beyond this multiplicity of purpose, however, is Morgenthau's clear 
moral sense and it is his strong strain of idealism, his sense of w hat man 
ought to be rather than is, that helps to account for so much that is 
contradictory in his work. The idealist Morgenthau wishes to open up the
152 This is a clear reference to Frederick Schuman's International Politics (1933) w hich w as, 
perhaps, the first textbook of international politics to be issued in the United States. For the 
above correspondence see Roger W. Shugg's letter to M orgenthau of January 8, 1948 and  
M orgenthau's reply of January 10 in Box 121 of the Morgenthau Papers .
153 M orgenthau, Politics Among Nations , first edition 1948, p.39.
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space for hum an agency through diplomatic intercourse, but the realist 
M orgenthau is sceptical of such a possibility under the conditions of 
modernity. The idealist Morgenthau sees that historical contingency opens up 
space for the exercise of free will but the realist Morgenthau is aware of the 
existence of iron laws of politics and the perennial tragedy of the political. It 
may well be, as Peter Gay has suggested with reference to Meinecke, that the 
very idea of power as a tragic phenomenon is a "habit inherited from German 
idealism."134 This is fundamentally the same point made by Michael Oakshott 
and echoed by Martin Griffiths when the latter claims that Morgenthau's 
abstraction of 'political man’ from 'real man' is idealistic.i3S We have already 
seen how Morgenthau's emphasis on the importance of cognition and the 
existence of something like an innate moral sense in human beings streaked 
his vision with an idealism that rested uneasily with his realism. In his more 
lucid moments he recognised too, in sharp contrast with his regular use of 
the Chamberlain parable, that "what separates the "utopian" from the "realist" 
position cannot be so sharply expressed in terms of alternative foreign 
policies. The very same policies can be and are being supported by both 
schools of thought. W hat sets them apart is not necessarily a m atter of 
practical judgement, but of philosophies and standards of thought."i36 This 
suggests that the relationship between idealism and realism in international 
politics is, at the very least, more problematic than has been portrayed in most 
treatments of the discipline's evolution.
With this in mind recent efforts to question the plausibility of treating 
the history of the subject as a series of 'great debates' between irreconcilables 
have been welcome. One of the most important of these has been the David
^34 Gay calls it an ’unfortunate habit'. See Gay,Weimar Culture, p.93.
t35 Griffiths, Realism, Idealism, and International Politics, p.66. On the general them e of  
M orgenthau's idealism  see Hoffm ann, 'Notes on the Limits of "Realism" p.657 and George 
Liska, 'M orgenthau and M achiavelli: Political Realism  and Power Politics', in Truth and 
Tragedy, p . I l l
136 Morgenthau, 'Another Great Debate', p.961.
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Long and Peter Wilson edited collection of essays Thinkers of the tzoenty years 
crisis: inter-war idealism reassessed which has served, as Wilson suggests, to 
stress "both the uncertainty as to the nature and scope of idealism as a 
category and who the idealists actually were."137 The contributors to this book 
have reminded us of the richness and variety of the thinkers who in the past 
have been lumped together by critics like M orgenthau and Carr. Wilson 
juxtaposes a more conservative wing of 'idealism' (Davies, Lothian, and 
Zimern) against a more radical wing (Hobson, Woolf, Mitrany). Federalist 
approaches to integration competed with the functionalist. Scholars placed 
very different emphases on the relative importance of international law and 
free trade as instruments of peace.i38Many 'idealists' were as state-centric as
the 'realists'.139
Brian Schmidt has argued that the successive phases of liberalism and 
realism represent "reified intellectual contructs" where analytical traditions 
have been conflated with real historical ones.i^^ At a minimum Schmidt 
suggests that a clear division between interw ar scholars and the first 
generation of realists "cannot withstand much critical scrutiny."i3i At another 
level Rob Walker has pointed out that the normal juxtaposition in the 'great 
debates' of a relativist realism and a universalist idealism must at least be 
questionable when so many realists have themselves "been challenged on the 
ground of historicism and difference."^^^ Morgenthau was himself, as I have 
already shown, ready to use realism as a relativistic weapon against the 
universalist claims of idealism whilst simultaneously, and in a much stronger
137 Peter W ilson, 'Introduction: The Twenty Years' Crisis and tlie Category of 'Idealism' in 
International Relations', in Peter W ilson and David Long (eds.) Thinkers of the twenty years' 
crisis: interwar idealism reassessed (Oxford University Press, 1999) p .l4 .
138 ibid. p.20.
139David Long, 'Conclusion: Inter-W ar Idealism , Liberal Internationalism , and the 
Contemporary International Theory', in ibid. p.305.
160 Brian C. Schmitt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A  Disciplinary History of International 
Relations (State University of N ew  York Press, Albany, 1998) pp.22-25.
1^ 1 ibid. p .191.
162 Walker, Inside/Outside, p.30.
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way than, say, EH Carr, offering an alternative set of universal claims. 
Similarly the claims of different pluralistic societies and their particular 
national interests can, at least in principle Morgenthau suggests, be reconciled 
but only through a universalistic discourse known as diplomacy. The very 
idea of 'tolerance' which M orgenthau considers essential to a pluralistic, 
competitive society of states is itself necessarily bound to a kind of universal 
empathetic principle.
These revisionist accounts have been a welcome corrective to earlier 
narratives but if in some respects they have gone too far it is precisely because 
they have been written as 'disciplinary histories' which ignore the fact that 
international relations has a much broader context in terms of the social 
sciences. This is especially so in the United States where political science 
predated International Relations in a formal, institutional sense. Looking at 
political realism through this wider contextual lens will enable us to 
appreciate how it was that Morgenthau's works were so controversial in the 
United States. As Morgenthau has suggested it was, indeed, in terms of 
"philosophies and standards of thought" that his brand of political realism 
appeared so distinct.
The American Science of Politics
To speak of the 'American science of politics' is not to suggest that 
Americans retain a monopoly upon the study of politics, nor even that 
Americans were necessarily the first to think of politics as a science. Just to 
take a couple of examples, one could point to the impact of the Scottish 
Enlightenment and others have pointed to Machiavelli as the founder of 
political s c ie n c e . 3^3 w hat I do want to suggest, however, is that in no other
163 por the Scottish Enlightenm ent as foundation see James Farr, 'Political Science and the 
Enlightenm ent of Enthusiasm', American Political Science Review, Vol.82, N o .l ,  March 1988, 
pp.51-69.
127
country has the science of politics - understood as a subject which draws upon 
the methodological and epistemological practices of the natural sciences - 
been pursued w ith such enthusiasm , w ithin such a vast institutional 
framework. This enthusiasm is itself the product of a broader commitment to 
a mutually reinforcing triptych of liberalism, science, and progress. This is, no 
doubt, what Rolf Dahrendorf had in mind when he described America as 'The 
Applied Enlightenment'.134 it goes almost without saying that the European 
experience has been a dramatically different one, as I described in chapter 
one. Not even in Britain - the birthplace of the industrial and scientific 
revolutions - has there been such an unambiguous commitment to modernity. 
Nor - whether or not the 'founding fathers' are to be drawn from the Scottish 
Enlightenment - has the British academy ever been anything more than cool 
towards the suggestion that politics could be approached with the same 
intellectual tools appropriate to the natural sciences. This has been, broadly 
understood, a peculiarly American enthusiasm. It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to provide a comprehensive history of political science in the 
United States but I do think it important to at least provide a sketch and 
suggest how it relates to the broader intellectual and social climate.
In the most general terms over the course of the nineteenth century 
the sheer weight and importance of scientific innovation and discovery wore 
down the resistance to placing science at the centre of university life. Faced 
with works of the importance of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species the 
defenders of a classical or religious centred education were slowly forced to 
give g r o u n d .  135 The study of politics began to expand steadily after the Civil 
War before accelerating in the late nineteenth century and, even more, during 
the twentieth century. David Ricci has suggested that there were three broad
134 Dahrendorf quoted in Stanley Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva: essays in the theory and practice 
of International Politics (W estview Press, Boulder, 1987) p.8.
135 D avid Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science (Yale University Press, N ew  H aven, 1984) 
pp.36-37.
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stages in the growth of the discipline from the late nineteenth century until 
the Second World War. In the first of these, from 1880 to 1900, political 
scientists succeeded in establishing programmes of political studies as a 
legitimate part of the university curriculum while its practitioners continued 
to rely, in the main, upon older research methods drawn from comparative 
history. The second period from 1900 to 1920 was dom inated by 
professionalisation and specialisation as political science sought to establish 
itself as a subject distinct from history, economics, and sociology. In the third 
period from 1920 to 1940 Ricci suggests that "the emphasis on science finally 
came of age" as m odern research m ethods were introduced by a new 
generation of scholars.^36 is possible that Ricci exaggerates the nature of the 
change in this third period for, as we shall see, the new scientism did meet 
with some intellectual resistance and the new methods introduced were not 
as w idely employed as Ricci implies. It was not until the rise of the 
behavioural movement from the mid 1940s that scientism was consolidated as 
the primary methodological framework.
Though a chair in History and Political Science had been established 
for Francis Lieber at Columbia as early as 1857 it was not until 1880, after 
some struggle, that John Burgess was able to establish the first school of 
political science in the United States, at Columbia. This took place, as Ricci 
has pointed out, in the broader context of intensifying professionalisation and 
specialisation across American society. In academe this was reflected by the 
establishment of a host of new professional organisations: The American 
Historical Association in 1884; the American Economic Association in 1885; 
The American Statistical Association in 1888; and The American Academy of 
Political and Social Science in 1889, which itself was to give way to more 
specialised organisations in the form of the American Sociological Society 
and the American Political Science Association in 1901 and 1903 respectively.
136 ibid. p.77.
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In terms of the content and research methods of this science of politics 
greater specialisation was to follow later but for the moment an important 
shift occurred, based on a commitment to empiricism and the adoption of a 
rhetorical scientism. In his The American Commonwealth of 1888 James Bryce 
announced that his purpose was "to paint the institutions and people of 
America as they are ... to ayoid temptations of the deductive method and to 
simply present the facts of the case ..." A later work presented this claim in 
even starker terms: "it is facts that are needed. Facts, Facts, Facts."137 
Elsewhere, Bryce criticised Alexis de Tocqueville's now famous Democracy in 
America on the basis that "what he has given us is not so much a description 
of the country and the people as a treatise, full of fine observation and 
elevated thinking..."138 The subtext, as Bernard Crick points out, is perfectly 
clear : de Tocqueville was an dilettantish aristocrat and not a serious student 
of politics.139
This scientism, as yet, was little more than a call for scholarly enquiry 
to be pursued in a serious and dispassionate way. The prim ary method 
employed continued to be the historical/comparative one even if Woodrow 
Wilson had called for political scientists to look beyond documents and 
archives to "real events, real people, and real political life."i70 Wilson's call 
found an echo in the early part of the twentieth century in the work of so- 
called 'muckraking' journalists like Upton Sinclair and the young Walter 
Lippmann who sought to uncover what they saw as the objective, and often 
uncomfortable, truths lurking beneath the institutional veneer of American 
government and business. These 'muckrakers' clearly provided a source of
137 Bryce quoted in  Evron M. Kirkpatrick, 'The Im pact of the Behavioral A pproach on  
Traditional Political Science', in Austin Ranney (ed.). Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics 
(University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1962) p.8.
168 Bryce quoted in Bernard Crick, T/ie American Science of Politics (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1959) p .l l5 .
139 ibid.
170 W ilson quoted in Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, American Political Science: From 
Burgess to Behavioralism (Allyn and Bacon Inc, Boston, 1967) p.32.
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inspiration for the following generation of sociologists and political 
scientists.!^!
In the academy the calls for a science of politics to be modelled along 
the lines of the natural sciences became ever more strident. One of the best 
examples of this was provided by William Bennett Munro in his 1927 
presidential address to the American Political Science Association. While the 
natural sciences had, Munro noted, "... moved a long way... from the teachings 
of Galileo and Newton ... too many political scientists are still dallying fondly 
with the abstract formalism of Locke and Montesquieu, Austin, Blackstone, 
and B e n t h a m . " ! 7 2  Pointing to the revolution wrought by quantum theory in 
physics M unro implored that in political science "our immediate goal, 
therefore, should be to release political science from the old metaphysical and 
juristic concepts upon which it has traditionally been based... It is to the 
natural sciences that we may most profitably turn ... for suggestions as to the 
reconstruction of our postulates and methods."!73 His call for new methods 
was being answered even as he spoke. The period from 1920 to 1940 
witnessed the introduction of the sort of scientific methods that the post 
World War Two generation of scholars would come to take for granted. 
Charles Merriam and Harold Gosnell's Non Voting: Causes and Methods of 
Control was "the first major study in political science to use both random 
sampling and the statistics of attributes." !74 A plethora of titles incorporating 
new methodological techniques followed in quick s u c c e s s i o n . ! ^ ^
This same period also saw the establishment and expansion of 
institutional structures to support these new scientific undertakings. Three 
'National Conferences on the Science of Politics' held in the years 1923-1925
!7! Crick, American Science, pp.83-84.
!72 W illiam  Bennett Munro, 'Physics and Politics - A n Old A nalogy Revised', The American 
Political Science Review, Vol.XXII, N o .l, February 1928, p.3.
!73 ibid. p.lO
!^^ Barry D. Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics (University of Chicago Press, 
1974) p .l48.
!73 Somit and Tanenhaus, American Political Science, p .127.
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gave the process an additional momentum.!76 A  Social Science Research 
Council was founded in 1923 and by the end of the decade had provided well 
over four million dollars in grants for research in social science largely 
drawing upon the financial resources of the foundations established through 
the munificence of the 'Robber-Barons' Carnegie, Rockefeller and others.!77 
Foundation money was also flowing through to political science in the 
universities. The new social science building at the University of Chicago was 
established with a large grant from the Rockefeller foundation.!78 The single 
extraordinary figure linking all of these developments' was Charles Merriam 
who was one of the first of the empire builders who were beginning to appear 
on the scene in American higher education. If there is a 'founding father' of 
American political science it is Charles Merriam.
The range of his activities was astonishing. As an academic he was the 
author and co-author of numerous publications during a career in higher 
education spanning more than fifty years. He joined the Departm ent of 
Political Science at the University of Chicago in 1900 and served as its 
chairman from 1923 until 1940 when he, as Kenneth Thompson has rather 
archly observed, "gave up the title if not the p o w e r . " ! 7 9  was co-founder of 
the Social Science Research Council and President of the American Political 
Science Association in 1925. He was the first individual to bring corporate and 
governmental philanthropy to research in politics. He served on numerous 
governmental committees and advisory boards. His interest in political life 
extended well beyond the boundaries of the ivory tower. As a young. 
Progressive activist his biographer describes him "tramp [ing] up and down 
stairs in tenem ent sweatshops, attend[ing] labor union meetings, and
!76 ibid. p.87.
!77 For a detailed discussion see Karl, Charles E. Merriam, pp.118-139.
!^3 ibid. p .136.
!79 Kenneth Thom pson, Schools of Thought in International Relations: Interpreters, Issues, and 
Morality (Louisiana State University Press, 1996) p.lO.
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[teaching] a course in economics in the John Elliott settlement h o u s e . " ! 3 0  He 
was an Alderman on the Chicago City Council from 1909 to 1917 and lost a 
closely contested mayoral election in 1911 in which his victorious opponent 
was widely suspected of having benefited from various forms of fraudulent
practice.
Crick suggests that, the demise of Woodrow Wilson - the ultimate 
scholar in politics - and the end of the Progressive Era symbolised by the 
election to the Presidency of the venal Warren Harding led Merriam to 
retreat from direct political activities in order to "construct a genuine science 
of politics that would make 'jungle' politics i m p o s s i b l e . " ! ® ^  There is, no doubt, 
some merit to this thesis but it is also the case that Merriam never renounced 
his belief in the importance of scholars retaining an active commitment to the 
shaping of political life, however problematic this may prove to be in practical 
terms. And this new science of politics with its more sophisticated research 
methods based on the actual behaviour of men and institutions was to be 
placed at the service of government. A science of politics was a science/or 
politics.
We also need to keep in mind, however, that there was some 
resistance to this new scientism. Men like William Elliot, Edward Corwin, and 
Charles Beard opposed scientism on much the same grounds as so-called 
'traditionalists' opposed 'behavioralists' in the 1950s and 1960s.!®® Corwin, as 
early as 1929, felt able to question the achievement to date of "the new 
political science." He found in the works published so far "an immense 
unlimbering of apparatus, an immense polishing of a technique already 
spotless; but it was all apparently for the game itself. The problems set were 
of no great evident moment, and the solutions provided either were
!®3 Karl, Charles E. Merriam, p.31.
!®! ibid. p.71.
!®7 Crick, American Sciejtce of Politics, p .l34.
!®3 M any of the participants in the latter debate appeared to be entirely unaware of this 
earlier dispute.
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inconclusive or merely substantiated what might have been the off-hand 
verdict of any rather intelligent and well-read observer."!®^ One could level 
precisely this criticism against many of the post-World War Two behavioural 
projects.!®® Corwin also warned that a value-free political science was a 
utopian ambition that was neither possible nor desirable.!®®
A similar thesis was advanced by Charles Beard w ho was 
undoubtedly the most prominent of these critics of the new scientism. Beard 
had him self begun his academic career as an opponent of the arid 
institutionalism and neo-Hegelian state worship of John Burgess and others 
and had welcomed a more 'behaviorally' minded subject accordingly. He had 
also held Merriamesque hopes for the combination of political study and 
practice. With the demise of Progressivism, however. Beard came to take a 
rather different view.!®7 Far from advocating the marriage of intellect to 
power he now came to believe that the former should have an inherent 
m istrust of the latter. He also thought that a healthy interest in the real 
behaviour of men and institutions had degenerated into an arid scientism. 
Echoing, no doubt unconsciously, Weber’s claim that Americans had a 
tendency to 'romanticise' numbers Beard suggested that it was a fundamental 
weakness of American scholarship to assume "that when once the 'data' have 
been assembled im portant conclusions will flow from observing them - 
conclusions akin in inevitability to those of physics or mathematics."!®®
!®*! Edward S. Corwin, 'The Dem ocratic D ogm a and the Future of Political Science', The 
American Political Science Review , Vol.XXIII, A ugust 1929, pp.588-589. From across the Atlantic 
Harold Laski w as already lambasting the American "...tendency to judge m en by the volum e  
of published o u tp u t... a facile test of prom otion naturally w elcom e to busy administrators." 
Laski quoted in Somit and Tanenhaus, American Political Science, p .92. This 'facile test of 
promotion' is now  a normal administrative m ethod in the United Kingdom as well.
!®3 In International Relations the Correlates of War project stands out as a m onum ent to the 
m ost pointless kind of relentless empiricism. See John Lewis Gaddis, 'International Relations 
U ieory and the End of the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 17, No.3, Winter 92 /93 , pp.5- 
59.
!®3 pp.582, 591.
!®7 Raym ond Seidelm an, Disenchanted Realists (State University of N ew  York Press, Albany, 
1985) pp.66, 85-86.
!®® Beard quoted in Karl, Charles E. Merriam, p .223. On Weber's claim see Scaff, Fleeing the 
Iron Cage, p.227.
134
Beard's most public challenge to the new scientism was made in his 
1926 presidential address 'Time, Technology, and the Creative Spirit in Political 
Science' which, given that it followed Merriam's vastly different presidential 
address of the preceding year, amounted to something of a direct reply to 
Merriam as welld®^ The essential theme of his address was that the quest to 
establish the study of politics as a scientific, value-free undertaking was 
misguided. As a historian, and some fifty years before Hayden White, Beard 
pointed out that a process of selection was an inevitable part of any historical 
investigation, no matter how painstaking the commitment to the empirical. 
The 'facts' never selected themselves and hence there was no way for the 
historian - or the political scientist - to avoid normative considerations.!^*! 
Positivist commitments also left may aspects of social life unexamined. 
Research undertaken "under scientific formulas in things mathematically 
measurable or logically describable leaves untouched a vast array of social 
forces..."!9! The inductive method "discourages the use of that equally 
necessary method - the deductive and imaginative process which often makes 
the poet or artist a better fore-teller and statesman than the logical master of 
detail and c o m m o n s e n s e . " ! ^ ^  Beard also sought to defend the relevance of 
what later came to be called 'the Canon'. "By common consent", asks Beard 
rhetorically, "are not Aristotle, Machiavelli, and the authors of The Federalist 
giants?"!^® For the moment then the new scientism, though it had made 
im portant intellectual and institu tional inroads, was by no means 
unchallenged, nor had the new research methodologies come to be as widely 
employed as Ricci has suggested.!^^
!®  ^ Charles A. Beard, ‘Time, Technology, and the Creative Spirit in Political Science, The 
American Political Science R eview , Vol.XXI, N o .l, February 1927, pp.1-11,
!^^ ibid. p.7.
!^! ibid p.9.!^ 2 ibid. p.9.
!^ ® ibid. p .10.
!^ 4: On this point see John G. Gunnell, 'American Political Science, Liberalism, and the 
Invention of Political Theory', American Political Science Review , Vol.82, N o .l ,  March 1988, 
p.74.
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In fact, scientism moved to its apogee in the twenty-five years from 
1940 to 1965 rather than the period from 1920 to 1940. This expansion was 
encouraged by a number of sociological and institutional factors, the most 
important of which was undeniably the massive growth in the size of the 
Federal Government in the United States. This had begun with the New Deal 
but it was the Second W orld War and the Cold War which produced a 
dramatic increase in the size of government; a process which was further 
intensified by the ambitious social welfare programmes of the 1960s. The need 
for a new arm y of bureaucrats, policy advisers, and committee members 
offered opportunities to academics who could produce research w ith an 
explicitly instrumental and quantitative bias. As one participant in the debate 
between 'traditionalists' and 'behaviouralists' put it openly:
"In choosing between traditionalists and behavioralists the governm ent 
official will be asking specialised questions, and he will prefer precise 
answers. Insofar as behavioralists follow the canons of scientific enquiry they 
undoubtedly will be given priority..."!95
Beyond Political Science it was generally the case that Federal Government 
funding was strongly biased towards "the social sciences deemed worthy of 
the appellation 'behavioral sciences' " and large sums were channelled 
through the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Political 
Behavior.!^®
The trend was encouraged by the Foundations which had continued to 
grow in size and number following the Second World War. Most of them 
favoured behavioral projects on the same grounds as official bodies: 'results’ 
or at least the promise of such. The Ford Foundation established an explicitly
!^3 The sentence continues "even though our discipline has not reached such an advance 
stage drat results of research w ill be as solid a basis for decisions as tliose in m any branches 
of physics." (!) That the author w ould  even suggest such a comparison show s a striking level 
of ambition. See M ichael Haas, 'A Plan for Bridge Building in International Relations', in  
Klaus Knorr and James N . Rosenau (eds.). Contending Approaches to International Politics 
(Princeton University Press, 1969) p .l72.
!^ ® Som it and Tanenhaus, American Political Science, p. 184.
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named Behavioral Science Program and was a particularly large donor.!97 The 
period also witnessed a massive increase in the size of American Higher 
Education generally and Political Science and International Relations in 
particular were also beneficiaries of this process. The creation of new 
departments and the influx of new scholars helped to weaken resistance to 
the new methodological practices, as did the example of relatively new 
disciplines like Psychology and Sociology. Finally, the emergence of computer 
technology encouraged quantitative methodology as did the growth of public 
opinion polling and other forms of sampling and marketing.
It has been suggested that the use of the term 'behavioral science' or 
'behavioralism' in Political Science owes its origins to the University of 
Chicago where a group of social scientists were anxious that federal funding 
bodies not confuse social science with socialism (!) and hence conceived the 
term 'behavioral science'.!^® The general appellation had a much wider 
currency. Edwin Corwin, some twenty years earlier, had pointed to the 
influence of psychology and in particular John Watson's 1912 publication 
Behaviorism which sought to place that subject on a more inductive
footing. 199
The question of what political scientists had in mind for a 'behavioral 
science' of politics was made clearer in the early 1950s. In 1953 the Behavioral 
Sciences Division of the Ford Foundation announced a large package of 
funding to support a detailed survey of "...a small group of American 
universities selected from among those providing leadership in [the 
behavioral] field to take a systematic look at the state of the behavioral 
sciences at their institutions and to express their needs in terms of detailed 
plans for development and i m p r o v e m e n t . O f  fifteen initial candidates five
!^7 ibid.
!^ ® ibid. p .183.
Corwin, 'Democratic Dogm a ', pp.583-586.
700 Q uoted in Arthur W. M acmahon's review  of A  Report on the Behavioral Sciences at the 
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institutions - Chicago, Harvard, Michigan, North Carolina and Stanford - 
were awarded $50,000 each to undertake year-long surveys.
Though by no means unanimous in terms of what they understood 
'behavioral science' to mean and the subject areas it covered, two broad 
themes did emerge. The first of these was the preference given to the 
monitoring of observed and observable behaviour and hence a commitment 
to the use of empirical methods. The Harvard Committee suggested that 
behavioral studies were "those involving direct, empirical observation of how 
people behave in particular situations."7®! The second thematic point of 
argument was that a sharp distinction should be drawn between empirical 
explanation and ethical evaluation, between subjective and objective, between 
is and ought. The North Carolina report suggested that a behavioral science of 
politics necessarily "means a departure from the normative character of much 
research in political science."707 The Chicago report committed behavioural 
science to the "objective description of regularities." As for the value of 'ideas': 
"An idea is good not simply because it is exciting, not just because it is about 
some socially important problem with consequences for action; to be good an 
idea m ust also be true in the sense that it generates non-contradictory 
predictions which are confirmed and it is important that it generates many 
such predictions."703
This characteristically ambitious claim on the part of the University of 
Chicago was echoed by its members in other fora. In testimony given to the 
1945 Senate Hearings on Science Legislation the Chicago sociologist William 
Ogburn made the grandiose claim that behavioral science could "aid in the
Report by a Faculty Committee (Harvard University Press, 1954); Survey of the Behavioral Sciences: 
Report of the Faculty Committee and Report of the Visiting Committee (University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, 1954); The University of North Carolina Survey of Behavioral Science 1953-1954 
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American Political Science R eview , Vol. XLIX, N o.3,1955, p.857.
701 ibid. p.860.
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national defense. "704 Prom inent intellectual representatives of the new 
approach included Harold Lasswell, Herbert Simon, (whose 1947 publication 
Administrative Behavior was a prominent example of the new literature) 
Gabriel Almond and David Truman.
To see that there were important differences in comparison with the 
period of 1920-1940 one has only to return to the figure of Charles Merriam. 
Though Merriam was a driving force behind the new scientism he was 
himself a generalist who avoided the use of the term 'science' in his own 
works and who was by no means a methodological purist.70® His biographer 
relates that, upon returning from an extended summer absence, Merriam was 
furious to discover that at the behest of William Ogburn the new Social 
Science Research Building was engraved with the maxim 'When you cannot 
measure, your knowledge is meagre and unsatisfactory'. For Merriam 
measurement could only ever be one element, albeit an important one, of the 
intellectual armoury of the student of politics.70®
It was, nevertheless, the Chicago Department of Political Science 
which became most closely associated with behaviouralism and it was no 
small irony that Hans Morgenthau found himself here in 1943. A number of 
authors have seen both M orgenthau and political realism as entirely 
compatible w ith this new scientism. As Chris Brown has pu t it "... in 
retrospect it seems clear that the movement for science was not merely 
compatible w ith realism, but actually preordained by the realist view of the 
world ..."707 Hollis and Smith, too, see realism as lying "squarely in the 
scientific tradition" and Morgenthau himself as a "positivist."708 Robert Gilpin
704 Ogburn quoted by James Farr, 'Remembering the Revolution: Behavioralism in American  
Political Science', in James Farr, John S. Dryzick and Stephen T. Leonard (eds.). Political 
Science in history: research programs and political traditions (Cambridge University Press, 1995)
p.211.
^05 Karl, Charles E. Merriam, pp. 114-115.
706 ibid. p. 155.
707 Brown, International Relations, p.99.
708 H ollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, pp .10, 22. See also 
W illiam C. O lson and A.J.R. Groom, International Relations then and now (Routledge, London,
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has accepted that M orgenthau can be found on both sides of the 
traditionalist/scientist fence.709 Others have, perhaps wisely, simply pushed 
Morgenthau with all his difficulties to one side. It is surely no accident that 
M orgenthau is barely mentioned in an article in which Robert Jackson 
juxtaposes - favourably - the 'classical hum anist realism' of Hedley Bull 
against the 'contemporary positivist realism' of Kenneth Waltz, even though 
Jackson sees the English School itself as a closely related version of classical
realism.710
As we have already seen, M orgenthau was by no means clear or 
consistent in w hat he understood to constitute a rational or scientific 
approach to politics. Given the availability of a central concept like power 
M orgenthau felt that it was possible to distinguish a separate sphere of 
politics. In spite of the "ambiguities of the subject matter" one could assume 
that "politics is engaged in by rational men who pursue certain rational 
interests with rational means."7H Elsewhere M orgenthau drew an analogy
1991) pp.109-110. Kenneth Waltz insists that M orgenthau and other 'traditionalists' affirmed a 
preem inently behavioral logic. K. Waltz, 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory', in Charles 
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with economics: "as economics is centered upon the concept of interest 
defined as wealth, its accumulation, and distribution, so political science is 
centered upon the concept of interest defined as power, its accumulation, 
distribution and control."7i7 Some years later, having apparently been taken at 
his word by many academics who did draw upon economic methodologies, 
M orgenthau now asserted that politics could not be compared w ith 
economics in this way. A theoretical scheme based upon economic theory 
meant that "nations confront each other not as living historic entities will all 
their complexities but as rational abstractions, after the model of 'economic 
man', playing games of military and diplomatic chess according to a rational 
calculus that exists nowhere but in the theoretician's mind."(!) This rational 
calculus was made possible in economics by the nature of its central concept 
- wealth. Power, given its lack of fungibility, could simply not be used in this 
way.213 It is hard to see this as anything other than flatly contradictory. 
Though, as we've already seen, the confusion is connected to fundamental 
epistemological problems it is possible that these were exacerbated by 
Morgenthau attempting to stretch his Weberian position to meet the scientific 
criteria for legitimacy which were established in the discipline in the 1950s 
and 1960s.
Neo-Realism has been described as a 'progressive, scientific, 
redemption of classical realism' and it is clear that Waltz was one of those 
who sought to make som ething further of M orgenthau's original 
methodological analogy of economics and politics.7i4 Waltz first came to
212 M orgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1958).
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Norm an D. Palmer (ed.), A  Design for International Relations Research: Scope, Theory, Methods, 
and Relevance (American Academ y of Political and Social Sciences, Philadelphia, 1970) pp.70- 
71. For a d iscussion  of the problem  of pow er and its fungibility see Barry Buzan, 'The 
Tim eless W isdom  of Realism'?, in Smith et.al.. International Relations Theory, pp.51-55. For a 
denial that it actually does present a serious problem  for realism  see W altz, 'Realist 
Thought', pp.72-73.
744 In a review  of Morgenthau's Dilemmas of Politics W altz com m ents on the passage from  
M orgenthau quoted on the previous page:
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attention with the publication of his Man, the State, and Yfar in 1954. In it 
Waltz explored the problem of the causes of war and identified three 'images' 
or levels at which the causes of war could be identified; firstly within the 
individual nature of man (so-called 'first-image pessimism', a position he 
attached to classical realists like Reinhold Niebuhr and M orgenthau); 
secondly, within the structure of individual governments (for example, in the 
fundamental nature of authoritarian/totalitarian regimes); and, thirdly,as a 
product of the anarchical system (anarchical in the formal sense of having 'no 
common power’, to borrow Hobbes's description). It was already clear that 
Waltz found the third of these three 'images' to provide the most convincing 
explanation for the cause of war. Kenneth Thompson reports on a 
conversation that he had with Waltz some years later (in the early 1960s) in 
which Waltz expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack of theoretical rigour of 
Man, The State, and War and suggested that he intended to devote himself 
exclusively for several years to reading in the history and philosophy of 
science.713 Some fifteen years later Waltz produced his magnum opus with the 
publication of Theory of International Politics which has become one of the 
most influential and undoubtedly one of the most important books published 
in International Relations during the past fifty years.
"... what it suggests to this reviewer is the follow ing question; W ould it be helpful to say that 
in econom ic matters the businessm an pursues his interests defined in terms of w ealth, and  
that in order to make "rational" decisions he needs a "rational" outline, or map, of economics? 
This is precisely what Professor M orgenthau does say of the state in international relations, 
with only the substitution of the w ords "political science" for "economics" and "power" for 
"wealth". Econom ic theory, h ow ever, d oes not depend  upon the assu m p tion  that 
entrepreneurs are rational or that any one of them  w ill calculate correctly, but rather on the 
perception that in a com petitive econom y all of them are constrained to try, w ith bankruptcy, 
the penalty for failure, as the com pelling factor." Waltz, The American Political Science Review, 
Vol.53, N o.2, June, 1959, p.53. The interesting thing about this passage is that it show s how  
W altz w as already preparing to shift away from Morgenthau's m ethodological individualism  
towards a more holistic position centred around an anarchical international system  w hich  
shapes the behaviour of its constituent units. Others have been  content to fo llow  
Morgenthau's m ethodological suggestion. Gilpin contrasts Waltz's 'sociological' formultation  
w ith the 'economic or rational choice theory' of his ow n War and Change in World Politics 
which starts w ith the individual state actors and their m otives (as in classical m icroeconomic 
theory) and only  then seeks to account for the em ergence and change of international 
systems'. See Gilpin, 'The richness of the tradition of political realism', p.288.
743 Thompson, Schools of Thought, p .l39.
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A small industry has grown around the examination of Theory of 
International Politcs and I do not wish to subject it to (yet) another close 
scrutiny here. I do, however, want to suggest two things; firstly, that in spite 
of some superficial similarities, at a much deeper level the differences 
between M orgenthau and Waltz are profound and, secondly, that Waltz's 
version of neo-realism is in m any respects fully in keeping w ith the 
progressive nature of the American science of politics. It is true that Waltz's 
emphasis on war as the product of an anarchic international system is hardly 
'progressive' but the astonishing thing about Theory of International Politics is 
that nowhere does one get any sense whatever that international politics can 
actually be a perilous undertaking, no sense of the occasions during the Cold 
War when humanity hovered precariously above a precipice. Written in the 
calm, measured, scientistic tone of much of American social science there is a 
vast and, as we shall see in chapter three, important, rhetorical gulf between 
Waltz and Morgenthau. And though Waltz has been careful to distance 
himself from the suggestion that specific foreign policy positions can be 
draw n from his theoretical stance, he is undoubtedly being som ewhat 
disingenuous. He does, after all, suggest that "the challenge is to bring theory 
to bear on facts in ways that perm it explanation and prediction."746 
'Explanation and Prediction', surely, opens up the possibility of prescription 
and control.747 Elsewhere Waltz makes the provocative suggestion that,on the 
assumption that hum an beings are fundamentally rational, the spread of 
nuclear weapons may actually serve to prevent conflict.748 This, I would
746 W altz, 'Realist Thought and Neorealist H ieo iy ’, p .68.
747 One prominent 'behaviouralisf displayed an astonishing naivete in this respect:
"My v iew  is that, as our know ledge base expands and is increasingly integrated in the 
theoretical sense, the better our predictions w ill be, and therefore, the few er policy  
disagreem ents w e  w ill have." J. D avid Singer, "The Incom pleat Theorist: Insight w ithout 
Evidence', in Knorr and Rosenau, Contending Approaches, p.66.
748 See Kenneth W altz, 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More M ay Be Better', Adelphi Paper 
171 ( International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1981). For criticism of w hat he calls 
this "simplistic rational m odel of deterrence" see Joseph S. N ye, Nuclear Ethics (The Free 
Press, N ew  York, 1986) p.87.
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suggest, displays a faith in hum an reason strong enough to make the most 
enlightened of philosophes blush. It is a faith categorically not shared by 
Morgenthau who, as we shall see in the next chapter, viewed the possibility of 
nuclear proliferation with the deepest dread. The point is that even when 
looking at an American realist like Waltz we can still see threads of the 
familiar faith in the powers of reason and the efficacy of science.
Similarly, it has often been pointed out that the notion of power was 
an integrating feature of the Chicago School in local, national, and 
international politics.^i^ "When we speak of the science of politics", wrote 
Harold Lasswell, "we mean the science of power." This is true even of 
Charles Merriam and it could hardly have been otherwise.^^^ How could any 
man with an intimate knowledge of the politics of a city like Chicago be 
unaw are of the importance of power? The point, however, is that the 
understanding of power is very different indeed from that of someone like 
Morgenthau. Power in this American context seems to lose the diabolical 
qualities that is possesses in Morgenthau's reading. Shorn of its anguished 
m etaphysics it becomes som ething altogether more m alleable and 
manageable: a form of energy that can be tamed by the forces of science and 
reason. In short, power is stripped of its tragic dimension.
This is, surely, connected to the long-standing faith in science and 
progress that runs through the whole history of political science in the United 
States. One of the indications of this has been the extraordinary fact that until 
at least the Second World War the question of what science was and how it 
was to be constituted was taken to be entirely unproblematic in spite of the 
heavy emphasis placed upon its importance. Merriam and Lasswell, two of 
the most important figures in the establishment of a science of politics, do not
See for exam ple, Olson and Groom, International Relations , p .l20.
220 Lasswell quoted in Crick, American Science, p. 181.
221 Crick suggests that Merriam was the first American to see the 'inner consistency' of the 
notion of pow er in politics as the equivalent of 'mass' and 'energy' in physics, ibid. p.l48.
144
at any point concern themselves with the philosophy of s c i e n c e . 2 2 2  Typically,
when William Munro pointed to the revolutionary intellectual developments
in physics during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he did not
draw from this any epistemological doubts about the value of any given set of
scientific truths, but rather took the changes as confirmation of a highly
simplistic understanding of scientific p r o g r e s s . 2 2 3  When M orgenthau draws
attention to this problem in Scientific Man it seems rather trite from a
contemporary vantage point but it must have been the first time that many of
his readers had been exposed to this sort of epistemological question.
Similarly, the notion that the American science of politics has been an open-
ended and value-free undertaking has always been a sham given the
fundamental faith in the American triptych. As Ricci has pointed out "the
discipline was not really asked, directly or otherwise, to follow the dictates of
science w herever they m ight lead... instead, because America w as so
overwhelmingly devoted to the principles and practices of democratic
liberalism, the end for political science was virtually laid down in advance 
..."224
So strong has this faith in the American triptych been that it has 
resulted in "an American political culture almost innocent of irony and 
tragedy."225 This absence has deep historical foundations. Samuel Bercovitch 
has shown how the Jeremiad introduced by the Puritans quickly adopted a 
more progressive form in its New England context.226 jn America the dark 
this-worldly pessimism of Calvin could be set aside in a land free of the 
religious bigotry and hierarchical feudalism of Europe.222 The 'Founding 
Fathers' fears of how commerce and uncontrolled power could corrupt
222 On this point see Crick, American Science, p .214.
223 Munro, 'Physics and Politics', p .113.
224 Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, p.70.
225 D iggins, Max Weber, p.XV.
226 Sam uel Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (University of W isconsin Press, 1978).
227 Niebuhr, The Irony of American H istory , pp.25,52-53.
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republican virtue were swept aside by the sheer exuberance and forward 
m indedness of Jacksonian democracy. The first major challenge to the 
doctrine of progress - the Civil War - left nothing like the poisonous legacy 
the Great War did in Europe, in spite of its ferocity. Southerners, fearful of the 
replacement of a patriarchal, hierarchical, gentlemanly commerce w ith an 
impersonal, industrial capitalism could at least console themselves w ith the 
newly acquired understanding that 'uppity' blacks could continue to be 
emasculated through mechanisms more informal than that of s l a v e r y .2 2 8  in  a 
certain sense the Civil War was America's crisis of modernity in that it pitted 
two distinct civilisations - one m odern and one anti-modern - against each 
other and once that conflict had been resolved in favour of the N orth there 
was little else to provide a fundamental challenge to the doctrine of progress.
America was much less affected by the fin-de-siècle angst that was so 
influential in Europe. Progressives sought not to overturn the existing socio­
economic system but rather to reform the worst aspects of robber-baron 
capitalism. Trade unionists fought their bitter industrial battles simply to 
obtain their fair share of the bountiful surplus of Fordism, and not as the 
vanguard  of pro letarian  revolution.229 pew recognised N ietzsche's 
armouncement of the 'Death of God'. I t  is, surely, no coincidence that a 
commitment to the doctrine of progress has remained strongest in a country 
where Judeo-Christian faith and participation in formal religious organisation 
has continued to be correspondingly strong. Nor did many subscribe to 
Weber's prophecy of an alienating, suffocating bureaucracy; much less the 
imminence of Marxian revolution.280 I t  has been said of Charles Merriam, and 
it no doubt has a much wider currency, that he "was not the slightest bit
228 On this period see Eric Foner's classic Reconstruction: America's unfinished revolution, 1863- 
1877 (Harper and R ow ,N ew  York, 1988).
229 See John Patrick D iggins, The rise and fall of the American Left (WW N orton, N e w  York, 
1992).
230 As has been noted elsewhere, for W oodrow W ilson the bureaucratic m achine w as a tool to 
be utilised, not a prison. See M ichael Rogin, 'Max W eber and W oodrow  W ilson: The Iron 
Cage in Germany and America', P olity , December, 1971, p .572.
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ambivalent about the rationalization of the world. To him, the iron cage of 
industrial society was a modern political community - a perfect union of 
democracy and b u r e a u c r a c y . " 2 3 i  Even the Great Depression found an 
adequate antidote in the pragmatism of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. And 
Theodore Roosevelt's romantic nationalism was barely a pale imitation of the 
virulent volkish mysticism which infected the German polity. In short, there 
was no crisis to compare with that in Europe and especially Germany.
In material terms the doctrine of progress was buttressed by an 
unequivocal commitment to science and technological advance. Intellectually, 
the American response to European nihilism was resolute and two-pronged 
in the form of John Dewey's pragmatism allied to Woodrow Wilson's 
evangelical l i b e r a l i s m . 2 3 2  Pragmatism, with its setting aside of metaphysics 
and its implicit - and often explicit - faith in democracy and science seems a 
quintessentially American p h i l o s o p h y .2 3 3
In a certain superficial sense one can see similarities between the 
pragm atist and the Weberian positions in, for example, the common claim 
that there is no scientific means with which to choose between the relative 
value of values. This is how Weber has come to be misappropriated as a 
positivist in the United States.234 When seen in their broader contexts the two 
positions seem much less similar. As I have already suggested, given the 
background of the German metaphysical crisis, Weber's call for value 
neutrality appears as a kind of grim intellectual ascetic. Weber challenges us 
to stare into the abyss without blinking. In the American context pragmatism 
serves to reinforce the existing social order and acts to reaffirm the essential 
value of the American triptych.
231 Seidelman, Disenchanted Realists, p .115.
232 On this alliance of Pragmatism and W ilsonianism see Diggins, Max Weber, p.278,
233 On Pragmatism being used as a w eapon in the fight against historicism see Jurgen Herbst, 
The Germait Historical School, pp.158-159, 206-207. For a good summary of D ewey's impact see 
Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science pp.103-106.
234 On Weber's American reception see D iggins, Max Weber, and H.Stuart H ughes, The Sea 
Change, pp.30-32.
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A similar point can be made of Morgenthau vis-a-vis behavioralism in 
the United States. In his case it is the comparison with Charles Merriam which 
proves instructive. Again, in a certain superficial sense, the two could be seen 
to have had more in common than either would perhaps have recognised. 
Both believed in the primacy of politics. Both accepted that intellectuals had 
duties beyond the boundaries of the ivory tower even while they remained 
fundamentally ambivalent about the form that this public engagement should 
take. A nd though Weber had  not flowed through to the American 
consciousness in the 1920s, Progressives like Merriam- shared Morgenthau's 
emphasis upon the importance of leadership.235 Moreover, as mentioned 
earlier, the emphasis upon power made it a central unifying principle of the 
Chicago School. Again, however, it is at a much deeper level that the 
differences between the two men became apparent. Though he accepted the 
centrality of power, Merriam also thought that it could be successfully 
managed through the application of reason. As his biographer has suggested 
"his utopia was that of rational, scientistic political debate."236 The notion that 
power and the political may have tragic dimensions scarcely enters into 
Merriam's consciousness, nor does it enter the broader realm of American 
social science.
I do not wish to suggest that there is no darker, sceptical, less 
progressive intellectual tradition in America. John Patrick Diggins point to the 
existence of "another tradition, one that begins with Calvinism and culminates 
in the twentieth century in the theology of Reinhold Niebuhr; and this 
Niebuhrian, Augustianian strain in American thought includes the tragic 
sensibility of Lincoln and M e l v i l l e . "237 To this list one could add John C.
235 On these points see Karl, Charles E. Merriam, p p .4 0 ,138,179.
236 ibid. p .204. For a similar assessm ent of Merriam see W illiam  T.R. Fox, 'Pluralism, The 
Science of Politics, A nd the W orld System', World Politics, V o l.27 ,1974-75, pp.597-611.
237 Diggins, Max Weber, p.278. It is no accident that Abraham Lincoln w as a figure so often on 
M orgenthau's m ind. As w e shall see in chapter four, Lincoln is the subject of one of 
Morgenthau's final works.
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Calhoun and those other defenders of the South, fearful of the threatening 
modernity presented to them by the industrial North. One could also include 
the gloomy handful of intellectual Europhiles characterised by Henry James 
and this list is undoubtedly not exclusive. Even so, what Diggins fails to 
emphasise enough is how marginal and ephemeral this tradition has been in 
the American context. No intellectual tradition, nor even a seismic political 
event of the m agnitude of the Civil War has provided a fundamental 
challenge to the doctrine of progress.
This is despite the fact that, though America has been free of the 
baggage of a feudal past, it has by no means been w ithout its share of 
'contradictions.' "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."238 
The most obvious contradiction here was that this grandiose declaration was 
thought entirely compatible with the enslavement of one section of humanity 
on the basis of the colour of its skin. Some men were, manifestly, more equal 
than others! Similarly, the emphasis upon equality has always rested uneasily 
with the commitment to free-market capitalism. Alexis de Tocqueville pointed 
to the sameness of American individualism, amongst other paradoxes. Hans 
Morgenthau is, then, part of a longer tradition of outsiders who have sought 
to lay bare the paradoxes and contradictions at the heart of the American 
doctrine of progress. In dismissing the debate between 'traditionalists' and 
'behaviouralists' as one of mere method. International Relations scholars, in 
their typically parochial way, have ignored this broader context.239 it was 
precisely his questioning of the doctrine of progress which placed 
Morgenthau so fundamentally at odds with the American science of politics.
238 Tbe Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776.
239 For further exam ples of this w idely  held position see K.J. H olsti, The Dividing Discipline: 
Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (University of British Columbia, 1985) p.39; 
M ichael Banks, Conflict in World Society (W lieatsheef Books, Brighton, 1984) p .14.
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In Morgenthau's specific case he sought to challenge the notion of American 
exceptionalism in foreign affairs - the belief that American alone had been 
able to remain free of the corruption of the power politics of the old world. 
Much of the chapters three and four concerned w ith tracing M orgenthau's 
engagement with this American national mythology.
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Chapter Three: Intellectual in the Political Sphere
’’Mendacity in a professor is a moral fault which denies the very core of the 
professor’s calling.” (Hans Morgenthau)
The Europe-wide persecution of Jews and leftist intellectuals resulted 
in the emigration to America of a group which George Steiner has described 
as "...undoubtedly the intellectually rnost gifted community since fifth-century 
Athens and Renaissance F lo re n ce ...B y  no means was this an exaggeration. 
The emigres brought about an unprecedented enrichment to American 
cultural and intellectual life. In the case of physics and mathematics their 
impact was dramatic enough to profoundly shape the course of international 
politics. The 'Manhattan Project' is inconceivable without the input of the 
brilliant physicists, chemists, and mathematicians from Eastern and Central 
Europe.2
Other émigrés helped to find a new home for psychoanalysis at a time 
when it was foundering in Europe and in danger of disappearing as a subject 
altogether. In music, a galaxy of foreign-born musicians and conductors 
helped to create new American orchestras and strengthen existing ones such 
that they came, in Chicago, in Boston, in New York and elsewhere to match 
the best of the old-world. If Europe remained the centre for developments in 
composition, the émigrés did help to enrich existing American musical forms. 
The movie scores of the famous Viennese Wunderkind Erich Korngold helped
 ^ George Steiner, 'The Archives of Eden', in No Passion Spent: Essays 1978-1996 (Faber and  
Faber, London, 1997) p p .284-285. It is estim ated that from  Germany alone som e 3000 
academ ics and other intellectuals w ere driven into exile. About half of the European  
intellectuals w ho came to America were German, of w hich two-thirds was also Jewish. See 
Hems Kostendiek, 'Political developm ent and Political Science in W est Germany', in David  
Easton, John G unnell and Luigi G raziono (eds). The Development of Political Science: A  
Comparative Survey (Routledge, London, 1991) p .ll5 ;  Stuart H ughes, The Sea Change, p.2.
2 It is interesting to ponder the counterfactual of w hat m ight have happened had the energies 
of these m en been harnessed by the Nazis.
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to raise this genre to a new pinnacle of excellence. Kurt Weill merged German 
cabaret with the Broadway musical to fascinating effect.
In sociology and in political science, as we have already seen, émigrés 
like Morgenthau, Kissinger, Strauss and Voeglin made a profound challenge 
to the prevailing orthodoxy of behavioralism in American political science. 
Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumamas' Theory of Games and Economic 
Behaviour signalled (for better or for worse) the path that many American 
political scientists would follow upon the exhaustion of behavioralism.
W hat is often forgotten amidst the glitter of these tales of intellectual 
achievement, however, are those who faded into obscurity in their new 
surroundings. For many intellectuals the ability to function successfully 
depended, after all, upon a particular form of cultural and physical 
environment. Not every intellectual could be a man - or woman - of the world 
in a thoroughgoing sense.3
America provided its own share of problems for the émigrés. Few of 
them spoke English, as is a matter of course for the global elite now, and this 
was especially troublesome for novelists. It was one thing for a scientist to 
acquire enough English to produce technical papers but quite another for a 
writer to capture the subtleties of the new language. It comes as no surprise to 
learn that writers formed the largest group of those intellectuals who 
subsequently re-emigrated to Europe.^ One of the biggest difficulties for 
many arrivals was the lack of deference and status afforded to intellectuals 
and the life of the mind in general in the United States. Theodor Adorno 
discovered that in America "...no reverential silence in the presence of 
everything intellectual prevailed, as it did in Central and Western Europe far
3 The long list of suicides by those in exile includes Joseph Roth, Stefan Z w eig, Walter 
Benjamin, Klaus M ann and Ernst Toller. See H enry Pachter, 'On Being an Exile: A n Old- 
Timer's Personal and Political Memoir', in Robert Boyers (ed.). The Legacy of the German 
Refugee Intellectuals (Schocken Books, N ew  York, 1969) p .20.
 ^Fermi, Illustrious Immigrants, pp.379-381.
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beyond the confines of the so-called educated classes..."^American-style 
competition in the marketplace proved too much for some of those arriving in 
a state of physical and emotional fragility and financial vulnerability. Many 
intellectuals returned to Europe from America from the early 1950s, Thomas 
Mann among them.^
For many of the Germans who stayed, Nazism assumed the form of 
an ever-present motif in their publications even when, very often, their 
personal intellectual interests had little to do with politics. One can point here 
to Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom, Theodor Adorno's The Authoritarian 
Personality, Franz Neumann's Behemoth, Ernst Cassirer's The M yth of the State, 
Hannah Arendt'sThe Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem and 
there are many other examples. This preoccupation with the German past 
often betrayed a continuing emotional em pathy and identification w ith 
Germany in spite of their effective expulsion from the nation. Many did 
return to Germany for good and others, like Hannah Arendt, continued to 
regard it as 'home' even while remaining in the United States.
The flip-side of the absorption with Nazism was the spectre of the 
disintegration of the Weimar Republic. This gave many the sense that 
democracy was an inherently fragile form of government and it meant that 
they sometimes overreacted to domestic political developments like the rise of 
McCarthyism, as disturbing as that phenomenon was. A scan through the 
many articles of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau finds them replete 
with titles involving failure, crisis, collapse, tragedy and so on. If Morgenthau 
shared this element with some of his fellow émigrés he was, in many other 
respects, very different. Though in his late thirties when he first came to
3 Theodor Adorno, 'Scientific Experiences of A  European Scholar in America', trans. Donald  
Flem ing, in Flem ing and Bailyn (eds.), The Intellectual Migration, p.367. Adorno w ent on to 
suggest that "the absence of this respect inclined the intellect toward critical self-scrutiny". 
This m ay w ell be the case but, alas, it did nothing to make Adorno's works any less opaque!
5 See Fermi, op.cit. Som e of these w ere responding to the im proved econom ic clim ate in  
Europe. Others w ere fleeing M cCarthyism and the fear that it marked the em ergence of a 
nascent American fascism.
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America, he seems to have acquired an impressive fluency in English with 
remarkable e ase / That he was also able to find a position at a leading 
university also facilitated the process of adjustment.
At a deeper level there is little doubt that Morgenthau was largely free 
of the emotional hankering for a German 'home' that so marked Arendt and 
many others.^ Though he returned to Germany for short visits on a number 
of occasions there is little doubt that he did come, at least for a time, to feel a 
part of the American collectivity, as we shall see in chapter four. It is also clear 
that Nazism did not prey upon his mind in the way that it did with many 
others. Given that he was a German lecturer in International Politics it would 
have been astonishing if he had never written anything at all on Nazism or 
the Jewish catastrophe in Europe (which also claimed many of his family 
members) but the two articles and single review which I have found hardly 
amount to very much given the overall size of Morgenthau's output.9
7^ Though he never lost his strong German accent w hich was, to give the reader w ho has never 
heard him  som e basis for comparison, even more pronounced than Henry Kissinger's.
3 It is hardly surprising that two general works on the subject of the intellectual em igre in 
America include M orgenthau as an exam ple of w hat one author described as "those w ho  
have experienced no problem of adjustment but, on the contrary, are sw im m ing happily in  
the m ainstream  of American life and politics." Pachter, 'On Being an Exile', p.43. A lso see  
Fermi, Illustrious Immigrants.
9 See 'Naziism '(sic), in  Joseph S.Roncek (ed.). From Twentieth Century Political Thought 
(Philosophical Library, N ew  York, 1946) pp.132-148; The Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture' (Leo 
Baeck Institute, N ew  York, 1961) pp.5-16; 'The incarnation of dem oniac power': review  of 
Robert Payne's 'The Life and Death of A dolf Hitler' inBusiness Week, April 21 1973, p .12. N or  
is  there anything exceptional in h is reading of N azism , though one does register  
inconsistencies w ith his brief remarks on the subject elsewhere. The book chapter on N azism  
cited above stresses its fundamental incoherencies and irrationality whereas in Scientific Man 
he points to the instrumental rationality of the Nazis and warns against the claim that fascism  
w as "...a m ere temporary regression into irrationality..." Similarly, in the article he attempts 
to place a certain am ount of distance in  terms of continuity betw een N azism  and the 
German past:
"It is indeed obvious that w ith respect to m any of its tenets, such as the em phasis upon w ill 
and em otions as over against reason, the glorification of the state and the disdain for the 
ind iv idual as such, the w orship of pow er pure and sim ple, the political ph ilosophy of 
N aziism  (sic) builds upon foundations laid by the German tradition. Yet one looks in vain in 
the pre-N azi tradition of German political thought for the intellectual closedness, the moral 
nüiilism  and the pseudo-religious fervor, w hich characterize N azi political thought." (p.l38). 
In a letter, adm ittedly written a few  years earlier, M orgenthau em phasised that N azism  had  
"...arisen from the depth of the German soul and represents its atavistic, barbaric side w hose  
vitality has been plaintively recognised by the greatest Germans..." Letter to Professor Phillip 
C. Jessup, A ugust 10 1942, Morgenthau Papers, Box 31.
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This relative detachment was also reflected in Morgenthau's attitude 
towards the Nuremberg Trials, Anticipating the argum ent that Hannah 
Arendt would make in her Eichmann in Jerusalem, Morgenthau accepted that 
"the eighteen men convicted at Nuremberg were guilty of many crimes and 
they were justly condemned and punished." He also stressed, however, that 
this amounted to a punitive trial which had little plausible foundation in 
international law:
"The Second World War was a war for survival, undertaken by individual 
nations in their own national interest, not the punitive war of a morally 
united humanity for the purpose of making eternal justice prevail". He went 
on to warn that "to make the condemnation [of those tried at Nuremberg] the 
occasion for the revival of the institution of punitive war is morally 
unwarranted and fraught with moral and political d a n g e r ." ^ o  
As Jaap Nobel is also aware, Nazism appears for Morgenthau as another 
calamitous chapter in the history of the politics of the twentieth century rather 
than, as Nobel describes it, "a triumph of evil over good" and one gains little 
sense of the personal tragedy for Morgenthau as German and Jew.^^
All these elements combine to give us a picture of a man who adjusts 
very well to the new circumstances of his life in the United States. If in this
In his Leo Baeck address h is remarks are familiar enough but w hat stands out is a sense of 
distance from the subject matter. A t no point w ou ld  a reader (or listener) unaware of 
Morgenthau's background glean that M orgenthau w as h im self a Jew or that his family w as a 
part of "the disaster w hich befell the Jews of Germany..." (p.5). A s w e shall see in chapter four, 
how ever, M orgenthau did com e to develop a certain em pathy for the state of Israel and his 
Jewishness seem s to have given him  some sense of solace in his final years.
The book review  is interesting for Morgenthau's description of a rally held in M unich in 
1922, at w hich Hitler spoke:
"I had one of the m ost profound experiences of m y life. I have never heard before or since a 
m an with such passionate eloquence who told his audience exactly what it wanted to hear... 
Hitler transformed that audience... into a how ling mob. I shall never forget the paralysis of 
w ill that took hold of m e w hile I was listening to this man, know ing full w ell in m y m ind that 
what he said w as malicious nonsense."
It does seem  a little odd, given the obvious interest to American audiences, that Morgenthau  
doesn't repeat this story in his interview with Bernard Johnson or indeed anywhere else as far 
as I have been able to determine.
See his letter to Reverend John La Farge of the Am erican N ational Catholic W eekly, 
Novem ber 12,1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 1.
Nobel, 'Morgenthau's struggle with power', p.6.
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respect he was different from many other German emigres there is one 
element, I would suggest, that virtually all German intellectuals, émigré or 
otherwise, held in common, and that is a certain yearning for unity - physical 
and metaphysical - for something beyond the economisation of politics that 
m odernity has brought in its wake.This applies equally to Schmitt, 
Morgenthau, Arendt, Habermas, Tonnies, Marx, Hegel and even W e b e r / 2  I t  
is, however, obvious that there are important differences in the nature of the 
political or public spaces which these individuals wished to carve from the 
maelstrom of m odernity. There are significant differences, too, betw een 
Arendt and Habermas though both use the adjective 'public' rather than 
'political' to describe their conceptions. Morgenthau's understanding of a 
political sphere is very different again from the Arendt/Habermas notion of a 
public s p a c e / s p h e r e / r e a l m . i 3  in  exploring the notion of a 'public' sphere, 
however, I hope to illuminate Morgenthau's alternative conception.
The Public Sphere
In one of Habermas's earliest works The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere he identifies a bourgeois public sphere which arose in parts of 
Europe and, especially, England in the eighteenth century.^^ In the Middle 
Ages the notion of a 'public' had hardly extended beyond the confines of 
monarch and court but this had begun to change with the expansion of 
capitalism and the rise of the middle classes. Court society in England was 
gradually replaced, or at least supplemented, w ith the salons, the coffee­
houses, the taverns and, perhaps most im portantly, the new spapers.
^2 Warren M agnusson's assertion that the "...search for political space appears as som ething  
especially of the left ..." is sim ply untrue. See his The search for political space: globalization, 
social movements, and the urban political experience (University of Toronto Press, 1996) p.47.
3^ In the discussion that follow s I w ill use these tliree words interchangeably.
Much of the discussion here is based upon Craig Calhoun's introduction to his edited book  
Habermas and the Public Sphere (MIT, 1992) pp.1-50.
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pamphlets and other forms of print media which came into being initially as a 
response to the need of merchants for economic information of w ider 
geographic areas. This economic imperative coincided with the growth of the 
perm anent administration of state bureaucracy and the result was that 
newsletters began to carry news concerning this tangible public sphere as 
well.i^ A bourgeois public developed an intimate concern with the doings of 
this public sphere but did not become an identifiable part of it and formed a 
'civil society' which could approach this public realm critically. The most 
important element for Habermas was that this did not amount merely to the 
rise of a new interest group, but rather gave rise to a genuine "rational-critical 
discourse on political matters" which at least opened up the possibility of a 
general interest not reducible to its private components.
Aside from the rise of an impersonal public agency, the other crucial 
factor underpinning the public sphere was that economic relationships 
remained a largely private matter. Hence the bourgeois participants in this 
nascent public sphere, as the paternal heads of families and small-scale 
commercial enterprises, could meet in the public realm on the basis of 
relatively equal terms or, perhaps to be more accurate, in a situation in which 
differences in status had been temporarily suspended. Calhoun describes a 
situation where:
"...early British businessmen met in coffee houses to discuss matters of trade, 
including the "news", which was coming into ever-wider circulation. London 
had three thousand coffee houses by the first decade of the eighteenth 
century, each with a core of regulars. The conversations of these little circles 
branched out into affairs of State administration and politics. Journals of 
opinion were created, which linked the thousands of smaller circles in 
London and throughout the country. These were often based at particular
The novelty  of this public sphere w as that it w as im personal and not im m ediately  
identifiable w ith the w ill of a King or other overlord.
Calhoun, 'Introduction', p.9.
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coffee houses and replicated in their contents the style of convivial
exchange."i2
'Convivial exchange', then, between relative equals who were linked in the 
broadest terms by class, gender, and economic interests.
A number of the contributors to the Calhoun volume emphasise that 
this am ounts to a highly idealised po rtra it of eighteenth century 
discourse. 13Aside from this, the conservatism of the notion is manifest 
excluding, as it does, plebeian elements and women from participation in this 
public sphere. It should also be obvious to anyone with even the sketchiest 
knowledge of modern history that Habermas's public sphere, even if accepted 
on his terms, could only ever have am ounted to a brief moment of 
crystallisation when state/civil society and public/private were coherent 
dualities. Habermas accepts that, as private economic organisation grew in 
size and developed a public significance, on the one hand, and the state 
penetrated civil society and assumed welfare functions on the other, a 
'refeudalization' occurred which blurred the clear distinctions necessary for a 
viable public sphere. Party politics and the manipulation of the mass media 
came to take precedence over rational debate. The existence of large-scale 
organisations meant that work was no longer the purely private prerogative 
of the bourgeois paterfamilias. As a consequence many of these individuals 
withdrew from participation in public discourse to the apolitical privacy of 
family life and a role of passive consumption.
It is at this point that Habermas's appreciation of the Enlightenment 
clashes with the sort of bleak critique of the mass culture and instrumental
ibid. p .12.
18 vVidi reference to American circumstances, Michael Schudson suggests that "the idea that a 
public sphere of rational-critical discourse flourished in the eighteenth or early nineteenth  
century... is an adequate, if not incoherent notion. Its empirical basis, at least in the American 
case, seem s to be remarkably thin." Michael Schudson, 'Was There Ever a Public Sphere? If 
So, When? Reflections on the American Case, in Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Space, 
p.l46.
Callioun, 'Introduction', pp.21-23; Robert C. H olub, filrgen Habermas: critic in the Public 
Sphere (Routledge, London, 1991) p.6.
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rationality of twentieth century society developed by Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer in their Dialektik der Aiifldciriing and elsewhere/OAs a 
consequence Habermas finds himself unable to identify any concrete way in 
which to reground a public sphere within the context of advanced capitalist 
societies. Calhoun notes that Habermas's response was to make a 'linguistic 
turn' in which he sought a universal basis for a public realm in speech rather 
than in specific institutional forms.^^The whole project is representative of a 
familiar desire amongst German intellectuals to reclaim a (mythical?) lost 
whole, an Archimedean (Arcadian?) point.
The theme of the public sphere is one that also resonates strongly 
throughout the work of H annah Arendt. A rendt is one of the more 
controversial figures of the intellectual history of the last fifty years or so. Her 
best known publications are undoubtedly The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) 
and Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). The latter work, in particular, stimulated a 
furious response to her suggestion that the so-called 'evil' attributed to the 
actions of some prominent Nazis was, in fact, better understood as the 
banality of bureaucrats proceeding in instrum entally rational ways. Her 
second and even more inflammatory claim was that the co-operation 
extended to the Nazis by various elements of the Jewish leadership in Eastern 
and Central Europe meant that Jews were, to some degree, complicit in their 
own destruction. W hether one accepts these claims or not Eichmann in 
Jerusalem remains a brilliant work which alone would justify a substantial 
posthumous reputation.
She has, however, also attracted a large num ber of detractors, 
particularly those of an Anglo-American analytical bent like Isaiah Berlin for 
whom Arendt's works have always been too fuzzy, too opaque for comfort.22
20 Holub, Jürgen Habermas, p.7.
21 Calhoun, 'Introduction', pp.29-32.
22 The Am erican philosopher Raziel A dels on com plained that "it is never clear w hat, if 
anything. Miss Arendt is for or against." Cited in Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For 
Love of the World (Yale University Press, 1982) p.424. In public discussion  at a conference
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In truth, there are probably few writers who mix flashes of brilliance with 
eccentricities as consistently as Arendt. And one of the least plausible 
elements of Arendt's oeuvre was her treatment of the public sphere.
Unlike Habermas, who at least managed to locate his version of the 
public sphere in the eighteenth century, it is the Greek Polis that Arendt has 
firmly in mind.23 In rejecting modern notions of equality, Arendt turned to 
the ancient Greek notion that equality exists only in a "...specifically political 
realm, where men met one another as citizens and not as private persons."24 
Freedom too, is a condition which can only be enjoyed when man is amongst 
his peers in the public sphere.25 Arendt's public space does, however, rely 
upon the same sort of clear dualities: public-private, politics-economics etc. In 
particular, the public sphere is the realm of freedom while the private sphere 
is the realm of necessity where man fulfils his animal functions of eating, 
procreation and so on. The household was "the center of the strictest 
inequality" which existed in order to support the equality of the political 
space.26 The surplus generated by the slave-holding household enabled its 
head to participate in the life of the polis.27
In the modern world, however, the emancipation of labour has 
enabled the 'animal laborans' to take possession of the public realm or, to be 
more accurate, to obliterate it altogether by replacing the political with the
devoted to her work, M orgenthau once asked: "What are you? Are you a conservative? Are 
you  a liberal? What is your position  w ithin the contemporary possibilities?" M orgenthau  
quoted in ibid. p.451.
23 H ie other important difference, as Calhoun is also aware, is that Habermas is enough of a 
liberal to believe, unlike Arendt, that individuals are formed primarily in the private sphere 
and that the private sphere itself is a realm that needs to be defended from excessive  
interference by the state. See Callioun 'Introduction', p.7. Both are almost entirely absent from  
Arendt's work where the em phasis is very much upon the private sphere encroaching upon  
the public space instead of the reverse.
24 Hannali Arendt, On Revolution (Pelican Books, London, 1986 [1953]) p.31.
25 ibid. See also The Human Condition (Doubleday Anchor Books, N ew  York, 1958) p p .45-50.
26 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp.27-31.
27 "The institution of slavery in antiquity, though not in later times, was not a device for 
cheap labor or an instrument of exploitation for profit but rather the attempt to exclude labor 
from the conditions of man's life. What m en share w ith all other forms of animal life w as not 
considered to be human." ibid. p.74.
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s o c i a l .23 Facile utilitarian philosophies produce an approach to public life 
which "...takes on the deceptive aspect of a total of private interests as though 
these interests could create a new quality through sheer addition. All the so- 
called liberal concepts of politics... have this in common: they simply add up 
private lives and personal behavior patterns and present the sum as laws of 
history, or economics, or politics."29The modern belief that this development 
represents the advance of democracy and freedom is illusory:
"The government is democratic in that popular welfare and private happiness 
are its chief goals; but it can be called oligarchic in the sense that public 
happiness and public freedom have again become the privilege of the few. 
The defenders of this system, which actually is the system of the welfare 
state... must deny the very existence of public happiness and private freedom; 
they m ust insist that politics is a burden and that its end is itself not 
political."30
It is hardly surprising that so many of Arendt's critics have found her 
Republican vision to be hopelessly anachronistic, in addition to itself being 
based on a highly idealised reconstruction of the Greek polis.^i In modern 
times Arendt is only able to point to fleeting historical constellations which 
signified, for a moment, the recapturing of a political e s s e n c e . 32 Margaret
23 See Arendt, The Human Condition, pp.43,115,211.
29 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, N ew  York, 1951) 
p.145.
30 Arendt, On Revolution p.269.
34 Judith Shklar referred to Arendt's "many ahistorical fantasies" and charged that she lived  in  
a 'fantasy world'. See 'Hannah Arendt as Pariah', Stanley Hoffmann (ed.), in Judith N . Shklar, 
Political Thought and Political Thinkers (University of Chicago Press, 1998) pp.366,373. On her 
idealised, even romanticised view  of Greek political life see John G. GunneU, Political Theory: 
Tradition and Interpretation (Winthrop Publishers, Cambridge, Mass., 1979); Seyla Benhabib, 
'Models of Public Space: H annah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas', in  
Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere , p .75. Behabib is even more disturbed by the 
fact that Arendt's conception necessarily excludes large sections of hum an societies.
32 These included the American Revolution and, in the twentieth century, the Russian and 
Hungarian Revolutions. In broader terms the 'republican thesis' has relatively few  m odern  
adherents. Charles Taylor is probably its best know n advocate. For an eloquent (but 
unconvincing) attempt to rebut the suggestion that "to hanker after the unity of earlier 
republics is to indu lge in bootless nostalgia" see h is 'Cross-Purposes: The Liberal- 
Communitarian Debate', in N ancy L. Rosenblum (ed.). Liberalism and the Moral Life (Harvard 
University Press, 1991) pp.159-176.
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Canovan, one of Arendt's most tenacious defenders, suggests that Arendt 
anticipated a contemporary revival of interest in civic humanism but it is still 
difficult to see Arendt’s treatment of the public sphere as anything bu t a 
hopelessly romantic and anachronistic e n d e a v o u r /3  Arendt singularly fails to 
engage with the problems of modernity in a way similar to that of many of 
the German intellectuals we,have encountered so far.
M orgenthau was an admirer of Arendt in both a personal and an 
intellectual capacity.34 He entirely accepted A rendt's assertion that 
totalitarianism was an essentially new form of government.35 And at the 
heart of the storm raging over Eichmann in Jerusalem Morgenthau remained 
firm in her support. In a letter to the New York Times he made a strident 
defence of Arendt against the attacks of Barbara Tuchman and others. 
Eichmann, Morgenthau accepts, "... was a prototype of the efficient German
33 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: a reinterpretation of her political thought (Cambridge 
U niversity Press, 1992) p p .2 ,236-238.
34 Arendt's biographer observes that A rendt and M orgenthau holidayed  together on a 
num ber of occasions and that they often w ent out to dinner in N ew  York, especially in the 
years follow ing the death of Arendt's husband Heinrich Blücher. Arendt apparently rejected a 
m arriage proposal from  M orgenthau though they continued their social relationship. 
According to Young-Bruehl "Arendt alw ays praised him  w ith  the phrase she reserved for 
m en of action - m asculini generis - but she felt that he w as w ithout the k ind of "real 
understanding of people" she had loved  in Blücher. See Young-Bruehl, 'Hannah Arendt', 
pp.453-454. In the Hannah Arendt Papers there is w hat can only be described as a love letter 
from M orgenthau to Arendt of extraordinary intensity:
"Dear Hannah: Please don't m ention your age to m e again. It detracts from you, from m e, and 
from our relations. I love you  at your age. I w ould  love you  if you w ere twenty. I w ou ld  love  
you if you  w ere ninety. Each time in a w ay  appropriate to your age. This is a sacred thing  
w hich  w e  ought not to belittle  or, rather, do it an injustice b y  confusing it w ith  our 
a.ge"Hannah Arendt Papers,Yol.12, Adam s Library, Library of Congress, W ashington D.C.
It's unclear whether or not this suggests that there w as, indeed, som ething m ore to their 
relationship  than friendship. Arendt's apparent reference to her age, a llu d ed  to by  
M orgenthau, m ay have am ounted to a tactful form of rejection. The other striking elem ent to 
be draw n from  the M orgenthau-A rendt correspondence is that, in intellectual terms, 
M orgenthau clearly felt a slight but nagging sense of inferiority vis-a-vis Arendt. In a letter 
he com plains that he is "too busy w ith Vietnam  to do what I really w ant to do. But then, one 
has to do one's duty, especially w hen it's alm ost literally a question of life and death. I wrote 
an article on Stevenson w hich  is probably som ew hat better than the stuff I m ust write 
now adays on foreign policy." Letter to Hannah Arendt, 25th July, 1965, Hannah Arendt Papers, 
Vol.12. Elsewhere he objected to having "...been typed as an "international relations man" and 
"power politician", and m y activities in this field have obscured m y real interests w hich  are 
really in the field of political philosophy". Letter to H ans Simons, President of the N ew  School 
for Social Research, A ugust 3 ,1955, Morgenthau Papers, Box 18.
35 See his 'Hannah Arendt on Totalitarianism and Democracy', Social Research, Vol.44, N o .l,  
1977, p .l27.
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bureaucrat, who happened to apply his administrative talents to the 
extermination of the Jews. As compared with the monstrosity of his deeds, his 
person indeed recedes into "banality". Yet it is uncomfortable to have to admit 
that so ordinary a person was capable of such extraordinary evil. It is, 
nevertheless, true."36
Even Morgenthau, however, found it necessary to reject her notion of 
the public space. For, as he warns, "the public space populated by free men is 
not going to remain populated by free men... [0]ut of the open space of a free 
society there arise new social forces which, by design or historic 
contingencies, recreate inequality and close the open space in favor of those 
who have the power to close it.37 Thus there is a romantic element in Hannah 
Arendt's conception of freedom and of the mechanism by which it is to be 
accomplished." Arendt has nothing to tell us on "...how the open space is to 
be created, how it is to be preserved, how the natural inequality of man can be 
reconciled with the postulate of equality within the open space..." In one of his 
most strikingly modernistic moods he concluded that "it may be argued, and I 
would be willing to argue, that the dilemmas which we are facing are no 
longer susceptible to the traditional concepts and remedies to which we have 
been accustomed in our thinking and in our actions."38
Morgenthau in the Political Sphere
36 See the Letters to the Editor, New York Times, July 17, 1966, Morgenthau Papers, Box 43. 
M orgenthau also saw  fit to remind his readers that "there are ordinary people in this country 
w ho are convinced that Negroes are sub-human and therefore deserve to be treated like sub­
humans." Ironically, Eichmann in Jerusalem is arguably Arendt's m ost im pressive work  
precisely because here she does engage with a specific problem of modernity: in this case how  
can one attribute moral responsibility to individuals w ho are bound to vast, instrum entally  
rational, bureaucratic machines? See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (Penguin Books, 
1994 [2nd edition 1965] ).
37 Habermas has been similarly criticised for an inattention to the importance of agency and  
poltical struggle.
38 M orgenthau, 'Hannah Arendt', pp. 129-131. The irony is that in accusing A rendt of 
subscribing to a form of romantic nostalgia Morgenthau was making the same charge levelled  
against him  by som e of his critics.
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It should be clear enough from the discussion so far that 
Morgenthau's political sphere is different in important ways from the public 
sphere of Habermas and Arendt. Informed by the sociology of knowledge 
M orgenthau w ould no doubt have challenged the notion presented by 
Habermas in The Structural Transformation of The Public Sphere on the same 
ground that he questioned the liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, namely that the middle classes were labouring under a kind of false 
consciousness which served to conflate their victory over the aristocracy with 
the trium ph of universal v a l u e s . 39 Morgenthau is unlikely to have accepted 
Habermas's position that the bourgeois discourse of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries represented something of potentially enduring value 
rather than a temporary constellation of the balance of interests. In general the 
difference w ith  H aberm as and A rendt is straigh tforw ard  enough: 
Morgenthau simply cannot conceive of a public realm in which clashes of will 
and the struggle for power do not predom inate. To be sure, certain 
constitutional arrangements like those in the United States do a better job 
than others in keeping conflict within manageable limits but they are certainly 
not able to eliminate it entirely.^^The ubiquity of the struggle for power also 
m eans that the p rivate/public  duality favoured by both A rendt and 
Habermas is implausible.
And yet, as I have already suggested, Morgenthau's political sphere 
does assume something more than the economisation of politics and its 
domination by interest, even if in a far more attenuated form than that in 
Habermas and Arendt. Effective diplomacy requires that, within states, there 
is some space for the rational contemplation of state interests free from the
39 Harmcih Arendt once wrote a critical review  of M annheim's Ideology and Utopia in w hich  
she defended the autonom y of philosophy against the socio logy  of know ledge. She also  
asked the fundam ental question of h ow  the 'free floating' intellectuals them selves could  
possib ly be freed of the ties of interest, a problem  that M orgenthau never really addressed  
adequately. See Young-Bruehl, Hannah A ren dt, pp.83-85.
In broad terms he w ould  never have been able to accept Arendt's claim that "violence is a 
marginal phenom enon in the political realm." Arendt, On Revolution , p .l9 .
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clamour of the market and sectional interest groups. Outside the state 
diplomacy requires at least some kind of communication and understanding 
in order for competing interests to be successfully reconciled without recourse 
to war. This is, to be sure, nothing remotely approaching a Habermasian 
'ideal-speech' situation but it does require at least a rudimentary form of 
mutual empathy which is. threatened by nationalism. As we shall see, it is 
also the case that in his activities in the political sphere Morgenthau behaves 
as if there is, indeed, a critical public to appeal to. If the political sphere 
consisted of nothing more than the clash of. interests' it would seem rather 
pointless for a lone intellectual to participate in it. This could merely reflect a 
kind of grim obligation to perform one's duty, a Weberian ascetic of 
responsibility, but if this was the case it wouldn't account for Morgenthau's 
evident dismay at the failure to change the American course of action in 
Vietnam. In any case, in his evident desire to shield a political space from the 
threat of modernity he confirmed the link with so many of his fellow German 
intellectuals. How then, did Morgenthau view his role as an intellectual in this 
predom inantly adversarial political space and w hat were the specific 
problems presented under the conditions of modernity in the American 
context?
The question of the relationship between 'truth and power' was never 
far from Morgenthau's thoughts and he wrote a number of papers and gave 
several conference papers on the subject. We will need to return to this central 
theme but for the moment I wish to give some thought to the wider 
dimensions of the role of the intellectual. How, for example, should the 
university-based intellectual be disposed to the other pressing commitments 
of teaching and research? Beyond official institutions what should the 
relationship be with the broader public, with civil society in general? How 
can a reasonable balance be struck amongst these multifarious obligations?
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There is, of course, no easy answer but we do need to explore how 
Morgenthau wrestled with the problem.
In terms of teaching M orgenthau wrote nothing on pedagogical 
theory or practice and there is very little to be found in the way of personal 
correspondence or reflection on the area in the Morgenthau Papers. The image 
that does emerge from the snippets available, however, is that of a man who 
took his teaching commitments very seriously and whose disposition was 
very far removed from the notion that higher education was merely a form of 
utilitarian exercise in the training of students to become suitable bureaucrats, 
accountants and lawyers. Reading through the summary of Morgenthau's 
lecture notes made by his students and retained in his papers, one gains a 
clear sense of the importance he placed upon sharpening his students' critical 
faculties, encouraging them at all times to confront commonplace notions 
afresh.
Beyond the classroom it is clear that, following Weber, Morgenthau 
considered it of the utmost importance for the academic to conduct his 
activities in the public realm with the utmost integrity. Indeed, he made clear 
that the onus placed on the academic was, in this respect, actually greater 
than that in other walks of life:
"Mendacity in a professor is a moral fault which denies the very core of the 
professor's calling. A mendacious professor is not like a politician who 
subordinates the public good to private gain, nor like a business man who 
cheats. Rather, he is like a physician who, pledged to heal, maims and kills. 
He is not so much the corrupter of the code by which he is supposed to live as 
its destroyer.''^!
This passage is taken from an article Morgenthau wrote on a scandal that 
arose in the late 1950s and was recently made the subject of a Hollywood film. 
An academic from Columbia, Charles Van Doren, had been dazzling the
44 'Reaction to the Van Doren Reaction', New York Times, Novem ber 22,1959.
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nation with displays of his acumen in a popular television quiz programme 
until it emerged that the whole event had been stage-managed and that Van 
Doren had, for financial gain, been complicit in an act of deception further 
compounded by his false denials under oath. What troubled Morgenthau 
even more than the act itself was some of the wider response to it. Of the 
Congressional Committee .appointed to investigate the incident five of its 
members "addressed Van Doren in laudatory terms" and two expressed the 
hope that he would not be forced to relinquish his positions at Columbia and 
at the National Broadcasting Company. Perhaps even more disturbing for 
Morgenthau was the fact that, when Columbia did indeed dismiss Van Doren, 
a student petition demanding his rehiring contained some 650 signatories. 
"Who", Morgenthau wondered, "blinded them to the moral standards by 
which they - at least as students - are supposed to live?"^2 a further article 
w ritten as a public response to private correspondence from students 
Morgenthau re-affirmed that the academic had a particular commitment to 
substantive truth which required standards higher than those prevailing
elsewhere.43
Aside from responsibilities he also sought to defend the attendant 
rights of the intellectual as he understood them, one of which was the 
entitlement to reject excessive editorial interference. As we have already seen, 
in the early part of his academic career in the United States, at least until the 
manifest success of Politics Among Nations, he faced a constant battle with 
editors who called for the wholesale revision and re-writing of his work. 
Later, in 1965, a public spat arose between M orgenthau and Norm an 
Podhoretz, the then editor of C om m entary, over a piece of editorial 
intervention so heavy-handed that Morgenthau claimed it to have resulted in
42 ibid.
43 See his 'Epistle to the Columbians on the M eaning of Morality', New Republic, December 22, 
1959. Both articles w ere reprinted as appendices to h is The Purpose of American Politics 
(Vintage Books, N ew  York, 1960) pp.342-359.
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his article being "drastically changed in content and s t y l e . " 4 4  The ever- 
supportive Louis Halle took up the theme in The Times Literary Supplement, as 
did M orgenthau in a letter in which he complained about the editorial 
treatment of his recently puhlishedVietnam and the United States and stressed 
that "the relationship between thought and language is organic and not 
accidental." Hence, "... whoever attacks my language attacks me in the center 
of my being. He cripples my communication with my p u b l i c .  "45 All of this 
serves to affirm the Weberesque image of a man not given to the sort of easy 
accommodations and compromises that many others accepted with alacrity.
As for Morgenthau's 'public', this was another of the responsibilities 
which he accepted as an integral part of the intellectual's lot. As we shall see 
in the epilogue, much of the recent (limited) debate in British International 
Relations over the appropriate role of the intellectual has been too narrowly 
focused on the relationship, im portant as it is, between academy and 
government. Morgenthau was sensitive to the existence of a much wider 
public and he made strenuous efforts to ensure that his ideas were 
propagated in as wide a variety of fora as possible: newspapers, magazines, 
academic journals, television and radio broadcasts, lectures at military 
colleges and schools, addresses to various clubs and societies and so on. If 
anything, there were times when he was too ambitious in his efforts to 
cultivate as wide a public appreciation as possible. He went as far as to 
submit one article to Playboy Magazine whose associate editor, perhaps not 
surprisingly, replied that "our judgem ent was that the article was too 
scholarly for our a u d i e n c e . " (!)46 His public profile also ensured an increasing
44 See 'The Writer's Duty and H is Predicament', The Hudson Review, Vol. XVIII, No.2, Summer 
1965, pp .270-277. M orgenthau also used  the occasion to condem n other w idely  practised  
literary devices like the use of 'ghost' writers. The article includes a bad-tempered reply from  
Podhoretz w ho rejected Morgenthau's charges and, in passing, virtually accused him  of being  
a semi-literate!
45 Letter to the Editor, Times Literary Supplement, October 5,1965. For similiar sentiments see 
Louis Halle's Letter to the Editor, Times Literary Supplement, September 23,1965.
46 Letter from James G oode, A ssociate Editor, P layboy M agazine, October 27, 1966, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 45.
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amount of correspondence with the general public and it is a striking general 
them e from the M orgenthau papers that he was often m uch more 
forthcoming about matters intellectual and political in these letters than in 
communication with his peers.
Given the strength and breadth of this commitment to engaging with 
the public, together with his other responsibilities, it was perhaps inevitable 
that he had less time for sustained research and publication than he might 
otherwise have wished. Though Morgenthau's first three books Scientific Man 
Vs Power Politics, Politics Among Nations, and In Defense of the National Interest 
all consist at least in part of re-workings of previously published articles they 
nevertheless retain a thematic coherency and consistency which justifies their 
independent existence. This is much less clear w ith all of M orgenthau's 
subsequent works which are, with the partial exception of The Purpose of 
American Politics, collections of essays which have been cobbled together and 
presented as a cohesive whole. This no doubt reflected the fact that, as 
Morgenthau's public engagement increased during the 1950s and 1960s, he 
came to concentrate almost exclusively on forms of communication - articles, 
op-ed pieces, letters - which were most suitable for this audience. It is also the 
case that Morgenthau was not above recycling what was essentially the same 
piece of work in a number of different publications and settings. One might 
observe this practice cynically but I would suggest that it actually represented 
a genuine effort on Morgenthau's part to reach as wide an audience as 
possible. He was, after all, a tenured professor for all of this period and not 
subject to today’s bureaucratic imperative of publication by number. As we 
shall see, however, it is instructive that as tensions began to rise over the 
course of the Vietnam War in the 1960s, a number of his opponents within 
academe began to question his publication record and the level of his 
professional as opposed to public commitment.
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This public commitment never extended to elected office. Unlike 
Weber and many others he never even considered the possibility.^ 7 Given his 
strong sense of independence and general reluctance to suffer fools gladly this 
was undoubtedly a wise decision. His position with respect to non-elected 
forms of office was, however, rather more complicated.
At first glance there appears to have been a wide range of 
involvement with various organs of government and non-governmental 
organisations. In 1949, at George Kennan's behest, he was employed as a 
consultant to the State Department through the Policy Planning Board and in 
1951 he was sent to Vienna and commissioned to write a report on the 
changeover from military to civilian rule. He was a member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations from the mid-1950s until 1974, at which point he renewed 
his former relationship with the policy planning staff of the State Department. 
Hie Defense Department employed him as a consultant from 1963 to 1966 and 
he also received various commissions from the Disarmament Agency and the 
Space Agency. He lectured at the staff colleges of the armed forces and 
testified before Congressional Committees on a number of occasions. In the 
mid-1950s he set aside his usual non-partisanship to join the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs to advise the Democratic National Committee.
When examined more closely however, the list appears much less 
impressive. With most of these appointments Morgenthau's involvement was 
no more than peripheral and sometimes of short duration. And, as we shall 
see in chapter four, his opposition to the Vietnam War brought an abrupt end 
to at least one official role and placed his position on the Counsel on Foreign 
Relations under extreme pressure. Whatever the extent of M orgenthau's 
interest in official positions it is clear that he was reluctant to promote himself
^7 In a letter written toward the end of his life he stated quite p lainly that he w as "... 
temperamentally unsuited for this kind of activity." Letter to Dr. Christian Harke, A ugust 17, 
1977, M orgenthau Papers, Box 25. For an account of George Kennan's brief candidacy as a 
Democrat for the H ouse of Representatives see his Memoirs 1950-1963 (Hutchinson: London, 
1973).
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in the assertive manner necessary in American political life, nor was he 
prepared for the inevitable setbacks which follow from such a competitive, 
and often partisan, process. In his interview with Bernard Johnson he recalls 
that he approached the government in 1954 with a view to making use of his 
Spanish contacts and expertise only to find the rejection so humiliating "that I 
swore I would never again offer my services to the government."^^ A letter to 
Dean Acheson in 1963 bemoans the dearth of men in Washington "... who are 
capable of thinking in political terms" and M orgenthau records his 
"ambivalent longing at trying my hand at doing better'what is being done so 
b ad ly ." 49  I f  this represented an effort on Morgenthau's part to attract the 
attention of a Democrat grandee it was, I would suggest, altogether much too 
coy to be successful in the American (or indeed almost any other) context.
In broader term s the relationship betw een intellectuals and 
government was a subject which M orgenthau frequently explored in his 
writing and public addresses, especially so as his opposition to the Vietnam 
War in the 1960s heightened his public profile and attracted official attention. 
In an article published toward the end of 1966, Morgenthau provided what 
was probably the clearest summary of his view of the relationship between 
intellect and power. Following a initial discussion of the particularly troubled 
dealings of the Johnson Adm inistration w ith the intellectual community 
Morgenthau outlined what amounted to a kind of dialectical relationship 
between the intellectual and the politician:
"The intellectual lives in a world which is both separate from, and potentially 
intertwined with, that of the politician. The two worlds are separate because 
they are oriented toward different ultimate values: the intellectual seeks truth; 
the politician, power.^® ...In his search for the truth, the ideal type of
Johnson, 'Interview', pp.385-386.
Letter to Dean Acheson, March 30,1963, Morgenthau Papers, Box 2.
H e em phasised in passing that he did not w ish  to im ply the superiority of the intellectual 
over the politician.
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intellectual is oblivious to power; in his pursuit of power, the politician at best 
will use truth as a means to his ends. Yet the two worlds are also potentially 
intertwined; for truth has a message that is relevant to power, and the very 
existence of power has a bearing upon both the expression and recognition of 
truth. (NP) The two worlds are not only separate from, and potentially 
intertw ined w ith each other, they are also hostile to each other. Truth 
threatens power, and power threatens truth. Power, in order to be effective, 
m ust appear as something other than w hat it actually is. Deception - 
deception of others and of self - is inseparable from the exercise of power... 
(NP) Conversely, truth, by unmasking the pretensions of power, at the very 
least disturbs the powers that be; for it puts power on the intellectual and 
moral defensive... and truth may even challenge the status quo of power at 
the level of practical politics if it is supported by sufficiently powerful 
interests. Once these interests have won the struggle for power, yesterday's 
truth becomes today's ideology, justifying, rationalizing, and covering up for 
the new powers-that-be. Then a new cycle begins, and truth again challenges 
power."^^
To w hat he described as "this existential estrangem ent and potential 
interconnectedness between truth and power" Morgenthau suggested that the 
intellectual could "respond in four different ways: by retreat into the ivory 
tower, by prophetic confrontation, by expert advice, by s u r r e n d e r .
The first option - 'retreat' - amounts to a form of escapism which 
Morgenthau, like Weber, rejects. The intellectual can also enter the political 
space as an expert adviser. In this instance he accepts the status quo and is
'Truth and Power: The Intellectuals and the Johnson A dm inistration’, Nezv Republic, 
N ovem ber 26, 1966, pp .8-9. A s I've already indicated this M annheim ian approach to the 
problem of ideology and interest leaves a host of questions unanswered. What is the process 
w hich enables intellectuals to remain detached from the rise and fall of these great blocs of 
interests? WTiy should  the intellectual be concerned w ith  the prom ulgation of tem poral 
truths w hich m erely result in changes to the balance of interests? If deception is an integral 
part of any exercise of pow er w hat it to be gamed from its exposure?
ibid. p.9. The fourth option - 'surrender' - appears to be synonym ous w ith retreat.
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concerned with giving certain instrumental advice as to how particular means 
can be best utilised in the service of given ends. At this point the ultimate 
standard for the intellectual is still power but the danger is that from this 
point it is only a "small step" towards becoming "an ideologue, that is, a 
political agent, subject to the criteria of power... [The intellectual] invests 
popular passions with the dignity of reason and power witlr the appearance 
of truth. He substitutes what politicians do in terms not only of necessity, as 
did Machiavelli, but also of truth and virtue. Here we are in the presence of 
w hat Julian Benda forty years ago called '.’La Trahison des Clercs" (The 
Betrayal of the Intellectuals). Their betrayal does not just consist in the 
exchange of one calling for another, which can be respectable and even 
worthwhile. It consists in the exploitation of one calling on behalf of another, 
in the false pretense of politicians dedicated to the pursuit of power, who 
make it appear as though they were still intellectuals dedicated to the pursuit 
of truth."^^
The alternative to the intellectual-as-expert is the second option of 
'prophetic confrontation' where the intellectual keeps a formal distance from 
the political sphere while yet trying "to make the knowledge and insight 
peculiar to him count for the purposes and processes of politics. He is 
concerned with, but personally detached from, politics. He looks at the 
political sphere from without, judging it by, and admonishing it in the name 
of, the standards of truth accessible to him. He speaks, in the biblical phrase, 
tru th  to power."54 Though it is the case that "only rare individuals have 
achieved the Socratic distinction of unpopularity, social ostracism, and 
criminal penalties which are the reward of constant dedication to the relevant 
truth in matters political" it is, nonetheless, the image of intellectual as pariah 
that M orgenthau has in mind when he considers the appropriate role of
55 ibid. 
54 ibid.
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a c a d e m i c s . 5 5  In broader terms a political science "which is true to its moral 
commitment" should be a popular undertaking that must, above all, avoid 
being "treated with indifference as an innocuous pastime ..."56
It is important to keep in m ind how strongly this notion of an 
intellectual's proper role is shaped by Morgenthau's experiences in Germany 
in the 1930s. At a conference in 1966 where he faced many of his critics he 
recalled how influential these were:
" I saw in Germany, before 1933, a great number of academics who were in 
their majority extremely able, intelligent, and honorable men, concentrating 
upon their own irrelevant but intellectually respectable speciality and turning 
their backs upon the problems of today. I remember very vividly in 1935 
when I came back to Germany for a few days and met, at the University of 
Munich, with a number of outstanding members of the faculty, who were all 
opposed to the Nazis, and with a number of church leaders. I listened to their 
discussions, and I was quite amazed at the parochialism of these intelligent 
and morally committed people. Each opposed the Nazi regime, not on general 
grounds but on the ground of particular infringements of their particular 
domain. Thus, the protestant leaders said they were against the Nazis because 
they infringed upon the freedom of the churches. The academics opposed the 
Nazis because they infringed upon academic freedom. After the meeting was 
over, I mentioned to a world-famous scholar the experience I had that same 
morning (I am still moved thinking about it) when the body of a close friend 
of mine had been delivered to his mother from the concentration camp of 
Dachau. This great scholar, who was also a great man, was obviously 
annoyed by what I was saying and cut me short with the remark: "I'm not 
dealing with politics; I'm a scholar." This is, perhaps, one of the experiences 
which have led me to believe that it is the moral obligation of a political
55 Morgenthau, 'Nature and Limits', pp.22-23.
56 'Reflections on the State of Political Science', The Review of Politics, Vol. II, N o.4, October 
1955, p.446; 'The Purpose of Political Science', p.73.
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science worthy of the name to be involved with, and to make an intellectual 
contribution to, the political problems of the day, and that, by doing this, it is 
bound to expose itself to the risks and liabilities of political c o n t r o v e r s y . "57
As I suggested earlier this is by no m eans an uncontested 
understanding of what should constitute the proper role of the intellectual.58 
The 'Betrayal of the Intellectuals’ as understood by Benda, after all, did not 
occur because intellectuals had not exercised their critical faculties in 
opposition to the political status quo, but rather because intellectuals had 
m uddied their hands in the political sphere at all. It is also possible to point to 
intellectuals in America who drew very different messages from the German 
experiences of the 1930s. Edward Shils also invoked Weber and Mannheim as 
intellectual influences but rather than the collaboration w ith or lack of 
resistance to the Nazis on the part of intellectuals it was their failure to 
support the Weimar Republic that loomed uppermost in his mind. In the view 
of Shils those intellectuals fortunate enough to be members of relatively open 
societies, specifically the United States, had a duty to support such political 
structures with constructive criticism instead of taking an oppositional role.59 
This rather different reading of the same set of historical events accounts for 
Shils' rather more conservative view of his own role in American intellectual 
life and for his reluctance, for example, to involve himself with the anti- 
Vietnam W ar movement. I will return to examine the cases of other 
intellectuals, but for the moment we need to consider Morgenthau's notion of 
the intellectual as critic in the political sphere both within the general context 
of modernity and in the specific case of the United States in the 1950s and 
1960s.
57 'Conference D iscussion on Objectives', in Charlesworth (ed.), A Design for Political Science, 
p .135.
58 A lso refer to the appendix.
59 Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers, p.I. In Britain W illiam  W allace has adopted a similar 
position. See 'Truth and Power, monks and technocrats: theory and practice in international 
relations'. Review of International Studies, V ol.22 ,1996, pp.308-309.
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Morgenthau and M odernity
Nick Rengger has drawn attention to two different senses of how 
modernity is understood, respectively modernity as 'mood' and modernity as 
'socio-cultural form'. He draws upon Richard Bernstein to describe the former 
as a mood which is "amorphous, protean and shifting but which nevertheless 
asserts a powerful influence on the ways in which we think, act and 
experience." The latter is more straightforward in its emphasis upon the 
institutional, social, and economic nature of modernity, in other words the 
material foundations of what it means to be modern. The difference, as 
Rengger suggests, is that in the former instance modernity is fundamentally a 
philosophical question, in the latter case it is sociological.^^ The distinction is, 
of course, largely a heuristic one as in most instances the two elements will be
intertwined .6t
One can, nevertheless, point to the way in which authors place 
different weightings upon the two elements. In Max Weber's work, for 
example, modernity is presented more as a sociological than a philosophical 
problem. In Hans M orgenthau's writing there appears to have been 
something of a shift over time beginning in the mid 1940s and the publication 
of Scientific Man Vs Power Politics. Here "the political and military catastrophes 
of the thirties and early forties" are "but the outward manifestations of an 
intellectual, moral, and political disease which has its roots in the basic 
philosophic assumptions of the age."67 It is important to keep in mind that 
this understanding of modernity as mood is supplemented at all times by an 
awareness of the important changes in the material structure of life since the
68 Rengger, 'Political Theory, Modernity and Postm odem ity', p p .41-42.
6t This is not invariably the case though. In Eric Voeglin's The New Science of Politics 
modernity appears as a purely philosophical question (University of Chicago Press, 1952).
62 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, p.6.
176
eighteenth century, the "most profound... in recorded history" as Morgenthau 
is rightly aware. Even so, my general sense of the evolution of Morgenthau's 
thought is that the relative w eighting he assigns to the sociological 
understanding of modernity becomes increasingly pronounced over the 
course of the 1950s and 1960s. The most im portant factor in this was 
undoubtedly the unfolding nuclear arms race: an event M orgenthau 
understood, again correctly, as having no substantial historical or 
philosophical antecedents. However, it is likely that other factors were 
involved too. As Morgenthau's public profile and attendant responsibilities 
increased over this period he was brought more directly into contact with the 
ubiquitous institutions of modern life: government agencies, foundations, 
large corporations, the mass media and so on. All of this served to heighten 
his Weberian sense of the way in which these massive organisations came to 
define themselves in instrumentally rational ways at the expense of broader 
understandings and also of the profoundly material and sociological nature 
of these changes.
There is no doubt, though, that of all the material developments that 
combined to emphasise the difference of m odern life it was the advent of 
nuclear weapons that disturbed him most. 'Disturbed' is perhaps something 
of an understatement; he was, in fact, shaken to the core. For the remainder of 
his life following the announcement of the successful test of a Soviet atomic 
weapon, Morgenthau lived in the shadow of the belief that some kind of 
cataclysmic nuclear exchange was likely to take place eventually, possibly 
resulting in the extinction of humanity. Though he was a fervent supporter of 
nuclear arms reduction talks (though not of the prospects for conventional 
arm s reduction) and lived long enough to see at least the partial 
implementation of the of the SALT agreements, he probably never suspended
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his scepticism that nuclear weapons could be held by states indefinitely 
without some sort of disastrous e x c h a n g e . 6 5
So distressed was M orgenthau by the news of the initial Soviet 
detonation that his initial written response bordered on the hysterical. In an 
article written in 1950 he asserted that the successful Soviet test constituted a 
decisive change in the world balance-of-power, nothing less than "the 
shattering of the foundations upon which American foreign policy has been 
built. "64 Somewhat prematurely, as it turned out, he announced that "the 
period of the Cold War itself has come to an end ...From now on it will be 
either peace or war,"6S In addition to calling for an increased defence budget 
he rather astonishingly asks whether the United States can continue to do 
w ithout "a general mobilization plan" the absence of which leaves "Alaska 
open to invasion."66 In this clearly agitated state of mind his usually judicious 
analysis of the nature of the Soviet threat seemed to disappear entirely.
His distress can, perhaps, be better understood when one is aware of 
his wider understanding of the impact of nuclear weapons. His fundamental 
position was that the development of nuclear weapons had given rise to an 
historically unprecedented situation:
"The availability of nuclear weapons has caused the first real revolution in the 
structure of international relations. From the beginning of history to the end 
of World War II, that is to say, to the beginning of the nuclear age, there has 
always existed a rational relationship between violence as a means and the 
ends of foreign policy. ... This rational relationship has been radically altered 
by the introduction of nuclear weapons into the arsenal of foreign p o l i c y . " 6 7
65 For a d iscussion  of the fundam ental differences, as he perceived them, betw een nuclear 
and conventional arms control see 'Some Political A spects of Disarmament', in C.Schiefl (ed.). 
The Dynamics of the Arms Race (London, 1975).
64 'The Conquest of the United States by Germany', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. VI, 
N o .l, January 1950, p.22,
65 ibid. p.25.
66 ibid. p.26.
67 'The American Political Legacy', in W illiam H. N elson  (ed.). Theory and Practice in American 
Politics, 1963, pp.145-146.
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In essence M orgenthau’s suggestion was that the Clausewitzian nexus 
between means and ends had been shattered, for w hat possible rational 
political ends could be morally justified or even physically achieved through 
the means of nuclear weapons? He did not, however, conclude from this, as 
Kenneth Waltz and some others have, that the inherent irrationality of nuclear 
weapons meant that they were never likely to be used. He ultimately did not 
have enough faith in the enduring power of hum an reason to be able to 
accept that suggestion with any degree of equanimity. And beyond reason he 
was only too alive to the contingent dangers of miscalctilation, accidents, and 
the prospect of spiralling arms races. He was especially fearful of the 
destabilising consequences of nuclear proliferation:
"Should American foreign policy not now anticipate a situation which will 
most likely be upon us in a few years' time, w hen more than three 
governments will have the ability to make atomic weapons. Are we prepared 
to face the international anarchy of ten or so more or less responsible nations 
having the ability to make atomic weapons? In comparison with that anarchy 
the present situation will look like a kind of golden atomic a g e ."68  
He felt, for example, that France's acquisition of nuclear weapons increased 
the risk of both a localised and a general nuclear war.69 It was the 
developm ent of nuclear weapons, more than any other factor, which 
convinced Morgenthau that the nation-state was now obsolete as a form of 
political organisation and that new, supra-national principles were required if 
humanity was to stave off disaster.
68 U npublished letter to Gilbert Harrison, Editor, New Republic, July 2 1956, M orgenthau  
Papers, Box 43. See also 'From Great Pow ers to Superpowers', in Brian Porter (ed.). The 
Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919-1969 (Oxford U niversity Press, 1972) p .135. 
Joseph N y e  supports the suggestion  that the risk of nuclear w eapons use am ong new  
proliferators is considerably higher. See his Nuclear Ethics, pp.87-88, (The Free Press, N ew  
York, 1996).
69 'The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy', American Political Science Reviezv, Vol. LVIII, N o .l,  
1964, p.34.
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In terms of his writings on nuclear weapons Morgenthau spent some 
thirty years criticising the efforts of the 'managers' of nuclear strategy to 
restore a Clausewitzian rationale to the theory of nuclear war, whether in the 
form of 'counterforce', so-called 'tactical' nuclear weapons, or any of the other 
oddities emerging from the increasing fantastic world of American strategic 
planning. In one of his last, publications, written in 1979, Morgenthau re­
affirmed that for over thirty years the American strategic community had 
tried - and failed - in the attempt to make it appear that nuclear weapons 
could indeed be treated as merely another form of conventional w e a p o n r y .78
Specifically, Morgenthau rejected both 'tactical' nuclear war and the 
possibility of a graduated form of deterrence on the grounds that the general 
levels of risk and uncertainty connected with such forms of conflict meant 
that participants were unlikely to be able to maintain the necessary level of 
rational control. Decisions would not be made, Morgenthau emphasised, "... 
in the detached and rational manner in which chess players make their 
choices."^^ In practice, maintaining a distinction between tactical and strategic 
objectives would prove i m p o s s i b l e . 7 2  M orgenthau used similar arguments 
against so-called 'counterforce' strategy whose proponents suggested that the 
United States should, in the first instance, target Soviet military forces rather 
than cities so as to give, in Robert M 'cNamara's words, "... a possible 
opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own 
c i t i e s ."75 Morgenthau pointed out that the Second World War had shown that 
the kind of war being waged between industrial societies had made "the 
traditional distinction between military and non-military targets tenuous in
78 'Fighting the Last War', The Nezu Republic, October 20,1979, p .l6 .
71 'The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy', pp.25-26.
72 H e noted elsew here the absurdity of the fact that w eapons w ith  the destructive capacity 
of the H iroshim a and N agasaki bom bs had now  (1962) com e to be categorised as 'tactical'. 
See 'What Price Victory', The Nezu Republic, February 20, 1971, p.23. A lso  see his letter to 
Lawrence A. Finkelstein, Carnegie Endow m ent for International Peace, A ugust 6, 1957, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 99.
75 M'cNamara quoted in ibid. p.29.
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theory and untenable in practice."74 Any advantage gained in this respect 
from the use of more accurate missiles would be more than outweighed by 
the imm ensely greater destructive capacity of the hydrogen bomb. 
Morgenthau was absolutely right to challenge the bizarre notion that the 
hydrogen bomb could somehow also be a w eapon of subtlety and 
discrimination.
For most of the 1950s and 1960s Morgenthau consistently maintained 
his central point that nuclear weapons posed unique problem s when 
considered in historical context and that, consequently, efforts to treat them as 
normal components of warfare were deeply implausible. There are, however, 
two curious exceptions to this. In an article written in 1950 he claimed that, in 
fact, "the moral dilemma with which the H-bomb confronts the United States 
is different only in magnitude, but not in kind, from the dilemmas with which 
all the modern instruments of mass destruction, from the machine gun 
onwards, have confronted the conscience of the Western World."7S This seems 
to be at odds with all his remarks on the subject elsewhere. The second 
deviation from his central thesis occurred in the mid-1950s when, for a very 
brief period, he appeared to at least entertain the possibility that nuclear 
weapons could have some sort of tactical application. Given what he took to 
be a Soviet superiority in conventional forces he argued that "the United 
States must prepare for, and fight if necessary, a limited atomic war, with the 
atomic ingredient carefully adapted to the challenge to be met; strong enough, 
at the very least, to avoid defeat but not so strong as to avoid all-out atomic
retaliation."^^
74 ibid. p.28.
75 'The H-Bomb and After', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. VI, No.3, March 1950, p .76.
76 'Has Atom ic War Really Become Impossible', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XII, N o .l,  
January 1956, p.9. Jaap N obel also quotes this section in his article on M orgenthau but he  
fails to m ention  the qualifying remarks w hich fo llow  the critical passage. See N obel, 
'Morgenthau's Struggle w ith Power’, pp.71-72.
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It is important to point out that, even here, Morgenthau adds strong 
qualifying remarks. The political leaders of the United States, M orgenthau 
suggests, "... m ust bring to their tasks a blend of self-restraint and daring, 
which very few leaders in history have proven themselves to be capable of for 
any length of time" while simultaneously displaying "such an extraordinary 
degree of excellence as to border on the unfailing." The leadership of the 
Soviet Union, too, needs to possess similar qualities if a limited conflict is not 
to become a full-scale nuclear e x c h a n g e . 7 7  These qualifications are so strong as 
to actually appear to challenge altogether the claim that the United States 
must stand ready to fight a tactical nuclear war. In any case as at no other 
time in public or in private did M orgenthau repeat the suggestion that it 
might be possible to place nuclear war on a rational footing we should, 
perhaps, set aside the claim as an aberration. It seems likely that Morgenthau 
had been influenced by the general intellectual currents of the mid-1950s, 
including Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy published in 
the same year as Morgenthau's article (1956), in which Kissinger had argued 
that nuclear weapons could indeed be used as part of a coherent battlefield 
strategy.
The two decades from the late 1940s until the late 1960s marked the 
highwater point for the 'science' of strategy just as it did for the 'science' of 
politics in the United States. Having its methodological beginnings in the 
Operational Analysis employed in World War Two the science of strategy 
became ever more influential over the course of the Cold War as both the 
American global reach grew ever deeper and the nuclear arms race increased 
in v e l o c i t y . 7 8  A host of new research techniques and methodologies; game 
theory, systems analysis, various forms or organisational and behavioural 
theories - many of them drawn from economics and political science - came to
77 M orgenthau, 'Has Nuclear War Really Become Possible', p.9.
78 The mathematical number-crunching m ade possible by computer technology provided a 
further fillip to the process.
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be used in the policy-making process; in no small measure due to the 
influence of the Research and Nuclear Development (RAND) Corporation. 
The leaders of this methodological movement: Thomas Schelling, Albert 
Wohlsetter, Herman Kahn - the 'Wizards of Armageddon' in Fred Kaplan's 
memorable description - were marked by a level of mathematical acumen 
which had not previously been a part of the intellectual hinterland of social 
sc ien tists.79 Many of them looked with disdain upon the more usual 
methodological approaches to scholarship in the humanities adopted by 
Morgenthau and others. Albert Wohlsetter referred contemptuously to "the 
essay tradition."50 This kind of criticism even took in some of the first post­
war strategic thinkers including Bernard Brodie which led to a breakdown in 
the formerly close relationship between Brodie and Wohlsetter.51
Herman Kahn has been called 'the high priest of nuclear rationality' 
and there is little doubt that of those specifically devoted to the question of 
nuclear strategy (rather than say, nuclear physics) he had the highest public
79 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Arntageddoit{Simon and Schuster, N ew  York, 1983). One of 
their num ber was m em orably lam pooned in Stanley Kubrick's brilliant, satirical film  Dr 
Strangelove. Dr Strangelove him self is played by Peter Sellars as a wheelchair-bound nuclear 
scientist w ith  a fanatical antipathy towards the Soviet U nion and an unfortunate habit of 
giv ing  involuntary N azi salutes! (The character speaks w ith  a heavy German accent). The 
identity of the precise m odel for Dr Strangelove is unclear; Kaplan sees him  as a direct 
parody of Herman Kahn w hile Fred Inglis detects a "shrieking image" of W em er von  Braun 
w ith  a dash, perhaps, of Edward Teller. Others have seen Henry Kissinger as a possible  
source of inspiration for Kubrick. See Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon , p.231; Fred Inglis, The 
Cruel Peace: Everyday Life and the Cold War (Basic Books, London, 1991) p.314.
88 W ohlsetter quoted in Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p.81.
81 For m ore on the relationship betw een the tw o m en see Kaplan, ibid. By the late 1940s 
Brodie had come to question the w hole direction of strategic analysis in the United States and 
he expressed m any of the sam e concerns registered by M orgenthau, specifically about 
com bining m odern technology w ith  rational war aims and scepticism over the possibility of 
u sin g  nuclear w eapons in a lim ited  w ay. H e also, rather unusually  for a native-born  
American political scientist, expressed reservations about the American belief in science and 
scientific techniques in general. See his Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton University Press, 
N ew  Jersey, 1959. It is difficult to know  to w hat extent Brodie s criticisms are a reflection of 
his personal pique at being sidelined by the newcom ers in the strategic com m unity because of 
his lack of training in the n ew  m ethods. In the sam e book he w as, after all, still calling  
enthusiastically for economic m ethodology to be used in strategy. H e was, nonetheless, a m an 
w ith  an intellectual hinterland m uch broader than m ost of his colleagues in strategic circles 
and it is likely, at least in part, that he w as in a better position to understand the intellectual 
problems involved with the n ew  m ethodological approaches.
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profile.82 A m an of both enormous bulk and energy he was a powerful 
influence upon the strategists of his generation and it is no accident that much 
of Morgenthau's critique of the enterprise of nuclear strategy was directed at 
Kahn specifically, together with the so-called 'Father of the H-Bomb', Edward 
Teller. Morgenthau was highly critical of both Kahn and Teller in his May 
1962 University of Chicago public lectures Reflections on the Nuclear Age and 
he took another swipe at the pair in the same year whilst reviewing Teller's 
ghostwritten book The Legacy of H ir o sh im a .In his private correspondence 
and letters he was, if anything, even more scathing especially w ith reference 
to Kahn.54
Upon reading w hat is supposed to be Kahn's m agnum  opus. O n  
Thermonuclear War, it is hard not to agree w ith Morgenthau. The book is 
replete with the language of positivism and the appropriate buzzwords of the 
American science of politics. In the introduction Kahn announces that he will 
adopt the 'systems analysis point of view' and there are frequent references to 
what he calls 'objective studies' and the need to discuss the problems of war 
on a 'factual' rather than 'emotional' b a s i s . 5 5  What appears as 'objective' and 
'factual' in the fantastic world of Herman Kahn can seem rather different to 
those not a part of this parallel universe. When Kahn complains that "the 
average citizen has a dour attitude towards planners who say that if we do 
thus and so it will not be 40 million dead - it will be 20 million dead" one can 
only be grateful for the robust good sense of the 'average c i t i z e n ' . 5 6  Elsewhere 
he frets that "the European deterrent ... can only inflict about as m uch
52 For the above description of Kahn see Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p.222.
55 A  copy of the public lectures can be found in the Morgenthau Papers, Box 171. For his 
review  see 'Another Legacy of Hiroshima: The Partially Scientific Mind', Bidletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, Vol. XV in, N o.6, June 1962, pp.34-36. A lso see the cleverly titled 'Off to the wars in  
a think-tank', Nezo York Herald Tribune, June 20, 1965. A n even m ore fiercely critical attack 
upon Kahn came nearly a decade later in his Science: Servant or Master? (N ew  Am erican  
Library, N ew  York, 1972) pp.126-136.
54 See, for example, his letter to Louis Halle of Novem ber 24,1964, Morgenthau Papers, Box 26.
55 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton University Press, 1960) pp. VIII, 21,47.
56 ibid. p.20.
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damage on the Soviet Union as the Soviets suffered in World War II", that is 
in a matter of days this apparently inadequate European arsenal could match 
the destruction meted out over four years of the bloodiest conflict in human 
history: surely enough deterrence to satisfy all but nuclear strategists |57 He 
also ponders a scenario where the Soviets, by way of sabotage, seek as a casus 
belli to have a nuclear missile launched against their own territory!58 Had 
Kahn been handed the reigns of American government he would have 
devoted between forty and fifty percent of gross national product to the 
defence budget and, amongst other inanities, would have spent one hundred 
million (1960) dollars on the purchase and distribution of radiation meters(59 
And in truth Kahn actually had no better idea than anyone else how the 
United States might recover from a thermonuclear exchange but he appeared 
to believe that the very act of assigning utterly speculative figures to wildly 
implausible scenarios gave his work a 'factual' and 'objective' status which he 
held to be lacking elsewhere.98 This, I would suggest, is the 'romance of 
numbers' that Weber had identified in America in its most extreme and 
disturbing form.
As bizarre as some of Kahn's suggestions were, he was influential 
enough not to be dismissed as a harmless eccentric. As Joseph Nye has 
pointed out, "to the extent that planning and discussion of prevailing in war 
after repeated massive nuclear strikes encourages notions that nuclear war 
can be engaged in with tolerable hum an and moral consequences, it is 
malicious in its effects."9i The kind of state and society envisaged by Kahn 
where half of the gross national product is devoted to the military and 
massive civil defence schemes seem rather more than less likely to find itself
57 ibid. p.21,
55 ibid. p.31.
59 ibid. p p .27 ,86.
980n Thermonuclear War is, as M orgenthau described it, "a piece of political science fiction." 
See Science: Servant or Master?, p. 136.
91 N ye, Nuclear Ethics, p .105.
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involved, for one reason or another, in a major nuclear exchange. One is glad 
to learn, for example, that in 1961, a year before the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
John F. Kennedy's budget submission to Congress for seven hundred million 
dollars for civil defence projects was hacked down to eighty million.92 
Outside the nuclear realm an important consequence was that the methods 
employed for nuclear strategy spilled over into other areas of American 
government. As we shall see in chapter four, the faith in rational analysis and 
the managerial and behavioural methodologies so much in vogue came to be 
applied to the war in Vietnam with calamitous results.93
Though nuclear weapons presented unique difficulties they were also 
part of a broader problem with technology, which in turn was a reflection of 
what Weber called "the disenchantment of the world" and M orgenthau the 
"rationalization of life and world." In his w riting on technology and 
m odernity M orgenthau was consciously placing himself in the stream of 
m odernists who had wrestled with the problem in the latter half of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Marshall Berman has pointed 
out, an im portant difference between m any of the m odernists of the 
nineteenth century and their twentieth century counterparts is that the former 
have also seen the astonishing technological developments of the period as 
opportunity as well or even, in the case of Marx, instead of threat. They 
retained enough of a sense of the possibilities of hum an agency to at least 
hope that technology could be harnessed for the greater benefit of humanity. 
Beginning w ith Weber, however, technology comes increasingly to be 
portrayed as one of the fundamental reinforcements of that suffocating 'iron 
cage' of m odernity and its attendant specialisation, centralisation and
bureaucratisation.94
92 These figures com e from Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p.314,
95 On the links betw een  the nuclear calculus and the m ethods em ployed  in  V ietnam  see  
Kaplan, ibid., pp.327-337. Kaplan sees Robert M'cNamaras Vietnam strategy as essentially a 
version of counterforce adopted for conventional war (p.329).
94 Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, pp.27-29.
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In one sense this had always been a concern of Morgenthau's, as with 
the critique of 'Scientific Man' in his first b o o k .9 5  As has already been 
suggested though, it is also true that 'the crisis of modernity' assumes an 
increasingly prominent position from the 1950s on and by the time we reach 
1972 it has become the main theme of his book Science: Servant or Master? 
which, if anything, provides an even bleaker vision than that contained in 
Scientific Man Vs Power Politics a quarter of a century earlier. "Technology as 
applied science", Morgenthau writes, "threatens to destroy man and his social 
and natural environment through war and has already gone through social 
dislocation and pollution in destroying the social and natural environment 
tliat makes healthy and civilised life p o s s i b l e . " 9 6
In more specific terms Morgenthau felt that modern technology had 
contributed to a grave decline in the standards of public life. The very 
sophistication of twentieth century technology had served to discourage the 
public scrutiny of its management: a developm ent the new technocratic, 
managerial and scientific elite was only too happy to encourage. This had, in 
particular, taken the determination of military and foreign policies beyond 
proper democratic control:
"Thus small elites within the executive branch can commit us to informal 
alliances and undeclared wars; they can change military strategies and 
weapons systems - and whatever public debate exists is like the chorus of a 
Greek tragedy, praising or bewailing what has already been d o n e . " ^ 7  
This process was accentuated by the extreme emphasis placed on the 
importance of secrecy within the executive branch. He also lamented what he 
saw as public apathy. The ascendancy of scientific elites had been aided by
95 For other references to the problem s posed  by m odern technology see 'Tlie Evil of Pow er’, 
p,517 and 'The Decline of Democratic Government', New Republic, Vol. 17, N o .l9 , December, 
1957, pp.14-15.
96 M orgenthau, Science: Servant or Master?, p.3. The ecological elem ent adds a n ew  dim ension  
to Morgenthau's pre-existing concerns.
97 ibid. p .l02 .
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the "abdication" of "politically responsible authorities and the politically 
conscious p u b l i c . "98
This amounted to a rather pronounced change in emphasis on 
Morgenthau's part. In his earlier writing he had been much more concerned 
about the impact of the masses upon political life and the problem of 
preserving the necessarily secretive arrangements necessary in order for 
diplomacy to flourish. He was now, to the contrary, troubled by the lack of 
direct public scrutiny of the executive branch and the presence of too much 
secrecy in its dealings. In the end Morgenthau reached what amounted to an 
entirely Weberian position: little faith in the virtues of the general public but 
even less in its political masters. As we shall see in greater detail in chapter 
four, this change was at least in part the result of Morgenthau's personal clash 
with American government and his profound dismay at the calamitous war 
being pursued in Vietnam.
Beyond the general problem posed by modern technology it was also 
the case that modern institutions had compromised the ability of intellectuals 
to act as critics in the political sphere. James Burnham's books of the early 
1940s, The Managerial Revolution (1941) and The Machiavellians (1944) 
suggested that there was something like a 'natural' tendency for authority to 
become concentrated under the auspices of an 'elite' of managers and 
executive d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s . 9 9  This 'elite' presided over the organisations - 
government agencies, corporations, foundations, special interest groups, the 
mass media - which loomed ever larger in the political sphere of post-war 
America. Morgenthau's particular concern was with the way in which these 
institutions impacted upon the critical independence of intellectual life. It was 
a time of a massive expansion of higher education in the United States and to 
the extra money becoming available through this channel was added the
98 ibid. p.l08.
99 On this point see Richard H. Pells, The Liberal M ind in a Conservative Age (Harper and Row, 
N ew  York, 1985) p.77.
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largesse of corporations and, especially, the charitable foundations.
Morgenthau was right to view these developments with suspicion though, at
the same time, he was not above joining the general rush to the trough himself 
(100
We now know, as a result of Frances Stonor Saunders' excellent book, 
the extent to which many of the foundations were used as public fronts for the 
secret channelling of money from the Central Intelligence Agency and other 
government ag en c ie s .^ 8 1  A staggering amount of money was funnelled by the 
CIA through the foundations as part of its strategy of 'promoting the non­
communist left' though in practice the pot of gold was so large that 
beneficiaries were drawn from a much wider stratum of American intellectual 
life. 182 Much of the activity was co-ordinated through the offices of the 
American Committee for Cultural Freedom and journals like Commentary, The 
New Leader and Partisan Review, all of which, incidentally, carried articles by 
Morgenthau on a regular basis. The list of intellectual luminaries who were 
aware of the CIA's involvement includes, according to Stonor Saunders,
188 The 'Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy', established under Morgenthau's 
auspices at the University of Chicago in 1950, was supported with a Lilly Endowm ent grant 
of nearly 90,000 dollars over three years w hich w as not, how ever, renewed. 'Emergency 
grants' from the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations kept the centre running in 1953 until 
longer-term funding w as secured from Carnegie in 1954 (75,000 dollars over three years) and 
renew ed in 1957 w ith a further 142,500 dollars awarded over a five year period. Towards the 
end of his life Morgenthau received a Rockefeller grant of nearly 10,000 dollars for a proposed  
book on Abraham Lincoln. See the documents m boxes 50, 67, 68 and 69 of the Morgenthau 
Papers.
181 Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper: The CIA and the Cidtural Cold War (Granta 
books, London, 1999). The authors of many of the earlier works dealing w ith the impact of the 
foundations were entirely unaware, it seems, of the behind-the-scenes role of the CIA. See, for 
exam ple, Robert A. M cCaughey, International Studies and Academic Enterprise (Colum bia  
University Press, N ew  York, 1984). The foundations w ere once described as "a golden half­
w ay house betw een W ashington and academia" but they n ow  appear to have been rather 
closer to W ashington than the academy! The description is Stanley Hoffman's in his 'An 
American Social Science: International Relations', Daedalus, Vol.106, No.3, Summer 1977, p.50.
182 ibid. pp .134-135. Large amounts of m oney were also m ade available for suitable cultural 
activities in W estern Europe. In reading Stonor Saunders I w as struck, not for the first time, 
by the pointlessness of the historiographical debate over whether America's global activities 
were to be ascribed to geo-strategic, econom ic or other m ono-causal motivations or spheres 
of interest. The project was, undoubtedly, global in every respect.
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George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr, Daniel Bell, Isaiah Berlin and Walter 
Lacqueur.
Was Morgenthau also aware of the conspiracy? Though his name 
receives no mention in Stonor Saunders' book, Kenneth Thompson was in a 
senior position at the Rockefeller Foundation for much of the time and must, 
surely, have become aware at some point of the source of much of his 
f u n d i n g . 1 8 3  There is, perhaps not surprisingly, nothing in the correspondence 
from Thompson to indicate that he had told M orgenthau, nor is there 
anything else in Morgenthau's papers to suggest that he knew. It is clear, 
however, that by 1967 at least some elements of the CIA's intervention into 
intellectual life had become public knowledge. In an address given at the 
University of Chicago Morgenthau referred to the (unnamed) editor of an 
eminent magazine who actually was an agent of the CIA. "With which editor", 
Morgenthau asked rhetorically, "can one afford to consort without having 
incontrovertible proof that he is not an agent either of the CIA or some other 
secret a g e n c y ? " ^ 8 4  He further decried the damage done to "the ties of trust 
which bind the members of a healthy society t o g e t h e r . " ^ 8 5  n  jg, I think, 
unlikely that Morgenthau would have accepted foundation money had he 
known that its source was the Central Intelligence Agency. I doubt very 
much, in full knowledge of the kinds of duplicity of which we are all capable, 
w hether M orgenthau would have knowingly perm itted his sense of 
independence and intellectual integrity to be compromised in this way.
It is, perhaps, worth pointing out in passing that the consequences of 
the CIA's intervention into cultural and intellectual life were not wholly 
pernicious. The sheer amount of the lucre available and the fact that a
^83 Stonor Saunders describes the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations as "... conscious  
instrum ents of covert US foreign policy w ith directors and officers w ho w ere closely  
connected to, or even members of American intelligence." ibid. p .l39.
184 'The Intellectual in Government', Address given at the U niversity of Chicago, April 13, 
1967. This quotation com es from page 15 of the transcript contained in Box 172 of the 
Morgenthau Papers.
185 jbH p. 15.
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considerable proportion of it was not given with a specific end in m ind in 
each instance m eant that some good was achieved along the way. For 
example, one of the strangest stories to emerge from Stonor Saunders is that 
the CIA played a crucial role in both financing and organising the broader 
critical support for the artistic movement of Abstract Expressionism. This was 
undertaken for two reasons: firstly, to encourage an art form which could be 
seen to be genuinely indigenous to the United States and also capable of 
attracting critical acclaim in Europe and, secondly and perhaps most 
importantly, because Abstract Expressionism was as different as could 
possibly be imagined from the Social Realism of Soviet Art. At one point an 
utterly bizarre situation arose whereby Congressional philistines were 
attacking the foundations for their support of Abstract Expressionism (often 
using the by-now-familiar pejorative of 'Un-American') unaware that the 
movement's funding was being provided via another arm of government!i86 it 
is also clearly the case that journals like Partisan Review and Commentary 
were much more than the vessels of propaganda that their Soviet equivalents 
were. Editorial influence was exercised judiciously and it was still possible to 
print articles which were critical of American government.
Ultimately, however, this fails to provide sufficient compensation for 
the harm done in broader terms. It is easy enough to understand how so 
many intellectuals came to have critical faculties dulled by their close ties to 
the foundations and the official agencies of American Government. For a 
period of around thirty years or so intellectuals had been able to at least 
partially transcend their customary position of low esteem and prestige in 
American society. Intellectuals began to come to Washington in substantial 
numbers during the New Deal and this initial involvement was dramatically
186 See Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper, pp.249-277.
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intensified during the Second World War.187 This initial involvement was 
sustained during the 1950s in spite of the difficulties imposed by the Me 
Carthy witch hunts and the general anti-intellectualism of the Eisenhower 
Regime. And in the 1960s intellectuals were sum m oned to the court of 
Cam elot by a President who liked them  to be associated w ith his 
administration even if, in reality, he was no more intellectually inclined than 
most of his twentieth century predecessors. This amounted to a remarkable 
turnaround in fortunes, as Edward Shils has pointed out, "...from the 
condition of being peripheral in a society which they believed was culturally 
provincial, American intellectuals were even less able to resist the attractive 
power of the centrality in the United States." 8^8
Most did not go to W ashington to serve in any direct capacity but 
instead remained in academe and drew upon the largesse of the universities 
and the foundations. In International Relations the foundations were directly 
responsible for a large increase in the number of academic posts in addition to 
providing fellowships for PhD students.i89 Once again it would be wrong to 
condemn these developments without qualification. In many cases there was 
no direct qttid pro quo involved and no doubt many worthwhile areas of 
intellectual life received financial support which would not otherwise have 
been available.
One can, nevertheless, see that in the broadest terms there were some 
harmful consequences. The funding from government, foundations and, in 
some cases, corporations was not, after all, provided on the basis that all 
intellectual endeavour was equally w orth supporting. Even if in many
^87 Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers, pp. 165-167. A nd as early as 1936 Walter Lippmann  
w as w arning of "the corrupting effects of governm ent on intellectuals." See Ronald Steel, 
Walter Lippmann and the American Century (H ie Bedley H ead Ltd., London, 1980) p.320 
^88 shUs, The Intellectuals and the Power, p .171 W hat Shils failed to m ention, how ever, is that 
he w as h im self unable to resist the lure of the 'centrality'. H is nam e crops up on a regular 
basis in Stonor Saunders as a function of his intimate involvem ent w ith the (sic) Committee 
for Cultural Freedom.
189 M cCaughey, International Studies and Academic Enterprise, p.218.
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instances no pay-off was expected in general terms funding was provided on 
the basis that research would lead to some sort of instrumentally useful 
dividend. This, of course, supported a strong bias in favour of applied 
research at the expense of theoretical and philosophical contemplation: 
instrumentally rational rather than value rational activity. As has already 
been suggested, this provided a form of reinforcement to behavioralism in the 
United S t a t e s . A t  one end, almost paradoxically, the closer connections 
between foundations and government on the one hand and intellectuals on 
the other encouraged a form of academic life that was even less concerned 
with political engagement than with questions of importance only to other 
academics and of, frankly, trivial value in any wider s e n s e . T h i s  was the 
phenomenon of the so-called 'new scholasticism' condemned by Morgenthau 
and Barrington Moore among others.i^^ At the other extreme the involvement 
w ith  governm ent resulted in some academics engaging in ethically 
questionable activities, as for example in the various Army and CIA 
sponsored projects in so called 'counter-insurgency'.1^ 5 also gave rise to a
new breed of public intellectual - the Kahns, Kissingers, McNamaras, Bundys 
- who brought such an overwhelming faith in rationality and in their own 
abilities to manage American foreign affairs that it amotmted to an especially
^ 8^ M orgenthau w rote to K enneth T hom pson at the Rockefeller Foundation w ith  the 
su ggestion  that "... the Foundation ought to redirect the efforts of scholars aw ay from  
formalistic enterprises toward the substantive problem s of International Relations ..." In his  
rep ly  T hom pson  claim ed that 'behaviorally m in d ed  types' in the foundations w ere  
responsible for the current state of affairs. See M orgenthau's letter of January 7, 1954 and  
T h om p son ’s reply of M arch 1954 in  the Morgenthau Papers, Box 57. D uring a lecture 
M orgenthau once observed that "if the counting  of leaves w ere a social or political 
phenom enon... the Ford Foundation w ould  have given  us half a m illion dollars." (!) See the 
notes for his Political Science lecture, Sept.18,1970, Morgenthau Papers, Box 173.
A nyone w ho has ever had to plough through the vast tom es churned out in the 1950s on 
electoral behaviour or the minutiae of the American system  of governm ent w ill understand  
w hat I have in m ind here.
See Barrington M oore Jnr, 'The N ew  Scholasticism  and the Study of Politics', World  
Politics, Vol. VI, 1953, pp .122-138. M orgenthau developed  the theme in his 'Reflections on the 
State of Political Science', The Reviezo of Politics, V o l.l7 , N o.4, October 1955, pp.431-460; 
'Common Sense and Theories of International Politics', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XXI, 
1967, pp.207-214.
^ 5^ Me Caughey, International Studies and Academic Enterprise, p.229.
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dangerous form of hubris. In all cases the net result was an intelligentsia, 
particularly that portion of it situated in International Relations, that was less 
willing or less able to engage critically in the political sphere. As we shall see 
in chapter four, it is hardly surprising that so few of the dissenting voices 
being raised in the mid to late 1960s were drawn from International 
Relations.
Morgenthau as American Critic
The question of the appropriate role for intellectuals in their societies 
is one which has existed across national boundaries. To assume, however, that 
the fundamental problems are universal because intellectuals are the most 
cosmopolitan group in all modern societies is to assume rather too much.^i^ 
We have, for one thing, seen only too often over the course of the twentieth 
century - the First W orld War being a prime example - how quickly 
cosmopolitanism came to be replaced by the worst kind of national 
chauvinism. It is also the case that there have been important differences 
within individual societies. The nexus between intellectuals and government 
is of more or less importance everywhere but local institutional differences 
can bring about variations upon the theme. The specifics of the relationship 
are also coloured, naturally enough, by local social and cultural dynamics.
In the American context, as George Steiner has pointed out, "the very 
concept of an intelligentsia, of an elite infected with the leprosy of abstract 
thought, is radically alien to the essential American c i r c u m s t a n c e . T h e  
United States is defined, Steiner claims, by "an eschatology of monetary-
For this claim see Szacki, 'Intellectuals between Politics and Culture', p.270.
11  ^ George Steiner, 'The Archives of Eden', in No Passion Spent: Essays 1978-1996 (Faber and 
Faber, London, 1996, p.285). This essential disregard for intellectual life is also a feature of 
Great Britain and Australia, the other anglophone countries w ith  w hich I am familar, though  
w ith  perhaps n ot quite the sam e degree of in tensity  as in the U nited  States. This is 
undoubtedly (for better and for worse!) very different historically from the situation for 
intellectuals in, say, France and Germany.
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material success" where "the central and categorical imperative [is] to make 
money" and "Fortiina is fortune".!!^ Though, as has already been suggested, 
this general position was at least partially suspended for some of the period 
from the mid-1930s to the late 1960s it, nevertheless, placed a further difficulty 
in the path of the critically-minded public intellectual. Even during this 
period it was apparent that politicians so inclined could tap into a well of anti­
intellectual feeling when required, as Joseph McCarthy and his followers 
demonstrated in the 1950s. Lyndon Johnson too, when he had abandoned 
efforts to woo the dissidents, was quite prepared to play the populist card 
when tensions were escalating over Vietnam.
The 1950s were, in general, the period in which American intellectuals 
grappled with the problem of m odernity in the way that their German 
counterparts had some fifty or more years earlier. It would not be correct to 
intimate that Morgenthau was alone in raising troubling questions about the 
impact of modernity in general and in the United States specifically. Many of 
his fellow sceptics were, of course, fellow Europeans; Adorno, Strauss, 
Voeglin, Arendt et al. There was, however, also a relatively small group of 
native-born critics whose num ber included Richard Hofstadter, Dwight 
Macdonald and, perhaps most notably of all, C. Wright Mills.
It has been said of Mills that "of all the post-war writers, no one seemed 
more alienated, more at odds with the political orthodoxies of his time, and 
m ore sw eeping in his indictm ent of m odern  America..."^^^Of the 
aforementioned it is Mills whose take on modernity most closely resembled 
that of Max Weber. Rather than class per se, his emphasis was much more 
upon the impact of the m odern division of labour and its attendant
Steiner, 'The Archives of Eden', p .289.1 am alw ays struck by the eagerness w ith  w hich  
officials from the public sector in the United States turn to m oney m aking on a large scale 
upon leaving office or the bureaucracy; alm ost as though no career can be deem ed properly  
successful or fulfilled w ithout the additional mark of substantial wealth.
Richard H. Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age (Harper and Row, N ew  York, 1985, 
p.249).
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bureaucratisation. His particular concern was with the elite which ran 
American institutions and, as he perceived it, sought to m anipulate the 
nation's nominally democratic institutions. His conception of the role of the 
intellectual was very much like that of Morgenthau in its insistence that 
intellectuals had to remain formally separate from, but nevertheless relevant 
to, the public realm. As the "last craftsmen" of modernity (effectively 'free- 
floating'agents) intellectuals were in a unique position to transcend the 
political and cultural limitations prevailing elsewhere in American society. 
Like Morgenthau, Mills had no qualms about writing for journals at the 
popular end of the market and he shared Morgenthau's disdain for those 
intellectuals who had cast their lot with the government or the corporations or 
the foundations and pursued safe, nominally apolitical subjects of study. He 
was equally scathing of those who had accepted their alienation and retreated 
from the public sphere altogether. And, like Morgenthau and so many of the 
other dissenting voices of the 1950s and 1960s, Mills was a prickly, often 
difficult man who refused to affect the air of amiable clubb ability that seemed 
to be a feature of political science in the United States.^^^
His dissenting voice was, however, very much in the minority in the 
American academy of the 1950s for, characteristically, and in complete 
contrast to the German experience, a group of American intellectuals had 
moved to embrace the very developments that Morgenthau and others had 
viewed w ith such trepidation. Their ideas received their most famous 
explication in Daniel Bell's The End of Ideology. W h e r e  some critics saw an 
undifferentiated, lumpen mass. Bell pointed to a nation of 'joiners' who were 
highly active in all manner of voluntary associations. The apathy of voters as 
indicated by low turnouts in elections was not evidence of social crisis but 
rather, according to Seymour Lipset in his Political Man, an indication of social
I draw this summary of Mills from Pells, The Liberal M ind in a Conservative Age, pp,249-261.
Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (The Free Press, N ew  York, 1962).
196
stability and individuals who were generally content with their lotd^^ Where 
critics like Adorno pointed to the commodification of culture. Bell suggested 
that rising levels of education amongst the population actually translated into 
a wider appreciation of cultured^^ Where critics saw an American society 
stratified by the hierarchies of race, class an d /o r technocratic elites Bell 
defended what he saw as the essential pluralism of American society which, 
when supplemented with government intervention in the form of the welfare 
state and the general institutions of the mixed economy, provided for 
something at least approximating an equality of opportunity. "Behind the 
theory of social disorganization", Bell claimed, "lies a rom antic - and 
somewhat false - notion of the past, which sees society as having once been 
made up of small, "organic", close-knit communities (called Gemeinschaften 
in the terminology of the sociologists) that were shattered by industrialism 
and m odern life, and replaced by a large, impersonal, "atomistic" society 
(called Gesellschaft) that is unable to provide the basic gratifications, and call 
forth the loyalties, that the other communities knew. These distinctions are, 
however, completely riddled by value judgments."^^^ It was no accident. Bell 
suggested, "that the major theorists of mass society - Karl Mannheim, Emil 
Lederer, Hannah Arendt - have been European, and derived their concept 
from European e x p e r i e n c e . " 1 ^ 3  Bell accepted that social and cultural change 
in America following World War Two was probably greater than elsewhere 
"but the assumption that social disorder and anomie inevitably attend such 
change is not borne out in this case. This may be due to the singular fact that 
the United States is probably the first large society in history to have change
Pells, The Liberal Mind, pp.144-145. M ills referred scathingly to this elem ent of the thesis 
as an "intellectual celebration of apathy". Mills quoted by Stephen W. Rousseas and James 
Fagin, 'American Politics and the End of Ideology', in Irving Louis H orow itz (ed.). The New  
Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in Honor of C. W right M z7/s(Oxford  
University Press, London, 1966) p.273.
121 ibid. pp.32-33.
122 ibid. p.27.
123 ibid. p.99.
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and innovation "built into" its culture."124 He further stressed the advantages 
conferred by America's rich endowment of natural resources, the absence of a 
feudal tradition, and the general 'pragmatic ethos'.
At the end of his book Bell attempted to make clear what he meant by 
The End of I d e o l o g y .  125 It did not, he stressed, mean that ideas had ceased to 
be important. By 'ideology' he had a specifically nineteenth century notion in 
mind of the mostly leftist intellectuals of Marxian hue with their plans for the 
transformation of humanity. Given the calamitous historical events of the 
first half of the twentieth century, "few serious minds believe any longer that 
one can set down "blueprints" and through "social engineering" bring about a 
new utopia of social harmony." The other political philosophies of the 
nineteenth century had also lost their 'intellectual force'. In the West 
conservatives and liberals alike now accepted, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the existence of a welfare state, the mixed economy and political pluralism. To 
be sure, outside the West states in Africa and Asia were fashioning "new 
ideologies of industrialization, modernization. Pan-Arab ism, color, and 
nationalism " which were driven by the im peratives of "economic 
development and national power" rather than the older humanistic and 
universalistic creed of nineteenth century intellectuals. In the West though - 
by implication the only area of real significance - "the old passions are 
s p e n t ."^26  Tbie end of ideology does not and should not mean the end of the 
quest for utopia as men will still need "... some vision of their potential, some 
manner of fusing passion w ith intelligence. Yet the ladder to the City of 
Heaven can no longer be a "faith ladder" but an empirical one: a utopia has to 
speciiywhere one wants to go, how to get there, the costs of the enterprise.
124 ibid. pp.37,98.
125 ibid. pp.393-405.
126 Francis Fukuyama, of course, makes precisely the same argument in his The End of History 
and the Last Man .
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and the realization of, and justification for the determination of who is to
pay."i27
The whole 'End of Ideology' enterprise was grossly shortsighted. One 
is struck, above all, by the absence of any real historical sense in the writing; 
the lack of any feel for historical contingency. It seemed to assume, for one 
thing, that the business cycle had come to an end and that the full 
employment and general prosperity of the Eisenhower years would become a 
permanent feature of the landscape, requiring only the occasional tweak of 
Keynesian demand management to keep the mixed economy in good order. 
And though Bell protested that he did not mean to imply that humanity had 
reached some form of final stage of socio-economic development in the form 
of the United States of the 1950s, it is hard to conclude otherwise from a 
reading of The End of Ideology. At no point does Bell even begin to speculate 
about the kinds of historical developments which could, and indeed did, re- 
ignite ideological conflict in the 1960s. He reveals no awareness of the kinds of 
nascent contradictions, most notably that of race, which would re-surface just 
a few years after the book's publication. The irony was that the 'End of 
Ideology' was nothing of the sort in that it actually amounted in many 
respects to a familiar reassertion of American exceptionalism which must 
itself be a form of ideology.
Though long part of the tapestry of American nationalism, the notion 
of an exceptional America had been somewhat m uted in the preceding 
decades under the impact of the disappointments of the 1920s and the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. 2^8%^  the 1950s, however, a new generation of
127 Bell, The End of Ideology, p.405.
128 A  detailed exploration of the historical origins of American exceptionalism is beyond our 
scope here, but it is obviously of long standing and can be found in a w ide variety of sources. 
The Puritan m etaphor of a 'City on a Hill' is one exam ple. The historiography of the 
nineteenth century is another. George Bancroft, the m ost influential American historian of 
the first half of the nineteenth century and beyond, wrote an epic, romantic account of the 
Am erican Revolution as a struggle for hum an liberty. One only has to exam ine the often  
strikingly similar inaugural addresses of American Presidents across more than tw o hundred  
years to see the popular resonance of the theme of American exceptionalism.
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historians had, for example, de-emphasised the social struggle which 
historians like Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles Beard had identified in 
American history, finding instead a pervasive harmony of i n t e r e s t s .1 2 9  
international affairs the notion of American exceptionalism had come to be 
linked by some with America's newly acquired global reach. No longer 
content with mere isolation from the corruption of the Old World it was now 
the American historical mission to re-cast the world in its own image.
A somewhat less strong representation of this theme was contained in 
the notion of a reluctant, essentially pacifistic American compelled by duty to 
defend the world against the unlimited designs of an evil Soviet Empire in a 
Manichean struggle of light against darkness; good against evil. As the Cold 
War intensified this was precisely the kind of argument being advanced by 
many American academics. As Frank Tannenbaum put it in his article The 
American Tradition in Foreign Relations :
" Time, place and fortune have wrought their own special imprint upon the 
American conscience and endowed our folk with an ethical bias peculiarly 
their own. The indefinable something we call the American outlook adds up 
to a philosophy of life and a political morality."i50
What follows is a grossly distorted rationalisation of the history of American 
involvement in international politics based upon the thesis that the juridical 
equality of the United States themselves had been transferred to the 
international realm and become a guiding principle of American foreign 
p o l ic y .  151 Hence the Monroe Doctrine, far from reflecting a claim to 
continental hegemony, actually represented an American defence of the
129 Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age, pp. 148-149. As Pells points o u t , it d id  require 
som e ingenuity  to fit the C ivil War into this sort of historical outline! On occasion the 
historical amnesia assum ed astonishing proportions. Daniel Bell asserted that "it has been one 
of the glories of the United States that politics has always been a pragmatic give-and-take 
rather than a series of wars-to-the-death, " (!) Bell, The End of Ideology, p .l21.
130 Prank Tannenbaum, 'The American Tradition in Foreign Relations', Foreign Affairs, Vol.30, 
N o .l, October 1951, p.31.
151 The Civil War, naturally, receives only the briefest m ention in this one-sided narrative.
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continent against the rapacious colonies in Europe. The 'Open Door’ policy 
towards China reflected a genuine, disinterested attempt to defend Chinese 
territorial integrity rather than the best available strategy for the maintenance 
of American strategic and commercial interests. The 'Good Neighbour' policy 
"is the logical sequence to a tradition as old as our government."i52 Theodore 
Roosevelt's 'big stick' formula, McKinley's annexation of the Philippines, the 
war with Mexico and the absorption of Texas are set to one side.
Suitably equipped with this one-sided reading of American history 
Tannenbaum could be unequivocal over the apportionment of blame for 
rising global tension:
"The enormous energy of the United States has been disciplined by the ethical 
conception of political equality, and harnessed to the ideal of collective 
security resting upon a federation of co-ordinate states. Uiese are the grounds 
of our difference with Russia. We are not quarrelling over economic interests, 
political doctrines or her internal policies, even if we do not like them. We 
cannot accept Russia's denial of the coordinate character of other states. We 
do not believe in the Big Five, the Big Three or the Big Two. The day the 
Soviet Union learns, if it can, to accept its neighbours as of equal rank with 
itself, the World will be united again and the Iron Curtain will melt into thin 
air. Our quarrel is not about Russia, but about her contempt for the 
independent sovereignty of other nations."i53
Tannenbaum is of particular interest for our purposes because his 
article was written very clearly as a reply to Morgenthau and other realists. "If
^52 Tannenbaum, The American Tradition, p.33. A s the peoples of Latin and South America 
discovered during the Cold War, the good  neighbourliness of the United States lasted only as 
long as they submitted to North American strategic and economic interests.
453 ibid. p.50. In passing , it is worth noting that in other respects Tannenbaum resonated  
w ith  the broader them es of Am erican political science w hich w ere explored in earlier 
chapters. H e argued, for exam ple, that the United States "had never elaborated its im plicit 
values into a conscious doctrine" and that this w as "evidence of strength and vitality" as "a 
formal ideology is an unconscious apology, a claim for validity that needs to be defended." 
(p.32) H e had earlier m ade a D ew eyesque defense of American intellectual pragmatism. See 
Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, p .113.
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in the present crisis", Tannenbaum wrote in his article, "[Americans] are 
troubled and confused by the contradictory policies urged upon them, it is 
because some of their counselors speak a language alien to American 
experience and indifferent to the inspiration of American polity."434 He also 
warned that "the doctrines of "power politics" now being preached by such 
persuasive scholars as Professor Hans J. Morgenthau... have always led to 
w ar and often to national suicide."435 in a letter to George Kennan, 
M orgenthau claimed that Tannenbaum 's article had been specifically 
commissioned by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of Foreign Affairs, in 
order to challenge him publicly.456
M orgenthau's response was as robust as usual. It had been 
fundamental to his general criticism of political liberalism to reject a link 
between domestic political forms and international politics but he now took 
the opportunity to look specifically - and critically - at the history of American 
foreign relations and at the formation of the United States itself. With 
Tannenbaum as a specific target he pointed out that " the historian who 
wishes to replace the balance of power as the guiding principle of American 
foreign policy w ith  the "hum anitarian and pacific traditions" of the 
"coordinate state" m ust first of all explain how it has come about that the 
thirteen original states expanded into the full breadth and a good deal of the 
length of a continent, until today the strategic frontiers of the United States 
run parallel to the length of Asia and along the River Elbe. If such are the
434 Tannenbaum, The American Traditimt in Foreign Relations, p.31.
435 ibid. p.47.
436 Letter to George K ennan, March 7, 1952, Morgenthau Papers, Box 33. A s evidence  
M orgenthau encloses copies of letters exchanged w ith Armstrong the previous year w hich  
are either not in the M orgenthau Papers or w ere overlooked by m e. M orgenthau also  
intim ated that during unsuccessful negotiations betw een the Radio Office of the University  
of Chicago and Tannenbaum it becam e clear that Armstrong had initated the article. H e also  
in sisted  that because of Arm strong's personal prejudice a bias existed  in Foreign Affairs 
"...against a realistic approach to American foreign policy."
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results of policies based upon "humanitarian and pacific traditions", never in 
the history of the world has such virtue been more bountifully rewarded !"437 
In more specific terms was it not easier, Morgenthau asked rhetorically, "to 
explain the successive shifts of American support from Great Britain to 
France and back again from the beginning of King George's War in 1744 to the 
War of 1812 in terms of the "coordinate state" than in terms of the balance of 
power ?" Similar questions could be asked of the Monroe Doctrine and at 
many other points in American history. In fact, "one could go on and pick out 
at random  any foreign policy pursued by the United States from the 
beginning to 1919 and one would hardly find a policy, with the exception 
perhaps of the War of 1812, which could not be made intelligible by reference 
to the national interest defined in terms of power - political, military, and 
economic - rather than by reference to the principle of the "coordinate state". 
Moreover, the foundations of the American nation were not fundamentally 
different from those elsewhere:
"Why should we not admit that American foreign policy has been generally 
hardheaded and practical and at times ruthless? Why should we deny 
Jefferson's cunning, say, in the Puget Sound affair, the cruelty with which the 
Indians were treated, and the faithlessness with which the treaties with the 
indians were cast aside? We know that this is the way all nations are when 
their interests are at stake - so cruel, so faithless, so c u n n i n g . " 4 5 8
This element of Morgenthau's critique at least was of manifestly good 
sense. Nations have almost invariably been formed at the expense of other 
groups and it was one of the great conceits of 'liberal' nations like the United 
States and Australia that they were for a very long time able to pretend that 
their own historical experiences had somehow been otherwise. Morgenthau
437 Morgenthau, 'Another "Great Debate": U ie  National Interest of the United States', p.964.
438 ibid. p p .970-971. Som e years later he observed that m ost Am erican history had been  
written from ihe perspective of w hite immigrants to the exclusion of blacks and Indians. See 
'Historical Justice and the Cold War', New York Review of Books, June 1969, p.2.
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describes it as "the fantasy of American innocence."459 He further lambasted 
Tannenbaum for adopting a method based upon accepting the official 
remarks of American statesmen at face value which would, inevitably, 
present hum anitarian justifications for American action. A world history 
written with the use of this method would lead to the conclusion "that from 
Timur to Hitler and Stalin the foreign policies of all nations were inspired by 
the ideals of hum anitarianism and p a c i f i s m . " 4 4 0  The central message of 
Morgenthau's political realism, then, was that the United States was not, and 
could not, be free of the moral ambiguities of international politics. To believe 
that it was could only be dangerous in a world where war could mean the 
unleashing of an almost unlimited capacity for destruction.
How successful, then, was this challenge to American exceptionalism? 
M orgenthau once wrote that in his view "the impact of realism on the 
Acheson era in the State Departm ent has been very considerable" but 
elsewhere he despaired at his lack of influence.44i He is reported to have said 
of his campaigning against the Vietnam War that "I might as well have 
collected butterflies."442 That Morgenthau, Kennan and Niebuhr et al had at 
least some impact upon intellectual life is clear enough, perhaps most of all in 
the area of diplomatic history which received confirmation when the doyen of 
American diplomatic historians, Samuel Flagg Bemis, wrote a laudatory 
review of Morgenthau's In Defense of the National InterestM'^ The influence of
459 M orgenthau, 'Another Great Debate', p.969.
440 ibid. p.966.
444 H is remark on the im pact of realism com es from a letter to Fred Friedel, April 9, 1963, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 20.
442 M ichael N icholson heard M orgenthau make this remark at a conference in Italy in 1974 
and cites it in his 'What's the use of International Relations', Review of International Studies, 
vol.26, no.2, April 2000, p .189.
443 "He has grasped as few  native- born students have the historical argument for American  
foreign policy and the reasons for it success during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." 
Sam uel Flag Bemis, 'Within Our O wn Power', New York Times, June 10, 1951. For a further 
discussion of the impact of realism upon the historiography of American diplomatic history  
see Jerald A. Combs, 'Norman Graebner and the Realist v iew  of Am erican D iplom atic 
History', Diplomatic H istory , Vol. 11, No.3, Summer 1987, pp.251-264,1 examine the issue w ith  
particular reference to the period of the War of Independence in m y Power Politics or the
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realism upon policy-makers is, however, much less clear. One can see the 
realist message that international politics is fundamentally conflictual filtering 
through to Washington but not the equally important component of prudence 
and an understanding of the limits to power. Stanley Hoffmann has captured 
this very nicely:
"Something strange happened to M orgenthau's realism on the way to 
Washington: there the celebration of power blended with, instead of 
replacing, the old American idealism and crusading spirit. Those in 
Washington who read Morgenthau used his concept of the national interest to 
justify a definition of America's interests that was practically limitless and 
made compromise difficult."444
Fundamentally the Realist Jeremiad, w ith its emphasis upon the 
tragedy of political life and its scepticism about the prospects for hum an 
progress, was too alien to take root in the American context as we shall also 
see in chapter four when we examine M orgenthau's opposition to the 
Vietnam War. We will also explore one of the most surprising and least well- 
known elements of the Morgenthau story: how Morgenthau, realist and arch­
sceptic, came, at least in part, to respond to a sense of American 
exceptionalism himself!
Idealism of a New Diplomacy ? (unpublished Master of Arts dissertation, University of Keele, 
1993.)
444 Hoffmann, 'Realism and its Discontents', p .134. John Foster D ulles provides an exam ple, 
in an especially obnoxious form, of this phenom enon in action.
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Chapter Four: Vietnam and the Purpose of American Politics
"The purposes of our politics from the very beginning have been unique 
and revolutionary" (Hans Morgenthau).
"Put not your trust in Princes" (Walter Lippmann quoting Psalm 46, Verse 2)
To say that "the purposes of our politics from the very beginning have 
been unique and revolutionary" seems an astonishing statement for a political 
realist to make but Morgenthau used precisely this phrase on too many 
occasions over the course of the 1950s and 1960s for us to be able to dismiss it 
as an aberration.4 It was, indeed, an extraordinary period in Morgenthau's 
intellectual life in which he came to believe that there was, after all, something 
exceptional in the American polity, past and present, which held it apart from 
other nations.
The Purpose of American Politics
There are signs through much of the 1950s that Morgenthau, in the 
light of a more thoroughgoing contemplation of American history and 
politics, was coming around to the notion of an exceptional America. In part, 
as has already been suggested, this reflected the success of Morgenthau's 
move from Old World to New as displayed in his In Defense of the National 
Interest where, for the first time, he uses the collective pronoun 'we' with 
reference to American affairs. In the works from the early 1950s his support 
for American exceptionalism rests uneasily in a context in which he is
4 See his Dilemmas of Politics, p.216; 'The D ecline of Am erican Government', New Republic, 
December 16th, 1957, p.lO; 'Goldwater - The Romantic Regression', p.66.
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generally critical of the notion. For example, in the scathing critique of Frank 
Tannenbaum's exceptionalism which we considered in the preceding chapter 
he nonetheless accepted that the pluralism of the domestic government of the 
United States, which enabled interests to be reconciled through mostly non­
violent means, made for a qualitatively different kind of approach to foreign 
affairs:
"The morality of pluralism allows the United States, once it is secure in that 
minimum of vital interests to which we have referred above, to transfer those 
principles of political morality to the international scene and to deal with 
divergent interests there with the same methods of genuine compromise and 
conciliation which are a permanent element of its domestic political life."2
This amounts at the very least to a pronounced change in tone from 
his early post-war works where the emphasis was very much upon warning 
the United States against the illusion that its behaviour was, or indeed could 
be, very different from other nations in the necessarily conflictual arena of 
international politics. At times the tension betw een the opposing 
understandings of American exceptionalism was evident from page to page. 
In another article from the early 1950s he accepted the exceptionalist 
argument that the growth of the United States had been marked by "...a 
continental expansion which created the freest and richest nation on earth 
without conquest or subjugation of others" before going on to emphasise, on 
the very next page, that it was only the "numerical inferiority of the Indian 
opponent" which obscured the element of power which was "...no more 
absent from the continental expansion of the United States than the 
expansionist movements of other nations."5
One can find this tension in much of Morgenthau's writing of the 1950s but it 
is with the publication of The Purpose of American Politics in 1960 that the
2 'Another Great Debate', p.985.
5 'The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest Vs Moral Abstractions’, 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. XLIV, N o.4, December 1950, pp.836-837.
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exceptionalist tenor reaches its most fervent pitch. This book is quite unlike 
any other in M orgenthau's opus and it should be required reading in 
International Relations for all those with a one dimensional appreciation of 
Morgenthau as a thinker.
In the first hundred pages or so Morgenthau is more sympathetic to 
American exceptionalism than anywhere else in his writing and his prose 
assumes, at times, w hat m ight even be described as a romantic hue. 
"America", Morgenthau announces, "has become the Rome and Athens of the 
Western World, the foundation of its lawful order and the fountainhead of its 
culture."^ Given that "in order to be worthy of... lasting sympathy a nation 
m ust pursue its interests for the sake of a transcendent purpose that gives 
meaning to the day-to-day operations of its foreign policy" it was the 
American purpose to defend Western civilisation against the threat of "a 
universal creed that knows no national boundaries and possesses the means 
of universal destruction."^ In meeting the Soviet threat the United States 
would also be fulfilling another of the components of its national purpose: the 
expansion of the area of equality in freedom. Hence "the American purpose 
carries within a meaning that transcends the national boundaries of America 
and addresses itself to all the nations of the world."6 Frank Tannenbaum 
could not have made the point any more clearly.
Along with the newly discovered appreciation of the American 
purpose came a suddenly dewey-eyed reading of American history 
beginning with the American Revolution itself which, indeed, has been the 
only true revolution "...because it is the only one in which men as creatures of 
history rationally chose to become its creators, to start history afresh by 
ridding themselves of its burdens and heeding its lessons, to give their nation
4 Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics, p.5.
5 ibid. pp. 5,8.
6 ibid. p.34.
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a novel purpose..."7 The sense of mission which the pilgrims had brought with 
them from England was able to flourish in an American context defined by 
"the equalitarian conditions of society and the absence of serious competition 
from abroad." This gave rise to a "vertical and horizontal mobility" which had, 
uniquely, enabled the pursuit of equality in freedom to become a part of the 
American purpose.®
It hardly needs to be added how different this is from Morgenthau's 
earlier readings of the course of American history. Gone are the images of the 
Founding Fathers as cautious practitioners of realpolitik only too fearful of 
what 'equality in freedom’ may mean for the survival of republican virtues. 
Also missing are the victims of 'horizontal mobility': the formerly numerous 
tribes of Native Americans. 'Vertical mobility' also excluded, of course, all 
those whose skin colour happened to be black and, indeed, the residual 
contradiction of slavery also appears to be absent from this new account. He 
downplays the Civil War with the rather astonishing rationalisation that "both 
the North and the South saw the purpose of America in the preservation and 
expansion of their respective kinds of freedom."(!!)^ The M orgenthau of 
another period may well have responded to this kind of claim with the 
observation that tyrannies of many hues have claimed to be defending the 
realm of freedom.
After this extraordinary beginning the tone of the argum ent does 
change somewhat as Morgenthau begins to explore some of the historical 
obstacles which have been placed in the path of the American purpose. At 
home vertical mobility required horizontal mobility to sustain it and the 
former was threatened by the closure of the territorial 'frontier' in the late 
nineteenth  century, in com bination w ith  the em ergence of highly
7 ibid, p.30. In contrast the English Revolution of the seventeenth century and the French 
Revolution w ere no more than "attempts at restoring an ancient order of tilings, an ancient 
"constitution" which the powers-that-be were despoiling."
® M orgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics . pp .13-22.
9 ibid. p.38.
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concentrated blocs of economic power - a phenomenon accentuated by the 
economic crisis of the Great Depression. The solution emerged in the form of 
what others have called the 'counterveiling' power of the expanded Federal 
Government under Franklin Roosevelt. This was, to be sure, nothing like a 
perfect resolution of the problem. For one thing it challenged the "main tenet 
of the American political tradition", namely, that public power is the primary 
threat to individual freedom and equality. This demonstrated "for the first 
time in the American experience ... that it was impossible to escape the evil of 
power altogether. America, like all other nations and, for that matter, like all 
men, had to choose between two evils and inescapably it chose the evil of 
public power to restrain, control, compete with and destroy the evil of private 
power."40
If this sounds more like the Morgenthau of old it is still the case that 
his conclusions are rem arkably sanguine. Though, at the very apex of 
American society, the remaining concentrations of economic power have 
given America "permanent political and economic masters", all Americans 
have yet "an approximately equal chance to rise to that mastery."44 In general 
terms "wealth is the democratic principle of social distinction par excellence" 
because "anybody can acquire it."42 In sum, "America emerged victorious 
from its first great crisis.''^®
Events external to the United States had also challenged the American 
purpose in an even more fundamental way and it is in exploring these that 
the tensions between M orgenthau's earlier positions and current empathy 
with exceptionalism become most explicit and problematic. He rejects the 
possibility that the American purpose had been betrayed from within in the 
rush for empire marked by the annexation of Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto
10 ibid. pp.80-81.
11 ibid. p.86.
12 ibid. p.45.
15 ibid. p.82.
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Rico and the establishment of the Cuban protectorate. For the first time he 
now felt able to agree that this had been nothing more than an 'aberration', an 
"historic incident that had no organic connection with the purpose and 
interests of A m e r i c a . " 1 4  A few pages later he conceded that "the idea of the 
American mission ... is certainly a political ideology, a rationalization and 
justification of policies that were undertaken for other and primarily selfish 
reasons." Nevertheless "...the idea expresses also a serious commitment to a 
purpose that is merely the American purpose projected beyond the territorial 
limits of America and circumscribed only by the reach of American 
influence."i5
There had, of course, been problems when American purpose clashed 
with recalcitrant political realities. By avoiding the contamination of the 
American purpose with power politics Woodrow Wilson had instead found 
himself labouring with "...the impotence of a universal formula of salvation, 
armed with nothing but its own inner rationality..."46 Morgenthau's criticism 
of Wilson was nothing new in terms of past works but Wilson's failure now 
assumes a heroic status that was merely foolishness and shortsightedness 
previously. "There is", Morgenthau suggests, "no gainsaying the grandeur and 
nobility of the Wilsonian conception of the American purpose..."47 Later in the 
book he describes Wilson as one of the "great revitalizers" of the past. 48 There 
are other, subtle, differences with his earlier historical accounts. While he 
continued to believe that American intervention in Europe was primarily to 
respond to the threat to the European balance of power, he now saw an 
element of the American purpose as well. In the "extirpation of evil" as he
44 ibid. p.96.
45 ibid. pp.100-101.
46 ibid. p. 108.
47 ibid. p.109.
48 ibid. p.295.
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described the German defeat,, "the American purpose had proved its
vitality."49
In the secorid half of the book, Morgenthau turns to the problems faced 
by the American purpose at home and abroad and in some senses this finds 
us back in much more familiar territory in terms of the major themes of his 
work. He is critical of the faqt that power and purpose have become separated 
in the 1950s with the calls of Dulles and others for the liberation or 'roll-back' 
of Communist areas being made to look ridiculous when it became apparent, 
as with Hungary in 1956, that no such action was possible. Even so, and 
without offering any tangible suggestions, he appears to feel that more could 
have been done. "The United States", he claims, "failed utterly to relate the 
American purpose of extending the area of freedom to the political situations 
with regard to which it was called upon to act."20 In so far as I am aware - and 
as vaguely as he puts it - this was the only occasion where Morgenthau 
actually called for a greater American effort to extend 'the area of freedom' 
instead of urging the United States to display more prudence in its dealings 
with the Soviet Union.
Elsewhere, M orgenthau points to the problems which modernity 
presents for the realisation of the America purpose. As ever, he is troubled by 
m odern technology, especially nuclear weapons, and he re-iterates that 
America's global influence "must serve the interests not only of the nation but 
also of mankind; for it must build the foundations for a supranational order 
that will take the control of nuclear weapons out of the hands of the nation 
state. "21
19 ibid. p .l26.
20 ibid. p .193. This was important because "the living presence of [America's] achievem ents 
carried tiie prom ise of further achievem ents to the world, and the hope of the w orld carried 
that m essage back to America." This is, again, an extremely un-M orgenthau like statement.
21 ibid, p.310. In the m ost romantic vein imaginable the passage continues: "Thus it w ill be as 
it w as at the beginning: what America does for itself it also does for mankind, and political 
experim entation on a w orld-w ide scale in order to save m ankind w ill be in direct line of 
succession to the political experim ent at w hich its inception America offered itself to the 
world."
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There is also a long section devoted to the decline of the public sphere 
and the 'new feudalism' of interest group pluralism  that he felt to be 
undermining both the power of government and the links of the populace to 
its governing elite. Even here, however, and more so than at any other point 
in his life, Morgenthau hoped that the daemonic element of charisma in the 
form of revitalised leadership, could help to re-establish the link between 
president and people and, in general, to overcome the problem s of 
m o d e r n i t y .22 I f  both virtu  and fortuna  would determine whether America 
would be able to fulfil its purpose, Morgenthau emphasised that the former 
rested upon "the quality of our wills and minds" and that this was "in our 
own hands."25
How,then, are we to account for this extraordinary work which is so 
dramatically different from all his other books? This was undoubtedly the 
period in which Morgenthau responded most keenly to a sense of American 
nationalism and that is clearly present in The Purpose of American Politics. One 
can also see that Morgenthau, at least in part, had been influenced by the 
revisionist historiography of the 1950s which provided a reading of the 
American past emphasising harm ony rather than c o n f l i c t . 2 4  These two 
elements are hardly enough to account for the change in its entirety, though.
Alternatively, one could read The Purpose of American Politics as the 
product of a subtle rhetorical shift on Morgenthau's part in order to better 
phrase his message in the kind of language that an American audience would 
be more likely to respond to. As Charles Jones has put it "rhetoric consists in 
the persuasive use of language. Persuasion rests just as much in the choice of 
genre and the manner of publication as in the construction of arguments and 
the employment of t y p e s . " 2 5  It may be possible to conclude on the basis of a
22 ibid pp. 397-398.
23 ibid. p.323.
24 He cites Louis Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in his footnotes amongst other works similar in 
tone.
25 See Jones, 'Carr: Am bivalent Realist', p .l09.
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'minimalist' reading of The Purpose of American Politics that M orgenthau's 
message is, in essence, the same. Aside from the markedly different reading of 
American history one could argue that many of his essential criticisms remain 
unchanged, for example, in the American failure to directly engage w ith the 
problems of power and the political; in the various difficulties thrown up by 
modernity and so on. "As long as the basic modes of address are articulated 
in the idiom of realism", as one writer has described the rhetoric of Henry 
Kissinger, "the speaker may also appeal for strategic purposes to democratic 
values, standards of justice, and other ideals without having to risk deferring 
to them. "26
On the other hand an author who has examined M orgenthau's 
rhetorical style in some detail has concluded that "...there is little evidence to 
show that he drew directly from rhetorical t h e o r y . " 2 7  One certainly does not 
sense that Morgenthau is consciously manipulating his rhetoric in the way 
one does when reading almost anything of Henry Kissinger's. Moreover, a 
minimalist reading of The Purpose of American Politics remains unconvincing 
in the final analysis. There are too many important differences of substance as 
well as style.
Rather than as a general rhetorical device, could we instead see the 
book as aimed at the specific audience of the incoming Democratic 
administration and its dynamic young President John F. Kennedy? Felix 
Gilbert has described the panegyric as a form of "humanist political writing" 
which "...frequently served the purpose of propaganda; often they were 
commissioned, or sometimes they were written in the hope of gaining the 
favor of a ruler or a g o v e r n m e n t . " 2 8  Just as Machiavelli's The Prince was
26 Robert Hariman, 'Henry Kissinger: Realism's Rational Actor', in Beer and Hariman (eds), 
Post-Realism, p.37.
27 G. Thom as G oodnight, 'Hans J. M orgenthau in D efense of the N ational Interest: On  
Rhetoric, Realism and the Public Sphere', in Beer and Hariman (eds), Post-Realism, p .145.
28 Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence 
(Princeton University Press, 1965).
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w ritten w ith the Medici family firmly in mind, was M orgenthau's book 
intended to catch the eye of the new Democrat P r e s i d e n t ? 2 9
That Kennedy was aware of the book was absolutely clear. It became a 
regular feature of the Kennedy presidency that the details of the books he and 
the First Lady had been reading would be made known to the media. It was 
widely reported in various newspapers across the country that the book 
President-elect Kennedy had been reading, whilst on the way to visit the Vice- 
President to-be Lyndon Johnson, was The Purpose of American Politics.^^ A  
subsequent review of the book suggested that Morgenthau's remarks on the 
institution of the Presidency were "surprisingly close to the views expressed 
by President-elect Kennedy." 5iA second review concluded that "the message 
of this book is intended, in fact, for the new President of the United S t a t e s . " 5 2  
It is not possible to determine whether or not Morgenthau hoped that 
the new administration would make use of him in some capacity. Aside from 
an invitation to Kennedy's inauguration and dinner at the White House there 
is nothing in the Morgenthau Papers to confirm that M orgenthau was 
considered for any kind of position in Washington, nor can we know if he 
was actively interested in such a possibility.
W hat is clear is M orgenthau's growing disaffection w ith the 
Eisenhower Administration over the course of the 1950s. He had, in 1951, 
accepted Dean Acheson's invitation to join the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
to advise the Democratic National Committee. In his letter of acceptance to
29 For Machiavelli's ringing exhortations to the M edici see TJte Prince, ed. and trans. R.Adams, 
(WW Norton, London, 1992) p.210.
50 Boston Globe, N ovem ber 17, 1960. A ll this extra publicity doesn't appear to have been  
translated into extra book sales. In a letter to A lfred A. Knopf, M orgenthau shares the 
formers disappointm ent at the reception of the book and asks whether in future prom otions 
"could not som ething be m ade of the fact th a t... K ennedy w as reading the book on the plane 
trip to Johnson's ranch." Letter to Alfred A. Knopf, January 10,1961, Morgenthau Papers, Box 
139.
51 R eview  by Ernest Lefever, The Washington Post, Sunday, December 4,1960.
52 R eview  by C. N  or the ote-Parkinson, The Saturday Review, Novem ber 26,1960. A lso see the 
review s by Charles Seeb in  The Sunday Star (W ashington D.C.), Decem ber 11, 1960; and by  
Robert E. Kennedy, Chicago Sim Times, January 15,1960.
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Acheson he stressed that he had set aside his usual non-partisanship because 
in present circumstances he could "...see no possibility of trying to improve 
the foreign policy of the United States through the instrumentality of the 
Republican Party" which was "intellectually sterile".55 In print he objected 
most of all to what he saw as the lack of political awareness of Eisenhower's 
government. It had "acted in terms of a philosophy alien to politics" in the 
naive belief that good businessmen would also make good statesmen; that the 
values and praxis of the American boardroom  could be successfully 
transferred to international politics.54 In terms of Eisenhower specifically the 
"fatal weakness" of his approach to foreign policy was that it was "informed 
by the same philosophy of abstention, conciliation, and pacification" as his 
domestic policies.55 Morgenthau was never, of course, likely to warm to the 
hectoring tones of John Foster Dulles nor to what he saw as Dulles' propensity 
"...to look at foreign policy with a lawyers eye and to manipulate it with a 
lawyers tools."56
What probably troubled M orgenthau most about the Eisenhower 
Administration, as it did many other intellectual critics, was the sense that 
this was somehow an indolent and complacent government whose members 
would rather be on the golf course than attending to affairs of state.57 From an 
intellectual's viewpoint they also seemed to embody the very worst elements 
of provincial, philistine, anti-intellectual America.
It is hardly surprising then that Morgenthau, like so many other 
Americans intellectual and otherwise, was initially captivated by the 
incoming Democratic Administration. The manifest energy of the new regime 
could be set against the apparent sloth of its predecessor. Moreover, the
55 Letter to Dean Acheson, A ugust 27,1957, Morgenthau Papers, Box 17.
54 Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, p.283.
55 ibid. p.296.
56 ibid. pp.299-301.
57 G iven the catastrophes of the fo llow ing decade, created by m en w ho delighted  in 
m eddling in every corner of the globe, m any w ould  look back som ewhat nostalgically at 
Eisenhower's businessmen.
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newcomers were so much younger, relatively speaking, not to mention better 
educated and altogether more interested in intellectual life and in what 
intellectuals may have to offer Washington. Or so it appeared. In reality the 
new President was not really any more intellectually inclined than his 
predecessor and successor; intellectuals may have been useful for the allure 
they added to his court at Camelot but his interest in them did not stretch 
beyond the instrumental. And as for his servants, 'The Best and the Brightest' 
they may have been but, as we shall see later in the chapter, they were sorely 
lacking in Aristotelian phronesis or Oakshottian practical wisdom or even, 
more simply, the kind of common sense that could have helped them to avoid 
the disaster in Vietnam.
For the moment, however, their star shone brightly and Morgenthau 
was influenced by it too. More, I think, than any other factor it was the 
inspiration of the new wave of Democratic leadership that made The Purpose 
of American Politics so unlike all of Morgenthau's other books. It is important 
to keep in mind, however, that Morgenthau never became an uncritical 
devotee of Kennedy as so many other intellectuals did, Arthur Schlesinger Jnr 
for one. At no time did he cease to 'speak truth to power' and by the time of 
Kennedy's death he had been critical in a number of ways of the Kennedy 
Administration.58 He had for a time, though, seen in Kennedy the kind of 
charismatic leadership capable of restoring America's "sense of mission".59
The Kennedy Presidency coincided w ith  a period  in w hich 
M orgenthau's own sense of American identity appears to have been at its 
strongest and where, relatively speaking, his general outlook appears to have 
been at its most hopeful. All this, of course, came to be shattered by the 
impact of the Vietnam War and Morgenthau's rise to prominence as one of the 
war's most public opponents. Before we explore this critical period in his life.
58 'On Kennedy's Death', New York Review of Books, December 26, 1963; 'The Trouble w ith  
Kennedy', Commentary, 1962, pp.51-54.
59 'The Decline of American Government', p. 11.
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however, we do need to see how it is that he came to oppose the American 
intervention in Vietnam and this will require some backtracking so that we 
can observe the evolution of his position on the course of American foreign 
policy as the Cold War unfolded.
Reading the Cold War
On the whole Morgenthau's record of judgement is a good one, if one 
keeps in mind a couple of important caveats. Given that one of Morgenthau's 
most important functions was to provide commentary to popular journals on 
the twists and turns of the Cold War as they occurred, it is hardly surprising 
that errors and misjudgements were m ade along the way. There was 
undoubtedly an element of overreaction in his analysis of developments like 
the first Soviet atomic explosion and the Hungarian and Suez crises of 1956. 
His response to the latter events, for example, was a furious condemnation of 
American 'betrayal' of its allies in the Middle East and of the 'new pacifism' 
that he alleged to have given the Russians a free hand in Europe. Later on, 
when he had had the opportunity to contemplate the events in a more 
measured way, he was able to see that the Hungarian case was merely 
confirmation of a reality that had existed for some time: that the United States 
had recognised a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.^o Similarly, 
his early prediction that the Cold War had to give way to negotiated 
settlement of war was modified once the initial sense of crisis had passed.41
The other substantial caveat is that, as w ith his basic theoretical 
explanations, when it came to assessing foreign policy he was torn between 
treating ideology as something serious in its own right or as merely the cloak 
for interest. Hence, there are numerous changes in emphasis over time as to
40 On this point see Nobel, 'Morgenthau's Struggle w ith Power’, p.72.
41 Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy, p p .139,194-195.
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whether Soviet ideology was an important factor in its own right or merely 
the camouflage for the Russian imperialism of old. At times this tension could 
manifest itself in the space of a few pages of the same work. For example, in 
his/n Defense of the National Interest he describes the Soviet-American rivalry as 
a universal struggle between incompatible political philosophies before 
shortly afterwards stressing that communism was, in fact, merely a "tactical 
instrum ent of imperialist policies", "propaganda ... which justifies and 
rationalizes ... imperialistic moves and objectives in the universal terms of 
m arxist dogma."^^This tended to lead to som ewhat different policy 
recommendations: tougher and more direct w hen viewing the Soviet 
challenge in ideological terms and more restrained when seeing the Soviets as 
Russian imperialists writ large.
On the whole,though, M orgenthau's judgem ent stands up well to 
historical scrutiny. From the beginning he had urged a strong American 
involvement in the rebuilding of Western Europe and, though critical of the 
representation of the Truman Doctrine in universalistic moral terms, he 
welcomed the support for Greece and Turkey and the broader lifeline to 
Western Europe which was provided by the Marshall Plan in 1948.'^3 He was 
also a committed supporter of the European Union. In a letter to George 
Kerman he emphasised that the success of the European Union was "in the 
vital interest of the United States" and could not be assured without American
involvement.44
When he turned his attention from Europe to Asia, however, his 
outlook was rather different. The United States shared with the countries of 
Western Europe a common religion and, indeed, civilisation in addition to 
powerful m utual interests which made American involvement there both
American Foreign Policy , pp.59-63, 78.
For h is criticism of the Truman Doctrine see American Foreign Policy, p .116.
Letter to George Kerman, June 10,1949, Morgenthau Papers, Box 33. M orgenthau suggested  
that it could be presented to the American public as a 'United States of Europe’.
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necessary and practical. In Europe, moreover, the United States would be 
dealing w ith firmly established nation-states of mostly long-standing with 
attendant institutional structures for the to work with. None of these things 
could be taken for granted in the Asian context.
One could argue that underestimating nationalism has been one of the 
most common errors made by intellectuals of a wide variety of hues over the 
past two hundred years but it was not a failing shared by Morgenthau. He 
consistently argued that w hat was taken in America to be a monolithic 
communist revolution sweeping across Asia and directed from Moscow was, 
in fact, a series of anti-colonial revolts reinforced by nationalism. This 
suggested to Morgenthau that, in time, explicit rivalries would be likely to 
develop between the communist nations themselves. As early as 1951 his In 
Defense of the National Interest suggested that the Chinese were not "stooges of 
the Kremlin" and that "the sharing of communist ideology cannot in the long 
run overshadow China's traditional fear of, and enmity to, R u s s i a . " 4 5  He also 
sensed that, in time, China could come to play an important role in the ending 
of bipolarity.'^^ He warned that "the tide of Asiatic Revolution" could not be 
turned back by military force and was already, in 1951 and three years before 
the final humiliation at Dien Bien Phu, drawing the attention of his American 
readership to the French exertions in Indochina where, as with the Dutch in 
Indonesia, "the effort has been a drain on their resources out of all proportion 
to the objective to be gained, and regardless of the outcome has weakened 
rather than strengthened the over-all position of the countries concerned."^^
He also had a somewhat older historical analogy in mind; that of 
Metternich's doomed attempt to resist liberal forces in Europe and maintain 
the status quo of aristocratic rule. M orgenthau saw American attempts to 
oppose communism everywhere in precisely the same way: as a futile effort
M orgenthau, American Foreign Policy, p .116.
46 ibid. p.7,
47 ibid. p.65.
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to maintain the status quo against the ultimately irresistible changes taking 
place in Asia, the Americas, Africa and elsewhere. This was a thesis to which 
he stuck consistently and repeated time and again in his publications right 
through to the late 1970s. As he pu t it in 1975, "the champion of freedom 
became the defender of the colonial status quo. Making common cause with 
the colonial powers, it shared with them the moral taint of colonialism. Thus 
America came to lose the peculiar moral aura which it thought had set it apart 
from all other n a t i o n s . " 4 8  It should instead have been trying to work with the 
flow of change, moulding it in the direction of American interests where 
possible. Morgenthau was undoubtedly right in all of this. In supporting 
reactionary and often brutal regimes everywhere purely on the basis of their 
opposition to communism the United States did significant harm to its long­
term interests in the Americas, Asia and elsewhere. In Asia the communist 
movements in China and Vietnam had initially hoped to cooperate w ith the 
United States. Instead, goaded by the delusion that it had 'lost' China, the 
United States manned the barricades in Korea and set a precedent which was 
to prove so ruinous over the next twenty years.
Vietnam
American hubris was, of course, to meet its nemesis in the jungles of 
Vietnam .The general historical outline and h istoriographical and 
counterfactual questions (would Kennedy have ended American involvement 
had he lived to see a second term of the Presidency?) concerning the 
American intervention are well known and I don't intend to repeat them here 
but we do need to explore Morgenthau's involvement.
Following from his general reading of Asian politics, Morgenthau had 
identified Vietnam as a potential quagmire for the United States long before
48 ’The Decline of the West', Partisan Review, Vol.42,1975, p.512.
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the country began to assume a central position in public affairs as American 
involvement deepened in the 1960s. His reservations, too, were essentially 
consistent over the course of twenty years. Even the State Departm ent's 
Historical Office, in response to a request from the White House in mid-1965, 
found it necessary to report that "...he has been essentially consistent in his
attitudes."49
His reading of contemporary Asian politics seems to have been 
fortified by a trip he made through Asia in the latter part of 1955 and early 
1956 which both confirmed many of his existing views and also made him 
aware of how different events appeared to the Asian nations themselves, 
when compared with the view from Washington. In an article for The Chicago 
Sunday Times written shortly after his return he confirmed that, amongst 
other things, there was "...more concern in Washington about the expansion of 
Communist China that there is in Hong Kong."50 He was also strengthened in 
his belief that where revolutionary impulses existed in Asian countries they 
were fundamentally national and anti-colonial in hue rather than communist 
as such.
He had also visited Vietnam itself and obtained a personal meeting 
with President Diem which convinced him that Diem would not be able to 
establish a stable regime in South Vietnam. At the head of a government, most 
of whose leading members had fought with the French against their own 
people. Diem already faced a serious problem with his legitimacy which 
could only be heightened by his authoritarian methods and inability, or 
unwillingness, to cultivate a broader base of popular support. He claims to 
have warned Diem "to his evident displeasure" that by attempting to govern 
on a perm anent basis through the use of "totalitarian means" he would 
inevitably alienate the governed and "be left with nothing but his family and a
49 M em orandum  to Chester Cooper from W illiam J. Jordan, May 14,1965, Lyndon B. Johnson 
Papers, Microform Reel 7, Adam s Library, Library of Congress, W ashington D.C.
58 Chicago Sun Times, February 15,1966.
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praetorian guard and that his people would see in Communism the only 
alternative to his regime."5i Morgenthau was able to witness at first-hand how 
unpopular the Diem regime was; a fact hardly known to American public 
opinion right until the coup which removed Diem from the government.
Upon his return to the United States he resigned his membership of the 
Committee for a Free Cuba because the committee also gave public displays 
of support for the Diem regime. He refused an invitation to join the American 
Friends of Vietnam because the organisation presented the conflict in Vietnam 
as "one between freedom and slavery, democracy and tyranny" when in fact 
the regime in the south was manifestly despotic.52 Though it appeared in his 
writing from time to time, Vietnam was not yet a dominant feature of the 
work he produced for public consumption. American involvement was, after 
all, largely limited to financial assistance and a relatively small number of 
advisers. Other more pressing events claimed the bulk of his attention.
It was not until 1961 that he delivered what amounted to a first, 
formal warning in his article Asia: The American Algeria which, in effect, 
updated the concerns he had expressed about American foreign policy in Asia 
some ten years earlier.53 In a second article published in the same month on 
the general problems facing the new Kennedy Administration, he warned that 
Kennedy may soon have to face a choice in Vietnam between an escalation to 
war "in the defense of indefensible and at best non-essential positions" and a 
liquidation of the American commitment. He also cautioned that in South 
Vietnam "counter-guerrilla warfare, operating in hostile territory without a 
popular base, must fail."54 Ten months later he published another warning 
which proved entirely prophetic:
5t U npublished letter to The New York Times, A ugust 30, 1963, Morgenthau Papers, Box 43; 
Vietnam and the United States (Public Affairs Press, Washington D.C, 1965) p.29.
52 Letter to Angler Biddle Duke, Chairman, American Friends of Vietnam, March 15,1956, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 1.
53 'Asia: The American Algeria', Commentary, Vol. 100, July 1961, pp.43-46.
54 'Failure and Challenge', The New Leader, July 3,1961, pp.3-5.
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"If the present primarily military approach is persisted in, we are likely to be 
drawn ever more deeply into a Korean-type war, fought under political and 
military conditions much more unfavourable than those that prevailed in 
Korea and in the world a decade ago. Such a war cannot be won quickly, if it 
can be won at all, and may well la s t ... five or ten years, perhaps only to end 
again in a stalemate, as did the Korean War. Aside from the military risks ... 
such a war would certainly have a profound effect upon the political health of
the nation. "55
It is hard to imagine a more accurate foretelling of what did take place over 
the next ten years. It is worth keeping in mind, too, that at this time Vietnam 
had barely begun to impress itself upon the national consciousness. 
Newspaper opinion, such as it was, strongly supported American aid to the 
regime in South Vietnam and significant opposition had yet to appear in the 
Congress. In 1964, at a time when Morgenthau was already concluding that 
the situation in South Vietnam was "beyond redemption", Neil Sheehan and 
David Halberstam - well known dissenters from the second half of the 1960s - 
were still writing articles stressing the vital importance of Vietnam to the 
United S t a t e s . 5 6  As late as March 1965 even the arrival of the first American 
combat troops hardly provoked a reaction in the Congress or in the m e d i a . 5 7  
The precise story of how these men came to be committed to war in Vietnam 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation but I do think it important for us to 
take a generic look at the m en responsible for the shaping and 
implementation of policy towards Vietnam.
55 Morgenthau, Vietnam and the United States, p.36.
56por M orgenthau's assessm ent see his letter to Luther A llen , Dept, of G overnm ent, 
University of Mass., Morgenthau Papers, Box 3, February 26,1964. Sheehan and Halberstam's 
early support for the American presence in Vietnam is noted by Walter Isaacson and Evan 
Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (Faber and Faber, London, 1986) 
p.656.
57 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A  History (Pimlico, London, 1994 [2nd edition]) p.432.
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The Best and the Brightest; or Vietnam as a Management Problem
'Vietnam as A Management Problem' was actually the title of a seminar 
held at Harvard University in 1956 and it was surely true that no conflict to 
date had witnessed so many manager-bureaucrats storming the front lines; no 
war had been studied so intensively as it was being fought. At one point 
during 1967 these warriors of the word were producing nearly a tonne of 
printed reports per day.58 In a sense Vietnam represented the apogee of the 
American Science of Politics, the culmination of the intellectual developments 
of the preceding decades. Behavioralism had emphasised the separation of 
facts from values, of objectivity, and this epistemology was pu t to extensive 
use in Vietnam. Strategic analysis was informed by methods draw n from 
managem ent and economics. It was axiomatic that such methods were 
universal in scope, equally worthwhile for running a major commercial 
enterprise, for theorising about nuclear war, for running a bureaucracy or for 
fighting a war against a guerrilla army.
It followed that the intellectual advice most valued in such 
circumstances was given by those who felt comfortable with complacent 
universalities. Samuel Huntington, that mono-lingual 'expert' in comparative 
politics recommended, w ithout the slightest knowledge of Vietnam or its 
history, a program m e of so-called 'forced-draft urbanization  and 
modernization' which became the disastrous 'Strategic Hamlets' policy. Few 
troubled to acquaint themselves with the detail of the French debacle of the 
early 1950s, let alone with undertaking a more substantial study of Vietnam's 
history and politics. Daniel Ellsberg, for example, admitted that he had not 
read the history of the period from 1945 to 1954 until September 1969 after he
58 This figure is drawn from Fred Inglis, The Cruel Peacer.Everyday Life and the Cold War (Basic 
Books, 1991) p.224.
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had turned against the war, 59 Asianists with a thorough knowledge of 
Vietnam and its history and the caution inherent in an awareness of the 
particular, were sidelined within and without the bureaucracy.
The men most influential in shaping Vietnam were widely admired for 
their brilliance, not least by themselves. McGeorge Bundy had been the Dean 
of the College at Harvard at 34; Walt Rostow the scholar with the sweeping - 
and unhistorical - blueprint for economic growth which would permit the 
'take-off of underdeveloped countries all over the globe; above all, Robert 
McNamara who had transformed the Ford Motor Company with his systems 
analysis and had left the Presidency of Ford to become the Secretary of 
Defense. He had an overwhelming belief in the efficacy of quantitative 
methods and had a dazzling array of statistics which he could quote from 
memory, all of which appeared to affirm how well the war was proceeding in 
Vietnam.68 His chief civilian aide, also a confidant of McGeorge Bundy, was a 
former Harvard lawyer by the name of John McNaughton. McNaughton was 
an acquaintance of Thomas Schelling and he introduced many of Schelling's 
ideas into Vietnam strategy by adapting the coercive strategy of nuclear 
counterforce into a targeted program m e of 'escalation' against N orth 
Vietnam.6i The problem, as Lawrence Freedman has put it, was that "scant 
consideration had been given in theories of strategic coercion to the problem 
of shoring up a rotten regime against a resolute o p p o n e n t .  "<^2 None of the men 
seemed capable of the kind of empathetic identification which might have 
helped them to understand the mindset of a people struggling to emerge from
59 John C. D onovan, The Cold Warriors: A  Policy-Making Elite (DC H eath and Com pany, 
Lexington, 1974) p. 168.
68 D uring his first trip to Vietnam in 1962, after having spent more than a mere forty-eight 
hours in the country, hs announced that "every qualitative m easurem ent... show s that w e are 
w inning the war." McNamara quoted in Karnow, Vietnam: A  H istory , p.271.
61 For fuller discussions of John M cNaughton's influence see Kaplan, pp.329-336; Lawrence 
Freedman, 'Vietnam and the disillusioned stvedegist'international Affairs, Vol.72, N o .l , 1996, 
p p .136-142; D avid Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Random H ouse, N ew  York, 1972) 
pp.361-369.
62 Freedman, 'Vietnam and the disillusioned strategist', p .143.
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the shadow of colonial domination. Instead, they assum ed that their 
Vietnamese opponents shared their own peculiar kind of rationality which 
proved to be a tragic mistake.63
The Best and the Brightest' had a number of other flaws to add to their 
hyperrationality. Though they prided themselves on their hard-m inded 
approach to the world, their lack of sentimentality and their realism, it was a 
peculiarly American kind of realism. Absent was any sense of prudence, of 
the diabolical nature of the political and the realist's awareness that fortuna 
often finds ways of thwarting the rational designs' of men. Instead this 
American realpolitik was combined with a kind of muscular, problem-solving, 
can do-ism which was strengthened by the overweening confidence of the 
men themselves who, after all, had experienced little but success in their own 
lives.
The other missing component was any sense that the exercise of power 
was morally hazardous. Utterly convinced of their own virtue, and that of 
America's in the world, they failed to subject the means of American actions 
in Vietnam to substantive ethical questioning, convinced of the righteousness 
of the ends. Even when men like Bundy and McNamara left the government it 
was fundamentally because they had begun to doubt the future success of the 
w ar rather than its ethical wrongs. Giving American tactics scientific 
sounding names also helped to cloud the ethical problems. 'Strategic Hamlets' 
seemed to add an aura of rectitude to a sometimes explicitly violent process of 
hum an dislocation which had also featured in the modus operandi of the 
Japanese in China earlier in the century. At its worst, as in the so-called 'body 
count', the dehumanising language was hardly different from that employed 
by the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century.
63 One of the m ost comic examples of this w as Lyndon Johnson attem pting to buy off Ho 
Chi M inh w ith programmes of economic aid as though he were horsetrading w ith, say, the 
junior senator from Alabama.
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For M orgenthau the 'body count' was the ultimate symbol of an 
American approach that had placed quantitative m easurem ent above 
qualitative judgement.64 For a time Morgenthau, like so many others, had 
been impressed by the men brought to office by Kennedy. He felt that the 
Defense D epartm ent had been "transform ed by a group of young 
intellectuals" and that it was one of Kennedy's historical legacies "to have 
made the intellectual respectable as a manager of public affairs."65 Not long 
after making these remarks he found himself publicly opposing these same 
men over their handling of Vietnam.
By the middle of the 1960s Vietnam was very much at the centre of 
Morgenthau's attention and he was becoming ever more active in the public 
sphere. His critique was entirely consistent with his earlier observations on 
American policy in Asia. The United States, Morgenthau suggested, was 
continuing to operate according to the mind-set of Containment in Europe in 
1947 rather than adapting to the very different circumstances of Asia in the 
mid 1960s.66 It was clearly no longer plausible to equate Vietnamese national 
communism with Chinese or Soviet power and, in fact, the American 
presence was actually serving to prevent Vietnam and China from resuming 
their traditionally antagonistic stances towards each other.67 American tactics 
were just as flawed as their broader reading of the geo-politics of the region. 
Given the experiences of World War Two and Korea it seemed clear to 
Morgenthau that the United States was expecting far too much to come from 
the bombing campaign against the North.68 And the whole 'pacification' 
programme in the South was based on the fundamental misconception that
64 T he Intellectual, Political, and Moral Roots of U.S. Failure in Vietnam', in W illiam  D. 
Coplin and Charles W. Kegley Jnr (eds). Analyzing International Relations (Prager Publishers, 
N ew  York, 1975) p.118.
65 Morgenthau, 'Significance in History', The New Leader, December 9,1963, p.4.
66 M orgenthau, 'U.S. M isadventure in Vietnam', Current History, Vol.54, N o. 317, January, 
1968, p.30.
67 ibid. p.34; 'Johnson's Dilemma; The Alternatives N ow  in Vietnam', New Republic, M ay 28, 
1966, p .14; 'What are U.S Interests in Vietnam’, WarlPeace Report, December 1961, p.6.
68 'Johnson's Dilemma', p. 13.
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the guerrillas were an alien element who could somehow be separated from 
the local population.69
The means being employed in Vietnam would require serious ethical 
evaluation at any time, M orgenthau thought, but given the manifestly 
spurious ends they were indefensible. The nation was being tarred with 
"incalculable moral d a m a g e  J '78 In broader terms it represented the betrayal of 
the American mission in the world. America's war in Vietnam "...violates the 
very principles upon which the nation was founded and for which it has 
stood both in the eyes of its own citizens and of the world. It is an 
antirevolutionary war fought by a revolutionary nation. It is Metternich's war 
fought by the nation of Jefferson and L i n c o l n . " 7 i
The Politics of Dissent
As M orgenthau's dissent from governm ent policy became more 
prominent he began to attract the ire of the White House. It was not, of course, 
the first time since the end of World War Two that action had been taken 
against dissenters and against intellectual freedoms in general. This is 
commonly thought to have begun with the McCarthy purge but, in fact, 
earlier roots can be found in the executive order issued by Harry Truman 
some ten days after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in which the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was ordered to investigate the 'loyalty' 
of all current and prospective federal employees. These so-called 'loyalty tests' 
were swiftly adopted in many other areas of American society.72
69 Morgenthau, 'U.S M isadventure in Vietnam', p.31.
78 ibid. p.33.
71 'What A ils America', The New Republic, October 28,1967, p.18-19.
72 Pells, The Liberal M in d , pp.266-267. In the mid-50s M orgenthau wrote an article w hich w as 
scathing in its criticism of the dam age the loyalty-security measures had inflicted upon the 
State Department. 'The Impact of the Loyalty-Security M easures on the State Department', 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XI, No. 4, April 1955, pp.134-140.
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Even so, it is true that the McCarthy inquisition was especially 
harmful. In the period from 1953 to 1955 nearly three hundred 'resignations' 
took place from the State Department.73 Six hundred public school teachers 
and university lecturers were dismissed on the basis of their openly-held or 
suspected political views.74 Champions of civil liberties and academic 
freedom s were placed on the defensive everywhere. Children were 
encouraged to report their 'subversive' parents just as they had been in Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union.75 Books which had been consigned to the 
flames in Nazi Germany were proscribed for a second time. Thoreau's essay 
on civil obedience was banned simultaneously in the United States and 
China!76 In passing we should, nevertheless, keep in mind that even at their 
worst the restrictions in the United States never amounted to more than a pale 
imitation of those prevailing in the totalitarian countries. American dissidents 
were not disappearing into concentration camps and mental asylums like 
some of their counterparts in the eastern bloc. Even so, one can see how some 
understandably sensitive European exiles could see a nascent American 
fascism in the McCarthyist purges and choose to return to Western Europe. 
Tensions had eased somewhat in the latter half of the 1950s and early 1960s 
but as the Johnson Administration came under increasing pressure over 
Vietnam it began to take action against its critics.
M orgenthau claimed that he first came to Johnson's attention as a 
consequence of a speech given in the United Nations by the Soviet 
Ambassador in which he quoted from Morgenthau's articleWe Are Deluding 
Ourselves in Vietnam which had been published in the New York Times 
Magazine in April 1965. Johnson's initial response was to order Robert 
McNamara to end Morgenthau's consultancy with the Pentagon. He also
73 Iinglis, The Cruel Peace, p .l25.
74 Pells, The Liberal Mind, p.266. Raymond Aron's claim that few  careers w ere dam aged in the 
U nited States is plainly wrong. See Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, p.212.
75 Inglis, The Cruel Peace, p .l90.
76 Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper, pp .193-194.
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established a 'Project Morgenthau' desk at the White House where a junior 
staffer was given the job of looking for m aterial from M orgenthau's 
publications with which to discredit him. On a more sinister note the FBI and 
the Internal Revenue Service were ordered to probe into his a f f a i r s  .7 7  These 
weapons at the disposal of the White House were, of course, nothing like 
those available to the Kremlin but they were unpleasant enough in the 
American context.78
Pressure also came from other sources. The war still had plenty of 
vocal supporters in the media and of these, none was louder than Joseph 
Alsop. As Captain Joseph Alsop he had served in the Far East during the 
Second W orld War and had become embittered at what he saw as the 
American failure to properly support Chiang Kai-Chek in the struggle with 
the communists which followed the withdrawal of the Japanese from China. 
Upon returning to the United States he wrote a series of three articles for the 
Washington Post entitled "Why we lost China". This was quickly taken up by 
the Republican Party and used for partisan purposes against the Democrats 
and targets in the State Department. This, in turn, provided material for the 
later exploitation of Joseph M c C a r t h y  .79
In the mid-1960s Alsop was a forceful advocate of an American 
military presence in Asia generally and in Vietnam particularly, a position he
77 See M orgenthau's letter to Ernest Lefever, The Brookings Institution, June 26, 1969, The 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 35. Both of these agencies had, of course, been used by Presidents 
against their political opponents in the past, beginning w ith Franklin Roosevelt.
78 There is nothing in the Morgenthau Papers to indicate that governm ent agencies found  
anything w ith  w hich to dam age him. A s w as m entioned earlier, governm ent analysis in 1965 
affirmed the consistency of his Vietnam critique, though his articles and speeches continued  
to be m onitored. A  m em o sent to Walt Rostow in 1968 described the contents of a paper 
M orgenthau gave at the 1968 American Political Science Association Conference: 
"Morgenthau's criticism about the transferability of western institutions cuts the ground out 
of our pointing w ith  pride to the South Vietnam  elections... It is a grim ly pessim istic  
argum ent that den ies the p ossib ility  of cultural change and, hence, the h op e of 
"Vietnamizing" the war w hile W esternizing the society."
M em orandum  from Fred Panzer to W alt Rostow, September 14, 1968, Lyndon B. Johnson 
Papers, M icroform Reel 5. In the context Morgenthau's assessm ent of the clum sy American  
efforts at social engineering w as sim ply accurate rather than pessimistic.
79 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, pp. 112-115.
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pushed through the medium of his column in the Washington Post and other 
syndicated newspapers. He subscribed to virtually all of the ill-thought 
verities of the day - domino theory, the Munich analogy - and he was quick to 
challenge any dissenters. Morgenthau had come to his attention in 1965 and 
Alsop had attempted, in his typically crude way, to label M orgenthau as an 
'appeaser' in the same way .that Geoffrey Dewson of the London Times had 
allegedly been an 'appeaser' in England until 1939.80 In a reply Morgenthau 
couldn't hide his exasperation at having to defend himself against such a 
patently absurd historical analogy:
"I cannot be expected to explain to a literate public that Mao Tse-Tung is not 
Hitler, that the position of China in Asia is not like that of Nazi Germany in 
Europe, that Vietnam is not Czechoslovakia, that my opposition to our 
involvement in Vietnam is not identical with that of the appeasers of 1938. 
Anyone who believes that these disparate situations and issues are identical 
is beyond the reach of rational a r g u m e n t . "8 4
He also intimated that Alsop was little more than a propagandist for the 
governm ent w hich w as, in essence, an accurate assessm ent.8 2 
N otw ithstanding  its crudity , A lsop's attack had some unp leasan t 
consequences:
" The effect of the Alsop column has been striking and distressing. Before its 
publication, my mail was overwhelmingly favorable and even the dissenting 
voices were respectful and polite. Now the gates of the political underworld 
seem to have been opened. I receive every day letters with xenophobic, red-
80 Joseph Alsop, 'Pompous Ignorance', Washington P o st , April 21,1965.
84 M orgenthau, 'A Communication', Washington Post, April 30,1965. The dispute w ith  A lsop  
rum bled on through a num ber of A lsop articles and replies b y  M orgenthau, copies of w hich  
can be found in Box One of the Morgenthau Papers. Morgenthau w as so angered b y A lsop that 
he enquired into the possibility of suing him  for defamation but the legal advice w as against 
his proceeding.
82 In the sam e article in w hich he attacked M orgenthau, A lsop referrred to the "marked 
success of President Johnson's V ietnam ese policy" and observed that "he and his policy  
makers have been calling the shots w ith quite unprecedented accuracy." (!!)
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baiting and anti-semitic attacks, not to speak of anonymous telephone calls at 
all hours of the day and night."83
A number of the letters have been retained in the Morgenthau Papers and they 
are, indeed, full of the most obscene bile 84
Aside from Alsop, Morgenthau also clashed publicly with Freedom 
House and, in particular, its chairman Leo Cherne. In November 1967 
Freedom House had placed an advertisement in the New York Times with the 
headline, "Leaders warn that extremists could delay Vietnam negotiations." 
The statem ent continued: "A Crucial Turning Point! A Freedom House 
statement signed by 145 distinguished Americans urges the responsible critics 
of the Vietnam War to dissociate themselves from wild charges being made 
against the nation and its leaders." The so-called 'responsible' critics were 
warned that the failure "to draw the line between their positions and the 
views expressed by irresponsible extremists could encourage our Communist 
adversaries to postpone serious negotiations, raising the cost in lives and 
delaying the peace we earnestly seek."85
In an article written as a reply, Morgenthau pointed to the irony of an 
organisation calling itself Freedom House seeking to suppress dissent. He also 
observed that behind the Iron Curtain "the governments of the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, w ith the exception of East Germany, all make a 
d istinction betw een "responsible" and "irresponsible" criticism and 
"irresponsible" criticism is defined as that which attacks the foundations of 
governm ent policies." He likened the Freedom House document to the 
'Intellectuals Manifesto' presented in Germany in 1914 by men who, similarly.
83 Letter to Walter Lippmann, May 6,1965, Morgenthau Papers , Box 36.
84 See the Morgenthau Papers, Box 94. One cannot help but notice that a disproportionate 
num ber cam e from  the 'Deep South'. M orgenthau w as later to observe that "it is not 
accidental that m any congressional advocates of v iolent repression in Vietnam  represent 
states w h ose  societies could  not exist w ithout the violent oppression of large m asses, 
som etim es the majority of their populations." 'What A ils America', p.21.
85 Q uoted b y  M orgenthau in his 'Freedom, Freedom H ouse and Vietnam', The New Leader, 
January 2,1967, p .17.
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thought their nation could do no wrong. Both were informed by a misguided 
patriotism which "deems it its duty to support the policies of the government 
in times of crisis, thus identifying the government with the nation, and in the 
process sacrifices the interests of the nation upon the altar of c o n f o r m i t y . " 8 6
The prominence of M orgenthau's dissent also brought him  some 
professional difficulties. At some point during the 1960s (precisely when was 
not clear from the material in the Morgenthau Papers) Morgenthau accepted a 
Senior Fellowship in the Council on Foreign Relations in order to produce an 
updated statement of his views on international politics and ascertain 
whether or not he accepted that there had been substantial changes in the 
international system since the late 1940s. By the time he came to take up the 
position Vietnam had leapt into the public eye, as had M orgenthau's 
opposition to the war which had been viewed uneasily by some of the senior 
members of the council. Tensions appear to have reached a head over 
M orgenthau's wish to fly to Norway to address a Norwegian Students 
Association 'teach-in' on Vietnam. In theMorgenthau Papers there is a copy of a 
letter from council President Grayson Kirk to the association informing them 
that he had asked M orgenthau to let them know that he would not be 
attending after all.^^A second letter from a Vice-President to M orgenthau 
refers to the 'accepted amenities' of the Council (presumably relating to public 
debates about foreign policy) and expresses the view that "...these are violated 
when an American citizen at a time when we are at war - whether declared or 
not - attacks the policies of the United States before a foreign a u d i e n c e . " 8 8  The
86ibid p p .18-19. This clash, too, rum bled on for som e tim e. See Leo C herne’s reply, 
'Responsibility and the Critic', The Neio Leader, January 16, 1967, pp.9-13, and M orgenthau's 
further response, 'The H ouse that C hem e Built', The New Leader, January 30, 1967, p p .17-18. 
A lso see the letters to the editor from Freedom H ouse of February 1st and from M orgenthau  
of February 3rd. Here again M orgenthau instituted libel proceedings after Freedom H ouse  
circulated a copy of Cheme's attack to all those on its m ailing list.
87 Letter from Grayson Kirk, President, Council on Foreign Relations to N ils Gleditsch, 
President of the Norw egian Students' Association, January 20,1966, Morgenthau Papers, Box 
41.
88 Letter from Frank Aitschul, April 7,1966, Morgenthau Papers, Box 14.
234
Council later reversed its decision not to allow Morgenthau to attend but the 
incident appears to have left a bitter taste in his mouth. He came to believe 
that the original invitation from the Council had actually been made w ith a 
view to muzzling him.89
There are also indications in the Morgenthau Papers that not all was 
well at the University of Chicago. Morgenthau's was one of five names of 
faculty to appear on a statement of 'Academic Freedom, Autonomy and 
Protest', which was sent around the university. The first three of five 
paragraphs are devoted to affirming 'the constitutional principles of 
university of life' which, naturally enough, revolve around freedom of 
expression. Tlae concluding paragraphs are reproduced in full below:
"Any efforts by governments or private organizations outside the university 
to restrict this internal freedom by legislative or administrative action or by 
the threat of physical coercion are contrary to this principle. Equally contrary 
to this principle are efforts by members of the university to use similar 
coercive means to restrict this internal freedom of departments, divisions and 
schools of the university to govern themselves in matters of instruction, 
research, service and recruitment. (NP) The principles of the freedom of 
expression and manifestation of opinions and of academic freedom and 
autonomy can co-exist w ith each other as long as debate is reasoned and 
disagreement peaceful. The practice of coercion, either by outside bodies, 
public or private, or by one group of members of the university against other 
members of the university, is alien to the spirit and constitution of a free 
university."90
89 H e w as assured in a letter written over a decade later that this had not been the case. Letter 
from W illiam  Diebold Jnr, Senior Research Fellow , Council on Foreign Relations, A pril 24, 
1978, Morgenthau Papers, Box 15.
99 'Statement of Academic Freedom, A utonom y and Protest', Fred Eggan, G w in  J. Kolb, C.W  
Mackaver, Hans J. Morgenthau, Edward Shils, issued by the University of Chicago, Office of 
the Secretary of the Faculties, Novem ber 2,1967.
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One can only assume that this reflected various ructions in Chicago. Another 
hint is provided in a letter Morgenthau received from the Chairman of the 
Department of Political Science at the City University of New York to which 
Morgenthau eventually moved in 1968. Thomas Karis writes that "you could 
look forward to the warm est possible reception from a harm onious 
department. Also you can be confident that you will find at City College an 
atm osphere that will be not only personally congenial but also one of 
intellectual freedom and respect for independent thought.''^! M orgenthau 
must have intimated that he was having problems in Chicago.
All this combines to suggest that Morgenthau was placed under a great 
deal of strain as a consequence of his opposition to the government. This 
pressure was augmented in 1969 by the painful irony of his son, Matthew, 
being drafted into the army. Hannah Arendt's assurance that "...only one in 
ten of those we send there ever sees combat duty" was small consolation.92 To 
make matters worse, Matthew appears to have been victimised while in the 
army because of his father's activities.93
It would, however, be wrong to imply that his was a lone struggle. To 
be sure, few shared his foresight of the damage which was to be inflicted by 
the American intervention in Vietnam bu t by the mid-1960s others were 
beginning to join him in opposition. The media had, in general, begun to turn 
against the war by late 1967 but many key figures had done so some time 
earlier. Walter Lippmann had always been a sceptic and by the middle of 1965 
he was writing about little else apart from Vietnam.94 In the Congress, 
senators like Frank Church, Wayne Morse, and William Fulbright had burned 
their bridges with the Johnson Administration and were becoming ever more
94 Letter from Thomas Karis, Chairman, Department of Political Science, The City C ollege of 
the City U niversity of N ew  York, April 19,1967, Morgenthau Papers, Box 64.
92 Letter from Hannah Arendt, June 18,1969, Morgenthau Papers, Box 5.
93 See M orgenthau's letter to Senator Charles H. Percy, June 11,1969, Morgenthau Papers, Box 
45.
94 Steel,Wfl/fer Lippmann, p.576.
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vocal opponents.95 Morgenthau was in regular contact with both Morse and 
Fulbright and he was invited to testify before a number of congressional 
hearings in the late 1960s.96
The campuses were becoming focal points for the anti-war movement 
and student leaders, Robert McNamara's son among them, were attaining a 
more prominent media profile. Morgenthau spoke at a number of the teach- 
ins in the United States and abroad and, in general, gave his full support to 
the student movement. As with Walter Lippmann, this extended to approving 
the various forms of civil disobedience, from street demonstrations to draft- 
dodging. In this, Morgenthau demonstrated how different he was to an 
authentic conservative like George Kennan. Kennan shared Morgenthau's 
antipathy towards the war but, if anything, he appeared to find the student 
protesters even more distasteful. Kennan warned that he had "...seen more 
harm done in this world by those who tried to storm the bastions of society in 
the name of utopian beliefs..." before going on to oppose almost every 
manifestation of student o p p o s i t i o n . 9 7  Where Kennan and Morgenthau were 
agreed was that student unease was to do w ith much more than Vietnam 
alone. M orgenthau linked the student revolt to a m uch broader 
'disenchantment' with a 'mechanized and bureaucratized' world, a "...world 
thoroughly secularized and dedicated to the production of consumer goods 
and weapons of mass destruction, [which] has lost its m e a n i n g . . ."98
Morgenthau was joined by a wide variety of other intellectuals in his 
opposition to the war; sociologists like Barrington Moore, historians like 
Martin Duberman, scientists, poets, novelists, even a linguist in the form of
95 Fulbright was also a vocal opponent of the universties and of social scientists "who ought 
to be acting as responsible and independent critics of the Government's policies." Fulbright 
quoted in N oam  Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (Pantheon Books, N ew  
York, 1967) p.24.
96 Som e years later, M orgenthau suggested to Fulbright that "you rem ind m e of a Roman 
Senator in the last days of the Republic, doing his duty w hile know ing full w ell that it w ill 
be in vain." Letter, May 29,1974, Morgenthau Papers, Box 22.
97 George Kennan, Democracy and the Student Left (Hutchinson, London, 1968) p.7.
98 Morgenthau, Christian Science Monitor, July 19,1968.
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Noam Chomsky. The group noticeably underrepresented, however, was that 
of political science in general and its related specialisations in International 
Relations and Asian studies.99 The lack of attention given to the mounting 
crisis in Vietnam on the part of political science was remarkable. In the ten 
year period from 1959 to 1969 the three leading political science journals in 
the United States contained precisely one article devoted to Vietnam out of a 
possible nine hundred and twenty-fourl^oo
In part, this was the result of the arid professionalisation which had 
crept into political science and International Relations. 'Professionalism' 
required academics to stick to publications in their narrow , preferably 
uncontroversial specialisms and, above all, avoid taking an active part in the 
public sphere. Asian studies had for a long time, of course, been branded with 
the stigma of the McCarthyist purges so it is hardly surprising that this was a 
particularly reactionary branch of scholarship. Lucian Pye of MIT warned that 
those of his colleagues involved in protesting against government policy in 
Vietnam were guilty of the apparently unconscionable failing of "non- 
academic behavior." Robert Scalapino accused those of his fellow Berkeley 
academics involved in teach-ins of "anti-intellectualism." 494 Morgenthau had 
his professional commitment questioned by the eminently forgettable Heinz 
Eulau, a professional's professional if ever there was o ne .492  Professional 
prerogatives were also used to try and discredit Vietnam critics whose 
backgrounds were outside the subject. How dare Noam Chomsky, a linguist 
after all, think that he was entitled to roam across professional boundaries! 
Even Martin Luther King was turned upon when he deigned to stray from his
99 "Dismal branches of American scholarship", according to N oam  Chom sky, and "closely 
identified w ith  American imperial goals." Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins, 
p.72.
190 Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals, pp.156-157.
494 See M cCaughey, International Studies and Academic Enterprise, pp.233-234.
497 See Norm an D. Palmer (ed.), 'Conference D iscussion on Objectives', A  Design for Political 
Science (Am erican A cadem y of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, Decem ber 1966) 
p .ll9 .
238
appointed brief of civil rights in order to condemn American actions in 
Vietnam.403
The other factor, as Morgenthau pointed out, was that large sections of 
political science, especially International Relations, had simply moved too 
close to government, in one form or another, for its members to be able to act 
as independent critics, even when they opposed government policy. One of 
M orgenthau's most frequently voiced criticisms during the 1960s was that 
many of his colleagues who shared his concerns were not prepared to make 
their views known in public.494 Nor, it seems, were many of those who had 
turned against the war from within the government prepared to make a 
public declaration of the fact. Arthur Schlesinger Jnr appears to have been so 
compromised by his connection to the Democrat administrations of the 1960s 
that, at the Washington teach-in in 1965, he appeared to observers to want to 
support and attack the government simultaneously.495 Others simply slid out 
of government with barely a murmur. By 1967 McGeorge Bundy, Bill Moyers 
and George Ball had all resigned over their misgivings. Robert McNamara left 
in February 1968 to become President of the World Bank. 496
Of these four, only Ball had opposed the war from the beginning and 
made plain his dissent to President Johnson. Ball was a europhile convinced, 
correctly, that America's core interests lay in Western Europe rather than in 
the periphery of Asia. He had also, like John Kenneth Galbraith, been given a 
very early and direct lesson in the limits to power. As a member of the 
Strategic Bombing Survey which had examined the effects of the Allied
493 Halberstam,T/7e Best and the Brightest, p.60.
494 M orgenthau, T ruth  and Power', p .l2 . Like De Tocqueville, M orgenthau thought he 
detected a conform ism  in American society which worked to mitigate against dissent.
495 A ndrew  Kopkind, 'The Teach-In on Vietnam', The New Republic, M ay 29,1965, pp. 15-16.
496 jf the often savage reviews of his In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam are any 
indication he still appears unable, over thirty years after his resignation, to face up to the 
calam itous errors of judgm ent for w hich he w as responsible. See, for exam ple, Roger 
Hilsm an, 'McNamara’s War - Against the Truth: A Review Essay', Political Science Quarterly, 
Volum e 111, N o .l , 1996, pp.151-163: "To put it bluntly, McNamara twists the truth, falsely 
accuses others, and soils the historical record" (p.l51).
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bombing of Germany during World War Two he had discovered, to his and 
everyone else's astonishment, that bombing had been relatively ineffective 
and had actually served to intensify the German resistanced07 This, naturally, 
made him sceptical of what could be achieved in Vietnam through bombing. 
Ball assumed a curious dual stance as the Vietnam escalation proceeded. In 
the privacy of the White House he opposed every step that deepened the 
American involvement. In public, until his resignation, he defended the 
government policy at every opportunity, even taking a prominent role in 
shepherding the Tonkin Gulf Resolution through the 'Congress.^os Hilsman 
believes that Johnson "used Ball shamelessly" as evidence that he had 
considered dovish arguments against the war, when in fact he had never 
taken them seriously at all. 499
Morgenthau, for his part, simply could not see how Ball’s alleged 
dissent could be taken seriously when in the public sphere he had been so 
closely identified with the escalation of the war.449 When questioned about 
reports that Ball had opposed the war, Morgenthau replied that Ball "might be 
compared to a Court Jester. There was no open opposition. No one would 
speak up. Nobody put his career on the line and resigned over the war."444 
Ball always defended the correctness of his actions on both moral and political 
grounds but Dileo believes, like Morgenthau, that a considerable amount of 
ego and ambition were also involved: "wanting to preserve his career options 
and availability for high appointive office Bell was simply loath to cross a 
Democratic president."442 McNamara has written that he did not speak 
against the war because to do so "would have been a violation of my
497 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, pp .161,495.
498 D avid L. Dileo, George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment (University of North  
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1991) p.l36.
199 Hilsman, 'McNamara's War', p .161.
449 Significantly Ball, alone am ong Vietnam  dissenters, m aintained warm  relations w ith  
Johnson right up until the latter's death in 1972.
444 Morgenthau Papers, Box 187.
442 Dileo, George Bal l , p .l64 . Dileo also points to Ball's patricianly disdain for the perceived  
crudities of the anti-war movement.
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responsibility to the President and my oath to uphold the Constitution."445 
The suggestion that he would somehow have been guilty of violating 
constitutional precepts is the purest nonsense, and it is a very distorted kind 
of ethical framework indeed which would place loyalty to Johnson above the 
public interest.414 in looking back on the period, Morgenthau believed that a 
courageous president or a fejv high-profile dissidents from his administration 
could have been enough to end the wardis
The catastrophe in Vietnam vindicated much of what Morgenthau had 
been saying about American foreign policy during the Cold War. His finest 
hour, in a personal sense, came during a televised debate in which he 
grappled with McGeorge Bundy, who attempted to discredit Morgenthau by 
pointing to past misjudgements.446 M orgenthau's response was extremely 
well-judged, as the transcript records:
"I am honored by the selective quotations from my writings. As I have said 
before ...nobody who deals with foreign policy can be always right... I should, 
however, also say... that I have not always been wrong - and especially when 
it comes to Vietnam Mr Bundy might have quoted certain things I wrote in '61 
and '62 or quoted what I wrote after my interview with President Diem about 
what the future of South Vietnam might be. So I think that no useful purpose 
is served by pointing to one mistake, and I admit freely that I have made 
mistakes - I admit many more than Mr Bundy has found - (laughter) - but I
443 McNamara quoted in Hilsman, 'McNamara’s War', p .l61.
444 ibid. p .l62.
445 Morgenthau, 'The Intellectual, Political, and Moral Roots of U.S Failure in Vietnam', p .126; 
'The Web of Falsehood': review  of David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest,' The New  
Leader, December 31,1972, p .l6 .
446 B undy, incidentally, lied  about having done h is ow n  research into M orgenthau's 
publications: M orgenthau, "I admire the efficiency of Mr Bundy's office." Bundy: "I do m y  
own." A letter in tlie Johnson Papers confirms that Bundy's material w as prepared by one 
H oward W riggins of the Policy Planning Council. See the letter from James C. Thom son Jnr, 
National Security Council, to McGeorge Bundy, May 13,1965, Johnson Papers, Microform Reel 
7. For M orgenthau's debate w ith  Bundy (and others) see "Vietnam Dialogue: Mr Bundy and  
the Professors", CBS Special N ew s Report, June 21, 1965. A  transcript is retained in the 
Morgenthau Papers.
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have not always been wrong, and in any case, it is no argument to say, this 
man has been wrong about Laos, how can he be right about V i e t n a m ? " 4 i 7  
Rather than attempt to defend himself directly, Morgenthau freely admitted 
past errors and disarmed his audience with a bit of self-deprecating humour. 
He then pointed out that challenging him over what he had said in the past 
was hardly a persuasive way to go about defending the government's 
position in the present crisis in Vietnam. The effect was to draw attention to 
Bundy as he really was: arrogant and aloof. And far from encouraging 
governm ent supporters or causing opponents to think again, Bundy's 
reluctance to engage directly w ith the subject merely served to stimulate 
further doubts. Halberstam suggests that Bundy's "brittle performance" 
marked the beginning of the turn in his reputation, both in Washington and 
the rest of the country.448
Morgenthau did, then, play an important part in the opposition to the 
war but even here one still gains the impression that his fundamental message 
was no more acceptable, or even intelligible, to most of his fellow dissidents 
than it was to members of the executive. For much of the 'New Left' the 
American exercise of political violence in international politics was simply 
illegitimate in any form, whereas for Morgenthau it was simply that in this 
case American actions were both imprudent and unrelated to any national 
interest w orth defending in this manner. There was, of course, an ethical 
critique here too in that American actions could be seen to be immoral 
because the ends being pursued could not conceivably justify the means being 
employed, but this was a much more subtle ethical view than the rather 'black 
and white' perspectives of many of those of the 'New Left'. Similarly, though
417 ibid.
448 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p.620. M orgenthau him self confirmed that as ther 
result of Bundy's "rather sorry performance" he w as frequently told that m any view ers  
previously Inclined to the government's position found them selves w ith grave doubts for the 
first time. M orgenthau, 'Interview w ith  Bernard Johnston', p.383. A  psychologist wrote to 
M orgenthau about what he perceived as Bundy's "psychological imbalances" (!) Morgenthau 
Papers, Box 34.
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Morgenthau was generally supportive when discussing the views and work 
of 'New Left' intellectuals like Noam Chomsky and Gabriel Kolko, he couldn't 
help but register the important differences with their positions. In a review of 
Chomsky's A t War with Asia he stressed that Chomsky had performed an 
im portant political and moral function in drawing attention to American 
wrongs in Indochina, but he.rejected Chomsky's "moral absolutism supported 
...by a degree of economic determinism... In the picture the author paints of 
the political world, black and white, vice and virtue are clearly separated and 
there is never any doubt where they are located. This simplicity of moral 
judgement is of course a mere replica of the division of the world into good 
and evil nations on which ideological anti-communism thrives, only that the 
location of the attributes is here r e v e r s e d . " 4 4 9  He, similarly, found Kolko's The 
Politics of War lacking in 'messiness': "he yields to the temptation of attributing 
to American policy a rational coherence and Machiavellian purpose which 
run counter to the historical e v i d e n c e . " 4 2 0
In short, M orgenthau's message that politics was a diabolical 
undertaking, shot through with "the frailty of hum an beings", was just as 
unintelligible to his fellow opponents of the Vietnam War as to the men 
holding the reigns of government. 42i Under such circumstances, and faced 
with the additional pressures described earlier, it is hardly surprising that he 
could, at times, feel despondent about what he was doing. He once referred 
"to the complete usefulness of my endeavours to bring "the truth" to the 
attention of the policy-makers, from the president downward."422 His mood, 
in the early 1970s, m ust also have been affected by having observed a 
Republican Administration apparently repeating many of the mistakes of its
449 See M orgenthau's review  of Chom sky's 'At War w ith Asia', The New York Times Book 
jReuzew, June 17th, 1971.
429 M orgenthau, 'Historical Justice and the Cold War’, Neiu York Review of Books , June 1969, 
p.3.
424 This expression com es from M orgenthau and Chomsky, 'The N ational Interest and the 
Pentagon Papers', Partisan Review, Vol.39, N o .3 ,1972, p.356.
422 ibid. p.354.
243
Democratic predecessor, under the guidance of a man who would have 
appeared at first glance to be much like himself - a Jewish-German émigré 
and political realist.
Henry Kissinger
It is probably the case that with no other human being did Morgenthau 
have a relationship as complex as that which he shared with Kissinger. 
Admiration, contempt, perhaps a certain amount of envy, Morgenthau was 
capable, it seems, of feeling all these things about Kissinger almost 
simultaneously. They undoubtedly had a great deal in common. His junior by 
some twenty years, Heinz Kissinger, as he was named by his parents, was 
born on May 27,1923 in the Bavarian town of Fürth, not far from Nuremberg. 
A Jew, like Morgenthau, and also a bookish and introverted child, he appears 
to have experienced many of the same kinds of difficulties and humiliations 
familiar to Morgenthau, though publicly he has always downplayed the 
impact of anti-semitism, contrary to the recollections of his childhood 
associates.^23 He left Germany for America with his family in August 1938, a 
bare three months before Kristallnacht. Many of Kissinger's relatives - loyal 
German citizens like Morgenthau's - believed that the animus would pass and 
similarly paid for their misjudgment with their lives. In Kissinger's case some 
thirteen near relatives perished in the gas chambers.
Having the advantage of already having studied English, he appears to 
have adjusted to the new circumstances of his life in the United States very 
quickly. After graduating from high school he worked as a clerk during the 
day whilst attending the City College of New York in the evenings. His sights 
were set on accountancy until he was drafted in early 1943 and sent to a 
training camp in Louisiana. It was here that he met a charismatic young
123 See Isaacson, Kissinger, Chapter One.
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Prussian by the name of Fritz Kraemer who came to act as his patron, 
ensuring that he was taken out of the infantry and assigned as a translator to 
the American forces in Europe and later convincing him to go to H a r v a r d . i 2 4  
He immediately distinguished himself by writing an undergraduate thesis, 
with the suitably immodest title of "The Meaning of History', which at some 
three hundred and eighty-three pages was longer than anything previously 
submitted by an undergraduate and which led to the introduction of a rule 
limiting future undergraduate theses to one third of that lengthF^s
It was in H arvard in 1950 where he taugh t for a semester that 
M orgenthau first m et Kissinger, by now  a PhD candidate, and was 
immediately impressed w ith his obvious intellect and ability.i26 in  his 
obituary of Morgenthau, Kissinger stressed that they had "...remained close 
through all the intellectual upheavals and disputes of two and a half decades" 
but the correspondence between them, copies of which are held in the 
M orgenthau Papers, intim ates that their relationship was not as 
straightforward as Kissinger imp l i e s . T h e y  were regular, if not very 
frequent, correspondents for much of the 1950s and 1960s but following an 
exchange in 1968 all letters ceased until 1974, at which time Kissinger wrote to 
M orgenthau offering to meet with him to discuss their differences over 
Middle East policy.^^s May a further letter from Winston Lord suggested 
that Kissinger would be very pleased with Morgenthau's agreement to serve 
as a consultant to him and the Policy Planning Staff. 129 it is hard to see this as 
anything other than an exercise in rapprochement on Kissinger's part. And
124 ibid. pp.39-46.
125 ibid. pp.64-65.
126 M orgenthau, 'Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State', A ddress to the Lehrman Institute, 
March 17,1976. A  transcript can be found in the Morgenthau Papers, Box 175.
127 Pqj. Kissinger's undeniably m oving obituary see 'A gentle analyst of power'. The New  
Republic, A ugust 29,1980, pp.12-14.
128 Letter from H enry Kissinger, March 23,1974, Morgenthau Papers, Box 33.
129 Letter from W inston Lord, Morgenthau Papers, Box 62.
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the source of their disagreement in 1968 and subsequent silence was, of 
course, Vietnam.
Kissinger's initial letter in 1968 was written in response to an article of 
M orgenthau's in which he criticised Nelson Rockefeller's proposals for 
Vietnam as "the most elaborate attempt on the part of supporters of the war to 
cover their tracks." Given Kissinger's closeness to Rockefeller at this time it 
amounted to criticism of Kissinger too and he found "the tone and the content 
of [the] article extremely painful."i^o He further protested that both his and 
Rockefeller's "positions on major foreign policy issues will stand up fairly 
well." In his response Morgenthau regretted any hurt that may have been 
caused but he stood by his original analysis which had questioned Kissinger's 
political judgement:
"I see no reason to change my original evaluation. Both of you have supported 
the war in public and lent your considerable prestige to it. Both of you realize 
now ...that the war cannot be won and must be liquidated. But it is impossible 
to do this while maintaining one's original justifications for the war. (NP)The 
real issue in South Vietnam is who shall govern, the Communists or the 
opponents? Both of you have assumed that the Saigon government is the 
legitimate government of South Vietnam... You tell the Vietcong to stop acting 
like guerrillas, that is, to divest themselves of the main source of their political 
and military strength... The Vietcong have naturally no intention to surrender 
at the negotiating table what they have been able to defend on the battlefield... 
(NP)Thus I conclude that your proposal is as unrealistic as all the others 
which have been advanced by the supporters of the war. For they try to 
combine the faulty assumptions upon which the support for the war was 
based with attempts at liquidating it."^8i 
Kissinger replied:
Letter from Henry Kissinger, October 9,1968, Morgenthau Papers, Box 33. 
^81 Letter to Henry Kissinger, October 22,1968, Morgenthau Papers, Box 33.
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"I think you are mistaken on one point. I never supported the war in public. 
Before 1963, this was because I did not know enough about it and because I 
tended to believe the official statements. After the assassination of Diem I 
thought the situation was hopeless. In 1965 when I first visited Vietnam I 
became convinced that what we were doing was hopeless. I then decided to 
work within the government to attempt to get the war ended. Whether this 
was the right decision we will never know, but it was not ineffective. My view 
now is not very different from what you wrote in the New Republic,., though 
as a practical matter I might try to drag on the process for a while because of
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e p e r c u s s i o n s . " ^ ^ ^
He was, of course, soon to become the National Security Adviser and 
then Secretary of State of an administration that would 'drag on the process' 
for a further five years. And as the 1973 agreement predictably unravelled 
and the Vietnam saga moved towards its final and inevitable conclusion, 
Kissinger's biographer reports that he was still "...raging about the need for 
the United States to become reengaged in V i e t n a m . " ^ 3 3  n  ^ ^ s  also simply 
untrue that he had never supported the war in public. In December 1965, after 
his return from the trip in which he was supposed to have concluded that the 
situation was hopeless, he defended American policy in Vietnam during a 
satellite debate shown on CBS against Michael Foot and two students from 
Oxford. The same month he joined 190 Harvard academics in signing a 
petition in support of Johnson's handling of the war. In private he had written 
two letters to McGeorge Bundy in support of Johnson's decision to send in 
combat troops.^^^ As Isaacson has remarked "to his intellectual friends, he 
stressed his qualms about America's growing involvement in Vietnam. To
^82 Letter from Henry Kissinger, Novem ber 13,1968, Box 33.
Isaacson, Kissinger, p.602.
134 ibid. pp.117-119.
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those in the government, he claimed to be in favor of standing firm against
communist a g g re s s io n ." i3 5
Beyond their specific disagreement over Vietnam it was precisely this 
slipperiness, this duplicity, which diminished Morgenthau's admiration for 
Kissinger. Much of Kissinger's duplicity was, of course, the product of his 
immense personal ambition. In a lecture Morgenthau once described him as a 
'courtier' which seems entirely appropriate.i36 in  the space of seven years he 
managed to change his mind four times on the question of the efficacy of 
tactical nuclear weapons, largely in response to the shifting political winds.137 
He adopted Nelson Rockefeller as a patron in the mid-1950s but published a 
book. Necessity for Choice, a few weeks after the 1960 election which has been 
described as "a manifesto for the Democrats." His strenuous efforts to attract 
Kennedy's eye through McGeorge Bundy and Schlesinger came, however, to 
nothing more than a part-time consultancy.138 He was back with Rockefeller 
for his patrons unsuccessful bids for the Republican presidential nomination 
in 1964 and 1968 and on the latter occasion was rumoured to have been 
leaking information gleaned from the Paris Peace talks to the Nixon campaign 
team. He was duly rew arded w ith a job in the incom ing Nixon 
administration, much to the disgust of Rockefeller's staffers.i39
Morgenthau was only too aware of what Kissinger was capable of and 
he indicated so publicly on a number of occasions.i^o He noted Kissinger's 
general propensity "to bend his scholarship to the exigencies of his political
135 ibid. p .l l7 .
136 See the N ew  School for Social Research Lecture Series, April 18,1972. A  transcript can be 
found in the Morgenthau Papers, Box 175.
137 Isaacson, Kissinger, pp.85-114.
138 ibid. pp .106-113.
139 ibid. p p ,116 ,125-138. Rockefeller him self appears to have been remarkably m agnanim ous 
towards Kissinger.
140 See 'Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State'; 'The Elite Protects Itself, The New Republic, 
M ay 3, 1975, p p .17-19; Review  of Stephen R. G raubarfs, 'Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind', 
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interests."i4i He contrasted Kissinger's private distaste for the Johnson 
Administration's policies in Vietnam with his public supportd^z He was, 
however, m uch gentler w ith Kissinger than with the other cutters and 
trimmers of the intellectual world:
"Inevitably, if your ambition is not limited to scholarship but extends to the 
political sphere, you have to trim  your sails to the prevailing winds. It is a 
tribute to both Kissinger's sagacity and decency that, as far as Vietnam is 
concerned, he compromised his scholarship much less than did some of his 
eminent colleagues."i43
No-one else was ever extended this kind of latitude by Morgenthau and it is a 
measure of the complexity of his feelings towards Kissinger.
In his obituary of Morgenthau, Kissinger stressed that on the question 
of Vietnam "we both believed America was overextended; we both sought a 
way out of the dilemma. Hans wanted to cut the Gordian knot in one 
dramatic move; I chose a different route. "144 it simply wasn't the case, though, 
that their differences over Vietnam could be reduced to tactics. They were also 
the product of subtly different political views which can be illuminated by 
their readings of the diplomacy of the nineteenth century, in particular the 
part played by Metternich. For Morgenthau, Metternich amounted to nothing 
more than a failure because of his stubborn resistance to change which, 
ultimately, was irresistible. A statesman should seek to mould the forces of 
change rather than m ount futile rearguard actions. Kissinger's take on 
Metternich was rather more ambivalent. He praised Metternich for guiding 
his country through "39 years of crisis by a tour de force perhaps never 
excelled." 145 Metternich was the last of the generation "to whom the "great
141 Review of 'Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind'. A lso see 'Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State',
p.2.
142 Morgenthau, 'Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State', p.2.
148 M orgenthau, Review of 'Kissinger: Portrait of a M ind’.
144 Kissinger, 'A Gentle A nalyst of Power', p .l3 .
145 Kissinger, 'Reflections on Am erican Diplom acy', Foreign Affairs, Vol.35, N o .l ,  October 
1956, pp.37-56
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clockwork" or the "golden age" was more than an idle d re a m ." i4 6  Though he 
accepted that Metternich's increasingly rigid opposition to any change was 
ultimately futile, he admired his diplomacy anyway and found "an element of 
grandeur" in Metternich's o b tu s e n e s s T ^ z  His conclusion was that it was the 
conservative's task to forestall revolutions rather than defeat t h e m .  148
The problem was that upon reaching office Kissinger, in effect, turned 
himself into the Metternich of the late twentieth century. In what has rightly 
been called his "obsession with stability" Kissinger may even have exceeded 
the short-sightedness of his immediate predecessors.149At any sign of the 
appearance of communist or even more modest socialist governments around 
the world Kissinger committed the United States to defend or restore the 
status quo. In Greece, as Morgenthau put it, the United States supported "an 
incom petent and depraved ...coterie of Colonels against parliam entary 
democracy because the former would bring stability to American-Greek 
relations..." The result was the collapse of the modus vivendi in Cyprus and the 
rise to pow er in Greece of an anti-American government.i^o And as 
Morgenthau pointed out, it made absolutely no sense whatever for the United 
States to be pursuing a pragmatic policy of adjustment to the ideological 
differences with China and the Soviet Union whilst simultaneously adopting 
a renewed combativeness in the p e r i p h e r i e s . i ^ i  What this demonstrated was 
that, ultimately, Kissinger was unable to shed a reflexive and unwise 
conservatism that Morgenthau was able to look beyond.
146 K issinger, 'The C onservative D ilem m a: R eflections on the P olitical T hought of 
Metternich', American Political Science Review, Vol.48, No.4, December 1954, p .1021.
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131 ibid. p .l5 . A lso see his letter to Time Magazine of April 21,1975 in w hich he asserted that 
Am erican foreign policy was in a shambles because of the unsophisticated com m itm ent to 
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It m ust have been particularly disappointing for M orgenthau to 
witness Kissinger's failure because in other respects they did indeed share 
much in the way of a common outlook. As an incomer to American society 
Kissinger, like Morgenthau, was well placed to understand the peculiarities of 
the American approach to foreign affairs - the tendency to think of 
international politics in terms of the domestic political experience; the 
weakness of "American empiricism and its quest for methodological 
certainty"; the general reluctance to think in terms of power and the lack of 
tragic experience which meant that the warnings of his fellow European exiles 
were perceived, as he cleverly put it, as the "Cassandra cries of abstracted egg­
h e a d s . "132 All this could also have been taken alm ost directly from 
Morgenthau. Kissinger, similarly, accepted the Weberian antinomies of 
bureaucracy and creativity and their equivalents of instrumental and value- 
rationality.133
His approach to foreign policy has been nicely encapsulated by Stanley 
Hoffmann as a "curious mix of neoclassicism and n e o r o m a n t i c i s m . " i 3 4  The 
'neoclassical' consists in Kissinger's turn to the nineteenth century to provide 
models of diplomatic practice. The 'neoromantic' lay in his attempts to use 
Bismarckian methods in the vastly different circumstances of late-twentieth 
century America. It also involved an audacious effort by Kissinger to 
overcome one of the fundamental features of modernity - bureaucracy - 
through the Weberian antidote of charisma - his own! Encouraged by his 
President, Kissinger sought to neutralise the bureaucracy, in particular the 
State Department, through the creation of committees with himself at their 
head which either co-opted or simply ignored the existing b u r e a u c r a c y . ^ 3 5  
And like no-one before him in the history of m odern American diplomacy.
^32 Kissinger, 'Reflections on American Diplomacy', pp.38-41.
^33 Kissinger, A  World Restored (Universal Library, N ew  York, 1964) pp.326-329. 
^34 Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order, p.37.
1 3 5  ibid. p . 5 1 .
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Kissinger took responsibility for conducting high-level negotiations himself, 
from strategic arms talks, to crisis in the Middle East, to 'back channel' 
explorations over Vietnam.
The M orgenthau of 1950 m ight have welcom ed all of these 
developm ents unequivocally. Kissinger's circumvention of the regular 
bureaucracy had seemingly opened up the possibility for the revivified 
diplomacy which had been urged by M orgenthau. He seemed to share 
Morgenthau's political realism and the desire to bring a new, prudential ethos 
to the pursuit of the national interest. The Morgenthau of 1970 though, had 
already learned from the Johnson Administration that concentrated executive 
power could be a dangerous thing, even within the broader context of a stable 
democracy. He now understood, too, that bureaucracy could simply not be 
sidestepped in a state with the complex and multifarious global commitments 
of the United States. Kissinger's unwillingness to delegate had "distorted the 
distribution of functions between the Secretary of State and the Department of
State."i56
And though a new prudence would, indeed, have been welcome, 
Kissinger appeared to lose sight of it upon entering government. The Nixon 
Doctrine was supposed to bring about a reduction of America's commitments 
in the world, but under Kissinger's administration of it there was actually 
little discernible evidence that America's vital interests were being separated 
from the peripheral. From Angola to Vietnam and Chile and all parts 
between, every crisis seemed to Kissinger to have some vital bearing on the 
central East-West balance and had, therefore, to be treated accordingly. For a 
hard-headed man who dealt in terms of interests the irony was that he 
seemed to link almost every act of intervention around the globe to the 
defence of something as incalculable, as intangible as 'prestige'. Morgenthau 
took the notion seriously too, but his was the more balanced perspective on
156 M orgenthau, 'Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State', p. 10.
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how important it actually was. "How much", Morgenthau asked rhetorically, 
"did American prestige suffer in the long run from the debacle of the Bay of 
Pigs ... " Had it not been the case that "when France demonstrated the wisdom 
and courage to liquidate two losing enterprises on which it had staked its 
"honor", its prestige rose to heights it had not attained since the beginning of 
the Second W orld War ..."157 any event, w hat could have been more 
damaging to American prestige than the television images showing the 
damaging split within American society itself, or of the brutal means being 
employed in Vietnam? In the end, the Nixon Administration fought on in 
Vietnam until reaching a transparently temporary 'settlement' in 1973 that 
could probably have been attained four years and many lives e a r l i e r . i 5 8
Kissinger and Morgenthau had re-established their communication in 
1974 but M orgenthau continued to offer the same odd mix of praise and 
condemnation of Kissinger in public. In mid-1975 he observed that Kissinger 
had "walked on into the trap of Vietnam - and on and on and on. And now it 
is too late for his reputation. He l<nows that he will be remembered less as the 
builder of détente than as the destroyer of C a m b o d i a . " i 5 9  Some fifteen months 
later the following letter to the editor appeared in the New York Times:
"James Reston has praised Secretary of State Kissinger in his recent columns 
and has quoted foreign statesmen assembled at the United Nations in the 
same vein. He has also expressed his conviction that the tenure of office of Mr 
Kissinger will soon come to an end. (NP) Mr Kissinger is one of the most 
gifted statesm en on the international scene today and one of the few 
outstanding Secretaries of State who have served the United States. Is it not an 
enorm ous w aste of extremely scarce hum an resources to retire so
^37 M orgenthau, 'Vietnam: Shadow  and Substance', New York Review of Books, A ugust 30, 
1965, p.6.
158 poj. v/hich, of course, K issinger w as absurdly aw arded the N ob el Peace Prize. He, 
predictably, continues to deny that the N ixon Administration needlessly prolonged the war. 
See Diplomacy, p.695.
159 "pLe Elite Protects Itself, p .l9 .
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extraordinary a talent to private life, simply because there happens to be a 
Presidential election? If both candidates are really dedicated to the common 
good, of which an intelligent bipartisan foreign policy forms an intrinsic part, 
might it not be incumbent upon them to declare that, regardless of what will 
happen on Nov. 2, Mr. Kissinger will continue to take care of the foreign 
relations of the United States?"!^^
The relationship between Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger was, truly, 
an extraordinary one.
The 1970s; A Troubled Decade
Morgenthau and Kissinger were back on close terms by the late 1970s 
and met for breakfast a few weeks before Morgenthau's death. There was, 
however, no hiding M orgenthau's disappointm ent that the disaster in 
Vietnam had not been avoided. It m ust have been especially dismaying to 
have seen the Nixon Administration repeat so many of the errors of its 
predecessor in Vietnam: the gross overestimation of what could be achieved 
through the bombing campaign; the same overbearing hubris which led to the 
belief that the conflict could be successfully 'managed'; the same inability to 
appreciate the determination of the Vietnamese to unify their country and free 
it from colonial domination - what Kissinger expressed in his own inimitable 
way as Washington's failure "to understand how its adversary calculated the 
costs and b e n e f i t s . " ^ 8 i  n  was, of course, Kissinger's failure too. "I can't believe 
that a fourth-rate power like North Vietnam doesn't have a breaking point" 
was how he phrased the case for escalating the war in 1 9 6 9 .^ ^ 2  He was still 
repeating the claim nearly twenty years later:
160 Morgenthau, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, Oct. 2,1976. 
6^1 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p.661.
^32 Isaacson, 'Kissinger', p.246.
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"It simply could not have been true that North Vietnam was the only country 
in history to prove impervious to every conceivable calculation of risk and
benefit. "^ 33
Perhaps not, but probably nothing short of the levelling of North Vietnam 
would have done and no country claiming to exercise power responsibly 
could have acted in such ^ way. In broader terms the irony was that the 
American failure - political and moral - had confirmed Morgenthau's original 
post-war thesis that the United States was not fundamentally different from 
other states in the exercise of power, or at least no more immune than any 
other from the perils of the political. It was his later hopes for an 'exceptional' 
America that had been shattered by Vietnam.
His outlook was also affected, negatively, by the general climate of the 
United States in the 1970s, just as the prosperity and stability of the 1950s 
had fed into his relatively more optimistic world-view of that time. Race riots, 
the damage done to the urban environment under the impact of narcotics, the 
stagflation caused by the oil shocks, acts of 'terrorism' which seemed to 
heighten the sense of American impotence and so on. For the first time since 
the Industrial Revolution had so profoundly altered the fundam ental 
relationship of man to nature, questions were beginning to be raised about the 
'limits to growth' and Morgenthau was beginning to express fears for the 
health of the planet's long-term natural e n v i r o n m e n t . ^^4 Added to this was the 
crisis in government in which the United States had "experienced two 
presidencies in succession whose arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional rule 
tended to reduce democratic choice to exercises in futility." Lyndon Johnson, 
"the Julius Caesar of the American Republic", had been followed by Richard 
Nixon who "bids fair to become its C a lig u la ." ( ! ) i3 5  All of these developments
^33 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p.661.
164 See 'The Contraction of America', unpublished article for the New York Times, September 
1973, pp. 13, Morgenthau Papers, Box 17.
165 M orgenthau, 'The Decline of Democratic Government', New Republic, V ol.l7 , N o .l9 , p .l3 .
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gave rise to a mood in Morgenthau as dark as it had been since the emerging 
tensions of the Cold War and the beginnings of the nuclear arms race in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1975 he wrote that "the moral and material 
decline of the West is an observable fact. What is not observable is the kind of 
order that could take the place of the fading one created and maintained by 
the power of the West. Instead of the authors of a new order created and 
supported by a new center of power, what appears on the horizon of the 
civilised world is the specter of anarchy, with legal arrangements, institutions, 
and procedures being utterly out of tune with the objective technological 
conditions of the age."i^3 Others were referring to 'The End of Liberalism' or 
'The New Feudalism'.167
In his working life, too, he was far from settled. As we have already 
seen, he had moved from Chicago to New York in 1968, possibly because of 
pressures at Chicago related to his activities as an opponent of the Vietnam 
War. His general frustration at the timidity and cupidity of the political 
science profession led to an unsuccessful campaign in 1971 to become 
President of the American Political Science Association as the nominated 
candidate of the Caucus for a New Political S c i e n c e . i ^ ®  His official statement 
in support of his candidacy repeated what he had been saying for many years: 
"American political science is in urgent need of ceasing to be identified with 
the status quo and the powers-to-be. It must assume the mission, which is the 
mission of any science worthy of the name, to speak truth to power rather 
than justify and rationalize power in pseudo-scientific terms. Presidential 
leadership can contribute to that end."i69
His opponent, sponsored by 'The Committee for a Responsible Political 
Science', was ironically none other than the same Heinz G. Eulau who had
166 M orgenthau, 'The Decline of the West', Partisan Review, V ol.42 ,1975, pp.515-516.
167 See Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (WW N orton and Co, N ew  York, 1969).
168 H is candidature w as publicly supported by scholars of the calibre of Hannah Arendt, 
Samuel Beer, Louis Hartz, Stanley Hoffmann and Aristide Zolberg.
169 See the copy of the statement retained in Box 4 of the Morgenthau Papers.
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questioned the level of Morgenthau's professional commitment a few years 
earlier. Unsurprisingly, the statement in support of Eulau's candidature 
misses no opportunity to inform us of the ever diligent Professor Eulau's 
contribution to the 'profession': "as a member of the Association's Council and 
Executive Committee he never missed a meeting." (!!) His complete failure to 
engage with any of the substantive political problems of the United States 
during the preceding decade was, apparently, of no c o n s e q u e n c e .  170
Given the disappointments of the preceding decade one could have 
forgiven Morgenthau for choosing to slide quietly into semi-retirement and it 
is admirable that he continued to remain so active in the political sphere. One 
of the most surprising elements of this was his sudden interest in Jewish 
affairs. He was heavily involved in the efforts to secure the emigration from 
the Soviet Union of the orientalist Mikhail Zaird and Natan Scharansky and 
he came to be an unequivocal champion of Israel. He also became the 
chairman for the Academic Committee on Soviet Jewry, in which capacity he 
wrote the following, remarkable letter to President Carter:
"When the Soviet authorities are in such blatant violation of their own freely 
accepted commitments in the field of hum an rights, they cast a shadow on 
their faithfulness to other obligations. Accordingly we would caution against 
other agreements unless and until the Soviet Union puts into practice what it 
has accepted in principle - that in the nuclear age major powers have major 
responsibilities to promote universal values. For we strongly believe that a 
commitment to such shared values is a necessary precondition to meaningful 
international a c c o r d s . " i 7 i
This, in effect, stood everything he had said in the immediate post-war 
period on its head. His point then had been that it was precisely because of the 
nuclear age that major powers were obliged to set aside their differences of
470 Intellectually, of course, Eulau has already been forgotten w hile w e  continue to read 
M orgenthau because of his involvem ent w ith the fundamental issues of his day.
471 Letter to President Carter, June 3,1977, Morgenthau Papers, Box 2.
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value in dealings with each other. Under such circumstances the promotion 
of universal values was likely to be dangerous rather than positively 
desirable. Even at the height of his infatuation with American exceptionalism 
he never suggested that other powers should be expected to subscribe to 
American values. Elsewhere he registered strong doubts about the very 
existence of human rights: ,
"To w hat extent is it both morally just and intellectually tenable to apply 
principles we hold dear to other nations th a t ... are impervious to them? ... I 
w ant to make the point that ... hum an rights are filtered through the 
intermediary of historic and social circumstance which will lead to different 
results in different times and under different social circumstances ... the 
principle of the defense of human rights cannot be consistently applied in 
foreign policy because it can and it must come in conflict with other interests 
that may be more important than the defense of human rights in a particular
instance."472
H ad this abrupt change been the product of a fundam ental re- 
evaluation of the Soviet Union? Morgenthau himself appeared to indicate so 
in testimony to Congress. "After many dealings with high-placed Russians, 
political and academic", he had "come to the conclusion which Acheson urged 
upon me 25 years ago: that the totalitarian regime is an extremely brutal and 
destructive regime, extinguishing all freedom of thought and conscience." It 
had "created a kind of moral and intellectual deformation in the minds of all 
its servants, which is an enormous impediment to normal relations - in a 
sense, makes normal relations quite i m p o s s i b l e . " 4 7 3  The puzzling question is 
w hy now, so late in life, should M orgenthau have come to think so 
differently? He cannot, after all, have been previously unaware of the 
brutalities of the Soviet regime which were common knowledge in the West
4 7 2  M orgenthau, 'Human Rights and Foreign Policy', CRIA, N ew  York, 1 9 7 9 ,  pp.4,7.
473 M orgenthau quoted in Nobel, 'Morgenthau’s struggle w ith  power', p.80.
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as early as the 1930s. Moreover, in its 1970s incarnation it was significantly 
less brutal than it had been during Stalin's rule, for example. Nor was there 
any specific development in American-Soviet relations to suggest that the 
"intellectual deformation in the minds of all its servants" made "normal 
relations quite impossible." If anything, detente had suggested quite the 
opposite.
This is entirely speculative but I would like to suggest two possible 
contributory factors. The first is simply that Morgenthau's own ill-treatment 
at the hands of the government during the latter half of the 1960s increased 
his sensitivity towards the much greater suffering of others at the behest of 
the state elsewhere, even if upon more sober reflection, as indicated above, he 
continued to find the notion of universal hum an rights deeply problematic. 
The second is that, having had his hopes for American exceptionalism 
shattered by Vietnam he found, for the first time, some solace in his 
Jewishness. A relative has reported that he began to explore Hasidic thought 
and lore and that "he cherished his conversations with one of New York's 
prominent Hasidic r a b b i s . " 4 7 4  it is a phenomenon well known to sociologists 
that, in the West at least, there is a strong correlation between advanced years 
and religious belief and observance. There is, however, nothing to suggest 
that Morgenthau finally came to faith at the end of his life. He was never one 
of those self-absorbed human beings who fill their lives with uncontemplated 
activity before belatedly turning their thoughts to the question of the 
hereafter, or indeed, the absence of it. An awareness of his mortality cannot 
have come as a shock to him. It is more likely that he came to a discovery that 
Hannah Arendt had made some fifty years earlier: that beneath the outer 
layers of identity, of German and American, he was, in the end, inescapably a 
Jew.
474 George Eckstein, 'Hans Morgenthau: A  Personal Memoir', Social Research, Vol. X, Winter, 
1981, p.651.
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Much of this is necessarily speculative because he has left us almost 
nothing concerned with his 'inner life'. If any more intimate correspondence 
ever existed it has not been left in the Morgenthau Papers and despite the 
urgings of Arthur Schlesinger, among others, to write his memoirs he died in 
1980 without having left a record of his life.475 Henry Kissinger has written of 
his final meeting with Morgenthau:
"I saw Hans for the last time at breakfast a few weeks ago. He had grown 
quite frail, though mentally he was as alert as ever. His professorship at the 
New School had just ended. He spoke of how much teaching meant to him. 
Everyone must feel he makes a difference to the world, he said. And his 
vocation was teaching, which he hoped to continue. I told him he had already 
made a big difference to the world; he did not have to prove himself 
constantly. He did not quite believe it. His life was his work. As he said on 
another occasion, he saw no sense in extending the one by cutting down on 
the other."476
It was entirely appropriate that his final intellectual project, left 
unfinished upon his death, was a book on Abraham L i n c o l n . 4 7 7  Eor it was 
Abraham Lincoln, more than anyone else in the history of American political 
life, who understood the tragedy of politics.
475 See Schlesinger’s letter of July 14,1978 in the Morgenthau Papers, Box 53.
476 Kissinger, 'A gentle analyst of power', pp. 13-14.
477 Kenneth Thom pson w as entrusted by M orgenthau w ith the task of 'completion', but even  
his intervention cannot d isguise the fact that the text left b y  M orgenthau w as not close to 
being ready for publication. See M orgenthau, 'The M ind of Abraham Lincoln: A  Study in  
Detachment and Practicality', in Kenneth Thom pson (ed.). Essays on Lincoln's Faith and Politics, 
(N ew  York, 1983) pp. 3-101.
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Appendix; A Note on the Sociology of the Intellectual
What, then, is an intellectual? As Raymond Aron noted, a wide range 
of interpretations is possible; at the broadest involving virtually all educated 
non-manual workers and narrowly defined involving only the most rarefied 
of activities; poetry, painting, sculpture and philosophy draw n from what 
Aron calls 'the inner circle'd What I would like to suggest here is that in my 
interpretation the individual is defined somewhat less by function and 
position and more by disposition. Intellectuals are those who concern 
themselves with questions beyond the everyday routines of reproduction and 
accumulation. They are interested in exploring the most fundam ental 
questions of human existence and evolution. Who, or what, are we? What is 
the essence of truth, or of justice, or of progress?^
This disposition cannot, of course, be wholly removed from questions 
of function and other material problems. Intellectual contemplation requires 
the existence of at least a rudimentary surplus for the satisfaction of material 
needs (even as rudimentary as that of a British University lecturer!). And 
given the pressing professional and career im peratives of advanced 
economies marked by a highly specialised division of labour it is more likely 
that intellectuals will be found in universities than elsewhere, though it is still 
possible to find a relatively small number of writers, poets, artists and others 
who are able to earn an independent living. This is not to suggest that 
intellectuals cannot be found in other walks of life. It is even possible to 
conceive, for example, of an intellectual accountant though the extreme
4 Raym ond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectiials, trans. Terence Kibnarton, (W. W. Norton,
N ew  York, 1955) p.206.
2 As Edward Shils puts it, intellectuals are "...persons w ith  an unusual sensibility ... an 
uncom m on reflectiveness about the nature of their universe and the roles w hich govern their 
society". They are driven by an "...interior need to penetrate beyond the screen of immediate 
concrete experience...". Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays 
(University of Chicago Press, 1972) p .l.
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duality explicit in this kind of existence necessarily renders the combination 
an unlikely one. Beyond this orientation however, the question of what, if 
anything, the intellectual is to be concerned with beyond contemplation is an 
extremely problematic one.
The noun 'intellectual' appears to be of relatively recent provenance. It 
was first used during the Dreyfus Affair in France as a derogatory term by the 
Right in their attacks on the various poets, writers, and other 'men of letters' 
who had dared to challenge the prerogatives of Church, State, and Armed 
Forces.3 The pre-eminent Dreyfusard was, of course Erhile Zola and he often 
became a focus for the resentment of the Right:
"The interference of this novelist in a matter of military justice seems to me no 
less im portant than, let us say, the intervention of a police captain in a 
problem of syntax or versification... As for this petition that is being circulated 
among the Intellectuals! The mere fact that one has recently created this word 
Intellectuals to designate, as though they were an aristocracy, individuals 
who live in laboratories and libraries, proclaims one of the most ridiculous 
eccentricities of our time."4
The collective noun 'intelligentsia' is something like fifty years older having 
first been used in Eastern Europe and, especially, Russia. As with 'intellectual' 
the word conveyed a group that was often critical of established authority but 
was also understood to occupy a position separate from that of the normal 
class structure.3
Together, the nouns convey to two elements m ost commonly 
associated with intellectuals in their modem incarnation: as dissidents, critics 
seeking to 'speak truth to power' and as 'free floating' agents who are in some
8 On this etym ology see Jerzy Szacki, 'Intellectuals between Politics and Culture', in Ian 
Maclean, Alan Montefiore and Peter W inch (eds.). The Political Responsibiliy of Intellectiials 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.231; Robert J. Brym, Intellectuals and Politics (Allen and  
U nw in, London, 1980) pp.11-12; Aron, The Opium of the Intellectulals, p p .208-209.
4 Ferdinand Brunetiere quoted in Russell Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals: American Cidture in the 
Age of Academe (The N oonday Press, N ew  York, 1987) p.l07.
5 Aron, Opium of the Intellectuals, p.208; Brym, Intellectuals and Politics, p .11.
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fundam ental sense independent of existing class and power structures. 
Modernity also creates a fundamental paradox for intellectuals. In one sense 
the enorm ous expansion in wealth has created the surplus to enable 
intellectuals to attain a position somewhat removed from the constraints of 
power structures.^ This vast new pool of wealth has, however, necessarily 
been a function of an intensely specialised division of labour which has 
threatened to bury the relatively independent vantage point of the intellectual 
amidst the clamour of interest group politics and the instrumentally rational 
advice of the 'expert'.
If, then, modernity has given rise to a massive increase in the number 
of intellectuals and the scope of intellectual life this is not to suggest that it is 
only during m odern times that the problem of the broader place and 
disposition of those we now call intellectuals has existed. When Socrates 
chose hemlock rather than recanting what he believed to be true he, in a 
certain sense, made the ultimate commitment to truth over power. Nor has it 
always been the case that intellectuals have railed against the powers that be. 
For m uch of Chinese history intellectuals, to the contrary, played an 
important part in reinforcing a respect for authority and hierarchy. Many 
German intellectuals were champions of the Prussian State and a Greater 
Germany. Others have sought to keep 'the life of the mind' separate from 
power and politics even when they have proven to be unavoidable. One 
thinks here of Archimedes, or of Marc Bloch writing his treatise on historical 
method whilst hiding in a cellar in France from the Gestapo. The Philosophes 
sought, ambitiously, to enlighten the despots of their time. A relatively small 
number of intellectuals have assumed political responsibilities of the highest 
order: Disraeli, Gladstone, Woodrow Wilson, Masaryk, Havel, Nehru, Lenin, 
Kissinger et.al. A greater number have sought to challenge the status quo.
6 On a m uch smaller scale it w as the surplus generated by the slave-holding fam ily which  
freed up the space for intellectual life in Ancient Greece.
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setting truth against power. Others, Plato and Machiavelli among them, have 
had their ambitions thwarted.
There is then, clearly nothing new about these dilemmas and the 
problem of the balance between the life of the polis and the life of the mind 
preoccupied both Aristotle and Plato though, arguably, both ultim ately 
placed the activity of contemplation above that of politics.^This position 
received what has probably been its most famous defense in the twentieth 
century with the publication of Julian Benda's La Trahison des Clercs (The 
Betrayal of the Intellectuals). Benda, writing .in the aftermath of World War 
One, wrote a bitter polemic against his fellow intellectuals who, in his eyes, 
had debased the intellectual calling in the unseemly scramble to offer their 
services to political and nationalistic ends. As a number of commentators 
have pointed out, Benda's thesis assumed that there was indeed 'a realm of 
universal values' - a universal commitment to the pursuit of truth - that had 
been betrayed.® Benda was clearly running against the intellectual currents of 
the early twentieth century, most of which sought to undermine universality 
in all its guises. The collapse of the Second International had emphatically 
revealed as a sham the universal claims for the existence of a cosmopolitan 
brotherhood of working men. The eagerness of so many intellectuals to 
buttress their respective national chauvinisms threatened the intellectuals 
commitment to truth.
Max Weber sought a m iddle path  between the debasem ent of 
intellectual life though its complete politicisation and an 'escapist' retreat to 
the ivory tower. Morgenthau, too, sought to combine the activism of political 
engagement with a commitment to keeping such activities separate from the 
classroom and, above all, maintaining a critical distance from authority. This
7 On this point see John G. Gunnell, Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (Winthrop 
Publishers, Cambridge, Mass, 1979) pp.139-140.
8 On this point and for further discussion of Benda see Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, 
pp.300-301; Szacki, 'Intellectuals betw een Politcs and Culture', pp .230-236; Edward Said, 
Representations of the Intellectual (Vintage Books, N ew  York, 1994) p.25.
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is not to suggest that this duality was an unproblematic one and Morgenthau 
struggled for most of his life, as indeed did Weber, with the antinomies that 
arose from the multifarious commitments of intellectuals of their hue.
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